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               Auditing the Hacker’s Mind:
         da Wargames all’Underground Economy,
               passando per il cybercrime
                             A presentation by Raoul Chiesa
                          Senior Advisor on Cybercrime, UNICRI

       United Nations - Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)



                                         Cagliari
                                     13 Giugno 2011
Disclaimer


●   The information contained in this presentation does not break any
    intellectual property, nor does it provide detailed information that
    may be in conflict with actual Italian laws.

●   Registered brands belong to their legitimate owners.

●   The opinion here represented are my personal ones and do not
    necessary reflect the United Nations nor UNICRI or ENISA and
    ENISA’s
    ENISA’ PSG views.
                  i
Agenda
# whois
Introduction and Key Concepts
Yesterday’s h ki
Y t d ’ hacking VS today’s crime
                   t d ’     i
Hacking eras and Hacker’s generations
Cybercrime
Hackers…
Profiling the enemy: the Hackers Profiling Project (HPP)
Hacking, today: Underground Economy
What’s next? The Dark Links
Cybercrime: the responses
Conclusions
#whois
Who am I?
Raoul “Nobody” Chiesa

•   Old-school Hacker from 1986 to 1995
•   Infosec Professional since 1997 @ Mediaservice.net
•   OSSTMM Key Contributor; HPP Project Manager; ISECOM
                   y            ;         j         g ;
    International Trainer
•   Co-founder of CLUSIT, Italian Computer Security Association
    (CLUSI* : Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Switzerland)
•   Member of TSTF.net – Telecom Security Task Force, APWG,
    ICANN; ENISA PSG.
•   I work worldwide (so I don’t get bored ;)
•   My areas of interest: Pentesting, SCADA/DCS/PLC National
                             Pentesting SCADA/DCS/PLC,
    Critical Infrastructures, Security R&D+Exploiting weird stuff, ,
    Security People, X.25, PSTN/ISDN, Hackers Profiling,
    Cybercrime, Information Warfare, Security methodologies,
    vertical Trainings.




•   Basically, I do not work in this field just to get my salary
    every month and pay the home/car/whatever loan: I really
    love it ☺
UNICRI


                   What is UNICRI?

United Nations Interregional Crime & Justice Research Institute

A United Nations entity established in 1968 to support countries
worldwide in crime prevention and criminal justice

UNICRI carries out applied research, training,           technical
cooperation and documentation / information activities

UNICRI disseminates information and maintains contacts with
professionals and experts worldwide

Emerging Crimes Unit (ECU): cyber crimes, counterfeiting,
environmental crimes, trafficking in stolen works of art…


Fake Bvlgari &Rolex, but also     Guess how they update each others?
                       Water systems with “sensors”…
 Viagra & Cialis (aka SPAM)             Email, chat&IM, Skype…
Conficker (December 2009)
Stuxnet (December 2010)
UNICRI & Cybercrime


     Overview on UNICRI projects
         against cybercrime

    Hackers Profiling Project (HPP)


    SCADA & NCI s security (CIP)
            NCI’s


    Digital Forensics and digital investigation
                        SCADA Security
    techniques

    Cybersecurity Trainings at the UN Campus
2011
Strategic relationships and Information-sharing
      Networks, in order to fight cybercrime
                              g    y
Along the years we have been able to build a network of special relationships and direct
contacts with the following organizations, working towards specific areas of interest and
shared research topics:
(this li t i
(thi list is may not complete due to NDAs)
                   t     l t d t NDA )




            Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è
              presente nella versione pubblica
Yesterday
         y
and today’s
  Hacking
Crime->Yesterday

    “Every new technology, opens the door to new criminal approaches”.

•   The relationship between technologies and criminality has always been –
    since the very beginning – characterized by a kind of “competition” between
    the good and the bad guys, just like cats and mice.

•   As an example, at the beginning of 1900, when cars appeared, the “bad
    guys” started stealing them (!)

•   ….the police, in order to contrast the phenomenon, defined the mandatory
    use of car plates…

•   ….and the thieves began stealing the car plates from the cars (and/or
    falsifying them).
Crime->Today:Cybercrime
•   Cars have been substituted by information

                    You got the information, you got the power..

    (at least, in politics, in the business world, in our personal relationships…)

•   Simply p , this happens because the “information” can be transformed at once
        p y put,       pp
    into “something else”:
    Competitive advantage
    Sensible/critical information
    Money

•   … that’s why all of us we want to “be secure”.
                                       be secure

•   It’s not by chance that it’s named “IS”: Information Security ☺
Esempi tutti italiani...
•    L’informazione è immediatamente trasformabile in:
1.   Vantaggio competitivo
2.   Informazione sensibile/critica
3.   Denaro
4.   Ricatto
•    Esempi ? (…imbarazzo della scelta ;)
      – Escorts & co
      – La villa di Montecarlo
      – Regione Lazio (dall “hacking” sino al caso Marrazzo e poi Polverini/account “fantasma”)
      – Calciopoli
               p
      – Scandalo Telecom Italia/SISMI
      – Attacco Vodafone Grecia
      – Vittorio Emanuele di Savoia
      – Vallettopoli + Scandalo Escorts
      – Corona
      – McLaren/Ferrari
      – …………….
Hacking eras &
         g
Hackers’ generations
Things changed…

First generation (70’s) was inspired by the need for
knowledge
Second generation (1980-1984) was driven by curiosity plus
the knowledge starving: the only way to learn OSs was to hack
them; later (1985-1990) hacking becomes a trend.
The Third one (90’s) was simply pushed by the anger for
hacking, meaning a mix of addiction, curiosity, learning new
stuff, hacking IT systems and networks, exchanging info
with the underground community Here we saw new concepts
                     community.
coming, such as hacker’s e-zines (Phrack, 2600 Magazine)
along with BBS
Fourth generation (2000-today) is driven by angerness and
                       (2000 today)
money: often we can see subjects with a very low know-how,
thinking that it’s “cool & bragging” being hackers, while they are
not interested in hacking & phreaking history, culture and
ethics. Here hacking meets with politics (cyber-hacktivism) or
with the criminal world (cybercrime).                                €,
                                                                     € $
Cybercrime: why?


• QUESTION:
   – May we state that cybercrime – along with its many, many aspects and
     views – can be ranked as #1 in rising trend and global diffusion ?

• ANSWER(S):
• Given that all of you are attendees and speakers here today, I would say
  that
  th t we already are on the right track i order t analyze the problem ☺
           l    d          th i ht t    k in d to       l    th      bl

• Nevertheless, some factors exist for which the spreading of
  “e-crime-based” attacks relays.

• Let’s take a look at them.
Reasons/1

• 1. There are new users, more and more
  every day: this means the total amount of
       y y                                      Thanks to broadband...
                                                          broadband
  potential victims and/or attack vectors is
  increasing.


• 2. Making money, “somehow and straight        WW Economical
  away”.
      y                                         crisis…


• 3. Technical know-how public availability &   0-days, Internet
                                                distribution system /
  ready-to-go, even when talking about
                                                Black Markets
  average-high skills: that’s what I name
  “hacking p et à po te
    ac g pret-à-porter”
Darkness DDoS botnet
Reasons/2


•   4. It s
    4 It’s extremely easy to recruit “idiots” and set up groups molding those adepts
                                      idiots             groups,
    upon the bad guy’s needs (think about e-mules)              Newbies, Script Kiddies


•   5. “They will never bust me”            Psycology, Criminology


•   6.
    6 Lack of violent actions                Psycology and Sociology
What the heck is changed then??

