combatreform.org/fighterinabox.htm

1. Fighter-IN-A-BOX (FINAB)
Operational Concept
Maneuver Air Support Working Group (MASWG)
May 2007

2. Real World Battlefield:
Sri Lanka Tamils: want to break away into own
nation-state
Sinhalese Central Government wants them to stay for some god-awful reason

3. Mike’s Solution: Grant Tamil Independence,
build wall: good fences make good neighbors
Checkpoints keep Bombs out;
security fence on coastline, how
many Lankans surf?
Sinhalese
Sinhalese Central Government has enough economic power to do w/o Tamils

4. Sri Lanka wall math Checkpoints
245 miles of concrete 15’ Wall
high panels @ $600K/mile = $147 M
Fencing
345 miles of 10’ chain-link fence
@ $55K/mile = $ 18.975 M
______________________________
TOTAL $165. 975 M
45
15
Sinhalese
30x2 70
165
90
20
30
45 50
www.cecer.army.mil/.../MAR_STUD_FLM-06.htm

5. Wall/Fence Costs
We think Sri Lanka can certainly afford or have "someone afford for them" $165M to security wall and fence themselves off from
the Tamils. www.cecer.army.mil/.../MAR_STUD_FLM-06.htm
245 miles of concrete 15’ high panels @ $600K/mile = $147 M
345 miles of 10’ chain-link fence @ $55K/mile = $ 18.975 M
_________________________________________________
SUB-TOTAL $165. 975 M
Manning
We count just 7 places where road/rail checkpoints are required for the inner security wall. So 7 x infantry companies of 100 men
to man the checkpoints to keep car/human/railroad bombs out is 700. An Airborne parachute BATTALION of 1, 000 men and
M113 Gavins as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) at an SLAF base since they have C-130s. To secure/monitor each mile of wall
from a guard tower, 2-man buddy teams in an 8 hour shift 3 times with 1 squad leader = 7 men per mile or 1, 715 men. A roving
patrol Morice-line style would surveil the 345 mile outer security fence with tracker training and would drag a length of fence
behind their Gavins to smooth the ground adjacent to it to ascertain intrusions. An 8 hour shift at 5 mph can cover about 50 miles,
so 7 simultaneous shifts need to be maintained of 4 men (2 trackers, a sniffer dog, TC/gunner, driver) or 28 men every 8 hours, 3
times = 84 men.
Checkpoints 700 men
QRF 1700 men
Guard towers 1715 men
Roving Patrol 84 men
________________________________________
4, 199 men = one Brigade 24/7/365
4, 199 men's salaries @ $10K/year = $41, 990, 000 ($41.99 M)
TOTAL WALL COST TO SET-UP & RUN FOR 1 YEAR
Walls/Fencing $165. 975 M
Salaries 41.990 M
______________________
TOTAL $ 207.965 M Or less than the price on ONE airliner destroyed in a Tamil Tiger Sapper attack!

6. If, however….YOU DO NOT CREATE A LINEAR BATTLEFIELD BY WALLs, FENCES, DMZs, you
end up with a NON-LINEAR BATTLEFIELD (NLB) where the enemy is ALL-AROUND and you must have
360 degree security! For a small 300 x 150 mile long island surrounded by water like Sri Lanka there’s no
reason not to build a separation wall and put an end to the sub-national conflict (AKA CIVIL WAR).
However, if you have a much larger area like an Iraq or an Afghanistan or a continental land mass that
you are fighting on, you will at least initially be unable to push all enemies to your front and will be in a
NLB situation. Over time you should be able to ascertain where the combatants are coming from and
then wall them out, be it Shias from Sunnis or to keep Taliban/Al Queda out of Afghanistan, but it will
take TIME to build such boundaries. During this period effective militaries MUST HAVE NON-LINEAR
BATTLEFIELD capabilities to remain intact and not be pushed out like the French were from Spain and
Portugal by guerrillas and an outside military force like the Duke of Wellington’s “British Expeditionary
Forces”. SIZE DOES STILL MATTER IN THE BATTLE AGAINST PLANET EARTH (TBATE).
Sri Lanka Afghanistan
300 miles
s
ile
m
0
80
45
0
m
ile
s
150 miles

7. NLB free-for-all: we know where
the Government AirBase is…so
does the rebels,--painfully so!
But, where’s the rebel
Airstrip?
Google maps doesn’t show an airstrip West of Iranamadu
Tank but one due East...

