OTN Special Update - (The Doha Round-2011 Agenda ) 2011-01-07

SPECIAL
OFFICE OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

… for trade matters
OTN Update
January 7, 2011

THE DOHA ROUND: THE 2011 AGENDA

A GLIMMER OF HOPE already achieved.” It was further declared that
“2011 is a critical window of opportunity, albeit
It appears that the malaise which has permeated the narrow, and that engagement among our
Doha Round since the collapse of the 2008 Mini- representatives must intensify and expand. We now
ministerial has been lifted! Though the WTO DG has need to complete the end game.” 1
persistently promoted strategies aimed at advancing
the Doha Round beyond its current impasse, it was The statements by the G-20 and APEC leaders are
recognised that in the absence of genuine political will instructive in two primary ways. In the first instance,
amongst the major WTO Members to make the statement reiterates that the conclusion of the
compromises, little progress could be attained. Round will be based on the progress that has
already been achieved. This suggests that there is
The long awaited glimmer of hope finally arose in the collective acknowledgement amongst the G-20 and
final quarter of 2010 following the conclusion of the APEC leaders, that a ‘re-opening’ of the
November 2010 G-20 Seoul Summit and the APEC negotiations would be unacceptable. This could
Yokohama Summit. In their Declarations, the leaders allay fears regarding the interpretation of the
of the G-20 (and APEC) declared that they will direct political signals suggested by the President Obama
their negotiators to “engage in across-the-board Administration’s position on the negotiations. 2
negotiations to promptly bring the Doha Development
Round to a successful, ambitious, comprehensive, and
balanced conclusion consistent with the mandate of the
1
Doha Development Round and built on the progress Passage selected from The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration
November 11 – 12, 2010.

OTN UPDATE is the flagship electronic trade newsletter of the Office of Trade Negotiations (OTN), formerly the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery
(CRNM). Published in English, it is a rich source of probing research on and detailed analyses of international trade policy issues and developments
germane to the Caribbean. Prepared by the Information Unit of the OTN, the newsletter focuses on the OTN, trade negotiation issues within its mandate
and related activities. Its intention is to provide impetus for feedback by and awareness amongst a variety of stakeholders, as regards trade policy
developments of currency and importance to the Caribbean.
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Secondly, 2011 is identified as a critical window of Democrat Party is protectionist, it is tempting to
opportunity. The tacit significance of this time period conclude that it will be easier in 2011 to gain
becomes richly illustrated when juxtaposed to the traction on US Congressional support to conclude
rhythm of the American electoral politics. Previously the Round.
DG Lamy expressed optimism regarding the
likelihood of completing the Round in 2010. However, However, that convention is a simplification and
such hopes were considered unrealistic. Though the belies the nuances of American politics. It has to be
leadership of the US was regarded as important to noted that the completion of the 2010
bring closure to the Round, at the time, in a mid-term congressional elections signals the beginning of the
election year, it was unlikely that the Obama 2012 Presidential election season (and President
Administration would expend political capital to build Obama’s re-election campaign). This factor could
domestic consensus on the issues regarding the negatively influence bipartisan consensus building
WTO negotiations, (such as the reduction of on trade issues and could, for example, persuade
agricultural subsidies) at the expense of other otherwise pro-trade Republicans to frustrate any
domestic priorities. Furthermore, the US President’s victories that are being pursued by the Obama
authority to ‘fast track’ trade deals expired in former Administration. The U.S. critical role in bringing a
President George Bush’s second term and had not conclusion to the Doha Round could be significantly
been renewed under the Obama Administration.3 stymied should the White House, in the absence of
a renewed fast track authority, be unable to attain
In the wake of the conclusion of the 2010 US Congressional support on the outstanding Doha
midterm elections, which resulted in the Democrats issues. This notwithstanding, bipartisanship could
conceding to the Republicans, should one be still prove constructive, especially in these early
persuaded by the popular convention that the months of the Presidential election season.
Republican Party supports free trade while the