What’s really changed is the attacker’s
typology
From “bored teens”, doing it for “hobby
and curiosity” (obviously: during night,
pizza hut s
pizza-hut’s box on the floor and cans of
Red Bull)….
...to teenagers and adults not
           g
mandatory “ICT” or “hackers”: they just
do it for the money.
What’s changed is the attacker’s
profile, along with its justifications,
motivations and reasons.
Let’s have a quick test!


                                           26
Hackers in their environment
“Professionals”
There’s a difference: why?

• Why were the guys in the first slide hackers,
  and the others professionals ?

• Because of the PCs ?

• Because of their “look” ?

• Due to the environments surrounding them ?

• Because of the “expression on their faces” ?
Surprise!
  Everything has changed


• Erroneus media information pushed your
                    pp
  mind to run this approach

• T d
  Today, sometimes th professionals are
               ti     the   f   i    l
  the real criminals, and hackers “the
  good guys”… (Telecom Italia Scandal,
  Vodafone Greece Affair, etc…)
Understanding Hackers


• It’ extremely important th t we understand the so-called
  It’s t      l i     t t that      d t d th          ll d
  “hacker’s behaviours”
   – Don’t limit yourself to analyse attacks and intrusion techniques: let’s analyze
     Don t                                                             let s
     their social behaviours


• Try to identify those not-written rules of hacker’s subculture


• Explore hacker’s social organization


• Let’s zoom on those existing links between hacking and
  organized crime
Welcome to HPP
The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP)



                         Hackers

The term hacker has been heavily misused since the 80’s;
since the 90’ the mainstream h
 i     h 90’s, h       i        have used i to j if every
                                         d it  justify
kind of “IT crime”, from lame attacks to massive DDoS


 Lamers,   script-kiddies,   industrial    spies,   hobby
 hackers….for the mass, they are all the same


 From a business point of view, companies don’t clearly
 know who they should be afraid of To them they’re all
                                 of.        they re
 just “hackers”
The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP)




              Hackers: a blurred image

         Yesterday: hacking was an emerging
                 y         g           g g
         phenomenon – unknown to people &
         ignored by researchers

         Today: research carried out in “mono”: →
                                         mono :
         one type of hacker: ugly (thin, myopic),
         bad (malicious, destructive, criminal
         purposes) and “dirty” (asocial, without
         ethics,
         ethics anarchic)

         Tomorrow (HPP is the future): inter-
         disciplinary     studies     that merge
         criminology and information security →
         different typologies of hackers
The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP)


                       HPP purposes
       Analyse the hacking phenomenon in its several
       aspects    (technological,  social,   economic)
       through technical and criminological approaches

        Understand the different       motivations   and
        identify the actors involved

        Observe those true criminal actions “in the
        field”

        Apply the profiling methodology to collected
        data (4W: who, where, when, why)


        Acquire and disseminate knowledge
The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP)




        Project phases – starting: September 2004
           j    p               g    p


1 – Theoretical collection:                5 – Gap analysis:
                                                  p     y
                                           of data from: questionnaire, honey-
Questionnaire
                                           net, existing literature

2 – Observation:                           6 – HPP “live” assessment
                                                     live
Participation in IT underground security   of profiles and correlation of modus
events                                     operandi through data from phase 4

3 - Filing:                                7 – Final profiling:
Database for elaboration/classification    Redefinition/fine-tuning of hackers
of data (phase 1)                          profiles used as “de-facto” standard
4 - Live collection:                       8 – Diffusion of the model:
Highly customised, new generation          elaboration of results, publication of
Honey-net systems                          the methodology, raising awareness
The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP)


                          Project phases - detail
      PHASE              CARRIED OUT            DURATION        NOTES
  1 – Theoretical                                            Distribution on
                        YES          ON-GOING   16 months
     collection                                               more levels
                                                             From different
  2 – Observation       YES          ON-GOING
                                     ON GOING   24 months
                                                             points of view
                                                               The hardest
     3 – Filing                ON-GOING         21 months
                                                                 phase
                                                              The funniest
4 – “Live” collection   TO BE COMMENCED         21 months
                                                                phase ☺
     5 – Gap &                YET TO COME       18 months    The Next Thing
                                                                          g
Correlation Analysis
     6 – “Live”                                              The biggest part
                               PENDING          16 months
   Assessment                                                 of the Project
 7 – Final Profiling           PENDING          12 months     “Satisfaction”
                                                               Satisfaction
8 – Diffusion of the                                         Methodology’s
                               PENDING          GNU/FDL ;)
       model                                                 public release
The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP)



            Profiling Hackers – the book
The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP)




          Evaluation and correlation standards

Modus Operandi (MO)                      Hacking career

Lone hacker or as a
member of a group                        Principles of the hacker's ethics
                                               p


Motivations                              Crashed or damaged systems

                                         Perception of the illegality of
Selected targets
                                         their own activity

Relationship between                     Effect of laws convictions and
                                                   laws,
motivations and targets                  technical difficulties as a deterrent
The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP)

       Detailed analysis and correlation of
                profiles – table #1
The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP)

                               Detailed analysis and correlation of profiles – table #2
                           OFFENDER ID                LONE / GROUP HACKER         TARGET                    MOTIVATIONS /
                                                                                                            PURPOSES

Wanna Be Lamer             9-16 years                 GROUP                       End-User                  For fashion, It’s “cool” => to
                           “I would like to be a                                                            boast and brag
                           hacker, but I can’t”
Script Kiddie              10-18 years                GROUP: but they act alone   SME / Specific security   To give vent of their anger /
                           The script boy                                         flaws                     attract mass-media
                                                                                                            attention
Cracker                    17-30 years                LONE                        Business company          To demonstrate their powe
                           The destructor, burned                                                           / attract mass-media
                           ground                                                                           attention
Ethical Hacker             15-50
                           15 50 years                LONE /                      Vendor / Technology       For curiosity (to learn) and
                           The “ethical” hacker’s     GROUP (only for fun)                                  altruistic purposes
                           world
Quiet, Paranoid, Skilled   16-40 years                LONE                        On necessity              For curiosity (to learn) =>
Hacker                     The very specialized and                                                         egoistic purposes
                           paranoid attacker
Cyber-Warrior              18-50 years                LONE                        “Symbol” business         For profit
                           The soldier, hacking for                               company / End-User
                           money
Industrial Spy             22-45 years                LONE                        Business company /        For profit
                           Industrial espionage                                   Corporation
Government Agent           25-45 years                LONE / GROUP                Government / Suspected    Espionage/
                           CIA, Mossad, FBI, etc.                                 Terrorist/                Counter-espionage
                                                                                  Strategic company/        Vulnerability test
                                                                                  Individual                Activity-monitoring
Military Hacker            25-45 years                LONE / GROUP                Government / Strategic    Monitoring /
                                                                                  company                   controlling /
                                                                                                            crashing systems
Ok Raoul…
so what ?!?
Hacking, today

                                Numbers

  285 million records compromised in 2008 (source: Verizon 2009 Data Breach
Investigations Report)
 2 Billion of US dollars: that’s RBN’s 2008 turnover
 +80 MLN of US$: IMU’s 2010 Turn Over
                 IMU s
 3 Billion of Euros: worldwide Cybercrime turnover in 2010 (?)
 +148% increasing in ATM frauds: more than 500 000 000 € business each
                                                  500.000.000
year, just in Europe (source: ENISA “ATM Crime Report 2009”)
 .......bla bla bla


 Uh ?!?    RBN ?      WTH??
RBN

Russian Business Network
It’s not that easy to explain what it is...
First of all, cybercrime IRL means:
     Phishing & co
     Malware (rogue AVs, driven-by attacks, fake mobile games, + standard
   stuff)
     Frauds & Scams
     DDoS Attacks
     DD S Att k
     Digital Paedophilia (children and minors pornography )
     Generic Porn (who would bother for 10 bucks lost??)
     On-line games (those fake web sites)
RBN & phishing