8. Tamil Tiger rebels interdict Government road-bound truck supply lines keeping
Palay AB alive; sound familiar? So base is resupplied by SLAF Aircraft
“No supplies for you!!!”

9. Palay AB is visible from space 10 miles up!!!
(52, 800 feet)
Preventable!
MANPADS
SAMs have
a 2 mile range
yet perimeter
defense allows
gunners to get
2 mile range
too close =
shoot-downs

10. Aircraft landing and taking off from Palay AB
can use a straight-in approach over the ocean
to land safely if the SLA extends perimeter out
to 2-mile stand-off, however SLN will need to
keep rebel boats with MANPADS gunmen out of
the same exclusion zone
Palay AB is so obvious the
rebels have their own O/A
planes and have begun to bomb
the base!!
2 mile stand-off

11. Why doesn’t the Palay Air Base get resupply by SLN ships when Army holds the
stretch of land to the sea for MANPADS defense?
“We don’t have much of a
Navy to stop you, damn,
you!!! Fight Fair”

12. Tamil Tiger Airstrip @ 5, 280 feet altitude on Sri Lanka
To be high enough to avoid heavy
autocannon (5K) the unaided eye cannot
detect small enemy targets like
cars/tanks if under covering vegetation, if
you have a 3, 000’ L x 200’ runway you
can be easily targeted from the air and on
the ground…reports are Indian Air Force
Antonov transports land here to resupply
the rebels...
’
000
4,
20
0’

13. Tamil Tiger Airstrip: Firepower Magnet for SLAF
fighter-bombers?
http://lakdiva.org/suntimes/050123/columns/sitrep.html
“However, the Air Force is not without sceptics who seem to believe the
two aircraft were nothing but dummies. If their assertions are even
remotely correct, the question arises as to whether the new 1,250 metre
runway the LTTE built in Iranamadu is also a dummy. Having built a
runway, why is the LTTE only placing dummies?”
The SLAF are using fighter-bombers that fly too fast to discriminate targets
and are killing Tamil civilians like the Israeli Kfir above. By creating a super
obvious runway and a mythical air force perhaps they hope to invite the SLAF
to bomb mere dirt and not their people? If so, good for them. Armies should
not be bombing civilians.

14. To defend a 4-engine STOL transport 3, 000’ L x 200’ W
runway you need a perimeter on the ground large
enough so that aircraft can spiral down out of range of
heavy machine guns (1.25 miles)
and MANPAD SAMs (2.5 miles)
“My mojo can’t
reach you infidel!”

15. To defend a runway out of range of heavy
machine guns (1.25 miles) requires a 9
mile perimeter and out of MANPAD SAMs
(2.5 miles) a 18 mile perimeter to keep Mr.
Taliban/G-Man out 18 miles
whoever you are fighting etc. etc.
9 miles

16. To defend a 9 mile perimeter and keep out
enemy HMGs requires 1, 900 men 50 feet apart
in 950 x 2-man fighting positions and for
MANPAD SAMs (2.5 miles) a 18 mile perimeter
requires 3, 800 men 50 feet apart in 1900 x 2- 18 miles
man fighting positions
9 miles

17. Baghdad International AirPort @ 10, 000 feet altitude
Road connecting BIAP to
Governmental Green Zone
notoriously unsecured
13, 000 foot runway