Intensive Work Programme
Dead Ahead
2
Under the Obama Administration, the United States of America
(U.S.) has advocated that the linchpin to the success of the Doha The early months of 2011 are therefore crucial for
Round would remain in securing meaningful market access
commitments in agriculture, NAMA and services, particularly from the WTO and will need to be capitalized upon by
key advanced countries. Large Developing countries like India have
been wary of this stance. As suggested by the words of Dr. Amit
DG Lamy and other WTO members to secure the
Mitra, Secretary General of the Federation of Indian Chambers of progress necessary to conclude the Round.
Commerce and Industry (FICCI), “Such signals leave us worried that
the new US Administration might not be willing to proceed on the
basis of the ‘Doha mandate’. Instead, it may attempt to ‘reopen’ the
negotiations, or included ‘new areas’ into the negotiating agenda.
3
This is simply not acceptable to us”. The Fast track negotiating authority (also called Trade Promotion
See USTR’s ‘new approach’ may re‐open negotiations, CUTS Authority, TPA) for trade agreements is the authority of the
International, May 14 2009. Available at President of the United States to negotiate agreements that the
http://www.cuts‐citee.org/media‐ Congress can approve or disapprove but cannot amend or filibuster.
USTR%E2%80%99s_new_approach.htm Fast‐track negotiating authority is granted to the President by
Congress.

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DG Lamy has not hesitated to swiftly rollout the plan Annual Davos Meeting scheduled to commence
of action to push through the impasse. In his remarks January 25-30 2011, will provide an opportunity to
to the informal meeting of the TNC on November 30 track the political impetus.4 It is anticipated that the
2010, DG Lamy outlined an intensive work U.S., EU, Brazil, China and India and key
programme for the various Negotiating Groups negotiators will meet in the margins of that meeting
beginning the weeks of 10 and 17 January. to form a political view as to whether the talks can
be progressed further.
From January 10, the Trade Facilitation, Trade and
Environment, TRIPS and Development groups will
begin intensive sessions, to be joined from 17
January by Agriculture, NAMA, Services and Dispute CARICOM’s Preparation to
Settlement. The NG Rules will meet during the week Engage
beginning February 4. With a presumed 80 percent
of the Doha Round negotiations completed, the While, CARICOM countries have been carefully
ultimate goal of the programme is to work out the monitoring the Round, it is essential that the region
remaining 20 percent of the issues concerning, becomes increasingly vigilant and fully engaged
industrial market access, trade facilitation, anti- during the implementation of the upcoming
dumping and agricultural market access. It is programme to ensure that there is little or no
anticipated that this programme will culminate in the derogation from the current draft texts in as far as
preparation of new draft texts by the end of the first these reflect the Caribbean’s core offensive and
quarter of 2011. defensive interests.

What makes this development in the negotiations In order to do this successfully, with regards to the
distinctive from preceding processes is that senior outstanding negotiating issues, CARICOM member
officials are expected to engage in technical states will need to be clear about what their current
exchanges but with specific political instructions interests are, and how those interests relate
regarding the full scope and detail of concessions strategically to the collective interests of the various
that will be necessary to break the impasse. The sub-groupings in which they are aligned (such as
texts that will arise are expected to reflect the new the Small Vulnerable Economies (SVEs), G-33, and
package deal. the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) groups). In
addressing such considerations, CARICOM will
The final results of this intensified technical process
will in part, determine whether enough progress can
be made to conclude the negotiations. At the same
time, as the technical programme begins to roll out in 4
The Annual World Economic Forum Meeting held in Davos,
January, it will be necessary to continue to monitor Switzerland, will convene in 2011 under the theme “Shared Norms
the political pulse and atmospherics that will for the New Reality”. It is anticipated that attendance this year will
include Senator the Honourable Marlene Malahoo Forte, Senator
ultimately determine whether the Round can be and Minister of State in the Jamaica Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Foreign Trade.
advanced to conclusion. In this regard, the upcoming

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also need to weigh the implications of strategy. This Both the horizontal process, which is scheduled to
will include weighing the benefits and risks of begin in early January, and the vertical process will
engaging in a horizontal process relative to a affect the mapping of the final package. The way in
‘vertical’ process. Whereas, the horizontal process which these processes are exploited could
would allow for trade-offs among various however impact a country’s negotiating leverage
negotiating groups, a vertical process would and by so doing impact the extent to which a
facilitate the extraction of concessions within country is able to preserve its hierarchy of interests
specific negotiating groups. and minimize trade-offs.