 David Bizeul (Head of CERT at Societe Generale, France) wrote an excellent study on
RBN. One page was so interesting:
           p g                 g
http://194.146.207.18/config
storage_send_interval="600" config_file ="$_2341234.TMP" storage_file ="$_2341233.TMP" www_domains_list =
"pageshowlink.com" redirector_url ="citibusinessonline.da-us.citibank.com /cbusol/uSignOn.do {www}
/usa/citibusiness.php
/usa/citibusiness php 2 0 3" redirector url = "*fineco it /fineco/PortaleLogin {www} /it/fineco.php 2 0 3"
                            3 redirector_url    fineco.it                            /it/fineco php     3
redirector_url = "onlineid.bankofamerica.com /cgi-bin/sso.login.controller* {www} /usa/boa_pers/sso.login.php
2 0 2" redirector_url = "onlinebanking-nw.bankofamerica.com /login.jsp* {www} /usa/boa_pers/sso.login.php
2 0 2" redirector_url = "online.wellsfargo.com /signon* {www} /usa/wellsfargo.php 2 0 2" redirector_url =
"ibank barclays co uk /olb/*/LoginPasscode do {www} /uk/barc/LoginPasscode php 2 0 2" redirector url =
 ibank.barclays.co.uk /olb/ /LoginPasscode.do             /uk/barc/LoginPasscode.php         2 redirector_url
"*ebank.hsbc.co.uk /servlet/com.hsbc.ib.app.pib.logon.servlet.OnLogonVerificationServlet {www}
/uk/hsbc/hsbc.php 2 0 2" redirector_url = "online*.lloydstsb.* /miheld.ibc {www} /uk/lloyds/lloyds.php 2 0 2"
redirector_url = "*halifax-online.co.uk /_mem_bin/UMLogonVerify.asp {www} /uk/halifax.co.uk.php 2 0 3"
redirector_url olb2.nationet.com /signon/SinglePageSignon wp1 asp*
redirector url = "olb2 nationet com /signon/SinglePageSignon_wp1.asp {www} /uk/nationwide.php 2 0 3"
                                                                                  /uk/nationwide php       3
redirector_url = "webbank.openplan.co.uk /core/webbank.asp {www} /uk/woolwich.co.uk.php 2 0 3" #DE
redirector_url = "meine.deutsche-bank.de /mod/WebObjects/dbpbc.woa/* {www}
/de/deutsche-bank.de/login.php 2 0 3" redirector_url = "banking.postbank.de /app/login.prep.do* {www}
/de/postbank/postbank.de.php
/de/postbank/postbank de php 2 0 3" redirector url = "portal*.commerzbanking.de /P-
                                     3 redirector_url portal commerzbanking de /P
Portal/XML/IFILPortal/pgf.html* {www} /de/commerzbanking/login.php 2 0 2" redirector_url = "www.dresdner-
privat.de /servlet/P/SSA_MLS_PPP_INSECURE_P/pinLogin.do {www} /de/dresdner-privat/pers.php 2 0 3"
redirector_url = "www.dresdner-privat.de /servlet/N/SSA_MLS_PPP_INSECURE_N/pinLogin.do {www}
/de/dresdner privat/corp.php
/de/dresdner-privat/corp php 2 0 3 3"
What about the other IP
addresses?
RBN’s model
Underground
     g
 Economy
“Cybercriminals”
UE


Underground Economy is the concept thanks to which we will not experience
anymore – in the next future – “bank robbings”

Nowadays the ways in order to fraud and steal money are SO MANY. And, the
world is just full of unexperienced, not-educated users.

What is needed is to “clean” the money: money laundering. They need the
                                     y      y          g     y
mules.
UE: the approach


1.
1    Basics: Malware and Botnets
      Create the malware, build the botnet

2.   Identity theft
      Stealing personal and financial credentials (e-banking)

3.   Running the e-crime
              g
      i.e.: e-Banking attacks and e-commerce frauds (Ebay docet)

4.   Money laundering
      Setup money laundering’s networks
UE Business Model




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UE Cooperation Model




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Surprise....


This was happening last time one year ago
                                      ago.

Now there’s IMU (Innovative Marketing Ukraine) and other “spare” organized
crime gangs.

So, they’ve changed their business model (!)
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Who’s beyond ?

 Next slides will contain images from real
Law Enforcement operations, as well as
undercover operations.

 Please, stop video recording, no pictures
and….DO
and DO NOT DO THIS AT HOME ! ;)

 Thanks.
 Thanks
Carding 101
•   Carder - Slang used to describe individuals who use stolen credit card account information to conduct fraudulent transactions.
•   Carding - Trafficking in and fraudulent use of stolen credit card account information.
•   Cashing - The act of obtaining money by committing fraud. This act can be committed in a variety of ways: The term can stand for cashing out Western Union wires, Postal
    money orders and WebMoney; using track data with PINs to obtain cash at ATMs, from PayPal accounts, or setting up a bank account with a fake ID to withdraw cash on a
    credit card account
                account.
•   CC - Slang for credit card.
•   Change of Billing (COB or COBs) - Term used to describe the act of changing the billing address on a credit account to match that of a mail drop. This act allows the carder
    full takeover capability of the compromised credit card account and increases the probability that the account will not be rejected when being used for Internet transactions.
•   CVV2 - CVV2 stands for credit card security code. Visa, MasterCard, and Discover require this feature. It is a 3 digit number on the back of the card.
•   DDoS - Acronym for Distributed Denial of Service Attack. The intent when conducting a DDOS attack is to shut down a targeted website, at least for a period of time, by
    flooding the network with an overflow of traffic.
•   DLs - A slang term that stands for counterfeit or novelty driver's licenses.
•   Drop - An intermediary used to disguise the source of a transaction (addresses, phones etc.)
•   Dumps - Copied payment card information, at least Track 1 data, but usually Track 1 and Track 2 data.
                                information                   data                                  data
•   Dump checking - Using specific software or alternatively encoding track data on plastic and using a point of sale terminal to test whether the dump is approved or declined.
    This provides carders a higher sense of security for obtaining quality dumps fro those who offer them and also a sense of security when doing in store carding.
•   Full info(s) - Term used to describe obtaining addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, PIN numbers, credit history reports and so on. Full Info(s) are synonymous
    with carders who wish to take over the identity of a person or to sell the identity of a person.
•   Holos - Sl
            Slang for the word Holograms. Holograms are important for those who make counterfeit plastic credit cards to emulate an existing security feature.
                  f h        d l            l           i         f h        h    k         f i l i         di     d        l         i i         i f
•   ICQ - An abbreviation for "I Seek You". ICQ is the most widely used instant messaging system for carders. Popular among Eastern Europeans in their Internet culture, it
    continues to be used for carding activity.
•   IRC - An abbreviation for "Internet Relay Chat". IRC is a global system of servers through which users can conduct real-time text-based chat, exchange files, and interact in
    other ways.
•   IDs - Slang for identification documents. Carders market a variety of IDs, including bills, diplomas, driver's licenses, passports, or anything that can be used as an identity
    document.
•   MSR (Magnetic Strip Reader) - Device that can be used for skimming payment card information and/or encoding track information on plastic.
•   Phishing - The extraction of information from a target using a hook (usually an e-mail purporting to be from a legitimate company). Phishers spam the Internet with e-mails in
    hopes of obtaining information that can be used for fraudulent purposes.
•   POS (Point of Sale) - Acronym for a terminal through which credit cards are swiped in order to communicate with processors who approve or decline transactions.
•   Proxies - Term used for proxy servers. The use of proxy servers to mask ones identity on the Internet is widely practiced amongst carders. Many vendors sell access to proxy
    servers, socks, http, https, and VPN (Virtual Private Networks), which aide in hiding the user's actual IP address when committing fraud or other illegal activity on the Internet.
•   Track 1/Track 2 data - Track 1 and Track 2 data is the information stored on the magnetic stripe of a payment card that contains the account information.
Who lays behind
this ?