18. NLB FOB-itis: Defending Static Positions
Robs You of Offensive Combat Power!
Bigger the Runway = Bigger the FOB = More Men to defend it! = More Supplies to feed
men
3, 000 foot runway
HMGs: 1, 900 men 50 feet apart in 950 x 2-man fighting positions
MANPADS SAMs: 3, 800 men 50 feet apart in 1900 x 2-man fighting positions
10, 000 foot runway
HMGs: 6, 000 men 50 feet apart in 950 x 2-man fighting positions
MANPADS SAMs: 12, 000 men 50 feet apart in 1900 x 2-man fighting positions
This is worse-case if Army troops have just arrived at a newly constructed or seized runway/airfield, but its actually
the most reliable means to keep shooters out who only need to be lucky once to down an aircraft. What USAF
Security Forces do is economize on the number of men by using combat engineering---fencing patrolled by smaller
numbers of men in unarmored wheeled trucks/ATVs than the worse case direct occupation of the ground presented
above. Personally, I find this minimalist, cheapskate mobile truck patrol/fencing to be lacking (it lets them get too
close) and history shows that in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka that deliberate sapper attack teams get
through and demolish planes on the ground attacking the perimeter where its weakest. Walls defended by direct
occupation sensor/shooter troops and mobile patrols in M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs to converge on any
penetration would be much better. However, this only defends the air base from direct-fire weapons attack! To keep
Mr. Taliban’s heavy mortars and rocket out of range (4.3 miles or 7 km) which he liked to pummel the Soviets with--
requires an Army outer circle presence which will be difficult if all around the airport is civilians in buildings or
closed, vegetated terrain aka Tan Son Nhut airbase in Vietnam. An entire 10, 000 man division could be tied down
defending a 10, 000 foot large runway FOB.
Is it worth it?

19. Air Base NLB Security Math
Supplies = Convoys = Exposure = Ambush = Dead/Wounded = $$$ and morale sap
Food/Water
7 gallons H20 (35 lbs.), 3500 calories (3 lbs.) food per day
Fuel: TBD
Ammo: TBD
Parts: TBD
$$: TBD
3, 000 foot runway defense
HMGs: 1, 900 men: 76, 000 lbs or 3 x C-130 sorties or 6 x ISO containers by truck/ship
MANPADS SAMs: 3, 800 men: 152, 000 lbs or 6 x C-130 sorties or 12 x ISOs by truck/ship
10, 000 foot runway defense
HMGs: 6, 000 men: 240, 000 lbs or 6 x C-130 sorties or 12 x ISO containers by truck/ship
MANPADS SAMs: 12, 000 men: 480, 000 lbs or 12 x C-130s or 24 x ISO containers
Ships can be sunk: Ask Rommel’s Afrika Corps--they lost because of a lack of supplies
Trucks can be ambushed: Ask the Sri Lankan Army holding their Palay airbase or anyone
in Iraq about “MSR security”
Aircraft can be shot down: no “Berlin airlift” to save Berliners @ Stalingrad in WW2

20. What’s driving these long runways
in the first place? Progress: Threat to Enemy
Large Jet LTOL Aircraft. Overly
Complex “VTOL” Helicopters.
How long of a runway do they need
to operate?
Large jet aircraft = longer runways
= bigger FOBs = more men = more
supplies = more ground convoys,
more supply flights = roads that
need to be secured = more men
defending not attacking = more
targets for enemy to ambush =
more $$$ and lives lost = MICC-TT
racketeers very happy, this
“American Way of War” makes
them very filthy rich and our men
very bloody dead…and if things go Regress: Target to Enemy
really bad, results in DEFEAT!

