Coming to America, The Threat of IED\'s and Unconventional Tactics

1. Coming to America
The Threat of Improvised
Explosive Devices
November 8, 2004
November 8, 2004
Presented At the “Countering IED Conference,”
Washington D.C.
By: C. L. Staten, CEO and Sr. Analyst
Emergency Response & Research Institute
© Copyright, Emergency Response & Research Institute, 2001-2004. All rights reserved.
Materials within this presentation may be “military/law enforcement sensitive” or For
Official Use Only (FOUO) and NOT for general public presentation. Contact ERRI for
permission, before any usage or redistribution of this presentation

2. Lecture Agenda
Lecture Agenda
I. Nature of the Threat
I. Nature of the Threat
II. General Assessment of Threat
II. General Assessment of Threat
III. Suicide Bombers
III. Suicide Bombers
IV. VBIEDS
IV. VBIEDS
V. Other Considerations
V. Other Considerations

3. Presentation Perspective
Presentation Perspective
• While it is certainly a cliché and
something we are taught to avoid in a
formal presentation…it is also true…
“Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it.”
it.
-- George Santayana, philosopher, The
Life of Reason, Volume 1, 1905

4. Nature of the Problem #1
Nature of the Problem #1
• U.S. troops and especially
their leaders must realize
that they are now fighting an
ideology… one that is only
being manifested by car
bombs and other IEDs.

5. Nature of the Problem #2
Nature of the Problem #2
• This ideology
has even
allegedly
convinced
disillusioned
Americans and
citizens of
country we
consider allies
to participate
in this jihad.

6. The Nature of the Problem III…
The Nature of the Problem III…
American law enforcement officers,
firefighters, and EMTs are not trained
to deal with assaults that employ
these types of weapons…now the
favorites of the terrorists:
• Belt-fed Light Machineguns
• RPGs
• AK-47s,
• Grenades
• IEDs/VBIEDS
• Information about these weapons and
tactics is exclusive within the purview
of the United States Military…we need
to change that now.

7. ERRI General Assessment of Threat
• The present ERRI assessment would
respectfully suggest that the near term
threat to Americans and our country's
security may bring:
• -- a confusing mix of quot;stateless actors,“
• -- separatist and fringe quot;independence
movements,quot;
• -- insurgency operations,
• -- terrorist attacks,
• -- the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD),
• -- Information Warfare (IW), and
• -- other unconventional tactics and threats.
•
The nature of our defense thinking, training,
weapons, equipment, intelligence operations,
and national emergency response systems
must be redefined and redirected in order to
meet these threats that are concurrently both
devolving and evolving.

8. What to Expect…
What to Expect…
• The latest ERRI assessment
would suggest that the
tactics/techniques/ materials
and methods of deployment
of I. E. D.’s being used in
other parts of the world will
eventually find their way to
the continental United
States. Therefore, it is
incumbent on military,
emergency service and
intelligence personnel to
gain an understanding of the
problems faced
elsewhere…before they
happen here.

9. Source of our troubles…Who are the Terror-
Source of our troubles…Who are the Terror-
Trainers of Yesterday and Today?
Trainers of Yesterday and Today?
• Yesterday’s Jihadist bombers learned their skills
during an extended conflict with the former Soviet
Union in Afghanistan…they became the teachers
and tacticians who taught the future Al-Qaeda
fighters
• Many of today’s bombers were trained in
Afghanistan camps run by Al-Qaeda, et al.
• These Afghan-Arabs are now the trainers of the
newest insurgents in Iraq.
• Consequently, we should study tactics, techniques,
and devices used against the Soviets in the 80’s for
clues about what will happen in the future in America

10. Modus Operandi
• Suicide bombs can be delivered by
multiple means, complicating security
measures
Vehicle bombs: USMC barracks in
–
Beirut, 1983; Embassy attacks in
Africa, 1996
Boat bombs: USS Cole, 2000
–
Individual-borne bombs: the primary
–
method of attack in Israel since 2000
Terrorists will choose whichever method
•
is most likely to succeed against a
particular target

11. General Categories – IEDs 101
General Categories – IEDs 101
• IEDs fall into three general types of
categories:
• Package Type IED
• Vehicle-Borne IEDs (VBIEDs)
• Suicide Bomb IED
• Though they can vary widely in shape
and form, IEDs share a basic and
common set of components and
consist of the following:
• An initiation system or fuse;
• Explosive fill;
• A detonator;
• A power supply for the detonator; and
• A container.