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The organizational
model




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Who’s beyond?
Early
                          Arrests

    Markus Kellerer aka
        Matrix001                   Renu Subramaniam aka
                                            JiLsi
& Five Others, May 2007-Oct.
           2007                           July 2007
                                             y
         Germany                       United Kingdom
        Co-Founder                        Founder
Max Butler, aka Iceman
September 2007
San Francisco/Richmond
Founder of CardersMarket
$86 Million in actual Fraud Loss
Who’s beyond?




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Who’s beyond?




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Chi c’è dietro ?




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Who’s beyond?
Le feste per “i dealer”




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Girls, money, cars..




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Girls, money, cars..




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Videoclip Romania (2010)

Hi-Tech Crime Police Unit enters
    in ATM Skimmer factory
This is the end,my friends
                                Final toughts
 The hacking world has not always been linked to those true criminal actions.
 Those researches carried out until now, have not properly snapshot the
hacking world and its “tunings”.
                       tunings
 At the same time, nowaday’s hacking is moving (transforming?) towards crime.
And, different elements began working together (see next slides).
  Cybercrime and Underground Economy problem is not “a tech-people issue”:
rather, it is an issue for ALL of us, representing an impact on the countries’
ecosystem that could reveal itself as devastating.
 Also, forget fighting cybercrime on your own: you just can’t.
 That s
 That’s why my last slides are on cybercrime’s answers and VTFs (Virtual Task
                                  cybercrime s
Forces).
What’s next? The Dark Links
Human Organs trafficking

 September 2010, Asti (North-West of Italy)

 Police was eavesdropping on phone calls from and to the “Capo dei Capi” of a
Nigerian gang, specialized in cloned credit cards and elite cars theft.

 In one of this calls, a guy said to the Boss: “the Kidneys are ready”.

 So,
 So what we have here? Organized Crime “buying” Human Organs from Nigeria –
                                          buying
using the money gathered from cybercrime – then selling into EU (!).
Coke for cards?

 March/May 2010, Turin (North-West of Italy)
 Turin has got the biggest Romania s community of Italy
                           Romania’s              Italy.
 We also have a very big Nigeria’s community.

 Historically, Romenian gangs drive the business of ATM skimmers…
            y,          g g
 …and Nigerian the Cocaine business.

 After a joined FBI/US Secret Service/Interpol/Italian Postal Police operation, the
         j                                 p                          p
Romanians decided to “sell” the business to Nigerians.
 Cloned cards were paid with Cocaine.

 This happens because the Romenians also run the prostitutes business…
 …and, prostitute’s customers want coke as well.

 Compared to these guys, S
 C      d     h          Scarface was nearly a kid
                             f            l
Cybercrime: the answers
• Cybercrime is typically a transnational crime, borderless, that includes so
  many actors and different roles.
• That’s why you just can’t think about a single answer.

• Instead, it is necessary to think and act in a distributed approach, creating
  Virtual Task Forces (VTFs).

• It is essential the collaboration among Law Enforcement, Internet
  community, Finance sector, ISPs and carriers (voice & data), vertical groups, in
  order to identify a specific group, malware or facilitator.

• From the investigative point of view, challenges are the following:
      Analyze the malware
      Map the infrastructure
      Eavesdrop/Intercept/Sniff the communication and/or the links
      Explore the executed attacks
      Identify the developers and its crime-rings.
Vertical Groups & VTFs
•   That’s why, along these years, Vertical Groups have been raised,
    among which we can list the following:
       Team Cymru
       APWG –Anti Phishing Working Group
       IEEE-SA
       Shadow Server Foundation
       UNICRI – Emerging Crimes Unit
       Host Exploit
       Cyberdefcon
       ………..
•   …working along with :
       INTERPOL
       EUROPOL
       “Hi-Tech Crimes” groups into each National LEAs
While..you better watch
out!
Must-read books / 1

During the different phases of bibliography research, the Authors have made reference (also) to the following publications and on-line
resources:
●   H.P.P. Questionnaires 2005-2011
The Kingpin, Kevin Poulsen, 2011
●



●   Fatal System Error: the Hunt for the new Crime Lords who are bringing down the Internet, Joseph Menn, Public Affairs, 2010
           y                                                         g g                   ,     p      ,               ,
●   Stealing the Network: How to 0wn a Continent, (an Identity), (a Shadow) (V.A.), Syngress Publishing, 2004, 2006, 2007
●   Stealing the Network: How to 0wn the Box, (V.A.), Syngress Publishing, 2003
●Underground: Tales of Hacking, Madness and Obsession on the Electronic Frontier, Suelette Dreyfus, Random House
        g                    g,                                                 ,             y ,
Australia, 1997
●   The Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage, Clifford Stoll, DoubleDay (1989), Pocket (2000)
●   Masters of Deception: the Gang that Ruled Cyberspace, Michelle Stalalla & Joshua Quinttner, Harpercollins, 1995
●   Kevin Poulsen, Serial Hacker, Jonathan Littman, Little & Brown, 1997
●   Takedown, John Markoff and Tsutomu Shimomura, Sperling & Kupfler, (Hyperion Books), 1996
●   The Fugitive Game: online with Kevin Mitnick, Jonathan Littman, Little & Brown, 1997
●   The Art of Deception, Kevin D. Mitnick & William L. Simon, Wiley, 2002
●   The Art of Intrusion, Kevin D. Mitnick & William L. Simon, Wiley, 2004
●   @ Large: the Strange Case of the World’s Biggest Internet Invasion, Charles Mann & David Freedman, Touchstone, 1998
Must-read books / 2

The Estonia attack: Battling Botnets and online Mobs, Gadi Evron, 2008 (white paper)
●


Who is “n3td3v”?, by Hacker Factor Solutions, 2006 (white paper)
●                  y                               (      p p )
Mafiaboy: How I cracked the Internet and Why it’s still broken, Michael Calce with Craig Silverman, 2008
●


The Hacker Diaries: Confessions of Teenage Hackers, Dan Verton, McGraw-Hill Osborne Media, 2002
●


Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier, Katie Hafner, Simon & Schuster, 1995
●


Cyber Adversary Characterization: auditing the hacker mind, Tom Parker, Syngress, 2004
●


Inside the SPAM Cartel: trade secrets from the Dark Side, by Spammer X, Syngress, 2004
●


Hacker Cracker, Ejovu Nuwere with David Chanoff, Harper Collins, 2002
●


Compendio di criminologia, P ti G., Raffaello C ti
C
●     di       i i l i Ponti G R ff ll Cortina, 1991
●Criminalità da computer, Tiedemann K., in Trattato di criminologia, medicina criminologica e psichiatria forense, vol.X, Il
cambiamento delle forme di criminalità e devianza, Ferracuti F. (a cura di), Giuffrè, 1988
●United Nations Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer-related Crime, in International Review of
Criminal Policy – Nos 43 and 44
                  Nos.
●Criminal Profiling: dall’analisi della scena del delitto al profilo psicologico del criminale, Massimo Picozzi, Angelo
Zappalà, McGraw Hill, 2001
● Deductive Criminal Profiling: Comparing Applied Methodologies Between Inductive and Deductive Criminal

Profiling Techniques, Turvey B., Knowledge Solutions Library, January, 1998
        g       q   ,      y ,          g                  y,       y,
●Malicious Hackers: a framework for Analysis and Case Study, Laura J. Kleen, Captain, USAF, US Air Force Institute of
Technology
●Criminal Profiling Research Site. Scientific Offender Profiling Resource in Switzerland. Criminology, Law,
Psychology, Täterpro
Must-read books / 3


●   Profiling Hackers: the Science of Criminal Profiling as applied to the World of Hacking
●   ISBN: 978-1-4200-8693-5-90000
And...a gift for you all here! ☺




●   Get your own, FREE copy of “F3” (Freedom from
●Fear, the United Nations magazine) issue #7,
totally focused on Cybercrimes!