21. The JCA Example
The Army discovered with the STOL CV-2 Caribou that if your transport plane can land in less than 2, 000 feet, the overall
size of your FOB “firebase” decreases dramatically. The problem is that the piston Caribou could only carry 5, 000 pounds
of supplies which is just 2 x 500 gallon fuel blivets. The Army’s fuel-hungry VTOL100 mph, 100 mile radius helicopters even
though simple Huey types couldn’t get enough fuel during the LZ X-Ray fight so USAF C-130s which each can carry 10-14 x
500 gallon fuel blivets saved the day because the huge 1st Cav Division base at An Khe had a long runway suitable for C-
130s to land by firmness as well as length--the 150, 000+ pound C-130 will crush even pavement if its too thin/weak. A twin-
engined JCA that can lift 20, 000 pounds--half a Herk’s payload--6 fuel blivets---while landing on 2, 000 runways will enable
the Army to operate small FOBs to reduce the numbers of men just defending and our visible presence to the civilians
making them less likely to rebel as a permanent-looking air base clusterfuck does. If we employed ESTOL technologies like
air cushion or tracked landing gear to the JCA, the runway length might be shortened even more to shrink FOBs further.
Our rebel runway on closer examination is
about 2, 300 in length

22. An Khe FOB-itis
The whole point of VTOL is to NOT need airbases, WTFO?

23. JCA PROGRESS: to defend a 2, 000 foot
JCA runway out of range of heavy
machine guns (1.25 miles) requires a 6
mile perimeter and out of MANPAD SAMs
(2.5 miles) a 12 mile perimeter to keep Mr.
Taliban out 12 miles
6 miles

24. What if we used even smaller ESTOL planes only needing 300 foot runways? Or
freedrop or Low-Velocity AirDropped from C-130s/JCAs?
AirDrop
That’s a little over the width
of the rebel airstrip

25. From 5, 280 feet an American football field sized landing strip over a 3, 000’ strip

26. A bulldozer in a few hours could scrape and flatten a 300 foot strip anywhere creating
many dispersed airstrips…sealed in 24 hours hard with Rhino Snot

27. And these dispersed airstrips could be covered by an infared defeating camouflage
netting so they are INVISIBLE from the air and space, whack-a-mole with PGMs?

28. WHAT YOU’D REALLY SEE: WHERE DO YOU LAUNCH PGMs?
?

29. Dispersed airstrips unknown to the enemy having dispersed aircraft taking off and
landing randomly makes Mr. Taliban have to play whack-an-aircraft over a huge area
“Come out, infidels! I have
some virgins in paradise to
hook up with!”
?
?
?
?

30. Dispersed airstrips with Sparks-Owen’s BATTLEBOX camouflaged/fortified aircraft need
to keep Mr. Taliban out of medium machine gun range in closed terrain (1km or 2/3 mile)
A platoon of 30 men in 4
Mini-Gavins can guard
each Mini-AirBase
24/7/365

31. How will these
x30 x4 Soldiers, Mini-Gavins
and Aircraft get Fed?
Air Base NLB Security Math
Creates/Carries Own Supplies = No Convoys = No Exposure = No Ambush =
No Dead/Wounded = $$$ Saved and morale strengthened
Food/Water
7 gallons H20 (35 lbs.), 3500 calories (3 lbs.) food per day
Fuel: Mini-Gavins and 300-foot STOL O/A aircraft use same JP8, more on this later
Ammo: Enough ammo can be delivered by unit during initial occupation for several months
Parts: ditto
$$: a 12-aircraft squadron force of 6 x 2 hunter/killer aircraft pairs defended by 180 men beats
a squadron at a 10, 000 foot runway defended by 6, 000-12,000, salaries alone: $24M/month
300 foot runway Mini-FOB defense
HMGs: 30 men: 1,200 lbs; 1 x C-130 sortie or 2 x ISO containers by truck/ship = H2O/F:
lasts 33 days, if water can be collected, food only extends ops F only: 1, 333 days of ops
MANPADS SAMs: 30 men: covertness avoids targeting, diesel-piston engined fixed-wing
O/A aircraft has NO IR signature and/or has effective IRCMs
Artillery/Mortar shells: ground-based Phalanx CIWS
TBMs: covertness avoids targeting, everything underground or fortified above ground

