1. UAVs offer capabilities conventional manned aircrafts cannot. These include lower costs and
better endurance, both human and technological. According to Michael Lewis, drone
development minimizes “the number of human lives placed at risk to collect intelligence and to
deliver small amounts of ordnance with some degree of precision.”1 Drone pilots can also
identify their targets thanks to laser cameras installed on the front of the UAV, giving drone
pilots the ability to strike with precision with little error. With calls to reduce the United States
defense budget, drones offer a cheaper and attractive alternative to conventional manned aircraft.
A “Predator” drone costs approximately $4.5 million while the “Reaper” costs around
$11 million. The cost of an F-22 Raptor, the United States’ premier fighter jet, is approximately
ten times the amount of the latter UAV.2 However, as more sophisticated technology is built on
to drones, costs may rise over time.3 Drones also burn less fuel than manned aircraft. The four-
cylinder engine of “Predator” drone is said to burn 300 times less fuel than the average fighter jet
(which can only last two hours in the air before refueling), allowing the UAV the capability to
fly for longer stretches of time.4 Although drones are as susceptible to mishaps and crashes as
manned aircraft, monetary loss between the two favors UAVs. According to U.S. Air Force
Mishap Estimates from fiscal year 2013, there were one “Reaper” and four “Predator” drone
mishaps.5 Total estimated losses for these aircrafts were $27,957,644, about $4.7 million per
aircraft.6 In comparison, there were seven F-16 jet mishaps in 2013, costing the Air Force over
$160 million in monetary loss, an average of nearly $23 million per aircraft.7 The F-16 mishaps
also resulted in the deaths of two pilots, an occurrence drone pilots avoid as they operate their
aircrafts away from the battlefield.
A manned aircraft, though it may be superior to UAVs with regards to speed, versatility,
and maneuverability, is constrained by human limitations. Both sets of pilots battle human
performance limitations, for example, fatigue and hunger. A fighter pilot has to return to base to
1 Michael W. Lewis, “Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield,” Texas International Law Journal 47 (2): 296,
accessed March 4, 2014 http://www.tilj.org/content/journal/47/num2/Lewis293.pdf.
2 Romesh Ratnesar, “Five Reasons Why Drones Are Here to Stay,” Bloomberg Business Week, May 23, 2013,
accessed April 12, 2014, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-23/five-reasons-why-drones-are-here-to-
stay.
3 Schwing, 11.
4 PBS “Rise of the Drones”
5 The term “Mishap” is the United States Air Force’s preferred term when discussing crashed aircraft.
6 “United Air Force Fiscal Year 2013,” United States Air Force, last modified September 12, 2013, accessed April 2,
2014, http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/indexFY13.htm
7 The Author chose the F-16 losses to drone losses since the aircraft endured the closest number of mishaps
compared to the UAVs in 2013.

2. address these limitations and may lose the target, while a UAV pilot can pass on the controls to a
colleague. Aircraft pilots also monitor equipment, fuel levels, ammunition levels,
communication, and all the systems inside the plane.8 They also have to monitor (and at times
evade) aerial threats, surface-to-air missiles, and ground fire, all while attempting to identify
accurately and hit the target. These pilots’ lives are sometimes on the line, and losing them in a
crash or capture is unthinkable enough without also benefitting the enemy.9 With UAVs, there is
no risk of losing pilots, as they operate far removed from the battlefield, mostly in trailers turned
into makeshift cockpits.10 This practice allows pilots (and all those who can monitor the situation
from within these cockpits or live video feed) to determine the proper target and whether or not
to strike.11
A single drone can offer hours of unbroken surveillance, as it can stay airborne for a longer
stretch of time compared to conventional aircraft. Northrop Grumman’s RQ-4 “Global Hawk”
has a flight time range of up to 42 hours, while the “Predator” and Reaper” can stay airborne for
on average 24 hours before having to refuel, an obvious limitation for manned aircraft. The
ability to remain in the air for such long stretches permits drones to access vast and desolate
territories to collect intelligence or conduct a targeted strike.12 For example, When President
François Hollande of France ordered a military intervention to Mali to aid its government against
Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, an Al-Qaeda affiliate and Shalafi militant group,13 the Obama
administration offered drone surveillance to the French government.14 Former head of United
States African Command (AFRICOM), General Carter Ham, had stressed the need for such high
altitude surveillance due to natural limitations for gathering intelligence in the vast Sahara
8 Commander Mark R. Vlaun, “Drone Wars: The Legal Framework for Remote Warfare” Foreign Area Officer
Association Journal of International Affairs Writing Program: 4, accessed March 1, 2014, http://www.faoa.org/Reso
urces/Documents/Drone%20Wars%20The%20Legal%20Framework%20for%20Remote%20Warfare.pdf.
9 One such example is the 1960 U-2 incident when Gary Powers and his U-2 were shot down over the Soviet Union.
Powers survived but the Soviets were able to recover the data from the plane, and use this event to slander the
United States.Powers was convicted of espionage by the Soviet Union, but was later returned to the United States in
exchange for a Soviet spy detained by the FBI.
10 Yost, Rise of the Drones.
11 Lewis, 297.
12 Ratnesar.
13 Jonathan Masters,“Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” Council on Foreign Relations,last modified
January 24, 2013,accessed February 1, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p1271
7#p8.
14 Natalie Guibert, “le Pentagone a envoyé son drone Global Hawke au Mali,” Le Monde, January 26, 2013,
accessed February 12, 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/01/26/le-pentagone-a-envoye-son-drone-gl
obal-hawk-au-mali_1822951_3212.html.

3. region.15 The United States also took this conflict as means to establish another drone base in
Africa.16 The location of this base, geo-strategically speaking, permits the United States to
conduct flyovers of Algeria and Libya, nations where the White House believes violent
extremists are hiding and recruiting.17
15 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Plans Base for Surveillance Drones in Africa,” The New York Times, January 28, 2013,
accessed February 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/us/us-plans-base-for-surveillance-drones-in-north
west-africa.html?pagewanted=2&smid=tw-share.
16 Jamie Crawford and Chris Lawrence, “U.S. to Base Surveillance Drones in Niger,” CNN, February 7, 2013,
accessed February 8, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/29/us/niger.
17 Greg Miller and Craig Whitlock, “White House Secret Meetings examine Al-Qaeda Threat in North Africa,” The
Washington Post, October 1, 2012, accessed February 15, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-01/worl
d/35501403_1_qaeda-aqim-islamic-maghreb.