DOWNLOAD:
DOWNLOAD
●



●   www.FreedomFromFearMagazine.org

●   Or, email me and I will send you the full PDF (10MB)
Q
      Questions?

                           Contacts, Q&A


           Raoul Chiesa

   E-mail: chiesa@UNICRI.it

          Thanks folks!


 UNICRI Cybercrime Home Page:
         y                g                    http://www.unicri.it
http://www.unicri.it/emerging_crimes/cybercrime/

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Raoul chiesa - Auditing the hacker mind - da wargames a underground economy

  • 1. Versione Pubblica (alcune slide sono state sanitizzate) Auditing the Hacker’s Mind: da Wargames all’Underground Economy, passando per il cybercrime A presentation by Raoul Chiesa Senior Advisor on Cybercrime, UNICRI United Nations - Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) Cagliari 13 Giugno 2011
  • 2. Disclaimer ● The information contained in this presentation does not break any intellectual property, nor does it provide detailed information that may be in conflict with actual Italian laws. ● Registered brands belong to their legitimate owners. ● The opinion here represented are my personal ones and do not necessary reflect the United Nations nor UNICRI or ENISA and ENISA’s ENISA’ PSG views. i
  • 3. Agenda # whois Introduction and Key Concepts Yesterday’s h ki Y t d ’ hacking VS today’s crime t d ’ i Hacking eras and Hacker’s generations Cybercrime Hackers… Profiling the enemy: the Hackers Profiling Project (HPP) Hacking, today: Underground Economy What’s next? The Dark Links Cybercrime: the responses Conclusions
  • 6. Raoul “Nobody” Chiesa • Old-school Hacker from 1986 to 1995 • Infosec Professional since 1997 @ Mediaservice.net • OSSTMM Key Contributor; HPP Project Manager; ISECOM y ; j g ; International Trainer • Co-founder of CLUSIT, Italian Computer Security Association (CLUSI* : Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Switzerland) • Member of TSTF.net – Telecom Security Task Force, APWG, ICANN; ENISA PSG. • I work worldwide (so I don’t get bored ;) • My areas of interest: Pentesting, SCADA/DCS/PLC National Pentesting SCADA/DCS/PLC, Critical Infrastructures, Security R&D+Exploiting weird stuff, , Security People, X.25, PSTN/ISDN, Hackers Profiling, Cybercrime, Information Warfare, Security methodologies, vertical Trainings. • Basically, I do not work in this field just to get my salary every month and pay the home/car/whatever loan: I really love it ☺
  • 7. UNICRI What is UNICRI? United Nations Interregional Crime & Justice Research Institute A United Nations entity established in 1968 to support countries worldwide in crime prevention and criminal justice UNICRI carries out applied research, training, technical cooperation and documentation / information activities UNICRI disseminates information and maintains contacts with professionals and experts worldwide Emerging Crimes Unit (ECU): cyber crimes, counterfeiting, environmental crimes, trafficking in stolen works of art… Fake Bvlgari &Rolex, but also Guess how they update each others? Water systems with “sensors”… Viagra & Cialis (aka SPAM) Email, chat&IM, Skype…
  • 8.
  • 9.
  • 12.
  • 13. UNICRI & Cybercrime Overview on UNICRI projects against cybercrime Hackers Profiling Project (HPP) SCADA & NCI s security (CIP) NCI’s Digital Forensics and digital investigation SCADA Security techniques Cybersecurity Trainings at the UN Campus
  • 14. 2011
  • 15. Strategic relationships and Information-sharing Networks, in order to fight cybercrime g y Along the years we have been able to build a network of special relationships and direct contacts with the following organizations, working towards specific areas of interest and shared research topics: (this li t i (thi list is may not complete due to NDAs) t l t d t NDA ) Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 16. Yesterday y and today’s Hacking
  • 17. Crime->Yesterday “Every new technology, opens the door to new criminal approaches”. • The relationship between technologies and criminality has always been – since the very beginning – characterized by a kind of “competition” between the good and the bad guys, just like cats and mice. • As an example, at the beginning of 1900, when cars appeared, the “bad guys” started stealing them (!) • ….the police, in order to contrast the phenomenon, defined the mandatory use of car plates… • ….and the thieves began stealing the car plates from the cars (and/or falsifying them).
  • 18. Crime->Today:Cybercrime • Cars have been substituted by information You got the information, you got the power.. (at least, in politics, in the business world, in our personal relationships…) • Simply p , this happens because the “information” can be transformed at once p y put, pp into “something else”: Competitive advantage Sensible/critical information Money • … that’s why all of us we want to “be secure”. be secure • It’s not by chance that it’s named “IS”: Information Security ☺
  • 19. Esempi tutti italiani... • L’informazione è immediatamente trasformabile in: 1. Vantaggio competitivo 2. Informazione sensibile/critica 3. Denaro 4. Ricatto • Esempi ? (…imbarazzo della scelta ;) – Escorts & co – La villa di Montecarlo – Regione Lazio (dall “hacking” sino al caso Marrazzo e poi Polverini/account “fantasma”) – Calciopoli p – Scandalo Telecom Italia/SISMI – Attacco Vodafone Grecia – Vittorio Emanuele di Savoia – Vallettopoli + Scandalo Escorts – Corona – McLaren/Ferrari – …………….
  • 20. Hacking eras & g Hackers’ generations
  • 21. Things changed… First generation (70’s) was inspired by the need for knowledge Second generation (1980-1984) was driven by curiosity plus the knowledge starving: the only way to learn OSs was to hack them; later (1985-1990) hacking becomes a trend. The Third one (90’s) was simply pushed by the anger for hacking, meaning a mix of addiction, curiosity, learning new stuff, hacking IT systems and networks, exchanging info with the underground community Here we saw new concepts community. coming, such as hacker’s e-zines (Phrack, 2600 Magazine) along with BBS Fourth generation (2000-today) is driven by angerness and (2000 today) money: often we can see subjects with a very low know-how, thinking that it’s “cool & bragging” being hackers, while they are not interested in hacking & phreaking history, culture and ethics. Here hacking meets with politics (cyber-hacktivism) or with the criminal world (cybercrime). €, € $
  • 22. Cybercrime: why? • QUESTION: – May we state that cybercrime – along with its many, many aspects and views – can be ranked as #1 in rising trend and global diffusion ? • ANSWER(S): • Given that all of you are attendees and speakers here today, I would say that th t we already are on the right track i order t analyze the problem ☺ l d th i ht t k in d to l th bl • Nevertheless, some factors exist for which the spreading of “e-crime-based” attacks relays. • Let’s take a look at them.
  • 23. Reasons/1 • 1. There are new users, more and more every day: this means the total amount of y y Thanks to broadband... broadband potential victims and/or attack vectors is increasing. • 2. Making money, “somehow and straight WW Economical away”. y crisis… • 3. Technical know-how public availability & 0-days, Internet distribution system / ready-to-go, even when talking about Black Markets average-high skills: that’s what I name “hacking p et à po te ac g pret-à-porter”
  • 25. Reasons/2 • 4. It s 4 It’s extremely easy to recruit “idiots” and set up groups molding those adepts idiots groups, upon the bad guy’s needs (think about e-mules) Newbies, Script Kiddies • 5. “They will never bust me” Psycology, Criminology • 6. 6 Lack of violent actions Psycology and Sociology