12. Inquiring Minds Want to Know…
Inquiring Minds Want to Know…
• Why haven’t we
already seen multiple
improvised
explosives devices
being used in the
continental United
States??
Let’s examine the
scope of the
problem…

13. The Threat Is Spreading
The Threat Is Spreading
• 1990-2002:
1990-2002:
• During the 1980s:
1980s
Israel
India
Lebanon Pakistan
Kuwait Yemen
Algeria
Sri Lanka
Chechnya
Kenya
Tanzania
Panama
Argentina
Croatia
Australia
Turkey
Saudi Arabia
Afghanistan

14. Recent Attacks in Iraq
Recent Attacks in Iraq

15. Some VBIEDS in Baghdad, Iraq
Some VBIEDS in Baghdad, Iraq
Jordanian Embassy Blast – Iraq: 07 Aug 2003
U.N. Compound Blast – Iraq: 19 Aug 2003

16. History of Some Significant Car Bombs in 2004
History of Some Significant Car Bombs in 2004
Mass car bombings (by date) Location Dead Device
September 18, 2004 Kirkuk, Iraq 23 car bomb
September 14, 2004 Police station, Baghdad, Iraq 47 car bomb
September 9, 2004 Australian Embassy, Jakarta, Indonesia 9 car bomb
September 4, 2004 Police academy, Kirkuk, Iraq 20 car bomb
July 28, 2004 Police station, Baquba, Iraq 70 mini-bus bomb
June 26, 2004 Hilla, Iraq 23 car bombs (2)
June 24, 2004 Police stations, Mosul, Iraq 62 car bombs (5)
June 17, 2004 Iraqi army recruitment center, Baghdad, Iraq 35 car bomb
April 21, 2004 Police stations, Basra, Iraq 74 car bombs
February 11, 2004 Iraqi Army facility, Baghdad, Iraq 47 car bomb
February 10, 2004 Police Station, Iskandariya, Iraq 53 truck bomb
January 18, 2004 Coalition Headquarters, Baghdad, Iraq 31 truck bomb

17. Suicide Bombers
Suicide Bombers
• The Implications of
Suicide Bombers are
just becoming known
• Have been repeatedly
been shown to cause
mass casualty incidents
• Worse-case scenario
suicide bomber + WMD
(See handout and later
slide)

18. Why Suicide/Homicide Bombers?
Why Suicide/Homicide Bombers?
• First, suicide attacks generally result in a larger number of
casualties on average than do other types of terrorist attacks.
From 1980 to 2001, suicide attacks reportedly represented only
3%of all terrorist attacks but accounted for 48% of total deaths
due to terrorism.
• Second, suicide attacks usually attract more publicity than do
other types of attacks. The fate of the bomber him- or herself is
part of the story, and the large number of victims, again, ensures
public attention.
• In cost/benefit terms, suicide attacks are financially inexpensive:
according to one expert, the price of materials used in a suicide
attack in Israel is about $150.46. Rewards for terrorist
organizations, on the other hand, can be large.
• Fourth, the use of suicide operatives helps to control the timing
and placement of attacks. If there is no need to provide an
escape route for the attacker, the complexity of the plan is greatly
reduced.
• Finally, suicide attacks can be especially intimidating for the
target population and contribute greatly to the main intent of the
act itself…named to cause fear and undermine public confidence
in the government being targeted.

