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1. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting www.iiste.org
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)
Vol 3, No 2, 2012
Concentrated Share Ownership and Financial Performance
of Listed Companies in Ghana
Dadson Awunyo-Vitor (Corresponding Author)
Department of Agricultural Economics,
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology,
P.O. Box UP 1007, Kumasi, Ghana
Tel: +233(0)208152298 Email: Awunyovitor@yahoo.co. uk/ Dawunyo-vitor.ksb@knust.edu.gh
Emmanuel Baah
Leap Credit,
P. O. Box NW 722, Nsawam
# D102, Market/Bank Street, Nsawam
Tel: +233(0)3412255512, Email: dzidula@leapcredit.com
Abstract
Investment on the Ghana Stock Exchange has attracted keen interest from within and outside the
country. Foreign investors have grown substantially in developing markets over the last two decades,
parallel with the increase in their impact. These investors seek to own large proportions of equities as
well as acquire State Owned Enterprises, and as a result they have become influential on the
performance of companies in which they invest. Previous studies show no conclusive evidence on the
direction of the role of share ownership on the financial performance of firms especially in developing
economies. This research attempts to examine the effect of share ownership and investors’ involvement
on performance of investee companies. The study was conducted using panel data regression analysis
and Performance was measured by using Tobin's Q and Return on Asset (RoA). Significant statistical
relationships were found in this research. The results of the research suggest that share ownership on
the Ghana Stock Exchange is heavily concentrated in the hands of Ghanaians and that ownership
concentration, institutional and insider ownership precipitate higher firm financial performance. There
is the need to encourage concentrated ownership structure. Also, investments by insider and
institutional ownerships should be promoted in order to ensure proper monitoring, reduced agency
costs and improve performance.
Keywords: ownership structure, concentration, financial performance, Ghana stock exchange
1. Introduction
Theoretically, was argued that the ownership concentration may improve performance by decreasing
monitoring costs or decline due to the possibility that large shareholders use their control rights to
monitor activities of the agents (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Stiglitz (1999) also asserted that when
shareholders are dispersed, monitoring of mangers becomes a public good and hence is under supplied
which affect financial performance of the firm negatively. As a result, all owners have little control
over mangers, which may pursue goals different from maximizing financial performance of the
company. This is likely to impair company financial performance.
Indeed several authors asserted that ownership concentration act as monitoring mechanism, endowed
with incentives to reconcile the interests of shareholders and consequently a determinant in the value
maximization for example, Jensen (1986), Stiglitz (1985) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), They predict
the possibility of concentrating ownership in the hands of a limited number of shareholders as a
mechanism to monitor the activities of the agent and ensure that the interest of the principal is
projected. Furthermore, concentrated ownership may reduce managerial incentives to consume
perquisites, expropriate shareholders’ wealth as a result of strict monitoring by the shareholders
(Meckling, 1976). Thus concentrated share ownership would improve financial performance of the
firm
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2. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting www.iiste.org
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)
Vol 3, No 2, 2012
Thus Shareholders attempt to concentrate their share holding in order to have control and ensure that
their interest is served to avoid most of problem which may emerge because of the conflict of interest
between principal and agent. On the other hands Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that dispersed share
ownership may rather have adverse (entrenchment) effects in reconciling agency conflicts. This may
lead to an increase in managerial opportunism; implying conflict of interest on the part of corporations’
agents Thus , diversify ownership may prove necessary for management to have the capacity to handle
complex organisational structures, diversify risk among shareholders and obtain large enough funds to
acquire specific assets.
Indeed empirical studies by number of researchers on performance implications of ownership
concentration have produced mixed results. For example some empirical studies found that
concentrated share ownership affects firm’s performance as the ownership concentration motivates
innovation that leads to value maximization (Hill and Snell,1989). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) posited
that equity concentration is more likely to have a positive effect on firm performance in situations
where control by large equity holders may act as a substitute for legal protection in countries with weak
investor protection and less developed stock markets where they also classify Continental Europe.
Countering this, Fama (1983); Morck et al.(1988) point to the possibility of negative entrenchment
effects on firm performance associated with high managerial ownership stakes. For example in areas
where legal protection of minority ownership is absent, concentrated ownership is likely to be
accompanied by weak and non- transparent disclosures with negative implication for firm performance.