  • 26. What the heck is changed then?? What’s really changed is the attacker’s typology From “bored teens”, doing it for “hobby and curiosity” (obviously: during night, pizza hut s pizza-hut’s box on the floor and cans of Red Bull)…. ...to teenagers and adults not g mandatory “ICT” or “hackers”: they just do it for the money. What’s changed is the attacker’s profile, along with its justifications, motivations and reasons. Let’s have a quick test! 26
  • 27. Hackers in their environment
  • 29. There’s a difference: why? • Why were the guys in the first slide hackers, and the others professionals ? • Because of the PCs ? • Because of their “look” ? • Due to the environments surrounding them ? • Because of the “expression on their faces” ?
  • 30. Surprise! Everything has changed • Erroneus media information pushed your pp mind to run this approach • T d Today, sometimes th professionals are ti the f i l the real criminals, and hackers “the good guys”… (Telecom Italia Scandal, Vodafone Greece Affair, etc…)
  • 31. Understanding Hackers • It’ extremely important th t we understand the so-called It’s t l i t t that d t d th ll d “hacker’s behaviours” – Don’t limit yourself to analyse attacks and intrusion techniques: let’s analyze Don t let s their social behaviours • Try to identify those not-written rules of hacker’s subculture • Explore hacker’s social organization • Let’s zoom on those existing links between hacking and organized crime
  • 33. The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP) Hackers The term hacker has been heavily misused since the 80’s; since the 90’ the mainstream h i h 90’s, h i have used i to j if every d it justify kind of “IT crime”, from lame attacks to massive DDoS Lamers, script-kiddies, industrial spies, hobby hackers….for the mass, they are all the same From a business point of view, companies don’t clearly know who they should be afraid of To them they’re all of. they re just “hackers”
  • 34. The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP) Hackers: a blurred image Yesterday: hacking was an emerging y g g g phenomenon – unknown to people & ignored by researchers Today: research carried out in “mono”: → mono : one type of hacker: ugly (thin, myopic), bad (malicious, destructive, criminal purposes) and “dirty” (asocial, without ethics, ethics anarchic) Tomorrow (HPP is the future): inter- disciplinary studies that merge criminology and information security → different typologies of hackers
  • 35. The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP) HPP purposes Analyse the hacking phenomenon in its several aspects (technological, social, economic) through technical and criminological approaches Understand the different motivations and identify the actors involved Observe those true criminal actions “in the field” Apply the profiling methodology to collected data (4W: who, where, when, why) Acquire and disseminate knowledge
  • 36. The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP) Project phases – starting: September 2004 j p g p 1 – Theoretical collection: 5 – Gap analysis: p y of data from: questionnaire, honey- Questionnaire net, existing literature 2 – Observation: 6 – HPP “live” assessment live Participation in IT underground security of profiles and correlation of modus events operandi through data from phase 4 3 - Filing: 7 – Final profiling: Database for elaboration/classification Redefinition/fine-tuning of hackers of data (phase 1) profiles used as “de-facto” standard 4 - Live collection: 8 – Diffusion of the model: Highly customised, new generation elaboration of results, publication of Honey-net systems the methodology, raising awareness
  • 37. The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP) Project phases - detail PHASE CARRIED OUT DURATION NOTES 1 – Theoretical Distribution on YES ON-GOING 16 months collection more levels From different 2 – Observation YES ON-GOING ON GOING 24 months points of view The hardest 3 – Filing ON-GOING 21 months phase The funniest 4 – “Live” collection TO BE COMMENCED 21 months phase ☺ 5 – Gap & YET TO COME 18 months The Next Thing g Correlation Analysis 6 – “Live” The biggest part PENDING 16 months Assessment of the Project 7 – Final Profiling PENDING 12 months “Satisfaction” Satisfaction 8 – Diffusion of the Methodology’s PENDING GNU/FDL ;) model public release
  • 38. The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP) Profiling Hackers – the book
  • 39. The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP) Evaluation and correlation standards Modus Operandi (MO) Hacking career Lone hacker or as a member of a group Principles of the hacker's ethics p Motivations Crashed or damaged systems Perception of the illegality of Selected targets their own activity Relationship between Effect of laws convictions and laws, motivations and targets technical difficulties as a deterrent
  • 40. The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP) Detailed analysis and correlation of profiles – table #1
  • 41. The Hackers Profiling Project (HPP) Detailed analysis and correlation of profiles – table #2 OFFENDER ID LONE / GROUP HACKER TARGET MOTIVATIONS / PURPOSES Wanna Be Lamer 9-16 years GROUP End-User For fashion, It’s “cool” => to “I would like to be a boast and brag hacker, but I can’t” Script Kiddie 10-18 years GROUP: but they act alone SME / Specific security To give vent of their anger / The script boy flaws attract mass-media attention Cracker 17-30 years LONE Business company To demonstrate their powe The destructor, burned / attract mass-media ground attention Ethical Hacker 15-50 15 50 years LONE / Vendor / Technology For curiosity (to learn) and The “ethical” hacker’s GROUP (only for fun) altruistic purposes world Quiet, Paranoid, Skilled 16-40 years LONE On necessity For curiosity (to learn) => Hacker The very specialized and egoistic purposes paranoid attacker Cyber-Warrior 18-50 years LONE “Symbol” business For profit The soldier, hacking for company / End-User money Industrial Spy 22-45 years LONE Business company / For profit Industrial espionage Corporation Government Agent 25-45 years LONE / GROUP Government / Suspected Espionage/ CIA, Mossad, FBI, etc. Terrorist/ Counter-espionage Strategic company/ Vulnerability test Individual Activity-monitoring Military Hacker 25-45 years LONE / GROUP Government / Strategic Monitoring / company controlling / crashing systems
  • 43. Hacking, today Numbers 285 million records compromised in 2008 (source: Verizon 2009 Data Breach Investigations Report) 2 Billion of US dollars: that’s RBN’s 2008 turnover +80 MLN of US$: IMU’s 2010 Turn Over IMU s 3 Billion of Euros: worldwide Cybercrime turnover in 2010 (?) +148% increasing in ATM frauds: more than 500 000 000 € business each 500.000.000 year, just in Europe (source: ENISA “ATM Crime Report 2009”) .......bla bla bla Uh ?!? RBN ? WTH??
  • 44. RBN Russian Business Network It’s not that easy to explain what it is... First of all, cybercrime IRL means: Phishing & co Malware (rogue AVs, driven-by attacks, fake mobile games, + standard stuff) Frauds & Scams DDoS Attacks DD S Att k Digital Paedophilia (children and minors pornography ) Generic Porn (who would bother for 10 bucks lost??) On-line games (those fake web sites)
