This document analyzes the shortcomings of applying conventional Western conflict resolution mechanisms to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It argues that this approach has attempted to remove the principle of justice from the negotiations. Specifically: - It has shifted the agenda from one based on core values to one that is open to any issue being bargained, and from an entitlements-based matrix to a cost-benefits analysis. - This has led to issues being transformed and Arab negotiators having to make concessions rather than negotiate as equals. - Whatever agreement emerges from the current process is bound to fail because it cannot fulfill the basic demand for justice, resulting in a redefinition of the conflict.

1. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE
POLITICS OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
AMRG. E. SABET
ThisanalysisoftheMiddleEastpeaceprocessarguesthattheapplica-
tionofconventionalWesternconflictresolutionmechanismshas at-
temptedtoremovethejusticeprinciplefromtheArab-Israeliconflict.
Theauthorcontendsthattheshiftfroma "closedagenda"determined
bycorevaluestoan "openagenda"whereeverythingisopenforbar-
gainingandfroma justice-driven"entitlement-benefits"matrixtoa
utility-driven'cost-benefits"one,canonlyleadtoissuetransformation
and theprogressivescalingbackofgoals.Acceptanceoftheadver-
sary'sframeworkhas reducedArabnegotiatorstosupplicantsrather
thancounterpartswhoseperceptionscan be managedbytheoppo-
nent.AfterexaminingArab options,the authorconcludesthat
whateversettlementemergesfromthecurrentprocessisboundtofail
becauseitcannotfulfillbasicdemandforjustice,resultingina redefi-
nitionoftheconflictin itsbroaderreligiousand strategichorizons.
THE FANFARE SURROUNDING THE MIDDLE EAST "PEACE PROCESS" has obscuredhow
littleithas been subjectedto systematicand objectiveanalysis.Norhave its
negotiationprinciplesbeen sufficientlyscrutinizedto bringouttheunderly-
ingnatureand structureoftheprocessoritsabilitytodeliveron itspromises.
Ifa yetmore violentand bitterfutureof theArab-Israelicollisionis to be
avoided,distinctionmustbe made betweenconflictresolutionas "thetrans-
formationof relationshipsin a particularcase by the solution of the
problemswhichled to theconflictualbehaviorin thefirstplace" and "the
suppressionor settlementof conflictby coercivemeans,or by bargaining
and negotiationinwhichrelativepowerdeterminestheoutcome."1The dis-
tinctionmustbe made,then,betweenresolutionand settlement.Forunless
theformerobtainsand incorporatestheprincipleofjustice (particularlyin
theconflict'scorePalestinianissue),the"peace process"cannotbutcollapse
intoa reducedand unstablesettlementarrangement.
PEACE TRANSFORMATION AND THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE
The current"peace process"has attemptedto circumvent,transform,and
conceptuallyobliteratethe justiceprincipleof the Arab-Israeliconflictby
AMR G. E. SABET is visitingassociate professorof political science at Tampere University,
Finland.
Journal of Palestine Studies XXVII, no. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 5-19.

2. 6 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
resortingto conventionalWesternconflictresolutionmechanisms.These
mechanismshave fundamentallyalteredthepoliticalagenda oftheconflict
throughsubterfugeand issue transformation.This developmentwas facili-
tatedby systemicand regionalchangesarisingfromthecollapse oftheSo-
vietUnion,thesecond GulfWarand thedestructionofIraq,and American-
Israelimilitaryand scientificcooperation.
The applicationofWestern"conflictresolution"mechanismsrequiredthe
introductionof superordinateaxes to change the region'sregimeof alli-
ances. "Moderate"Araband Jewishforcessupporting"peace" were to be
alignedagainst"radicals"or "extremists"opposing itinbothsocieties.Arab
leaderswere to make commoncause withIsraelin fightingnotextremism
per se, but Islamicresistanceto the concessional schemes being worked
out-in otherwords,theywere to fighttheirown so as to claim shared
groundwithIsrael.Paralleltothesechangesinthepoliticalconstellationwas
a shiftfroma "closed agenda" determinedby immutablecore values to an
"open agenda" whereeverythingis open forbargaining.Thus,insteadofa
closed agenda settingIslamistsand existingregimesas naturalalliesagainst
a commonIsraelienemy,thenew open agenda evolved intoone of con-
frontingtheeffectsofinjusticeratherthanitscauses.
The negotiatingstrategyadopted bytheArabsaftertheGulfWarwas ar-
ticulatedby PresidentHusni Mubarakof Egypt,who inJanuary1989 pro-
claimedthathe and otherArableaderswere supportedin theirsearchfor
peace by "thepeace lovingforcesin Israelitself."He indicatedthatafterall
thesacrificesin previouswarswithIsrael,he "was notreadyto takemore
risks."2Thisstatementbasicallyacknowledgestheconflicttobe one ofcosts
ratherthanofentitlements,ofpragmatismratherthanrights,and conveysa
willingnessto playbytherulesoftheopponent.Expressinghisratherlim-
itedunderstandingoftheVietnamesecase as an exampleofa warthat"was
settledonlythroughnegotiations,"Mubarakfailedto relatetheoutcometo
conditionson theground.The Vietnameseweresuccessfulinimposingtheir
willon a farmorepowerfuladversarypreciselybecause theyhad been will-
ingtotakerisks,whiletheArabparty'sstartingpointfornegotiationswas to
concede entitlementclaims.SincetheArabswerewillingto relinquishwhat
theyhad consideredsacredsince 1948,furtherpressurecould be expected
to lead themto concede otherrightsand Jerusalemas well-after all, the
precedenthad been set. Thisintroducedstructuraltransformnationscapable
ofchangingthepsychologicaldistributionofpowerheavilyinfavorofIsrael
and alteringtheArabpositionfromone ofdefiancetoone ofvirtualsubmis-
sion. As a settlementmechanism,the "peace process" has recastthe sub-
stance of the conflictby steadilycreatingthe appropriateenvironmental
means-endsframeworkforsuch "concessions"to be made.
Negotiationconstitutesthe "artof the dialecticsof wills thatuse force
(and/orpeacefulmeasures)to resolvetheirconflict."3Strategiesand tactics,
in additionto optionsand the available resources,constitutethepillarsof
negotiatingdynamics.Theiroverridingprincipleis to takeadvantageto the

3. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 7
extentpossibleoftheadversary'sweaknessesand oversights.The configura-
tiveoutcomedeterminestheagreementsreachedand how theyare imple-
mented. In thissense, negotiationis a double-edgedsword:itcan resolve
conflictsor exacerbatethem.Whileitis impossibleto predictwithcertainty
the resultof a negotiatingprocess,a numberof premisesmayindicateits
direction.Thus,thefinaloutcomeofnegotiationsusuallyreflectstherelative
powerconfigurationofthepartiesconcerned;"whereone endsup depends
on whereone starts";4and negotiatingoutcomesemanatenotonlyfromob-
jectivematerialconditionsbut,as importantly,fromsubjectivepsychological
fortitude.The weakerside in particularmustthusexhibitconsiderablefirm-
ness to establisha credibilitythresholdsufficientto make demandsor up-
hold positions.Otherwise,in cases ofasymmetricalpower,diminishedwill
inevitablytranslatesintoa one-sidedopen agenda in which-as faras the
privilegedpartyis concerned-agreementmaynotnecessarilybe preferred
to nonagreement.Failureofwill also allows fortheunilateralalterationof
therulesofthegameand forredefiningthenormsthatall actorsmustfollow
intheirmutualrelations.5Once thisstagehasbeen reached,negotiationsub-
stantivelyceases, since, as Henry Kissingernoted, "the weak do not
negotiate."6
Both theAmericansand the Israelisbelieved thata step-by-steprather
thana comprehensivenegotiatingapproachwould contributeto undermin-
ingtheArabconsensusof"notalks,no recognition,no peace" thatemerged
attheKhartoumsummitinAugust1967. The purposewas todividetheArab
world,winde factorecognitionofIsrael,and putIsraelina strongerposition
whenitcame tonegotiatedirectlywiththefront-linestatesand thePalestini-
ans.7Israel'stacticwas to bringtheArabsinto"stepbystep,practicalsettle-
ments and interimagreements as a gradual incrementalprocess of
'interlocking'therivalsintopositivearrangementswhichmaymakeitmore
difficultforthemtoreverttoopen conflictand war."8Suchtacticswerecon-
sistentwiththeoverallstrategyofdetachingEgyptfromtheArab-Israelicon-
flict,isolatingSyria,and, on the Palestinianfront,pursuinga policy of
cantonizationin Gaza and the West Bank. Above all, the approach suc-
ceeded in breakingthenecessarylinkbetweenstatecraftand war.Once all
thishad been achieved,Israelreverseditsposition,withthecurrentprime
minister,BenjaminNetanyahu,callingfor"a package approach"thatcircum-
ventstheagreementssignedearlier.9
PEACE-JUSTICE DIALECTICS
Power relationsbased on considerationsof mightfrequentlyoffenda
"sense ofjustice"and fueltheemotionsof resentmentand angerthatulti-
matelylead to violence. Notionsof injustice"as a reactionto a perceived
discrepancybetweenentitlementsand benefits"alwaysremainan inherent
riskfactor.10"Peace"as theoppositeofviolenceratherthanas a reflectionof
justiceis unlikelytoovercomesuchconcerns.Bereavementsinflictedbythe

4. 8 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
Weston theArabsingeneral,and on thePalestiniansinparticular,havefrom
theoutsetcharacterizedtheconflictinArabeyesas one ofentitlement-bene-
fits(as opposed to themore pragmaticbargainingapproach of cost-bene-
fits),meaningthatitis thenotionofrightsthatis thedeterminingfactorand
thatwhateverbenefitsderivefromthe conflict'sresolutionare secondary.
The Arabsense of injusticehas triggeredintenseemotionalresponsesthat
cannotbe quantifiedsolelyin tangibletermsor reducedsimplyto an aver-
sion to loss. Phenomenologically,thesense ofjustice"engage(s) powerful
passionsthathavetheeffectofincreasingthestridencyofdemands,amplify-
ing intransigence,reducingsensitivityto threatsand value trade-offs,in-
creasingthewillingnesstorunrisks,and increasingthelikelihoodofviolent
behavior."" ThishelpsexplaintheviolenceassociatedwithmilitantMuslim
organizationssuch as Hamas, Hizballah,and IslamicJihad.Theiracts are
largelythe observablesymptomsof theunobservableneed to respondto
groupinsultwithrage.12
Referringto the Islamistorganizationsas terroriststructuresopposing
peace is partofan alternativediscursivemechanismthatseeks to eliminate
theentitlement-benefitsdiscrepancycontextin favor
of one based on cost-benefits,the formerbeing
depicted as irrationaland the latteras rational.But
historicalexperienceshows thatwhen basic entitle-
mentsare at stake againstoverrwhelmingodds, less
rationalityactuallyfaresbetterthanmore rationality.
For instance,the Czechs' behaviorwithrespectto
Nazi Germany'sdemands for theirland was "too
rational"in thefaceofa militarythreattheybelieved
theycould notwin againstin thelong run.13In contrast,theFinnsand the
NorthVietnamesewere less rationaland moreemotional,moredetermined
tofightagainsttheoverwhelmingpoweroftheSovietUnionand theUnited
States,respectively.Finland,whilelosingtwice,earnedrespectand perhaps
made itselfless attractiveas a potentialsatellite.The NorthVietnamese,of
course,ultimatelyprevailed,14winninga warinwhichtheyhad lostvirtually
all thebattles.Ithardlybearsmentioningthat,withinthecontextoftheU.S.-
constructed"peace" discourse,itis fareasier to manipulatepartieswhose
calculatingmatrixdriftstowardcost-benefitquantifications(the Czech op-
tion) than partieswho are not prey to such calculations(the Finn or
Vietnameseoption).
The justicemotivediffersfromaversionto loss both prescriptivelyand
extensively.Prescriptively,thedesireto see justicedone "thoughtheearth
mayperish"is a driveembeddedinbasic humanvalues and is indifferentto
materialvaluationsbased on economyor self-interest.Extensively,thejus-
ticemotivediffersfromgain-lossconsiderationsin thatitinvolvesnotwhat
people would like to have butwhattheyconsidertheirdue, theirentitle-
ments.People withintheentitlement-benefitsvalue matrixusuallyare will-
ing to incura heavy price forpotentiallyless usefulthingstheyconsider
Historical experience shows
that when basic
entitlementsare at stake
against overwhelming
odds, less rationality
actually fares betterthan
more rationality.

5. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 9
theirsas a matterofrightand arewillingtotradeofforforesweargoods that
theywould liketohavebuttowhichtheydo notfeelentitled."Themode of
reasoninginvolvedin thedefenseofone's entitlements,"therefore,"differs
fundamentallyfromthemode ofreasoninginvolvedin thepursuitofother
goods: ittendsto be categoricaland deontologicalratherthanutilitarian."15
In substance,Israel,aided byAmericanindifferenceifnotcomplicity,at-
temptedto reconcilethe entitlement-benefitsdiscrepancynot by meeting
legitimatePalestiniandemandsbutbytransformingtherulesin such a way
thatthePalestinianAuthority(PA), led by YasirArafat,would increasingly
act-if notactuallybelieve-as ifithad misconceivedthescope and content
ofPalestinianentitlements.16As YehoshafatHarkabi,formerchiefofIsraeli
militaryintelligence,pointedout:"Makingtheopponentuneasyand apolo-
geticabout his objective,is a firstsmallstep in theprocess of itserosion,
inducinghimto startdiscardingit."17Thus,recentyearsappear to have wit-
nessed a progressivescalingback ofPalestinianexpectations.Indeed,with
theexceptionofthehighlyskillednegotiatorHafizal-AsadofSyria,a look at
thenegotiatingpatternsofArabdecision makersrevealsa significantpro-
pensityto modifythevalues at stakein a fashionthatultimatelychallenges
theirown entitlements.Israel,on theotherhand,continuesto maintainits
own constantsand payoffsintermsofa unifiedJerusalemunderitscontrol,
possession of mostof the West Bank (despite redeploymentmaneuvers),
monopolizedaccess tonuclearweapons,priorityofIsraelisecurityconcerns
overall otherconsiderations,and eventualaccess to thewaterresourcesof
theNile and theEuphrates.18
Israel's delinkingof securityfromchanges on the groundinJerusalem
and theWestBank,and thereforefromthepoliticalheartofthe"peace pro-
cess,"reflectsa furtherattemptto divestthepurportedPalestinian/Arabne-
gotiatingformulaofitssubstance.DuringhisAugust1997visittotheregion
in the wake of Hamas bombings in Jerusalem,U.S. envoy Dennis Ross
soughtfurtherto entrenchthe Palestiniannegotiatorwithinthisdelinking
structure.He calledupon IsraelisandPalestinianstoworkas partnersagainst
the"commonthreat"frommilitants,emphasizingthat"securityis something
thatservesIsraeliinterestsand Palestinianinterests."19Israelisecuritywas
thusto become thePA's objective,whetheror notPalestiniandemandsfor
statehoodcould orwould be met.In returnforArafat'sresumptionofsecur-
itycooperationwithIsrael,Ross gave a vague promise of an upcoming
broadU.S.peace initiativethatsupposedlywould addressPalestinians'com-
plaintsagainstIsrael,including"some kind"offreezeon settlementexpan-
sion.20ButwhenSecretaryofStateMadeleineAlbrightvisitedtheregionthe
followingmonth,she respondedto complaintsthatIsraelwas strengthening
itsgriponJerusalem,expandingcolonies,and levelingthehomes ofPales-
tiniansbydeclaringthat"thereis no moralequivalentbetweenkillingpeo-
ple and buildinghouses.... The PalestinianAuthoritymusttakeunilateral
stepsand actionsto rootout theterroristinfrastructure."'21

6. 10 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES
The problemwithunilateralgestures,as Kissingernoted,is thatthey"re-
move a keynegotiatingasset.In general,diplomatsrarelypay forservices
alreadyrendered."Moreover,he continued,theytemptthe adversary"to
dragoutthenegotiationsinordertodeterminewhetherotherunilateralges-
turesmaybe forthcoming."22Notonlydid Albrightdemandsuch unilateral
gesturesofthePalestinians,she refusedtoacknowledgeanyconnectionbe-
tween themilitantacts of some Palestiniangroupsand theIsraeligovern-
ment'sbreakingofagreementsandsettlementexpansion.Ross'spromisesto
Arafatcan be likenedtoBritain'sWorldWarI commitmentsto supportinde-
pendence forArabsiftheyjoined thewar effortagainstOttomanTurkey.
Arafat'srelationshipwithIslamistgroups,however,is too complexto en-
able himto accede to U.S.-Israelidemandsfora crackdownon theirinfra-
structure,atleastnotto theextentdesired.Formuchas Arafatwould liketo
clamp down on theIslamists,he knows thatdestroyingthemcould mean
politicalsuicide.EradicatingHamas and IslamicJihadwould diminishhis
usefulnessas a negotiator:theIslamistsarehislasttrumpcard.Thisiswhere
the inherentcontradictionsof a common securityframeworkcan be felt
moststrongly.WhiletheIsraeliswould liketo see Islamicoppositionelimi-
natedtotally,Arafatcannotwithoutjeopardizinghis own survivaldo more
thancontainandweaken them.Thus,thePAandIsraelcannotpursuea com-
mon securitypolicy,but onlya parallel one. Arafat'sdilemmais thatthis
situationprojectshimsimultaneouslyas a collaborator(to theIslamists,as
well as tosome secularnationalists)and as an ineffectiveand uncooperative
leader(to theAmericansand Israelis).The resultis a concessionaryoutcome
thatcan lead onlyto theerosionofthePA'slegitimacy,forcingitto control
itsown people by increasinglycoercivemeasures.23
However much Israelismay loathe Arafat,he representsforthemthe
lesser of evils and a kindof safetyvalve. His rumblingsabout not being
dictatedtobyIsraelcannotconceal thathisrealconcernisfearofgenerating
sympathyforIslamicmilitantsbyacquiescinginIsraelidemands.Moreover,
the concentrationof power in Arafat'shands,his personal controlof the
fundsprovidedby internationaldonors,his virtuallack of accountability,
and hiseffortstoweakenallotherforcesand socialinstitutions-inshort,the
factthathe has become thePAin all butname24 significantlyconsolidates
Israel'sposition.Thus,and notwithstandingtheIslamistmilitants,Israelby
controllingthe"chief'can controlthe"tribe."In thisrespect,thePA,though
shortofbeing a state,is notan aberrationbuta typicalregionalplayer.
PEACE CONCESSIONS AND THE STRATEGY OF DEFEAT
Empiricalstudiesregardingwinnersand losers in negotiationsindicate
thatthepartieswithhigheraspirationlevels actuallygetmore.Opponents
withhighaspirations,irrespectiveoftheirskillor power,ended up as win-
nersineverycase wheretheyopposed low aspirants.Furthermore,negotia-
tors who made the firstcompromiseended up the losers in the final

7. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 11
outcome.25In thelightofsuch findings,itfollowsthatthestrategicconces-
sions initiatedby thelate PresidentAnwarSadat throughthe Camp David
regime,and in whose footstepsa numberof otherArableaders have fol-
lowed, can onlylead to disastrousconsequences fortheArabworld.The
patternof concessions thatinevitablyresultswhen one partyvirtuallyde-
claresitselfdesperateto opt out of confrontationwhile the otherremains
determinedcan neverbe just,forseveralreasons.
First,concessionsarefaironlyas longas thenegotiatorshave no need to
revisetheiroriginalexpectationsabout the overallshape of the ultimate
agreementor about theirstrategicgoals ofentitlement.26Leavingaside the
downgradingof Palestinianexpectationsthatpreceded Oslo, the Oslo ac-
cordsallowed thePalestiniannegotiatortoanticipatea Palestinianstatecov-
eringmostoftheWestBankand Gaza attheend oftheprocess.Sincethen,
thePA appears to have been reducedby thenegotiatingpatternithas fol-
lowed to nothingmore thanan auxiliaryIsraelisecuritystructure.Indeed,
theentireArabworldhas undergonean extraordinaryscalingback ofgoals.
As Mubarak'schiefpoliticaladviserOsama Baz remarked,theconflictbe-
tween the Arabs and Israel is now over boundariesand no longerover
27
Israel'sexistence. (In contrast,formerIsraelichiefof staffRaphael Eitan
declaredtheconflictto be "civilizational.")
Second,negotiationrequiresthatpartiesbe governedbythesame rules,
withneitherside havingtherighttoalterthemunilaterally.Giventhatnego-
tiationis a matteroffindingtheproperformulaas a referentprincipleand
thenimplementingdetail,28ifone partycan changethenegotiatingformula
atwilland theotheris constrainedbyit-thatis,ifthepartiescease tohave
equal stalematingpower-then no mechanismofjointdecisionmakingex-
istsand thetalksno longerconstitutenegotiations.Itis thusthatIsraelhas
unilaterallyalteredthe formulafromland forpeace, as was agreed at the
October1991Madridconference,to peace forpeace or securityforpeace.
Thischange,whichfundamentallyreorderstheprocessinIsrael'simage,be-
gan undertheLaborgovernment,albeitless overtly;29to personalizetheis-
sue by presentingitas a Netanyahuinitiative,as manyArabstendto do,
ratherthanas a matterof Israelistrategyis to blurthe deeper factors,al-
lowingtheoptionlessArableaderstobuytimebydeludingthemselvesthata
returnofLaborwillsetthingsright.
Finally,while any concessions made by the Israeliside can only come
fromgainsacquiredattheexpense oftheArabside,reciprocalconcessions
bytheArabsmustinevitablycome outoftheirown capital.A frameworkof
mutualconcessions,whilein appearance procedurallyfair,hidesa substan-
tiveinjusticeinflictedon one negotiatingparty.Whateverjustificationsare
cited forthisstateof affairs-thebalance of power, the situationon the
ground,thefactthatIsraelwon theland militarily-thenegotiatingexercise
isessentiallyreducedtothevictor'simposingitswillon thevanquished.This
situationinvitestermsof surrenderratherthantheconciliationthatcomes
fromconflictresolution.

8. 12 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
The Palestinianleaderthuscommitteda seriousstrategicmistakebysign-
inginterimagreementsthatdeferredtoa laterstagesuchfundamentalissues
as Jerusalem,refugees,and Jewishcolonies-in otherwords,by signing
agreementsemphasizingtheprocessofinteractionratherthanthecontentof
thenegotiatingpositions.30Sucha blunderwas a reflectionoftheArab/Pal-
estiniannegotiators'inabilitytorankprioritiesofnationalinterestsand goals,
as well as theirconfusionof means and ends. Withintheframeworkof a
confidence-buildingprocess(as opposed to one based on content),priority
goes to currentand ad hoc problemsofwhatevermagnitudeattheexpense
of long-termstrategicconsiderations,in essence resultingin a policythat
gives equal weightto all issues.Indeed,thisprocess-orientatedframework
actuallyleads to a confusionofpriorities,and ifprioritiesare confused,no
long-termnationalintereststrategycan be focused upon, nor decisions
about thechannelingof resourcesmade. Processbecomes an end in itself
ratherthanthemeans itis supposed to be.
Thisloss ofstrategicbalance iswhatmade itpossibleforIsraelto "screw"
thePalestiniansat Oslo II,to use LaborleaderShimonPeres'sfrankexpres-
sion.31Indeed, whateverWesternconflictmanagementframeworkis uti-
lized,theArabswilllose everytimetheyagree to be placed in an external
rulestructure.As CarlSchmittobserved,ifa people permitsanotherpartyto
determineon itsbehalfthe distinctionof friendand enemy,"thenitis no
longer a politicallyfree people and is absorbed into anotherpolitical
system."32
In endingtheintifadaand signingtheOslo accords,Arafatgave up twoof
his mostimportanttrumpcardswithoutreceivinganythingofsubstancein
return.HiserrorfurtherabsolvedtheAraband otherstatesofanyembarrass-
mentthatmighthavepreventedthemfromnormalizingrelationswithIsrael,
effectivelybolsteringitsregionaland internationalstatusand endingitsiso-
lation.In so doing,thePLO squanderedtheverylimitedleverageithad and
placed itselfin itsenemy'sgrip,or at best in thatof itsAmericanally(in
muchthe same fashion,thoughunderfarworse conditions,as Egypthad
done earlier).Nothingin thePA's negotiatingpatternwould seem to allow
fortherealizationofitsrightsand demandsforstatehood,even as parallel
expectationson thebroaderArabfrontcontinueto decrease in lightofthe
adversary'sinitiativedynamics.
ARAB OPTIONS
The perenniallegitimacycrisisand personalizedruleoftheArabregimes
inevitablyaffecttheirnegotiatingperformanceand conflictmanagement
competence.BoutrosBoutros-Ghali,a keyfigureinthenegotiationsthatled
to theCamp David accords,wroteinhismemoirsthattheEgyptiandelega-
tionnotonlydidnotknowhow toprepareforthecomingnegotiations,but
did not even know thegeneralstrategyupon whichto base itsmoves. "It
dallied myhopes thatinspirationwould come to us when we arrivedat

9. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 13
Camp David,"he wroteina perhapsunwittingbutdevastatingindictmentof
theEgyptiannegotiatingpattern.33GiventhatSadatwas ata loss as towhat
step to take afterhis visitto Jerusalem,he "put himselfcompletelyinto
Americanhands,"willing"totakeCarter'swordthata givenstepwas neces-
sary"and unable, unlike the U.S. president,"to separate business from
friendship."34The resultwas a diplomaticframeworkthatincludednotonly
traditionalnegotiation,mediation,conciliation,and arbitration,butalso the
presumablymoreadvanced methodsofconflictresolutionthatemphasized
notthecontentofthenegotiatingpositionsbuttheprocessofinteraction-
confidencebuilding,educationformutualunderstanding,and thepursuitof
superordinategoals,includingeconomicincentives.35The two overlapping
approachescompromisedcore issues,leadingSadatto sacrificeArabstrate-
gicentitlementsinfavorofshort-termEgyptianterritorialand financialgains.
The tragedyis thatthePAseemstobe followingthesame patternofcon-
cessions, but withoutthe assets and leverage thatEgyptpossessed. For
Egypt,as themostpowerfulArabcountry,could offerthe Israeliside the
strategicconcession of droppingout oftheconflictequation and in return
couldbe rewardedwithterritorialgains(even ifatthecostofa loss ofsover-
eigntyand self-respectand diminishedregionalstatus).The CampDavid ac-
cords,in otherwords,constitutedthehighpointofthepeace strategythat
could onlybe followedbythereversalofopposites:themorepeace is pur-
sued, the fewerthe returns,untila pointis reached where thereare only
negativeresults,whichiswhatwe arewitnessingtoday.Thisessentiallycon-
stitutesthedynamicsofthepeace dialectics.
Giventhecurrentsituation,theArabnegotiatorshavethreemainoptions.
First,theycan accept whateveris being "offered"or imposed,seekingthe
best conditionsunder the circumstances.Second, theycan stallfortime,
hopingfora change in circumstancethatwillpermitreversionto theland-
for-peaceformula.Finally,theycan transformthenegotiatingrulesbyintro-
ducingtheirown formulaand redefiningtheconflictintermsofitsbroader
religiousandstrategichorizons,whileworkingactivelytowardtheconstruc-
tionofnew regionaland systemicalliances.
In theshortrun,itis the firstoptionthatappears themostlikelyto be
adopted. Mubarak'sremarkto Netanyahuthatwar is "an old (fashioned)
matter... and willnotsolve anycause"36boils down to a peace-for-peace
formula.EvenwhentheArabLeague raisedthethreatofeconomicboycott
followingIsrael's decision to build a new colony on JabalAbu Ghunaym
(HarHoma) inoccupied EastJerusalem,itwas as a "recommendation"rather
thana commitment.BothEgyptandJordandeclinedassociatedcallsforthe
Arabsto freezetheirnormalizationof relationswithIsrael on thegrounds
thattheyweretiedtopeace agreementsthatpreventedthemfromdoingso.
Whatevertheiractualpolicies,theArabstatescontinueto callfora return
to land forpeace. This formulainvolvesconditionality,forimplicitin the
land-for-peaceconfigurationis a presumedveto:ifno landis returned,there
willbe no peace. Butto whatextentcan theArabscrediblycall forobser-

10. 14 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES
vance oftheformula?TheJune1996ArabsummitinCairoannouncedpeace
as a "strategicchoice." Such a declarationde factorendersland a residual
component.Ifneitherwar nor economic and diplomaticsanctionsare op-
tions,thentheMadridformula(withitsinherentvetoorconditionality)is in
essence dissolved.The summitthuseffectivelyreducedtheformulatopeace
forpeace, inlinewithMubarak'sremark.Butnationsthatattempttopresent
themselvesas unfailinglypeacefulcan hope to obtainlittleby way ofsua-
sion fromany forcestheymay have.37Nor can the veto capabilitycome
fromIslamistbombings:sporadicviolenceisnotthesamethingas warcapa-
bilityand can be dealtwithatthelocal securitylevelratherthanwithinthe
broadercontextofthe"peace process."
In sum,lackingcontrolovertheirconcessionalbehavior,theArabdeci-
sion makershave contributedto theeliminationofthesecond optionalto-
gethereven whilecontinuingto demanditsimplementation.Thisbeingthe
case, theycan onlyact withinthe confinesof an American-Israelisecurity
framework,tiltingthe balances heavilyin favorof the firstoption.Netan-
yahu'sintransigenceand disregardforthesignedagreementsdo notmerely
reflecthiscommitmenttohiselectoralpromises,hiscommonsense negotia-
tioncalculations,and his firmgraspoftheevolvingsituation;theyare also
consistentwithIsraelistrategyand beliefs,albeitwithoutLabor'sfinesseand
fig-leafoffers.And iftheArabnegotiatorsthemselvesare willingto under-
minetheirentitlements,thenitishardlysurprisingthattheiropponenton his
own does notrevertto theless favorablelinkageofland forpeace.
THE THIRD OPTION
In whatamountsto a viciouscircle,capitulationismonlyfuelsbitterness,
resentment,and, ultimately,the mobilizationof the forcesof indigenous
resistance.Thiscan be expected,even ifinthelong run,to bringforthop-
tionthree.
The Palestiniancore oftheArab-Israeliconflictobscuredtheunderlying
religiousand strategicfoundationsofconflictingwills.As long as thefocus
was on thepresumedconfrontationbetweentwo nationalisms,Jewishand
Palestinian,overthesame piece ofland,thesemoreinherentcontradictions
remainedin thebackground.Butwiththegradualcollapse ofnationalistic
justificationsand withtheissue ofJerusalemcomingto thefore,theArab-
Israeli conflictis being reduced to its religiostrategicunderpinnings-a
linkage emergingfromthe factthat"a nation's interestderivesfromits
identity."38
SinceJerusalemis a religiouscause, theclash overitcannotbe secular-
ized-that is,itcannotbecome a solelypoliticalissue.To theextentthatreli-
gionis entitlementcategorical,thecitycannotbe theobjectofcompromise.
Thisbeing thecase, "peace" outcomesand legalitieswill remainmarginal,
applicable in thedomainofpoliticsas long as thecoerciveframeworkthat
producedthemcontinuesin place. In therealmofreligion,however,such

11. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 15
constraintsmaynotfunctionas a long-termviable deterrentand indeed are
morelikelytopromoteconflictinsofaras theyfrustratethepursuitofentitle-
ments,identity,and basic values.39
In theArab/Islamicworld,Islamistgroupsaredrivenmainlybythejustice
motive,whichis value-oriented(entitlement-benefits),whileactorscommit-
tedtothe"peace process"tendtobe moreutility-ori-
ented (cost-benefits).This poses an acute problem
for the application of Westernconflictresolution
mechanisms in an Islamic context.First,militant
Islamistgroupsand Muslimsingeneralcontinue,as a
matterof faithand values, to rejectthe enemyirre-
spectiveofwhattakesplace atthepoliticallevel.Sec-
ond,thecontendingpartiestotheconflictdo notsee
anythingin commonwithone another,nor is there
desireto coexist.40Third,while thePalestinianissue is being transformed
throughthepeace strategy,itis also being countertransformedintoa core
religiousprinciple-a substantivechangethatcould foreshadowa futureIs-
lamic-Jewishconflict.Whatevertheoutcomeofthe "peace process"in the
politicaldomain,itis unlikelyto resolvethebroaderconfrontationthatis
now slowlybutominouslytakingshape.
Externalmechanismsseekingartificiallytoconstructcommongoals orin-
terestsbetween theadversariesdo notapply in thecase ofJerusalemand
would be seen as yetanotherattemptto impose alienstructures.Thisis es-
peciallytruewhen conventionalWesternconflictresolutionprincipleshold
that"peacemaking"isnotpossibleuntilconflictshave "ripened,"thatis,until
costshave escalatedto thepointwherepartiesarepreparedto settle.41War
maybe condemned,but"sanctions,punitiveexpeditions,pacifications,pro-
tectionof treaties,internationalpolice, and measuresto assure peace re-
main."42The harvestin the Arab/Islamicworld is there to see: Egypt
prostrateand ineffectual;Syriaisolatedand pressured;Jordan,an American-
Israelivassal; Palestinianscantonized;Iraq destroyed;Libyaand Sudan em-
bargoed;theArabianpeninsulavirtuallyoccupied; Algeriain the gripof a
bloodbath;Iranand militantIslamistgroupstobe containedorcrushed.On
theotherside is a robustJewishstatewitha nuclearcapabilityand militarily
farmorepowerfulthanall itspotentialadversariescombined.
Ithas been saidthatthesecond GulfWarwas an issue-transformingevent
thatcaused theArabsto recognize"notonlythattheycould notfightIsrael
butthatmanyofthemhad no interestindoingso."43Whilethemajorityof
theArabpeople-as distinctfromtheirlargelydelegitimizedrulers-maynot
sharethisconclusion,itis one thatperception-alteringmechanismsseek to
induce.44Withinsuch a reconstructionoftheregionalorder,SamuelHunt-
ington's"clashofcivilizations"argumentcan be perceivednotsimplyas an
intellectualexerciseto be supportedor refutedattheanalyticallevel,butas
thetheoreticalcover fora policyin the actualprocess of implementation.
Thispolicyattemptsto createtheripeenvironmentalconditionsforthees-
Islamist groups are driven
mainly by thejustice
motive,which is value-
oriented,while actors
committedto the 'peace
process" tend to be more
utility-oriented.

12. 16 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES
tablishmentof"peace" whilereconstructingtheMuslimworldand crushing
grass-rootsIslamistgroups.However,to the extentthatIslam is an active
value thatdeterminesthesubjective(and wherepossible theobjective)na-
tureoftheconflict,itconstitutesan organizationalcountermechanismthat
will continueto block the alterationof the conflictstructure.In Araband
Muslimeyes,and despiteAmerican-Israelieffortsto convincethemother-
wise, thisconflictis a zero-sumgame,forifAmerican-Israeli"peace" is to
constitutetheregion'snew interest,thiswill requirethetransformationof
theregion'sidentity.
The factthatIslam ontologicallyis entitlement-driven(focusingon con-
tent)whilethe"peace process"epistemologicallyis cost-articulated(focus-
ing on process) sets them on incommensurableplanes of interaction.
Harmonizingthoughtsystems,however,requiresthattheybe positioned
withinthesame logical framework.45To harmonizethe "thoughtlogic" of
the Arab/Muslimworld with that of the "peace" strategyrequires that
counterthoughtsbe peripheralizedand ifnecessarycrushed.Whatisatstake
consequentlyis no longerthe politico-nationalproblemof usurpationof
landbutrathertheveryextractionofa nation'sreligio-nationaland historical
heritage.An Arab negotiatorwhose thoughtis reconstructedwithinthe
frameworkof his adversary'sis essentiallyreduced to a supplicantrather
thana counterpart.His willand perceptionsofrealitycontinueto be man-
aged and alteredby the opponent,withany settlementlikelyto hingeon
contingentpowerrelations.Hereinliestheessence oftheso-called"civiliza-
tionalclash"and itscamouflagedlinkto the"peace process."
In focusingon the new Islamic enemy,the UnitedStateshas targeted
whatitcalls "terrorist"groups,aiming,withthe collaborationof clientre-
gimesand withvaryingdegrees of success, to neutralizeand marginalize
them.AnyIslamistoppositionalgroup is thusdepicted as a "disturberof
peace . . . [and]designatedto be an outlawofhumanity."46Whileitmaybe
feasibleto crushsuchgroupsthroughtheoverwhelmingpower ofthestate
and/orexternalassistance,thisdoes not solve theproblemas long as the
environmentalconditionsleadingto theiremergenceremainin place and
regenerate.Nordoes theirsuppressionnecessarilylead to thecontainment
ofIslamicdynamism,sincethevitalityofIslamis notconstrainedby,or de-
pendentupon, theirexistence.Finally,even thoughmanyofthosegroups
could be (or have been) marginalized,theyneverthelesshave succeeded in
scoringa majorstrategicvictoiyby mainstreamingIslam in public lifeand
societyat large.Islamicsymbolspenetratethesocietyand thepoliticaldis-
courseoftheMuslimworldmorethanever,and,ina dialecticalfashion,the
retreatofpoliticalIslamhas been accomplishedbytheadvancementofIs-
lam as a social condition.47Neutralizingthesesubtleundercurrentswould
requirenotonlycrushingthemilitants,butin effectsnuffingout thevalue
systemon whichtheirmotivationsare based. In otherwords,the system
would have to be attackedin itsbasic values and not merelyitspolitical
agenda.

13. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POUTICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 17
CONCLUSION
DefiningIslamas thenew enemyafterthecollapse ofcommunismconsti-
tutes a strategicdecision foreshadowingthe American-Israeliproject of
redrawingthepoliticalmap oftheArabworld.The expectationamongmany
MuslimsthatthisprojectwilltargetnotonlymarginalizedIslamistgroupsor
Muslimregimesbut,morebroadly,mainstreamIslamhas slowlyintroduced
a subtlemessianicstreakintotheirconflictperceptionsand contributedto
raisingforebodingsofupcomingapocalypticevents.
As theseinterest-identityadverselinkagesbecome increasinglytranspar-
ent,and as contiguousArabcountries,especiallyEgypt,graduallyrecognize
once morethatIsraelis nota threatonlytothePalestinians,theconflictwill
continueto changein proportionto theintensityofthosefeelings.ThatIs-
lamis beingpoliticizedis not,therefore,simplya matterofa religiousdoc-
trinethatdoes notallow fortheseparationofreligionand politics,butmore
fundamentallya matterofjusticeand strategicconsiderationsas well. In its
calltoarms,Islamisnotaboutviolenceand extremism;rather,itis aboutthe
legitimateand unequivocalrighttoself-defense.Threatstosecurity,identity,
and religiousvalues cannotbe containedbysuppressionor bymeresettle-
mentarrangements.By the same token,the "peace" being offeredis not
aboutnegotiationsand cooperationbutaboutthedestructionofvalues.The
"peace process"is sayingthatmotivesattheverycore ofhumanneeds will
have to be neutralized.
Westernconflictresolutionmechanismsdo not seem well-equipped to
cope withtheseunique characteristicsofpresentand futureArab-Israelian-
tagonisms.Availabletheoreticalconstructshave externalizedreligiousbe-
liefs as determiningcomponents,reducingthem to culturallyalterable
variables.Religiousconvictions,however,and especiallyMuslimviews of
theJewish/Zionistadversary,remainfixedconflictparameters.Conflictthe-
ory'sreactionhas been to rejectsuch factorsas a sourceofcognitivedisso-
nanceand todismissreligionas a matterofunwelcomecomplexitythatfalls
largelyoutsideitsken.Meanwhile,theseconflicttheorieshave failedto ad-
dresscrucialquestionsas to whether"theweak have the rightto make a
differentsetofrulesforthemselves."48Moreimportantly,theyhave failedto
cope withtheIsraeli-Palestinianshowdown as one facetof a multidimen-
sionalconflictinwhichreligionis a parameter,nota variable.The fearthat
theArab/Muslimworldwillgo ''Islamist"reflectsthefearthatWesternsettle-
mentmechanismsdo not and cannotmeetthebasic humanneeds of the
region'speople.
NOTES
1. JohnBurton,Con,flict:Resolution
and Prevention (London: Macmillan
Press Limited,1990), p. 3.
2. "PresidentHosni Mubarak:The In-
evitabilityof Peace (21 January1989)," in
WalterLaqueur and BarryRubin,eds.,
The Israeli-ArabReader, 5thed. (New
York: Penguin Books, 1995), pp. 546-47.
3. Edward N. Luttwak,Strategy(Cam-
bridge:Belknap Press of HarvardUniver-
sityPress, 1987), p. 241.