Through a horizontal process, for example, Nevertheless, the Caribbean will likely adopt the
developing countries could seek to make position that with respect to the outstanding
concessions in one negotiating group, such as issues, any additional movement attained,
Trade Facilitation, in exchange for obtaining including the granting of additional concessions to
concessions from developed countries on subsidies the Caribbean or other developing countries
under the Agriculture negotiations. In this scenario, should not come at the expense of concessions
for CARICOM countries, the concession gained that the Region has already secured in other
may be surpassed by the concessions given. ‘stabilized’ areas of the negotiations.

On the other hand, under a vertical process, the Taking a look at a few of the outstanding issues in
negotiating context and a country’s negotiating the negotiations in some of the Negotiating
leverage could be different. Obtaining movement Groups, we can discern the interests CARICOM
on agricultural subsidies from developed countries, member states will be seeking to preserve.
for example, could be demanded by developing
countries but developed countries may concede
only in exchange for different Agriculture market
access concessions, which could involve greater The Caribbean’s Interests in
tariff cut commitments for developing countries. the Outstanding Issues
When considering the trade-offs in this scenario, for
some developing countries, the reduction of 1. Agriculture
developed country agricultural subsidization may
There are three (3) pillars in negotiations in
be highly valued because of its potential impact on
Agriculture, namely, (i) market access (tariff
their competitive advantage in developed country
liberalisation, trade contingency measures, etc); (ii)
agricultural markets. On the other hand, for other
domestic support (overall trade distorting support,
smaller developing countries like CARICOM,
specific aggregate measure support, etc) and (iii)
securing protection for their agricultural markets
export competition (export subsidies, export credits
through limited tariff reduction commitments may
and international food aid). The negotiations have
be more critical to their economies.
concentrated on the market access pillar, with
emphasis on the Special Safeguard Mechanism
(SSM) and templates to be used in scheduling

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Members’ commitments. The Special Safeguard Mechanism

Issues of major significance to the Caribbean The treatment of the Special Safeguard Mechanism
(SSM) 5 constitutes one of the more politically
Tariff cut modalities
charged issues as it pits small and vulnerable
According to the last draft modalities in December subsistence farmers in developing countries
2008 (TN/AG/W/4), most CARICOM countries are against large farms benefiting from domestic
allowed as SVEs to designate all agricultural support and or export subsidies in industrialised
imports as Special Products and subject them to an countries. The complexity of the SSM issue is
average tariff reduction of 24 per cent over an compounded by the fact that the G-33 (heavily
implementation period of ten (10) years. Secondly, supported by the SVEs, LDCs and African Group)
a specific exemption allows Suriname to rebind its is being fought by the Cairns Group – a group of
tariffs to a level equal to that of the level that will be major agricultural exporters seeking additional
achieved by other CARICOM countries following market access. The Cairns Group membership
the application of the tariff reduction modality. includes traditional ACP allies such as Argentina,
Suriname’s tariffs are currently bound at 20 per Brazil and South Africa. It is widely recognised that
cent, a level that renders that country unable to the SSM’s highly political nature renders it one of
apply the CARICOM Common External Tariff (CET) the issues requiring Ministerial guidance, if not
on agricultural imports. resolution.