32. Water
BATTLEBOXes with solar power
can get drinking water from ambient
air using air-water machines. Air-water
NO!
machines can work when Mini-Gavins
are running, too. Well drilling for H2O
from ground within mini-FOBs are
another possibility...
YES! Fuel in fortified
ISO containers
Fuel

33. Ballistic Defense
Reports are that ground-mobile, trailer-mounted 20mm Phalanx CIWS
are swatting rebel mortars out of the sky in the Green Zone; what’s good
for-the-goose-is-good-for-gander: make aircraft ground-mobile, too. CIWS
needs to be on Mini-Gavins so mobile forces can have ballistic defense,
who wants to do this, ADA?

35. Crane-O’Reilly Aircraft LaSalle Launch & Recovery System (CORRALS)
Launch Option A
O/A aircraft in BB
O’Reilly’s Earthen O/A aircraft takes off down 300 foot below ground &
Ski jump Rhino Snot runway created by Mini- camouflaged
Gavin with dozer blade; ignites
JATO rockets
3 2 1

36. Launch Option B
2
1
SkyCrane helicopter connects O/A aircraft in BB
O/A aircraft to itself below ground &
camouflaged
4 SkyCrane launches O/A aircraft
3 SkyCrane takes-off with O/A aircraft

37. Launch Option C
3
1
4 2
O/A aircraft in BB on trailer-mobile, launches from “hip-pocket” at stretch
of road upon commander’s orders

38. Mobile War Scenario
A light air-mechanized force is moving to take a nation-state or rebel-held capital city either
in nation-state or sub-national conflict. With ground-mobile FINABs, the ground force has its
own “hip-pocket” air force (HPAF) to supply air cover against enemy aircraft as well as
maneuver air support like the Stukas of the German Luftwaffe that could land on grass strips
but better in that if the weather is bad or simply fuel must be conserved, the HPAF embedded
with the ground maneuver force can stay on the scene to render help from the 3rd dimension
of the air. The ideal home for the FINABs is the Army Field Artillery Headquarters which
has 60 km guided MLRS rockets, 30 km tube artillery and unguided MLRS rockets which it
stops to shoot. When it stops, it can launch FINAB O/A aircraft to spot for their fires to
insure bad guys and not civilians are hit, and recover them afterwards.
Air Mech Strike

39. BATTLEBOX aircraft suddenly take-off without warning and
signatures dissipate, air force is now in the air instantly!

40. O/A aircraft “Killer Bees” swarm and attack enemy air or ground threats: they could not
catch the former on the ground; might deter enemy from attacking in first place = PEACE

41. Recovery: what if the O/A plane needs more than 300 feet to land and roll to a
stop? Do we bust our stealth mini-airbase formula with 1, 000 foot runways?
NO. We stop them like a 300 foot angled deck area of an aircraft carrier does, but
without a tail-hook requiring aircraft structural re-engineering. We catch the
O/A plane after it touches down and deploys a tail braking parachute with a
nylon BARRIER aka a net.

42. NOTES
1. www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/saddam-iap.htm
2. www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_336.shtml
ACIG Indian-Subcontinent Database: Sri Lanka, since 1971
by Tom Cooper, with additional details from Sam Wickramsinghe and Pavel
3. www.geocities.com/strategicmaneuver/battleboxes.htm
4. www.geocities.com/usarmyaviationdigest/fighterinabox.htm
5. www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle1.jsp?
action=showView&kValue=1733&status=article&mod=b
According to a report submitted early this year to the President by the SLAF, during a
routine reconnaissance by a UAV on 12 January 2005, it found an airfield "estimated
around 3600 feet in length with a paved surface that was
sufficient to land quite an array of aircraft- medium lift aircraft
and even aircraft such as C-130 - south east of Iranamadu
irrigation tank."