19. Basic Dress and Behavioral indicators of
Basic Dress and Behavioral indicators of
Suicide/Homicide Bombers
Suicide/Homicide Bombers
• Unseasonable dress or conspicuous, bulky clothes
• Obvious or awkward attempts to “blend in” to a
crowd
• Repeated and nervous handling of parts of clothing
• Profuse sweating, slow-paced walking while
focusing on sides
• Attempts to stay away from security personnel
• Hesitant, nervous muttering (praying etc.)
• Perfumed, recently shaved

20. Recent Electronic Initiators - Iraq
Recent Electronic Initiators - Iraq
• Electronic Initiation of
I.E.D. – Some examples of
previous devices

21. Communication Initiators
Communication Initiators
Communication
devices have
also been used
to initiate
explosions…

22. Madrid Train Bombing
Madrid Train Bombing

23. Simple Alarm Clock Initiator
Simple Alarm Clock Initiator
• And there are
various kinds of
timing devices
used to initiate
devices…

24. Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
(VBIEDs)
(VBIEDs)
Dhahran
Barracks
Bombing
14 Sep 04 - Baghdad

25. VBIEDS
VBIEDS
• Vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs) are devices that use a vehicle as the
package or container of the device. These IEDs come in all shapes,
colors, and sizes which vary by the type of vehicles available —
small sedans to large cargo trucks. There have even been instances
of what appeared to be generators, donkey drawn carts, and
ambulances used to attempt attacks on Coalition Forces and the
New Iraqi Government.
• Larger vehicles enable larger amounts of explosive that can be
used, resulting in a greater effect. Functioning of devices can vary
within the same methods as the package types and can have the
same common characteristics or indicators as other IEDs.
• VBIEDs have increasingly used larger amounts of explosives, and
the explosive charge has ranged anywhere from 100lbs to well over
1000 pounds. The explosive charge has included items such as
mortar rounds, rocket motors, rocket warheads, PE4 explosives,
and artillery rounds.
• A growing technique in VBIED attacks in Iraq has involved the use
of multiple vehicles. In such instances, the lead vehicle is used as a
decoy or barrier buster. Once stopped or neutralized and with
coalition forces starting to move to inspect or detain – the main
VBIED comes crashing though and into the crowd before
detonating; thus resulting in an increase of the casualty ratio.

26. Frequency of VBIEDs…
Frequency of VBIEDs…
• quot;We focus a lot on IEDs, but probably the most
significant problem, and the one that concerns me
the most is car bombs. While we have an idea of
what we need to do with IEDs, car bombs are
much more difficult. Any vehicle on the highway or
on the road can be a car bomb. And how do you
tell one from the other?quot; Maj. Gen. John Doesburg,
commander of Research, Development and
Engineering Command said in an Oct. 21 interview
with “Inside the Army.”
• During the first 15 days of October, troops in Iraq
reported at least 30 car bomb incidents, according
to The Washington Post.

27. Tactics Used in the 12 May 2003 Riyadh
Tactics Used in the 12 May 2003 Riyadh
VBIED Attack
VBIED Attack
• Multiple targets
• Simultaneous attacks
• Multiple vehicles per
target
• Assault/breaching
cadre accompany the
VBIED to clear security
personnel and gain
access to the Riyadh Attack on Housing
compound. Compounds – 12 May 2003
Additional Reference: http://www.emergency.com/2003/saudi_bmbs_051203.htm

28. Some Potential VBIED Indicators:
Some Potential VBIED Indicators:
• Theft of explosives, blasting caps, or fuses, or certain
chemicals used in the manufacture of explosives.
• Rental of self-storage space for the purpose of
storing chemicals or mixing apparatus.
• Delivery of chemicals directly to a self-storage facility
or unusual deliveries of chemicals to residential or
rural addresses.
• Chemical fires, toxic odors, brightly colored stains, or
rusted metal fixtures in apartments, hotel/motel
rooms, or self-storage units.
• Rental, theft, or purchase of truck or van with
minimum (1) ton carrying capacity.
• Modification of truck or van with heavy duty springs
to handle heavier loads.

29. Surveillance of Targets
Surveillance of Targets
• It is likely that “bad guys”
involved with executing
several recent attacks
conducted extensive
preoperational
surveillance of the
compounds selected.
• Meticulous planning, to
include extended pre-
operational surveillance,
is a hallmark of Al-Qaeda
(or associated) terrorist
attacks.