It would be desirable to secure the same flexibilities In January 2010, the G-33 submitted a
for Haiti as those secured for Suriname. As an UN- communication on SSM (TN/AG/GEN/30) outlining
designated LDC, Haiti is not required to further proposed changes to the Chairman’s text. The G-
reduce its tariffs under the Doha Round of 33’s aim was to facilitate compliance with the Doha
negotiations. However, that CARICOM Member mandate of establishing a simple, effective and
imposes bound and applied tariffs on agricultural operational trade contingency measure. The G-33
products at 21.3 per cent and 5.7 per cent communication also enumerated SVE-specific
respectively. Similar to Suriname, the level of concerns on the SSM. For example, the submission
Haitian tariffs does not allow for the application of recognised that SVEs face a number of constraints
the CARICOM CET. A provision that allows Haiti to that justified the bestowal of additional SSM
rebind its tariffs to the target average of other
CARICOM countries would therefore assist in
facilitating Haiti’s fuller integration into the CSME.
At a December 2009 meeting with CARICOM Trade
5
The SSM is a rapid response instrument which is proposed to allow
countries to apply a safeguard in the form of additional duties to
Ministers, DG Lamy expressed his support for the agricultural imports in circumstances where the volume of
additional flexibilities for Haiti. agricultural imports increase rapidly beyond a specific volume
benchmark or in circumstances where the price of agricultural
imports fall below a specific level. In both cases, the volume and
price effects would have a deleterious impact on local agricultural
production/producers and food security.

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flexibilities. The G-33 submission further noted that
SVEs are subjected to higher transaction costs, as
well as limitations in crop diversification that inhibit
these countries from addressing the challenges of
food and livelihood security and therefore make
them more vulnerable to the adverse effects of
import surges and price declines. Against this
background, the G-33 reiterated its support for
seeking enhanced flexibilities in the SSM for SVEs.

Consultations have continued on SSM, with
discussions on prorating, seasonality and price
check mechanism. The main substantive issue with
the SSM remains establishing criteria for applying
additional tariffs that go above the “pre-Doha” rates.
For the Caribbean, this issue should be resolved as
part of special flexibilities to be granted to SVEs.
The SVE Group, to which CARICOM member
states are aligned, is pursuing as much flexibility as
possible in SSM by proposing less stringent criteria
for taking safeguard action.

Specifically, the SVEs have proposed that
regarding the volume-based SSM, safeguard action
should be applied on the basis of a rolling average Preference erosion
of imports in the preceding three-year period for
Preference erosion constitutes the Caribbean’s third
which data are available (hereafter "base imports").
principal interest in the market access pillar of
On this basis, the SVE group has also provided
negotiations on agriculture.
recommendations on applicable triggers and
remedies as set out in Table 1. Developed countries will generally apply a “tiered
formula”, i.e. higher tariffs will be subject to higher cuts,
thereby subjecting the products with high levels of
protection (and thus preference margins) to deep cuts.

There are also the provisions on reducing tariff
escalation6 as well as provisions on the modalities for
‘Tropical Products’7. On the other hand, also on the
table are proposed provisions on ‘Preference Erosion
Products’8,, and ‘Sensitive Products’ which relate to the

