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HOW TO FIND A
HIDDEN SPAMMER
By Andrew Brandt
Solera Networks
HOW IT STARTS
The typical spam campaign starts
with a social engineering hook,
which attempts to convince the
reader to click a link in the
message body.
SAY HELLO TO MALWARE
These links can lead to pages
hosting malware .EXE files inside
of .ZIP folders.
They can also use browser exploits
to force and install on the
victims computer.
THESE ARE STEPPING STONES
These specialized Trojans retrieve
instructions from a command-and-
control server that include the
body of the spam message, and a
list of mail servers and victim
email addresses to which the
Trojan sends the messages.
HOW THEY WORK
These Trojans retrieve instructions
from a server that include the
body of the spam message, and a
list of mail servers and victim
email addresses to which the
Trojan sends the messages.
THE GOOD NEWS / THE BAD NEWS
GOOD NEWS
Easy to identify and segregate the
offending machines.
BAD NEWS
Thousands more people could end
up receiving malicious messages
— which might result in your own
network ending up on a spam
blacklist
USING THE RIGHT TOOLS




 Using Solera's DeepSee, it detected that in just
 20 seconds the Trojan dispatched 181 identical
 messages.
USING DEEPSEE
Using DeepSee, you can take note of the
IP address(es) of your usual mail
servers, then create a Favorite with
queries.
        ipv4_address!=your_mail_server
              application_id=SMTP

That will bring to the fore all non-
mailservers that are sending email using
the SMTP protocol.
SETTING UP ALERTS
Once you’ve created that Favorite, you
can set up alerts to watch for traffic
matching the rule. Typical malicious
behavior might involve a large volume of
mail being sent by machines meeting
these criteria in a short period of time.
The most obvious standouts will be
sending messages at odd hours, such as
when nobody should be at work
(holidays/weekends).
CATCHING THE SLOWER ONES
Look at the traffic generated
by a much more low-key
spam relay Trojan. The
Trojan responsible sent
these Canadian pharmacy,
knockoff watch, and “dating
site” spams, transmitted at
a much slower rate of about
two messages per minute.
While the volume may keep
the messages under the
radar, you might consider
setting up alerts looking for
the subject matter of the
messages.
CATCHING THE SLOWER ONES

             Detect and extract the
             command-and-control
             traffic between the infected
             host and its botnet HQ.
             Spam relay Trojans must
             receive instructions, or they
             can’t do their job. Check
             out this extraction of traffic
             generated by just such a
             Trojan.
CATCHING THE SLOWER ONES

             The CnC traffic is made
             even more obvious by its
             inclusion of a second,
             extraneous port number"

             (Hint: Search for
             http_uri~:8080:80 in the
             Path Bar.)
MORE DISCOVERIES




Once you find the CnC traffic, extraction
can lead to more discoveries, but in this
case, the traffic seems to be unreadable.
IS IT REALLY UNREADABLE?




Well, unreadable but not indecipherable. A little bit-
shifting of the binary data in this artifact reveals the
true contents of the CnC message. The first set of
CnC exchanges usually include all the instructions
the bot needs, such as…
HOW TO DECODE




 …the message body of the spam it will send…
HOW TO DECODE




 …the link to the site hosting the malicious code,
    which will be embedded in the message…
HOW TO DECODE




…and, to my utterly astonished amusement, a list of
 CnC server IP addresses the botmaster will use to
                control the Trojan.
THE LAST EXERCISE
This last one really makes the whole exercise
worthwhile:
The bot itself downloads these IPs every time it
checks in with the CnC server. In essence, it’s
keeping us updated with a list of who the bot can
talk to.
Read the full article here

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How To Catch A Hidden Spammer

  • 1. HOW TO FIND A HIDDEN SPAMMER By Andrew Brandt Solera Networks
  • 2. HOW IT STARTS The typical spam campaign starts with a social engineering hook, which attempts to convince the reader to click a link in the message body.
  • 3. SAY HELLO TO MALWARE These links can lead to pages hosting malware .EXE files inside of .ZIP folders. They can also use browser exploits to force and install on the victims computer.
  • 4. THESE ARE STEPPING STONES These specialized Trojans retrieve instructions from a command-and- control server that include the body of the spam message, and a list of mail servers and victim email addresses to which the Trojan sends the messages.
  • 5. HOW THEY WORK These Trojans retrieve instructions from a server that include the body of the spam message, and a list of mail servers and victim email addresses to which the Trojan sends the messages.
  • 6. THE GOOD NEWS / THE BAD NEWS GOOD NEWS Easy to identify and segregate the offending machines. BAD NEWS Thousands more people could end up receiving malicious messages — which might result in your own network ending up on a spam blacklist
  • 7. USING THE RIGHT TOOLS Using Solera's DeepSee, it detected that in just 20 seconds the Trojan dispatched 181 identical messages.
  • 8. USING DEEPSEE Using DeepSee, you can take note of the IP address(es) of your usual mail servers, then create a Favorite with queries. ipv4_address!=your_mail_server application_id=SMTP That will bring to the fore all non- mailservers that are sending email using the SMTP protocol.
  • 9. SETTING UP ALERTS Once you’ve created that Favorite, you can set up alerts to watch for traffic matching the rule. Typical malicious behavior might involve a large volume of mail being sent by machines meeting these criteria in a short period of time. The most obvious standouts will be sending messages at odd hours, such as when nobody should be at work (holidays/weekends).
  • 10. CATCHING THE SLOWER ONES Look at the traffic generated by a much more low-key spam relay Trojan. The Trojan responsible sent these Canadian pharmacy, knockoff watch, and “dating site” spams, transmitted at a much slower rate of about two messages per minute. While the volume may keep the messages under the radar, you might consider setting up alerts looking for the subject matter of the messages.
  • 11. CATCHING THE SLOWER ONES Detect and extract the command-and-control traffic between the infected host and its botnet HQ. Spam relay Trojans must receive instructions, or they can’t do their job. Check out this extraction of traffic generated by just such a Trojan.
  • 12. CATCHING THE SLOWER ONES The CnC traffic is made even more obvious by its inclusion of a second, extraneous port number" (Hint: Search for http_uri~:8080:80 in the Path Bar.)
  • 13. MORE DISCOVERIES Once you find the CnC traffic, extraction can lead to more discoveries, but in this case, the traffic seems to be unreadable.
  • 14. IS IT REALLY UNREADABLE? Well, unreadable but not indecipherable. A little bit- shifting of the binary data in this artifact reveals the true contents of the CnC message. The first set of CnC exchanges usually include all the instructions the bot needs, such as…
  • 15. HOW TO DECODE …the message body of the spam it will send…
  • 16. HOW TO DECODE …the link to the site hosting the malicious code, which will be embedded in the message…
  • 17. HOW TO DECODE …and, to my utterly astonished amusement, a list of CnC server IP addresses the botmaster will use to control the Trojan.
  • 18. THE LAST EXERCISE This last one really makes the whole exercise worthwhile: The bot itself downloads these IPs every time it checks in with the CnC server. In essence, it’s keeping us updated with a list of who the bot can talk to.
  • 19. Read the full article here