A study by Mayer, and Rossi (2007,) report that “one of the best established stylized facts about
corporate ownership is that ownership of large listed companies is dispersed . . . in the U.S. and
concentrated in most other countries.” Dispersion of ownership arises when shares are distributed
among numerous petty stock holders. However if there is an effective mechanism for legal protection
of minority ownership rights, the problem of ownership dispersion may not be great. Thus the debate
on the effect of share ownership concentration and firm’s financial performance is inconclusive.
Apart from the results being inconclusive most of the research on ownership concentration and
performance has been conducted in developed countries (Bergström, and Rydqvist. 1990;
Bebchuk,,1999; Allen, and Phillips, 2000). However, there is an increasing awareness that the
theories developed in developed countries based on research evidence collected on developed countries
may have limited applicability to emerging market.
This attributed to the vast differences in political, socio-cultural and business contexts between the
developed and developing countries. For example in a recent study on corporate governance by Zeitun
and Gary ( 2007) suggest that social, economic and cultural factors of a country affect corporate
ownership structure which in turn impacts on a firm’s performance. This, present an important
opportunity for research into ownership concentration and performance of firms listed on Ghana Stock
Exchange. Thus the main objective of this paper is to analyse the relationship between share
concentration and performance of listed firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange.
2. Literature
2.1 The fundamental discourse between Ownership structure and Firm Performance
Developed economies are largely characterized by the existence of a widely held ownership structure,
highly liquid stock markets due to good investor protection and control of companies by professional
managers on behalf of scattered shareholders (Bhasa2004). In these economies, corporate management
has more power to make decisions, and these decisions may frequently be in their own interest, which
may give rise to an agency cost. Agency theory argues that ownership concentration may improve firm
performance by decreasing agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Jensen and Meckling (1976)
claim that agency costs consist of three different components: monitoring costs, bonding costs and
residual loss. Monitoring costs are the control costs incurred by the principal to mitigate the deceitful
behavior of the manager. Bonding costs are incurred to ensure that the manager takes decisions
beneficial to the principal. Residual loss is a political cost that occurs when both the above kind of
costs fails to control the divergent behavior of the manager.
In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) showed formally how share identity can influence the agency
cost and value of the firm. Since then, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm
performance has attracted special attention. Agency theory perspective and empirical literature thereof
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3. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting www.iiste.org
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)
Vol 3, No 2, 2012
usually considers share identity specially insider ownership as the main corporate mechanism that
affects firm value. However, empirical evidence regarding the relationship between ownership
concentration and the financial performance or firm’s value has shown mix results (e.g., Agrawal and
Knoeber, 1996; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Thomsen and pedersen 2006). Counteracting the
convergence-of Interest Hypothesis, Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that a rise in the managerial
share-ownership stakes may have adverse (entrenchment) effects in reconciling agency conflicts and
these can lead to an increase in managerial opportunism; implying conflict of interest on the part of
corporations’ agents and hence hurting overall performance of the corporation. Furthering this
proposition Jensen and Ruback, (1983) argued that the principal and the agent (agency cost theory) are
never exactly the same, and thus the agent, who is the decision-making part, tends always to pursue his
own interests instead of those of the principal. It means that the agent will always tend to spend the free
cash flow available to fulfil his need for self-aggrandisement and prestige instead of returning it to
shareholders. Hence, the main problem faced by shareholders is to ensure that managers will return
excess cash flow to them (e.g. through dividend payouts), instead of having it invested in unprofitable
projects (Jensen, 1986). If the principal wants to make sure that the agent acts in his interests he must
undertake some Agency Costs (e.g. the cost of monitoring managers). The more the principals want to
control manager decisions the higher their agency costs will be.
The agency theory hypothesis that ownership concentration and share identity may improve firm
performance by decreasing agency costs. This was first challenged by Demsetz (1983), who argues that
the ownership structure of a corporation should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of decisions
that reflect the influence of shareholders on the management of the firm which may influence agency to
improve value of the firm. According to Demsetz (1983), there should be no systematic relation
between variations in ownership structure and variations in firm performance. Demsetz and Lehn
(1985) used profit as a measure of firm’s performance on a proportion of shares owned by the top five
percent shareholders to evaluate the relationship between ownership concentration and firms’
performance. They found no evidence of any relation between the profit rate and the ownership
concentration.