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flexibilities given to all countries to effect lower treatment via modulated tariff reduction within the
levels of tariff reduction in exchange for granting Doha development agenda (DDA). For this reason,
expanded access through tariff rate quotas. India submitted to the ACP group in November 2009
a slate of agricultural products for which it is seeking
The Geneva Agreement on Trade in Bananas tropical product designation and treatment. It is
(GATB)9 which ended the long standing dispute believed that India’s actions represent an attempt to
between the European Union and a group of Latin increase its leverage with the EU in their bilateral
American countries over the EU’s tariffs on banana FTA negotiations as well as to secure specific
imports, was accompanied by additional access on rice to the U.S. market.
agreements made between the ACP, EU and the
Tropical Products Proponents on the treatment of Under the TP and PE agreement, the Caribbean
Tropical Products (TP) and Preference Erosion interest has concentrated on four principal products.
(PE). The ACP, EU and Latin American are seeking These are rum, sugar, rice and bananas.
to make these agreements part of the final Doha
With respect to rum, the Caribbean industry will
package deal.
benefit from preference erosion treatment, with an
However, India continues to oppose the linking of implementation period of ten (10) years.
the banana agreement with the deal on TP/PE.
With respect to sugar, both the EU and U.S. are
India has argued that its concerns have not been
likely to declare it a Sensitive Product. Sugar would
fully incorporated into the ACP/EU/MFN deal. India
therefore benefit from a gentler cut than that
has further contended that no link should be
proposed for preference erosion products.
established between the conclusion of the
longstanding banana trade dispute and the With respect to rice, the proponents of Tropical
settlement of the preference erosion package. Products agreed to remove husked rice, the
India’s substantive disagreement reflects its interest Caribbean’s main type of rice export, from their list
in exporting sugar, coffee, tea, rice, and tropical allowing this product to be accorded full preference
fruits to both the EU and U.S. These are all erosion treatment, provided that no other interested
products that will benefit from preference erosion country objects. The strength of India’s interest in all

6
The practice of applying higher tariffs to processed products than to the primary products from which they are derived.
7
The Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture stipulates a commitment to achieve the fullest liberalisation of trade in tropical
agricultural products. A group of Latin American countries, namely Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela are the major proponents of Tropical Products.
8
This proposal, which was submitted by the ACP, EU and Latin American countries on 15 December 2009 to the Chairman of the Special Session
on Agriculture and the Chairman of the TNC, lists the goods that the members of the group have agreed should benefit from gentler and slower
tariff cuts under the proposed ‘preference erosion’ treatment, as well as which goods should be slated for faster and deeper liberalisation as
‘tropical products’.
9
Under this agreement bananas will be treated as neither a ‘Preference Erosion’ nor a ‘Tropical Product’ but rather on a stand‐alone basis. The
agreement envisages a tariff reduction schedule with an initial reduction of the EU’s MFN tariff from the current Euro 176 per tonne to EUR 148
per tonne in 2010 and then to EUR 114 per tonne by 2017. In a separate ACP/EU agreement, a EUR 190 million Banana Accompanying Measures
(BAM) programme will be implemented. The aim of the EU‐funded programme is to assist ten (10) affected ACP banana exporting states to
adjust to the reduction in the value of their preferential access to the EU market.

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forms of rice and its intent to designate rice as a A number of CARICOM countries recognize the
tropical product compels the Caribbean to stridently value of the HM but are alarmed that as importers
protect the value of its preferential access to the EU of relatively few tariff lines, the administrative
market. requirements to institute this new system could be
burdensome. Furthermore, some countries fear that
the establishment of the HM with its non-recourse
2. Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) to DSU might lead to greater scrutiny of the
compatibility of their domestic laws and regulations
NAMA negotiations have concentrated on a limited with WTO obligations. It is in that context that
slate of issues. These are the horizontal mechanism, additional consultations are required to determine
treatment of remanufactured goods, TBT-related how the HM would be operationalised and what
sectoral initiatives, sectorals and scheduling. would be its possible impact on SVEs.