14. 18 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
4. Howard Raiffa,TheArtand Science
ofNegotiation (Cambridge: HarvardUni-
versityPress, 1982), p. 215.
5. Raimo Vayrynen,ed., New Direc-
tions in ConflictTheory(London: Sage
Publications,1991), pp. 4-5.
6. Norman G. Finkelstein,Image and
Realityof theIsraeli-Palestinian Conflict
(New York: Verso, 1995), p. 237.
7. Michael Field,Inside theArab
World(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniver-
sityPress, 1994), p. 384.
8. YehoshafatHarkabi,Arab Strategies
and Israel's Response (New York: The
Free Press,1977), p. 103.
9. Interview,Newsweek, 23 June 1997,
p. 39.
10. MelvinJ.Lerner,"The JusticeMo-
tivein Human Relations,"in MelvinJ.Ler-
ner and SallyC. Lerner,eds., TheJustice
Motive in Social Behavior: Adapting to
Times ofScarcityand Change (New
York: Plenum Press, 1981), pp. 12-13.
11. David A. Welch,Justiceand the
Genesis of War (Cambridge,England:
CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993), p. 20.
12. JohnW. Burton,Global Conflict
(London: WheatsheafBooks Ltd.,1984), p.
13.
13. Michael Handel, Weak States in
theInternational System(London: Frank
Cass, 1981), p. 93.
14. Ibid.
15. Welch,Justiceand the Genesis of
War, pp. 20-21.
16. Ibid.,p. 20.
17. Harkabi,Arab Strategies,p. 88.
18. In Reportofa Study Group Con-
vened by theAmerican Academy ofArts
and Sciences, itwas proposed that"re-
gional waterplans would be an important
component of the bilateraland multilat-
eral accords. The opportunityto increase
access to waterwould serve as one of the
inducementsforIsrael to negotiatesecur-
ityaccords withitsneighbors.Projectsto
be given highprioritywould include the
UnityDam on theYarmouk Riverinvolv-
ingJordan,Syriaand Israel,pipelines for
waterfromthe LitaniRiverin Lebanon
and fromTurkeyor Egypt,and a joint
Jordan-Israeldesalinizationplantin Eilat/
Aqaba." The reportis in Ann M. Lesch,
Transitionto Palestinian Self-Govern-
ment (Bloomington:Indiana University
Press, 1992), p. 158. Note the pafternof
concessions requiredof the Arabs in or-
der forIsrael to accept negotiatingsecur-
ityaccords withthem,Israelisecurity
being paramount.Even beforethe advent
of Netanyahu,"securityforpeace" rather
than"land forpeace" was essentially
what was being demanded.
19. Howard Goller, WashingtonPost,
12 August1997.
20. SamarAssad, Los Angeles Times,
12 August1997.
21. BarrySchweid, WashingtonPost,
10 September1997.
22. HenryKissinger,Diplomacy (New
York: Simon and Schuster,1994), pp. 467
and 488.
23. See furtherGlenn E. Robinson,
"The GrowingAuthoritarianismof the
ArafatRegime,"Survival 39, no. 2 (Sum-
mer 1997), 54.
24. Ibid., 45.
25. ChesterL. Karrass,The Negotiating
Game (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell,
1970), pp. 17-19.
26. OtomarJ.Bartos,"SimpleModel
of Negotiation"in I. WilliamZartman,ed.,
The Negotiation Process (London: Sage
Publications,1978), p. 22.
27. Kayhan al-Arabi, 17 March 1998,
p. 11.
28. I. WilliamZartman,"Negotiationas
a JointDecision-MakingProcess," in
Zartman,ed., The Negotiation Process,
pp.76-77.
29. Accordingto Benjamin Netanyahu,
YitzhakRabin,the assassinated Labor
partyleader and formerprimeminister,
"was vely clear thattherewere no limita-
tionswhatsoeveron Israeli construction
inJerusalem.Rabin was the one who au-
thorizedthe buildingof Har Homa (Jabal
Ghoneim settlement),"Interview,News-
week, 23 June 1997, p. 39.
30. Commentingon the result,and
perhaps justifyingNetanyahu'sposition
and his own call forredesigningthe Oslo
agreements,Kissingerstatedthatany
analogy to the earlystages of the peace
process was illusory.As he put it "inthe
earliernegotiation,step-by-stepprogress
relieved tensionsand builtconfidence.
On theWest Bank, the opposite was the
case. Both sides had jumped intothe
'peace process' withouthaving clarified
workable objectives and expected to
wrestthatclarityfromthe process itself.
Instead,ithas compounded theirperplex-
ities.This was no accident.Clearly,Arafat
was led to believe by Israeli,American
and European interlocutorsthatthe final

15. THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 19
destinationwas at least the '67 borders
and recognitionof a Palestinianstate-
hood. But thatignoredthevast difference
in the negotiationsbetween Israel and the
PLO compared withthose between Israel
and the neighboringArab states." Henty
Kissinger,"The Oslo Piecemeal Process,"
WashingtonPost, 24 August1997.
31. As quoted by Noam Chomsky,
"EasternExposure: Misrepresentingthe
Peace Process," Village Voice, 6 February
1996,p. 6.
32. Carl Schmitt,The Concept of the
Political, trans. George Schwab (New
Brunswick:RutgersUniversityPress,1976),
p. 49.
33. Boutros Boutros-Ghali,Tariq Misr
ila al-Quds [Egypt'sroad to Jerusalem],
(Cairo: Al-AhramCenterforTranslation
and Publication,1997), p. 137. Author's
translation.
34. RaymondCohen, Negotiating
AcrossCultures(Washington,D.C.: United
StatesInstituteof Peace Press, 1995), pp.
55-56. On the Egyptian-U.S.relationship,
Cohen writes(p. 56) thatrarely"can a pa-
tron-clientrelationshiphave achieved
such pronounced expression."
35. Luc Reychler,"The Artof Conflict
Prevention:Theoryand Practice,"in Wer-
ner Bauwens and Luc Reychler,ed., The
ArtofConfflictPrevention (London:
Brassey's,1994), pp. 5-7. See also Roger
Fisherand WilliamUry,Gettingto Yes
(New York: Penguin Books, 1983), as a
representativeof the HarvardNegotia-
tionsProject.
36. InterviewwithHusni Mubarak.Al-
Hawadeth, 21-27 February1997, p. 21.
37. Luttwak,Strategy,p. 194.
38. Samuel P. Huntington,"The Ero-
sion ofAmericanNational Interests,"For-
eign Affairs5,no. 75 (Sept.-Oct. 1997), p.
1.
39. Burton,Global Conflict,pp.
137-38.
40. Mohammed Abu-Nimer,"Conflict
Resolutionin an Islamic Context,"Peace
and Change 21, no. 1 (January1996), pp.
33-34.
41. Burton,Conflict.Resolution and
Prevention,p. 88.
42. Schmitt,The Concept of thePolit-
ical, p. 79.
43. Field,Inside theArab World,p.
385. Emphasis added.
44. Commentingon several polls in
theArabworld relatedto thismatter,Ed-
ward Said observed: "In evetyinstance
public opinion has in factexpressed no
enthusiasmfornormalizationwithIsrael.
On mass level thissuggeststhatthe sense
of defeatis not quite as widespread and
prostrateas officialpolicy and the logic
of capitulationistintellectualswould have
us believe." See his Peace and itsDiscon-
tents(New York: VintageBooks, 1995), p.
134.
45. Burton,Conflict.Resolution and
Prevention,p. 89.
46. Schmitt,The Concept of thePolit-
ical, p. 79.
47. OlivierRoy, The Failure ofPolit-
ical Islam, trans.Carol Volk (Cambridge:
HarvardUniversityPress, 1994), p. 78.
48. George Orwell,A CollectionofEs-
says (New York: Harcourt,1981), p. 40.