2.2. Empirical studies on share ownership and firm performance
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) investigated the important role played by concentrated ownership of shares,
by examining the relationship between firm’s share price and ownership concentration. They found
positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. In a related study, Morck et al.
(1988) re-examined the relation between corporate ownership structure and firms’ performance. They
used Tobin’s q as a measure of firms’ performance. Their results revealed positive relationship between
ownership concentration and Tobin’s q.
Wu and Cui (2002) found that there is a positive relation between ownership concentration and Return
on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) which are measures of accounting profits. However they
reported a negative relationship between ownership concentration and market value of the firms which
was measured as share price per earnings ratio (P/E) and market price to book value ratio
(M/B).Studies on ownership structure and performance in developed countries firms substantially rely
on the legal protection of investors consequently the ownership structure of these firms is found to be
dispersed. In other areas where there is less reliance on elaborate legal protections, share ownership
tend to be concentrated in the hands of large investors and banks, for example Europe and Japan. In
developing countries where legal protection is weaker, share ownership is typically heavily
concentrated in hands of families.
In emerging economies, where firm ownership is highly concentrated with family ownership, a positive
and significant effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is proposed. Zeitun and Gary
(2007) examined the relationship of ownership concentration, and firm performance both in term of
accounting measures and market measures using a sample of public listed companies in the Jordan
stock exchange, and found that there is a significant relation between ownership concentration and the
accounting performance measures. Abor and Biekpe (2007) investigated whether the effects of
corporate governance and ownership structure on the performance of SME’s in Ghana. They found that
board size, board composition, CEO duality, inside ownership and family ownership have significant
positive impacts on profitability.
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4. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting www.iiste.org
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)
Vol 3, No 2, 2012
However, interaction of these economic characteristics with governance and corporate structures and
performance implications of these factors have not been examined extensively even though the
empirical studies on ownership structure on firms’ performance, mostly from developed countries,
have provided divergent evidence. These contextual differences across countries therefore, create
another dimension to the ownership structure and performance issue. Because of the contextual
differences across countries, different relations between ownership and firm value could be expected.
The problem is compounded where shareholder cannot rely on only the market regulators to allocate
assets to the most productive firms Hashi (1997). It may be advantageous to employ several measures
rather than select a single one relying on subjective assumptions about their appropriateness. For
instance Kuznetsov and Muravyev (2001) employed labour productivity, profitability, and Tobin’s q as
proxies for performance.
2.3. Determinants of firm Performance
Performance is a difficult concept, in terms of both definition and measurement. It has been defined as
the result of activity, and the appropriate measure selected to assess corporate performance is
considered to depend on the type of organization to be evaluated, and the objectives to be achieved
through that evaluation Hunger et al (1997). Researchers have offered a variety of models for
analyzing corporate performance. However, little consensus has emerged on what constitutes a valid
set of performance criteria Cameron, (1981).
Lewin et al (1986) for instance, have suggested that studies on corporate performance should include
multiple criteria analysis. Thus different models or patterns of relationship between corporate
performance and its determinants should be used to demonstrate the various sets of relationships
between the dependent and the independent variables in the estimated models (Schmidt,1993). Nickell
et al.(1997), have identified the following factors as the drivers of performance, namely firm size,
competition, leverage, corporate control, and corporate demographic issues
The effects of firm size on corporate performance have gained important attentions in the research of
the firm. According to common intuition, the size of the firm has an important role in firm performance
for many reasons. In a certain perspective of studies, size can be a proxy of firm resource. Since larger
firms have more organizational resources, they give larger firms the better equipment to achieve their
goals Penrose, (1959). Sizes can also proxy for the probability of default and the volatility of firm
assets. It assumes that larger firms are more difficult to liquidate.
Majumdar (1997) also point out that larger firms generate superior performance relative to smaller
firms. A firm’s demographic characteristic such as number of outlets and the age or life stage of the
firm as well as board size are seen by some researchers as driver of corporate performance. If there are
economies of scale, a larger number of outlets mean a better performance, if not; more outlets lead to a
worse performance. In a study on retail banks, Barnett et al. (1994) find single unit banks performing
better. They argue that a firm’s emphasis on market positioning retards organizational learning.
