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Cyber Threats
Targetting Enterprises & Organizations

Guillaume Lovet

                            3 Times BlackHat Speaker
                              Pwnie Award Nominee
                                M.S. Georgia Tech
                              Sr. Manager FortiGuard



Fortinet Confidential
Agenda



   Attack consequences
   Attack consequences
          for the enterprise
         for the enterprise




     Forms of attacks
     Forms of attacks


           Defense
           Defense
Agenda



   Attack consequences
   Attack consequences
          for the enterprise
         for the enterprise




     Forms of attacks
     Forms of attacks


           Defense
           Defense
Risks: What you don't want to happen



      •Denial of Service (DoS) attack

      •Data Theft

      •Destruction

      •Loss of Reputation




CONFIDENTIAL
Risks: What you don't want to happen




      • Denial of Service (DoS) attack
      From outside, by a Botnet / Zombie network (Example?)
      From inside, on purpose or not (eg: Conficker Worm)


      • Data Theft

      • Destruction

      • Loss of Reputation



CONFIDENTIAL
Risks: What you don't want to happen




      • Denial of Service (DoS) attack

      • Data Theft
      Customer data (Example?)
      Intellectual Property
      Corporate Info (incl. banking credentials)


      • Destruction

      • Loss of Reputation


CONFIDENTIAL
Risks: What you don't want to happen




      • Denial of Service (DoS) attack

      • Data Theft

      • Destruction
      Data
      Computer systems
      Physical/Industrial systems (Example?)


      • Loss of Reputation


CONFIDENTIAL
Risks: What you don't want to happen




      • Denial of Service (DoS) attack

      • Data Theft

      • Destruction

      • Loss of Reputation
      Often a consequence of the above
      Top risk identified by UK companies (Aon Ltd, 2005)
      Adds up to the rest. Example: $318/rec in 2010 (Ponemon)



CONFIDENTIAL
Loss of Reputation: Heartland Breach




CONFIDENTIAL
The other side of the Mirror: Attackers’ Motivation

 •Financial
 Pay or I DdoS you! (eBay, Amazon...)
 Selling stolen data (Heartland, Sony PSN?)

 •Competitive
 Industrial Spying (“Israeli Trojan”)

 •Political / Hacktivism
 Espionnage (Ghostnet, Quai D'Orsay, Operation Aurora)
 Retaliation (Paypal, Master Card, Visa, Sony PSN?)

 •Military
 DDoS (Russia / Georgia)
 Seek & Destroy Worm (Stuxnet)



CONFIDENTIAL
Agenda



   Attack consequences
   Attack consequences
          for the enterprise
         for the enterprise




     Forms of attacks
     Forms of attacks


           Defense
           Defense
Information System Penetration




 • Via stolen credentials (Phishing / Social Engineering /
   Insider)


 • Via Exploitation of flaws


 • Via Infection: Trojan Horses / Bots / Worms




CONFIDENTIAL
Multiple Infection Vectors




     •E-Mail & IM

     •Web Sites

     •Social Networks

     •Physical Infection Vectors




CONFIDENTIAL
Multiple Infection Vectors




     • E-Mail & IM
     Attachments: executable, archives AND documents
     Links


     • Web Sites

     • Social Networks

     • Physical Infection Vectors


CONFIDENTIAL
Targeted attacks against Tibetan communities:
Email infection
Multiple Infection Vectors




     • E-Mail & IM

     • Web Sites
      60% of bot infections: “Drive-By Install” (Enisa)
     “Packs” available for purchase on the underground
     market


     • Social Networks

     • Physical Infection Vectors

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Multiple Infection Vectors




     • E-Mail & IM

     • Web Sites

     • Social Networks
     Intelligence source for targeted attacks
     Worms (eg: Koobface)


     • Physical Infection Vectors


CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Multiple Infection Vectors




    • E-Mail & IM

    • Web Sites

    • Social Networks

    • Physical Infection Vectors
    Laptops
    USB Keys
    CDs

CONFIDENTIAL
Agenda



   Attack consequences
   Attack consequences
          for the enterprise
         for the enterprise




     Forms of attacks
     Forms of attacks


           Defense
           Defense
Key Elements to Modern Defense



      You need AV, IPS, AS, WCF


      Above all, you need them altogether


      And most importantly, you need them working altogether

      Goal: when facing a threat, be able to
      tackle it from different angles


       => Intelligent Redundancy



                            CONFIDENTIAL
Two Examples of Enhanced Security by Intelligent
Redundancy




                    Phishing
                    • Phish Letter blocked by AS
                    • If not, blocked by AV
                    • If not, Phish Site blocked by WCF

                    Backdoor / Bot
                    • Binary blocked by AV
                    • If not, access to C & C blocked by IPS
                    • If not, by WCF
                    => The bot cannot “phone home”