30. Recent Car & Truck Bombs…
Recent Car & Truck Bombs…
• Beware of secondary
vehicles and personnel
clearing the way for the
actual VBIED. On several
occasions, dating back to
Australian Embassy
the African embassy Blast, Jakarta, Indonesia
bombings, a primary Sep 09, 2004
vehicle tried to clear
barricades/ obstacles and
gate guards just prior to the
onslaught of the vehicle
containing the bomb…

31. Some Respectfully Suggested Solutions…
Some Respectfully Suggested Solutions…
• Better HUMINT
• Better analysis of the
enemy and the devices
• Rapid dissemination of
technical info. concerning
IED/VBIED to the street/
field (“technical
bulletins”?)
• “Mutual Aid”

32. Some Suggested Solution II…
Some Suggested Solution II…
Now is the time to find a way to work together…to do less
will undoubtedly result in the unnecessary injuries and
deaths of American citizens…

33. Some Specific Counter-Measures/Solutions -- III
Some Specific Counter-Measures/Solutions III
• Ensure a knowledgeable, and aware public,
emergency responders, and troops
• Better/More Armor Protection For All Vehicles
to be used in the hostile zone Vehicles
• New and Better IED jamming and sensor
technology
• Robots to disarm and detonate the devices
before they explode
• Manned (Heliborne) Unmanned aerial vehicles
to recon areas before travel
• Analysis of data that should be gathered and
shared from each attack:
a. Common database, to be shared with
Homeland Security Forces
b. Attack information is also fed into
intelligence databases (i.e. Pathfinder and
Starlight)
c. “Activity and association” analysis of
events as they happen, with rapid
dissemination of terrorist tactics and
techniques…

34. And, don’t forget Improvised WMDs…
And, don’t forget Improvised WMDs…
• One more note before
concluding…
We should not forget the
possibility that improvised
devices of the future will contain
chemical, biological, nuclear, or
radiological materials materials.
• May be used as primary or
secondary devices
• It is one of the few ways that the
terrorists could potentially
increase the death toll of one of
their attacks…something that
they have vowed to do. (see
hand-out supplied with
presentation)

35. It Ain’t Over…Until It’s Over…
It Ain’t Over…Until It’s Over…
• IOHO: This is not a problem
that is not going to go
away. It is a potentially
burgeoning issue that we
believe is “Coming to
America” and one that we
(collectively) must address
before it becomes the “life
and death” situation that
we have seen elsewhere…
• We welcome your
comments, questions,
recommendations,
suggestions and criticism.

36. Additional Military References
Additional Military References
• TC 20-32-5 Commander's Reference Guide: Land Mine and
Explosive Hazards (Iraq)
• 1st Infantry Division Soldier’s Handbook To Iraq 1st Infantry
Division November 2003 [PDF 3.66 Mb]
• Iraq Purple Book - Operational Support Guide for Joint Service
EOD for Iraq Area of Operations NAVEODTECHDIV November 1,
2002
• CALL Handbook 03-33: Convoy Leader Training Handbook Center
for Army Lessons Learned November 2003 -- The purpose of this
handbook is to provide a quick-reference TTP guide for convoy
commanders and their subordinates on how to train for and
conduct tactical convoy operations on the asymmetric battlefield
in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. [PDF 1.68 Mb]
• Convoy Leader Training Handbook: Revision I 32nd
Transportation Group KUWAIT 8 August 2003 -- The purpose of
this handbook is to provide a field guide for convoy leaders
conducting long haul operations in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. The focus is on planning, preparing and executing
operations to counter level I and II threat. [PDF 388 Kb] [MSWord
Version 871 Kb]

37. ERRI
ERRI
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Emergency Net News
We Monitor the World for You!
We Monitor the World for You!
• More Information??
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© Copyright, 2004, Emergency Response & Research Institute and the author. All rights reserved. This presentation
contains military and law enforcement sensitive information and should not be distributed to the general public.
Contact ERRI/EmergencyNet News for more information about any usage of this presentation.