Again the age of a firm is said to have a consequence for performance. Firms have a cycle of growth
and decline. Newly established firms generally have an enthusiastic and energetic crew, which should
enhance performance. On the other hand young firms are confronted with start-up problems Cromie
(1991). Older firms have overcome these problems, and can rely on experience and a network of
existing suppliers and customers, which enhances efficiency. Birley (1990) find mature firms
performing better.
3.0. Methodology
This study employed data on listed firms at the Ghana Stock Exchange over a period of ten years
spanning from 1999 to 2008. The data were collected from different sources including audited
accounts of the listed companies as well as from the fact book of the Ghana Stock Exchange. Panel
data was developed and used for this study as it increases efficiency by combining time series and
cross-section data. To reveal the impact of ownership concentration on firm’s performance, the
estimation procedure used by Kuznetsov and Muravyev (2001) was adopted modified as:
= + +
(1)
Where
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5. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting www.iiste.org
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)
Vol 3, No 2, 2012
• is performance measure,
• αi = refers to time-invariant firm-specific effects
• are the independent (ownership concentration and control) variables
• coefficients of ownership and control variables respectively
• is a random disturbance.
Based on the above general model the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance was
evaluated using the model outlined below.
PERF it = α0 + β1TOP5it + β2TOP5SQit+ β3DEBTit + β4FIRMSIZEit + β5BODSIZEit+ β6 BODSIZESQit
+ β7AGEit + β8AGESQit Ɛit
(2)
Where
• PERF it , is the measure of the performance of the firms
• αi is a constant term that is the intercept of the regression equation
• β is the coefficient of the variables and βi represents the sensitivity of a company i’s
performance to changes in the movements of the various variables
• TOP5it is the ownership concentration of the ith firm
• TOP5SQit is the square of the ownership concentration of the ith firm
• FIRMSIZEit is the size of the ith firm
• BODSIZEit is the board size of the ith firm
• BODSIZESQit is the square of board size of the ith firm
• AGE is the length of existence – age- of the ith firm
• AGESQit is the squre of the age of the ith firm
• Ɛit is the error term
• The subscripts and i and t represent listed firm and time respectively.
In this study two performance measures were considered, namely return on assets and Tobin’s q. This
choice is motivated by the assumption that these indicators may have different interpretations regarding
firm’s performance. Return on assets is calculated by dividing income after tax by total assets. Tobin’s
q is the ratio of market values of equity to the book value equity. Market capitalization is used as proxy
for the market value of equity and is obtained from the GSE’s trading list from 1999 to 2008.
4.0. Results and discussion
The descriptive statistics of the performance indicators and level of share ownership concentration as
well as control variables are shown in Table 1. The average Tobin’s Q for the period under study is
0.921453 with a high standard deviation of 1.552668 (155.27%). The results show that on the average
firms listed on the GSE achieved a Tobin’s q of 92.15% which is quite high. However, the high
deviation of 155.27% suggests that very few firms were able to achieve the average Tobin’s q. on the
average, about 0.7644432 (76.44%) of shares of listed companies on GSE is in the hands of Top 5
shareholders. This depicts that firms are concentrated and the result is fairly representative of the entire
observations because its dispersion is about 0.1289022 (12.89%). A greater percentage of the assets of
listed companies are financed with debt even though the deviation is very high (Mean; 0.654534 and
Standard deviation; 0.7297543). The average of board size is 9.260337 with a deviation of 2.545818.
Lastly, the average of the squared board size listed firms is 92.260337 with a very high variation of
53.0221. ( Note 1)
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test and sign test was conducted to test for the stationary and
presence of multicollinearity respectively. The results of these tests showed that the variables were
stationery and multicolliaritity is not a serious issue. Furthermore, the Hausman specification test was
conducted and the result suggests that the firm fixed effects approach was the appropriate test to be
employed for the data analysis. The value of the overall R-square from the regression equation
involving Tobin’s q was 0.7540 representing 75.4%. This means that 75% of the dependent variable is
explained by the explanatory variables. The model is also fit for the regression since the P-value (Prob.