                           CONFIDENTIAL
Guillaume Lovet. Kibernetinių nusikaltimų daugėja: grėsmių įmonėms analizė

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Guillaume Lovet. Kibernetinių nusikaltimų daugėja: grėsmių įmonėms analizė

  • 1. Cyber Threats Targetting Enterprises & Organizations Guillaume Lovet 3 Times BlackHat Speaker Pwnie Award Nominee M.S. Georgia Tech Sr. Manager FortiGuard Fortinet Confidential
  • 2. Agenda Attack consequences Attack consequences for the enterprise for the enterprise Forms of attacks Forms of attacks Defense Defense
  • 3. Agenda Attack consequences Attack consequences for the enterprise for the enterprise Forms of attacks Forms of attacks Defense Defense
  • 4. Risks: What you don't want to happen •Denial of Service (DoS) attack •Data Theft •Destruction •Loss of Reputation CONFIDENTIAL
  • 5. Risks: What you don't want to happen • Denial of Service (DoS) attack From outside, by a Botnet / Zombie network (Example?) From inside, on purpose or not (eg: Conficker Worm) • Data Theft • Destruction • Loss of Reputation CONFIDENTIAL
  • 6. Risks: What you don't want to happen • Denial of Service (DoS) attack • Data Theft Customer data (Example?) Intellectual Property Corporate Info (incl. banking credentials) • Destruction • Loss of Reputation CONFIDENTIAL
  • 7. Risks: What you don't want to happen • Denial of Service (DoS) attack • Data Theft • Destruction Data Computer systems Physical/Industrial systems (Example?) • Loss of Reputation CONFIDENTIAL
  • 8. Risks: What you don't want to happen • Denial of Service (DoS) attack • Data Theft • Destruction • Loss of Reputation Often a consequence of the above Top risk identified by UK companies (Aon Ltd, 2005) Adds up to the rest. Example: $318/rec in 2010 (Ponemon) CONFIDENTIAL
  • 9. Loss of Reputation: Heartland Breach CONFIDENTIAL
  • 10. The other side of the Mirror: Attackers’ Motivation •Financial Pay or I DdoS you! (eBay, Amazon...) Selling stolen data (Heartland, Sony PSN?) •Competitive Industrial Spying (“Israeli Trojan”) •Political / Hacktivism Espionnage (Ghostnet, Quai D'Orsay, Operation Aurora) Retaliation (Paypal, Master Card, Visa, Sony PSN?) •Military DDoS (Russia / Georgia) Seek & Destroy Worm (Stuxnet) CONFIDENTIAL
  • 11. Agenda Attack consequences Attack consequences for the enterprise for the enterprise Forms of attacks Forms of attacks Defense Defense
  • 12. Information System Penetration • Via stolen credentials (Phishing / Social Engineering / Insider) • Via Exploitation of flaws • Via Infection: Trojan Horses / Bots / Worms CONFIDENTIAL
  • 13. Multiple Infection Vectors •E-Mail & IM •Web Sites •Social Networks •Physical Infection Vectors CONFIDENTIAL
  • 14. Multiple Infection Vectors • E-Mail & IM Attachments: executable, archives AND documents Links • Web Sites • Social Networks • Physical Infection Vectors CONFIDENTIAL
  • 15.
  • 16. Targeted attacks against Tibetan communities: Email infection
  • 17. Multiple Infection Vectors • E-Mail & IM • Web Sites  60% of bot infections: “Drive-By Install” (Enisa) “Packs” available for purchase on the underground market • Social Networks • Physical Infection Vectors CONFIDENTIAL
  • 19.
  • 20.
  • 21. Multiple Infection Vectors • E-Mail & IM • Web Sites • Social Networks Intelligence source for targeted attacks Worms (eg: Koobface) • Physical Infection Vectors CONFIDENTIAL
  • 25. Multiple Infection Vectors • E-Mail & IM • Web Sites • Social Networks • Physical Infection Vectors Laptops USB Keys CDs CONFIDENTIAL
  • 26. Agenda Attack consequences Attack consequences for the enterprise for the enterprise Forms of attacks Forms of attacks Defense Defense
  • 27. Key Elements to Modern Defense You need AV, IPS, AS, WCF Above all, you need them altogether And most importantly, you need them working altogether Goal: when facing a threat, be able to tackle it from different angles => Intelligent Redundancy CONFIDENTIAL
  • 28. Two Examples of Enhanced Security by Intelligent Redundancy Phishing • Phish Letter blocked by AS • If not, blocked by AV • If not, Phish Site blocked by WCF Backdoor / Bot • Binary blocked by AV • If not, access to C & C blocked by IPS • If not, by WCF => The bot cannot “phone home” CONFIDENTIAL