  • 45. RBN & phishing David Bizeul (Head of CERT at Societe Generale, France) wrote an excellent study on RBN. One page was so interesting: p g g http://194.146.207.18/config storage_send_interval="600" config_file ="$_2341234.TMP" storage_file ="$_2341233.TMP" www_domains_list = "pageshowlink.com" redirector_url ="citibusinessonline.da-us.citibank.com /cbusol/uSignOn.do {www} /usa/citibusiness.php /usa/citibusiness php 2 0 3" redirector url = "*fineco it /fineco/PortaleLogin {www} /it/fineco.php 2 0 3" 3 redirector_url fineco.it /it/fineco php 3 redirector_url = "onlineid.bankofamerica.com /cgi-bin/sso.login.controller* {www} /usa/boa_pers/sso.login.php 2 0 2" redirector_url = "onlinebanking-nw.bankofamerica.com /login.jsp* {www} /usa/boa_pers/sso.login.php 2 0 2" redirector_url = "online.wellsfargo.com /signon* {www} /usa/wellsfargo.php 2 0 2" redirector_url = "ibank barclays co uk /olb/*/LoginPasscode do {www} /uk/barc/LoginPasscode php 2 0 2" redirector url = ibank.barclays.co.uk /olb/ /LoginPasscode.do /uk/barc/LoginPasscode.php 2 redirector_url "*ebank.hsbc.co.uk /servlet/com.hsbc.ib.app.pib.logon.servlet.OnLogonVerificationServlet {www} /uk/hsbc/hsbc.php 2 0 2" redirector_url = "online*.lloydstsb.* /miheld.ibc {www} /uk/lloyds/lloyds.php 2 0 2" redirector_url = "*halifax-online.co.uk /_mem_bin/UMLogonVerify.asp {www} /uk/halifax.co.uk.php 2 0 3" redirector_url olb2.nationet.com /signon/SinglePageSignon wp1 asp* redirector url = "olb2 nationet com /signon/SinglePageSignon_wp1.asp {www} /uk/nationwide.php 2 0 3" /uk/nationwide php 3 redirector_url = "webbank.openplan.co.uk /core/webbank.asp {www} /uk/woolwich.co.uk.php 2 0 3" #DE redirector_url = "meine.deutsche-bank.de /mod/WebObjects/dbpbc.woa/* {www} /de/deutsche-bank.de/login.php 2 0 3" redirector_url = "banking.postbank.de /app/login.prep.do* {www} /de/postbank/postbank.de.php /de/postbank/postbank de php 2 0 3" redirector url = "portal*.commerzbanking.de /P- 3 redirector_url portal commerzbanking de /P Portal/XML/IFILPortal/pgf.html* {www} /de/commerzbanking/login.php 2 0 2" redirector_url = "www.dresdner- privat.de /servlet/P/SSA_MLS_PPP_INSECURE_P/pinLogin.do {www} /de/dresdner-privat/pers.php 2 0 3" redirector_url = "www.dresdner-privat.de /servlet/N/SSA_MLS_PPP_INSECURE_N/pinLogin.do {www} /de/dresdner privat/corp.php /de/dresdner-privat/corp php 2 0 3 3"
  • 46. What about the other IP addresses?
  • 48. Underground g Economy
  • 50. UE Underground Economy is the concept thanks to which we will not experience anymore – in the next future – “bank robbings” Nowadays the ways in order to fraud and steal money are SO MANY. And, the world is just full of unexperienced, not-educated users. What is needed is to “clean” the money: money laundering. They need the y y g y mules.
  • 51. UE: the approach 1. 1 Basics: Malware and Botnets Create the malware, build the botnet 2. Identity theft Stealing personal and financial credentials (e-banking) 3. Running the e-crime g i.e.: e-Banking attacks and e-commerce frauds (Ebay docet) 4. Money laundering Setup money laundering’s networks
  • 52. UE Business Model Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 53. UE Cooperation Model Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 54. Surprise.... This was happening last time one year ago ago. Now there’s IMU (Innovative Marketing Ukraine) and other “spare” organized crime gangs. So, they’ve changed their business model (!)
  • 55. Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 56. Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 57. Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 58. Who’s beyond ? Next slides will contain images from real Law Enforcement operations, as well as undercover operations. Please, stop video recording, no pictures and….DO and DO NOT DO THIS AT HOME ! ;) Thanks. Thanks
  • 59. Carding 101 • Carder - Slang used to describe individuals who use stolen credit card account information to conduct fraudulent transactions. • Carding - Trafficking in and fraudulent use of stolen credit card account information. • Cashing - The act of obtaining money by committing fraud. This act can be committed in a variety of ways: The term can stand for cashing out Western Union wires, Postal money orders and WebMoney; using track data with PINs to obtain cash at ATMs, from PayPal accounts, or setting up a bank account with a fake ID to withdraw cash on a credit card account account. • CC - Slang for credit card. • Change of Billing (COB or COBs) - Term used to describe the act of changing the billing address on a credit account to match that of a mail drop. This act allows the carder full takeover capability of the compromised credit card account and increases the probability that the account will not be rejected when being used for Internet transactions. • CVV2 - CVV2 stands for credit card security code. Visa, MasterCard, and Discover require this feature. It is a 3 digit number on the back of the card. • DDoS - Acronym for Distributed Denial of Service Attack. The intent when conducting a DDOS attack is to shut down a targeted website, at least for a period of time, by flooding the network with an overflow of traffic. • DLs - A slang term that stands for counterfeit or novelty driver's licenses. • Drop - An intermediary used to disguise the source of a transaction (addresses, phones etc.) • Dumps - Copied payment card information, at least Track 1 data, but usually Track 1 and Track 2 data. information data data • Dump checking - Using specific software or alternatively encoding track data on plastic and using a point of sale terminal to test whether the dump is approved or declined. This provides carders a higher sense of security for obtaining quality dumps fro those who offer them and also a sense of security when doing in store carding. • Full info(s) - Term used to describe obtaining addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, PIN numbers, credit history reports and so on. Full Info(s) are synonymous with carders who wish to take over the identity of a person or to sell the identity of a person. • Holos - Sl Slang for the word Holograms. Holograms are important for those who make counterfeit plastic credit cards to emulate an existing security feature. f h d l l i f h h k f i l i di d l i i i f • ICQ - An abbreviation for "I Seek You". ICQ is the most widely used instant messaging system for carders. Popular among Eastern Europeans in their Internet culture, it continues to be used for carding activity. • IRC - An abbreviation for "Internet Relay Chat". IRC is a global system of servers through which users can conduct real-time text-based chat, exchange files, and interact in other ways. • IDs - Slang for identification documents. Carders market a variety of IDs, including bills, diplomas, driver's licenses, passports, or anything that can be used as an identity document. • MSR (Magnetic Strip Reader) - Device that can be used for skimming payment card information and/or encoding track information on plastic. • Phishing - The extraction of information from a target using a hook (usually an e-mail purporting to be from a legitimate company). Phishers spam the Internet with e-mails in hopes of obtaining information that can be used for fraudulent purposes. • POS (Point of Sale) - Acronym for a terminal through which credit cards are swiped in order to communicate with processors who approve or decline transactions. • Proxies - Term used for proxy servers. The use of proxy servers to mask ones identity on the Internet is widely practiced amongst carders. Many vendors sell access to proxy servers, socks, http, https, and VPN (Virtual Private Networks), which aide in hiding the user's actual IP address when committing fraud or other illegal activity on the Internet. • Track 1/Track 2 data - Track 1 and Track 2 data is the information stored on the magnetic stripe of a payment card that contains the account information.
  • 60. Who lays behind this ? Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 61. Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 62. The organizational model Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 64. Early Arrests Markus Kellerer aka Matrix001 Renu Subramaniam aka JiLsi & Five Others, May 2007-Oct. 2007 July 2007 y Germany United Kingdom Co-Founder Founder