Issues of major significance to the Caribbean NAMA related Preference Erosion

The Horizontal Mechanism (HM) Preference Erosion constitutes the other NAMA
issue of major interest to the Caribbean. The ACP
The Horizontal Mechanism (HM) or the Procedures
applied objective filters to generate fifty-seven (57)
for the Facilitation of Solutions to NTBs is an informal
products exported to the EC and a further twenty-
dispute resolution mechanism that explores trade
nine (29) to the U.S. to benefit from preferential
solutions without affecting the rights and obligations
erosion treatment. Included in the ACP proposal
under the WTO Agreements. If adopted, the HM
are swordfish; deepwater rose shrimp, molluscs,
would allow for the establishment of a consultative
women’s cotton trousers, men’s shirts, T-shirts,
forum in which countries disputing the interpretation
women’s knitted jerseys, brassieres, cotton bed
of another Member’s NTB would accept mediation by
linen and aluminium doors and windows.
an independent actor. The initiative enjoys near
universal support among WTO Members. The major stumbling block remains the treatment to
be awarded to DAMs, i.e. Bangladesh, Pakistan,
The African Group is a strong proponent of the HM
Sri Lanka, Nepal and Cambodia with respect to
although the ACP is yet to develop a definitive
their exports to the US. The proposed concessions
position. Some Members have expressed concern
to the DAMs would have the effect of denuding the
with respect to the coverage of the HM and the
economic value of the preference erosion treatment
body’s relationship with other WTO Committees and
on seventeen (17) of the twenty-nine (29) tariff lines
the DSB. Some Members (such as Thailand and
granted to the ACP.
India) want the HM to apply also to agricultural goods
while others believe that such scope would breach The major Caribbean concern rests with Haiti and
the purview of NAMA negotiations. the possible impact of this proposed treatment of
the DAMs on that country’s preferences on clothing

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exports to the US under the Haitian Hemispheric in an attempt to prise improved access to the
Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement markets of advanced developing countries.
(HOPE) Act. 10
Second, the treatment of Sectorals can impact the
The negotiation of Sectoral Initiatives remains 11
tariff reduction of products which are preference
inextricably linked to preference erosion treatment for erosion products. Some of the items proposed to
industrial goods. Though participation in Sectorals is benefit from sectoral treatment are fish and fish
not mandatory, a number of industrialised countries products, clothing and footwear which are
have insisted that advanced developed countries preference erosion products of interest to the
should join such initiatives in order to establish Caribbean and the wider ACP. The ACP has
“critical mass” of trade in each industrial sector. already tabled a recommendation that the products
Sectors enumerated include motor vehicles, bicycles, selected for preference erosion should be removed
chemicals, electronics, fish, forest, gems and from sectoral initiatives. The Caribbean and the
jewellery, raw materials, textiles and industrial wider ACP will need to continue to defend this
machinery. It should be noted that the EU – one of interest in the upcoming months.
the ACP’s major preferential trading partners – is a
3. Trade Facilitation
strong proponent of sectoral initiatives.
Caribbean efforts have been principally directed at
Though the Caribbean is not the intended target of
the Special and Differential Treatment plank. The
industrialised countries’ offensive interest in sectoral
August 2010 version of the draft Consolidated
initiatives, for specific reasons, the Region retains
Negotiating Text (TN/TF/W/165/Rev.4)12 provides a
considerable interest in this aspect of the
more defined contour of a possible Agreement on
negotiations.
Trade Facilitation. Negotiations on trade facilitation
First, the tariff reduction in these specific sectors is to have concentrated on Article I - XI of the draft-
be higher than the reduction provided for under the consolidated text with a subsequent exchange of
Swiss formula reduction of tariffs and therefore views on Article XII, i.e. the proposed modalities for
reflects the level of ambition of the Round. Indeed, special and differential treatment (SDT).
this is a stance that the US has increasingly adopted

10
The preferential treatment received by Bangladesh in the U.S. market, for example, is very negligible. As a result, erosion of preference in the
U.S. market due to tariff reduction under NAMA negotiations is expected to be insignificant for Bangladesh. On the other hand, the reduction of
U.S. export duties under the NAMA negotiations will reduce the duties on products of export interest to Bangladesh. This is particularly the case
with respect to apparel exports. The reduction of U.S. duties on Bangladesh’s apparel exports will likely improve its competitive position in the
U.S. market and compromise the U.S. market share of Caribbean’s and Sub‐Saharan apparel exported under the U.S. unilateral preference
schemes for the Caribbean.
11
Sectoral initiatives are proposals from some WTO members for the elimination or harmonization at low levels of customs tariffs in specific
sectors. The tariff reduction in these specific sectors is to be higher than the reduction provided for under the Swiss formula reduction of tariffs.
The WTO members participating in the sectoral must comprise the majority of the total trade of all WTO members in that sector.