>F = 0.0000) is also statistically significant. On the other hand the overall R-square from the
regression equation with Return on Assets was 0.3646, that is, the explanatory variables explains
36.46% if a change in the dependent variable. The P-value (Prob. > F=0.0000) is also highly
significant. The regression results are presented in table 2 below (Note 2)
The results indicate that ownership concentration is positively related to Tobin’s q. on the other hand
the square of ownership concentration has a negative relationship with Tobin’s Q. However, they are
jointly insignificant. Similarly, ownership concentration is positively related to Return on Assets while
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6. Research Journal of Finance and Accounting www.iiste.org
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)
Vol 3, No 2, 2012
its square variable has a negative relation. Here both concentration and the square of concentration are
highly significant at 1% level. Our results are in line with theory that concentrated ownership improves
performance. This may be attributed to better monitoring of managers to restrains their opportunities to
pursue their own interests then smaller and dispersed shareholders. The findings are also consistent
with empirical evidence from the studies of Wu and Cui (2001), Kuznetsov and Muravyev (2001),
Djankov and Cleassens (1999), Pohl et al. (1997), Barberies et al. (1996) and Earle and Estrin (1996)
who in their various studies find positive relation between ownership concentration and firm’s financial
performance. The negative relationship between the square of concentration and performance suggests
that concentration has a non linear relation with performance. Performance increases with
concentration, reaches the optimum level beyond which any increase in concentration results in a
decrease in performance. Besides ownership concentration there may be other hidden factors that may
affect performance. Contrary to expectation firm size is negatively related to Tobin’s q and return on
assets. The results are statistically significant at 1% and 5% level respectively. Theoretically it is
believed that larger firms improve performance since they have huge capital to acquire high technology
equipment and employ highly skilled labour to improve performance. Our result is consistent with
empirical findings by Haines (1970), Marshal (1961) and Marcus (1969) who found a negative
correlation between firm size and profitability.
On the other hand the results show that age is positively related to RoA and Tobin’s q. However, they
are both insignificant. The results suggest that age has a positive impact on performance. It is argued
that older firms may have built up reputation over the years and acquired considerable experiences to
enable them compete favourably in the market. Over time, firms discover what they are good at and
learn to be more efficient (Arrow, 1962; Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1995). They specialize
and find ways to standardize coordinate and speed up their production processes. As well as to reduce
costs and improve quality. On the other hand the square of age is negatively related to return on assets
and Tobin’s q and in both cases they are also found to be insignificant. This suggests that old age may
make knowledge, abilities and skills obsolete and induce organizational decay (Agarwal and Gort,
1996, 2002). Therefore performance may get to the optimum and then decline.
The findings revealed that debt positively related to return on assets and Tobin’s q. it is however, that
of Tobin’s q is highly significant at 1% while that of return on assets is insignificant. The findings
suggest that debt has a positive impact on performance. This is in line with theory that the introduction
of debt in the capital structure of the firm improves performance since it exerts pressure on
management to work harder to settle their obligation. The finding is consistent with our expectation
and that of empirical evidence by Michealas et al. (1999). Lastly, while board size is positively related
to Tobin’s q, its square has a negative relation. The equation with return on assets however shows that
both board size and its square are negatively related. However, the two equations reveal that they are
all insignificant.
5.0. Concluding remarks
Generally on average, firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange achieved 92% ratio of market value to
book value (Tobin’s q). Also about 76% of the share traded on the exchanged is held by Top 5%
shareholders Large proportion of asset of these firms are financed by debt and board size is quite high
with average of 9.The regression result revealed that ownership concentration has significant positive
effect on performance (return on asset). Thus cconcentrated ownership improves return on asset
however ownership concentration does not offer significant increase in market value of the firms. In
the context of the above findings and conclusion corporate ownership structure of companies should be
evaluated and monitored. In particular, concentrated ownership structure should be encouraged.
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Note 1
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of performance measures and level of ownership concentration
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Logroa 219 -2.8427 0.9094 -6.6748 -0.1528
Logtobin’s q 259 0.9215 1.5527 -2.4010 8.5675
TOP5% 264 0.7644 0.1289 0.3614 0.9836
TOP5%SQ 264 0.6009 0.1862 0.1306 0.9675
Firm size 264 6.4347 1.4519 2.9498 10.1799
Age 264 32.8485 14.0420 5.0000 64.0000
Agesq 264 1275.4550 944.7545 25.0000 4096.0000
Bodsize 264 9.2604 2.5458 4.0000 19.0000
Bodsizesq 264 92.1818 53.0221 16.0000 361.0000
Source: Ghana stock exchange field data (1999-2008)
Note 2:
Table 2: Regression Model results: concentration and firm performance
Variables Logtobin’s q Logroa
Coef. t-statistic Prob. Coef. t-statistic Prob.
