By Rebecca S. Robinson, Arizona State University, presentation for AUSACE 2012

1. Rebecca S. Robinson
AUSACE
Atlanta, Georgia
November 19, 2012

2.  Arab Spring created a media hailstorm but
nations that did not achieve complete
revolution were overlooked
 Morocco offers an interesting case study for
social media researchers
 Examine why OCA of Blogoma failed to
explain how event would unfold
 Argument: Fragmentation of society
manifests online and off. Collective action
frames of the Blogoma failed to resonate
with the greater population.

3.  Lead author’s ethnographic research 2007-
2009: employed participant observation,
content analysis, interviews, and surveys
 This research oriented us to the primary
concerns of the bloggers: civil liberties and
freedom of speech, govt accountability
 Updated in 2012 through the discussions of
many of the same informants and they
oriented us to new blogs
 Examined dozens of blogs in English and
French (Feb 20, referendum, elections)

4.  Significant
social, economic, political, religious, linguisti
c, and ethnic distinctions
 DD not so much the binary of un/linked
(Selwyn 2004; Graham 2011) but similar
societal divides manifest off/online or are
exacerbated (Farrell 2012; Couldry 2012)
 Linguistic divide: even lower classes with access
may not contribute to Blogoma
 Arabophone bloggers, at times from divergent
socio-economic backgrounds, less likely than
Francophone to cover Mourtada and Erraji arrests

5.  “Homophily” reaffirms that interest of group
are most important issues (Farrell 2012)
 Blogoma presents as a unified front although
societal fragmentation prevalent
 Diagnostic frames identified in earlier
research: expand liberties and free speech
through govt accountability
 Prognostic frame: parliamentary monarchy
 Benford and Snow (1988) salience and
credibility most important

6.  Bloggerspart of media landscape so clearly
free speech important part of movement
 Not directly affected by poverty, illiteracy, lack
of services that preoccupy majority of
population, which impedes salience
 Regime started campaign to discredit
protesters/bloggers as inauthentic Moroccans
and called upon the true ones to uphold
sacred institutions through voting
 PJD not implicated in past corruption so able to
maintain credibility unlike bloggers/protesters

7.  Started as networking community in 2004 but
began to exhibit solidarity of a collective,
especially surrounding censorship issues:
Google Earth, YouTube, Mourtada, Erraji
 Less success in influencing politics
(abstention/anti-PJD in 2007 elections)
 Success in social initiatives: BlogonsUtile!
and Gaza relief
 1st survey: 18:21 said censorship issues were
most important
 2nd survey: 42 unanimously said Moroccans
should be able to debate sacred institutions

8.  Feb 20 resonates w/ Blogoma initiatives:
parliamentary monarchy free from arbitrary
rule and special favors (grima)
 Some linkages theoretical, others clear
 Former informant, Hisham Almiraat, co-founder
of Mamfakinch—covers protests
 Feb 20 viral YouTube video offers various
reasons for protesting:
freedom, equality, better living
standards, education, labor rights, minority
rights (Lalami 2011)
 Regime responds w/ subsidies, jobs, reforms

9.  Why did the protests not result in revolt?
 1st: Alaouais have maintained popularity--
1,200 yo dynasty descends from Prophet,
Moroccans inculcated with inseparability of
God, state, and monarchy (Roumana 2011),
regime scapegoating
 2nd: King central to stability—April Marrakech
bombing (M4C 2011)—against militants, used
to squelch assembly (Hogan 2011)
 3rd: part-time protesting (Imad 2011),
movement splintering (37 orgs) (M4C 2011)

10.  4th:middle class dubious of the ability of the
lower classes to participate in democracy
(Tourabi 2011)
 Blogoma/Feb 20 reject integration of religion
into politics not likely to have voted for
PJD, which has managed to avoid scandals
 PJD promises to reduce poverty, increase
wages, and fight corruption (Cabalmuse
2011), which are more concrete than
Blogoma/Feb 20’s abstract ideas of liberties
 Majority believe that PJD can reform system

11.  Majority of Moroccans voted for change
through PJD
 Islamic-oriented political parties have
offered services for years (Cohen and Jaidi
2008)
 Not likely concerned PJD’s rumored changes:
liquor sales, co-ed beaches, promoting hijab
 Coalitions integral to effective politicking
(Almiraat 2011)—hopefully expected change
will be realized
 The Arab Spring has not passed Morocco by:
it is in hibernation for the winter