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Issues of major significance to the Caribbean 4. Services

Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) DDA negotiations in trade in services span four
areas, i.e. market access; domestic regulation; GATS
The Caribbean’s main interest in this discipline rules; and the LDC waiver. Most members have
revolves around the treatment of SDT and, more made progress in services negotiations contingent
specifically, securing commitments on trade capacity only on minimum demands being met in both
building measures. The ACP argues that negotiations Agriculture and NAMA.
on trade facilitation are predicated on the proviso that
developing countries will assume new commitments Furthermore, the negotiations within the various
once enhanced trade capacity has been obtained. strands of trade in services have also proved
challenging. This is best expressed in the intimate
One of the major donors, the US, has tabled a new nexus between market access and rule-making. The
proposal (TN/TF/W/166) on special and differential Chairman has consistently asserted that several
treatment. However, the ACP views the US proposal Members believe that the level of ambition of the
as both unbalanced and inconsistent with the Doha disciplines is closely connected with advances on the
development mandate. The Chairman has requested market access side of the services negotiations, and
the resubmission of proposals on special and more broadly with progress in other areas of the
differential treatment by both the ACP (TN/TF/W/161) DDA. Issues of major significance to the Caribbean
13
and a group of Latin American countries, led by
Guatemala.

Negotiations in Trade Facilitation have not Domestic Regulation
progressed significantly, in spite of being identified as
The ACP and SVE Groups collaborate extensively in
one of the areas to benefit from an early harvest. One
negotiations on trade in services. The most notable
fundamental issue that divides developing country
sphere of ACP/SVE interaction extends to the
members from industrialised ones rests on funding of
possible reorganisation of the licensing and
trade capacity building measures. In this regard, the
qualification requirements of the 20 March draft text
EU has refrained from declaring the source of its
prepared by the Chairperson of the Working Party on
contribution to trade related technical assistance
Domestic Regulation (WPDR). A draft text has been
measures in the field of trade facilitation. Beyond
prepared by the ACP technical consultants and is
issues of principle, the ACP concern remains that the
aimed at streamlining the WPDR draft text by
EU’s development assistance envelope for the ACP
avoiding duplication. The effort is also seen as an
is defined by the EDF with the current budget cycle
attempt to counter attempts by Switzerland and other
slated to conclude in 2013.

12 13
Text available at Text available at
http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocum http://www.wcoomd.org/files/1.%20Public%20files/PDFandDocum
ents/Procedures%20and%20Facilitation/WTO_Documents_E/tnTF ents/Procedures%20and%20Facilitation/WTO_Documents_E/W161
W165R4E.pdf %20E.pdf

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countries to introduce revised texts on key areas of development round, should deliver an early harvest
domestic regulation already “stabilised” in the to the LDC Group, with the LDC waiver in Services
negotiations on trade in services. being one of the anticipated deliverables. In order to
address the marginalisation of LDCs in trade in
The SVE Group has developed a draft submission on services there has been an agreement that Members
Draft Licensing and Qualification Disciplines on would deviate from MFN obligations in order to award
Domestic Regulation. The document has benefited LDCs access to Members’ services markets. A
from considerable feedback of Delegations. textual proposal has been developed by a group of
However, it remains in draft form as all Members of countries led by Norway and has received
the Group are yet to fully support the proposed overwhelming support by almost all Members.
submission.

5. Rules
Subsidies
Negotiations in this context have centered on three
The OTN has finalised a draft SVE position paper on (3) pillars, namely (i) anti-dumping, and horizontal
the treatment of subsidies in the trade in services. subsidies; (ii) rules on RTAs; and (iii) fisheries
The paper seeks to justify the continued use of subsidies.
subsidies in SVEs by enumerating conditions under
which services could be subsidised. These conditions
include applying environmental protection,
developing new sub-sectors in services and Issues of major significance to the Caribbean
facilitating rural development. The OTN paper also
seeks to address issues such as disciplining services
subsidies, the relevance of the Agreement of Fisheries Subsidies
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) in
The major focus of the Caribbean in this cluster of
framing subsidies disciplines in services and
DDA negotiations remains fisheries subsidies. The
examining the case for a differentiated approach
primary objective of the talks continues to be
across all modes of supply. Informed by the
strengthening disciplines on fisheries subsidies,
discussions triggered by the OTN paper, the SVE
through, inter alia, the prohibition of certain forms of
Group will later determine the merits of preparing a
fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity
submission on this issue.
and over-fishing. The mandate of the negotiations
The Least Developed Country (LDC) Waiver targets both overcapacity and overfishing.