  • 65. Max Butler, aka Iceman September 2007 San Francisco/Richmond Founder of CardersMarket $86 Million in actual Fraud Loss
  • 66.
  • 67.
  • 68. Who’s beyond? Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 69. Who’s beyond? Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 70. Chi c’è dietro ? Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 72. Le feste per “i dealer” Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 73. Girls, money, cars.. Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 74. Girls, money, cars.. Questa slide è stata sanitizzata e non è presente nella versione pubblica
  • 75. Videoclip Romania (2010) Hi-Tech Crime Police Unit enters in ATM Skimmer factory
  • 76. This is the end,my friends Final toughts The hacking world has not always been linked to those true criminal actions. Those researches carried out until now, have not properly snapshot the hacking world and its “tunings”. tunings At the same time, nowaday’s hacking is moving (transforming?) towards crime. And, different elements began working together (see next slides). Cybercrime and Underground Economy problem is not “a tech-people issue”: rather, it is an issue for ALL of us, representing an impact on the countries’ ecosystem that could reveal itself as devastating. Also, forget fighting cybercrime on your own: you just can’t. That s That’s why my last slides are on cybercrime’s answers and VTFs (Virtual Task cybercrime s Forces).
  • 77. What’s next? The Dark Links
  • 78. Human Organs trafficking September 2010, Asti (North-West of Italy) Police was eavesdropping on phone calls from and to the “Capo dei Capi” of a Nigerian gang, specialized in cloned credit cards and elite cars theft. In one of this calls, a guy said to the Boss: “the Kidneys are ready”. So, So what we have here? Organized Crime “buying” Human Organs from Nigeria – buying using the money gathered from cybercrime – then selling into EU (!).
  • 79. Coke for cards? March/May 2010, Turin (North-West of Italy) Turin has got the biggest Romania s community of Italy Romania’s Italy. We also have a very big Nigeria’s community. Historically, Romenian gangs drive the business of ATM skimmers… y, g g …and Nigerian the Cocaine business. After a joined FBI/US Secret Service/Interpol/Italian Postal Police operation, the j p p Romanians decided to “sell” the business to Nigerians. Cloned cards were paid with Cocaine. This happens because the Romenians also run the prostitutes business… …and, prostitute’s customers want coke as well. Compared to these guys, S C d h Scarface was nearly a kid f l
  • 80. Cybercrime: the answers • Cybercrime is typically a transnational crime, borderless, that includes so many actors and different roles. • That’s why you just can’t think about a single answer. • Instead, it is necessary to think and act in a distributed approach, creating Virtual Task Forces (VTFs). • It is essential the collaboration among Law Enforcement, Internet community, Finance sector, ISPs and carriers (voice & data), vertical groups, in order to identify a specific group, malware or facilitator. • From the investigative point of view, challenges are the following: Analyze the malware Map the infrastructure Eavesdrop/Intercept/Sniff the communication and/or the links Explore the executed attacks Identify the developers and its crime-rings.
  • 81. Vertical Groups & VTFs • That’s why, along these years, Vertical Groups have been raised, among which we can list the following: Team Cymru APWG –Anti Phishing Working Group IEEE-SA Shadow Server Foundation UNICRI – Emerging Crimes Unit Host Exploit Cyberdefcon ……….. • …working along with : INTERPOL EUROPOL “Hi-Tech Crimes” groups into each National LEAs
  • 83.
  • 84. Must-read books / 1 During the different phases of bibliography research, the Authors have made reference (also) to the following publications and on-line resources: ● H.P.P. Questionnaires 2005-2011 The Kingpin, Kevin Poulsen, 2011 ● ● Fatal System Error: the Hunt for the new Crime Lords who are bringing down the Internet, Joseph Menn, Public Affairs, 2010 y g g , p , , ● Stealing the Network: How to 0wn a Continent, (an Identity), (a Shadow) (V.A.), Syngress Publishing, 2004, 2006, 2007 ● Stealing the Network: How to 0wn the Box, (V.A.), Syngress Publishing, 2003 ●Underground: Tales of Hacking, Madness and Obsession on the Electronic Frontier, Suelette Dreyfus, Random House g g, , y , Australia, 1997 ● The Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage, Clifford Stoll, DoubleDay (1989), Pocket (2000) ● Masters of Deception: the Gang that Ruled Cyberspace, Michelle Stalalla & Joshua Quinttner, Harpercollins, 1995 ● Kevin Poulsen, Serial Hacker, Jonathan Littman, Little & Brown, 1997 ● Takedown, John Markoff and Tsutomu Shimomura, Sperling & Kupfler, (Hyperion Books), 1996 ● The Fugitive Game: online with Kevin Mitnick, Jonathan Littman, Little & Brown, 1997 ● The Art of Deception, Kevin D. Mitnick & William L. Simon, Wiley, 2002 ● The Art of Intrusion, Kevin D. Mitnick & William L. Simon, Wiley, 2004 ● @ Large: the Strange Case of the World’s Biggest Internet Invasion, Charles Mann & David Freedman, Touchstone, 1998
  • 85. Must-read books / 2 The Estonia attack: Battling Botnets and online Mobs, Gadi Evron, 2008 (white paper) ● Who is “n3td3v”?, by Hacker Factor Solutions, 2006 (white paper) ● y ( p p ) Mafiaboy: How I cracked the Internet and Why it’s still broken, Michael Calce with Craig Silverman, 2008 ● The Hacker Diaries: Confessions of Teenage Hackers, Dan Verton, McGraw-Hill Osborne Media, 2002 ● Cyberpunk: Outlaws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier, Katie Hafner, Simon & Schuster, 1995 ● Cyber Adversary Characterization: auditing the hacker mind, Tom Parker, Syngress, 2004 ● Inside the SPAM Cartel: trade secrets from the Dark Side, by Spammer X, Syngress, 2004 ● Hacker Cracker, Ejovu Nuwere with David Chanoff, Harper Collins, 2002 ● Compendio di criminologia, P ti G., Raffaello C ti C ● di i i l i Ponti G R ff ll Cortina, 1991 ●Criminalità da computer, Tiedemann K., in Trattato di criminologia, medicina criminologica e psichiatria forense, vol.X, Il cambiamento delle forme di criminalità e devianza, Ferracuti F. (a cura di), Giuffrè, 1988 ●United Nations Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer-related Crime, in International Review of Criminal Policy – Nos 43 and 44 Nos. ●Criminal Profiling: dall’analisi della scena del delitto al profilo psicologico del criminale, Massimo Picozzi, Angelo Zappalà, McGraw Hill, 2001 ● Deductive Criminal Profiling: Comparing Applied Methodologies Between Inductive and Deductive Criminal Profiling Techniques, Turvey B., Knowledge Solutions Library, January, 1998 g q , y , g y, y, ●Malicious Hackers: a framework for Analysis and Case Study, Laura J. Kleen, Captain, USAF, US Air Force Institute of Technology ●Criminal Profiling Research Site. Scientific Offender Profiling Resource in Switzerland. Criminology, Law, Psychology, Täterpro
  • 86. Must-read books / 3 ● Profiling Hackers: the Science of Criminal Profiling as applied to the World of Hacking ● ISBN: 978-1-4200-8693-5-90000
  • 87. And...a gift for you all here! ☺ ● Get your own, FREE copy of “F3” (Freedom from ●Fear, the United Nations magazine) issue #7, totally focused on Cybercrimes! DOWNLOAD: DOWNLOAD ● ● www.FreedomFromFearMagazine.org ● Or, email me and I will send you the full PDF (10MB)
  • 88. Q Questions? Contacts, Q&A Raoul Chiesa E-mail: chiesa@UNICRI.it Thanks folks! UNICRI Cybercrime Home Page: y g http://www.unicri.it http://www.unicri.it/emerging_crimes/cybercrime/