Top5 4.4887 1.1900 0.2350 23.4547 5.0600 0.0000
Top5sq -2.1550 -0.8300 0.4060 -15.8736 -5.000 0.0000
Firmsize -0.1144 -3.2200 0.0010 -0.1074 -2.4500 0.0150
Age 0.0029 0.1700 0.8620 0.0209 0.9800 0.3290
Agesq -0.0003 -1.1600 0.2470 -0.0003 -0.8100 0.4220
Debt 1.7028 5.9400 0.0000 0.0450 0.5900 0.5570
Bodsize 0.0426 0.4100 0.6820 -0.0220 -0.1600 0.8750
Bodsizesq 0.0010 -0.1900 0.8470 -0.0015 -0.0230 0.8210
_cons -1.9645 -1.2800 0.2010 -10.9583 -6.0200 0.0000
R-sq 0.7540 0.3646
F (.) 59.0100 42.0001
Prob.>f 0.0000 0.0000
Source: Ghana Stock exchange (1999-2008)
85

9. International Journals Call for Paper
The IISTE, a U.S. publisher, is currently hosting the academic journals listed below. The peer review process of the following journals
usually takes LESS THAN 14 business days and IISTE usually publishes a qualified article within 30 days. Authors should
send their full paper to the following email address. More information can be found in the IISTE website : www.iiste.org
Business, Economics, Finance and Management PAPER SUBMISSION EMAIL
European Journal of Business and Management EJBM@iiste.org
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting RJFA@iiste.org
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development JESD@iiste.org
Information and Knowledge Management IKM@iiste.org
Developing Country Studies DCS@iiste.org
Industrial Engineering Letters IEL@iiste.org
Physical Sciences, Mathematics and Chemistry PAPER SUBMISSION EMAIL
Journal of Natural Sciences Research JNSR@iiste.org
Chemistry and Materials Research CMR@iiste.org
Mathematical Theory and Modeling MTM@iiste.org
Advances in Physics Theories and Applications APTA@iiste.org
Chemical and Process Engineering Research CPER@iiste.org
Engineering, Technology and Systems PAPER SUBMISSION EMAIL
Computer Engineering and Intelligent Systems CEIS@iiste.org
Innovative Systems Design and Engineering ISDE@iiste.org
Journal of Energy Technologies and Policy JETP@iiste.org
Information and Knowledge Management IKM@iiste.org
Control Theory and Informatics CTI@iiste.org
Journal of Information Engineering and Applications JIEA@iiste.org
Industrial Engineering Letters IEL@iiste.org
Network and Complex Systems NCS@iiste.org
Environment, Civil, Materials Sciences PAPER SUBMISSION EMAIL
Journal of Environment and Earth Science JEES@iiste.org
Civil and Environmental Research CER@iiste.org
Journal of Natural Sciences Research JNSR@iiste.org
Civil and Environmental Research CER@iiste.org
Life Science, Food and Medical Sciences PAPER SUBMISSION EMAIL
Journal of Natural Sciences Research JNSR@iiste.org
Journal of Biology, Agriculture and Healthcare JBAH@iiste.org
Food Science and Quality Management FSQM@iiste.org
Chemistry and Materials Research CMR@iiste.org
Education, and other Social Sciences PAPER SUBMISSION EMAIL
Journal of Education and Practice JEP@iiste.org
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization JLPG@iiste.org Global knowledge sharing:
New Media and Mass Communication NMMC@iiste.org EBSCO, Index Copernicus, Ulrich's
Journal of Energy Technologies and Policy JETP@iiste.org Periodicals Directory, JournalTOCS, PKP
Historical Research Letter HRL@iiste.org Open Archives Harvester, Bielefeld
Academic Search Engine, Elektronische
Public Policy and Administration Research PPAR@iiste.org Zeitschriftenbibliothek EZB, Open J-Gate,
International Affairs and Global Strategy IAGS@iiste.org OCLC WorldCat, Universe Digtial Library ,
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences RHSS@iiste.org NewJour, Google Scholar.
Developing Country Studies DCS@iiste.org IISTE is member of CrossRef. All journals
Arts and Design Studies ADS@iiste.org have high IC Impact Factor Values (ICV).