The negotiations have been exposed to considerable The centrality of special and differential treatment in
political pressure to agree on the terms of the LDC all facets of the negotiations has been established as
Waiver. The LDCs, which includes Haiti, have a cardinal principle. In that context, using arguments
demanded that the Doha Round of negotiations, as a

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based on the de minimis principle, the SVEs have Recent plurilateral discussions have centred on
tabled textual proposals on how SDT in fisheries three (3) issues, namely, (i) effective compliance;
subsidies can be applied. (ii) sequencing; and (iii) post-retaliation.

It has been recognised by the SVEs that the
prohibition of those subsidies causing overfishing
should be reconciled with the use of fisheries Issues of major significance to the Caribbean
subsidies for the sustainable development of In spite of its marginal share of global trade,
developing countries. However, having argued that Caribbean countries have amassed significant
their members control less than 0.1 per cent of experiences with the functioning of the WTO
global fish stocks catch and that consequentially Dispute Settlement Body. There are two sets of
they do not significantly contribute to overfishing, exposure to the DSB, namely, consideration of
SVEs have advocated that they should be allowed longstanding preferential treatment of EU sugar
to utilise fisheries subsidies for economic and banana regimes and the internet gaming case
development. involving the United States and Antigua and
The SVEs accept the use of conditionalities on Barbuda.
fisheries management but do not agree with the In the case of sugar and bananas, Caribbean (and
boat-specific criteria as enumerated in the last draft ACP) countries’ formal involvement was limited to
of the negotiating text. The SVEs seek additional third party status. This is in spite of the
flexibilities and, in that respect, have developed considerable contribution of these commodities to
SVE-specific benchmarks. The eligible countries the economies of affected ACP countries. This
would be those with a 0.1 per cent share of NAMA diminished legal status highlighted the weakness of
trade and 1 per cent share of marine wild fish the current DSB rules to take account of the
capture. economic impact of WTO Members in determining
a party’s status in a trade dispute.

6. Dispute Settlement Understanding The dispute involving Antigua and Barbuda also
underscores the need to amend the DSU rules so
In his July 2008 text, the Chairman of the Special that a small WTO member can instantly secure the
Session on DSU (Ambassador Saborio of Costa benefits of its successful approaches to the DSU.
Rica) identified twelve (12) issues to be addressed. Both categories of DSB cases demonstrate the
These are third party rights; panel composition; need for pro-developmental reform of the DSU, in
remand; mutually agreed solutions; strictly particular to take account of the needs of small,
confidential information; sequencing; post- vulnerable and preference–dependent economies
retaliation; transparency and amicus curiae briefs; of the Caribbean. The requested intervention will
timeframes; developing country interests, including seek to develop a Caribbean proposal aimed at
special and differential treatment; flexibility and reforming the DSB to take account of the region’s
Member control; and effective compliance. needs.

http://www.crnm.org

13

The Way Forward
It is imperative that all CARICOM Members remain
fully engaged during the upcoming accelerated
technical process to ensure that the Region’s core
interests are safeguarded and additional benefits
harnessed.

During this time, the Office of Negotiations of the
CARICOM Secretariat will be accelerating its own
technical support to CARICOM Members' Doha
Round negotiations and will continue to lend
support to all the member states and stakeholders.

*****************

http://www.crnm.org

OTN Special Update - (The Doha Round-2011 Agenda ) 2011-01-07

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