China As an Emerging Threat

1. Presented to the
The Intelligence Summit - 2006
By C. L. Staten
CEO and Sr. National Security Analyst
Emergency Response & Research
Institute
© Copyright, 2005-6, Emergency Response & Research Institute and the author. All rights reserved.
This presentation contains military and law enforcement sensitive information and should not be
distributed to the general public. Contact ERRI/EmergencyNet News for more information about any
usage of this presentation.

2. Assessing the Future
• In the coming decade:
China could become our greatest
economic opportunity…or our worst military
nightmare.
The management of the U.S. relationship
with China is one of the most important
issues that we face in the next ten years.

3. Why are we concerned?
• “Of the major and
emerging powers, China
has the greatest potential
to compete militarily with
the United States and field
disruptive military
technologies that could
over time offset traditional
U.S. military advantages…
absent U.S. counter
strategies”
Source: The Quadrennial
Defense Review, 2006

4. Emerging Peer Competitor?
• The possibility of
a strategic
conflict between
the United States
and China is
real. While it is
not inevitable, its
likelihood cannot
be ruled out…

5. Found Wanting...
How to Move Ahead
• Although unintentional, the United States has
influenced the direction taken by the modernization of
China's defense establishment in two ways. The quick,
decisive defeat of Iraq's armed forces in the 1991Gulf
War first informed the PLA leadership how far their
forces lagged behind a modern military. They learned
that the PLA's operational concepts were as antiquated
as their weapons.
• When the operational concepts discussed in China's
military journals over the past decade are linked with
the acquisitions from Russia and the priorities
suggested by China's indigenous military R&D
programs, it is evident that a primary objective of the
PLA is to exploit perceived U.S. vulnerabilities.
Source: THE PLA'S LEAP INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US,
By Paul H.b. Godwin, CHINA BRIEF, Volume 4, Issue 9 (April 29, 2004), The
Jamestown Foundation

6. PLA Changing R & D Practices
• The People's Liberation Army (PLA) and
the defense industrial base and R&D
infrastructure are significantly improved
beyond where they were in the late 1970s.
The number of military personnel has been
significantly reduced, and the ground, air
and naval forces have been reorganized to
support the transition to the joint warfare
operations sought by PLA doctrinal
changes over the past decade.

7. Let the Numbers Tell Us A Tale
• In 2000, the official budget figure was approximately 14.6 billion, or
121 billion yuan. China increased its defense spending for the year by
17.7 percent.
• In early 2001, China's publicly-acknowledged defense budget of over
$17 billion for 2001 was higher than the defense budgets of
neighboring countries India, Taiwan, and South Korea.
• In 2002, China increased military spending in 2002 by 17.6 percent, or
$3 billion, bringing the publicly reported total to $20 billion.
• China again increased its budget to $22 billion in 2003 (about 185.3
billion RMB ) .
• China's defense budget continued to grow in 2004. Chinese Finance
Minister Jin Renqing proposed an increase of 11.6 percent [$2.6
billion] in military expenditures.
• In 2005, it was announced that China's military budget will rise 12.6
percent, to 247.7 billion yuan ($29.9 billion). China has announced
double-digit increases in military spending nearly every year for more
than a decade.

8. Graphic Representation of Chinese
Military Budget 2000-2005
2000-2005
29.9
30
24.6
25
22.4
20
20
17
14.6
15 Chinese Military
Budget
10
5
Numbers
0
represented
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
are in Billions
of $U.S.
Dollars
Source: GlobalSecurity.org, 2005

9. What are The Chinese Spending their
Money on?
• The modernization of the PLA has placed priority
on the development of:
• · Battlefield communications
• · Reconnaissance
• · Space-based weapons
• · Mobile nuclear weapons
• · Attack submarines
• · Fighter aircraft
• · Precision-guided weapons
• · Training rapid-reaction ground forces

10. Chinese Military Modernization
• There is no question that China has achieved
a remarkable leap in modernization of the
forces needed for these missions and that it
is urgently continuing on that path. There is
question about how China is now proceeding
to exercise these new assets so as to make
them truly operational in a combat
environment. There is considerable question
about China’s capability to coordinate all
these forces in two major simultaneous
operations:
(1) to bring Taiwan to its knees and;
(2) cause the U.S. to be tardy, indecisive, or
ineffective in responding to such an assault

11. The 16-Character Policy
16-Character
• In 1997, the CCP formally codified the 16-Character
Policy. The quot;16-Character Policyquot; is the CCP's overall
direction that underlies the blurring of the lines
between State and commercial entities, and military
and commercial interests. The sixteen characters
literally mean:
• · Jun-min jiehe (Combine the military and civil)
• · Ping-zhan jiehe (Combine peace and war)
• · Jun-pin youxian (Give priority to military products)
• · Yi min yan jun (Let the civil support the military)
• This policy, a reaffirmation and codification of Deng
Xiaoping's 1978 pronouncement, holds that military
development is the object of general economic
modernization, and that the CCP's main aim for the
civilian economy is to support the building of modern
military weapons and to support the aims of the PLA.

12. The Psychological Aspects
of Chinese Strategy
• Chinese statecraft is based on political
warfare and psychological warfare; it aims at
manipulating foes into compliance by means
of the creation of an awesome aura of power,
for which the military and military action are
but an adjunct. This intended perception may
not be true and the Chinese – relative to the
the United States -- may not be as all
powerful as some might believe

13. The Chinese believe that…
All war is deception
• “The development of modern
military technology, the
exposure to foreign military
theories, and the repeated
defeats in wars against the
Western powers, have
broken the monopoly of the
ancient military theories but
they are still highly respected
and continually influence the
thinking of Chinese military
leaders,” writes Chinese
military historian Chen-Ya
Tien.”
Source: U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, Sept. 15, 2005

14. Ancient Thinking Still Dominates
Chinese Strategy
• To subdue the enemy
without fighting is the
acme of skill.
• And Thus the highest
form of generalship is
to foil the enemy’s
plans; the next best is
to prevent the junction
of the enemy’s forces;
the next in order is to
attack the enemy’s
army in the field; and
the worst policy of all
Sun Tzu , the father of the
is to besiege walled
Chinese “art of war”
cities.

15. The Chinese were ancient innovators in
military strategies and tactics…
tactics…
Legendary innovators in military
strategy and tactics, the potential of
Chinese military power has waxed
and waned over the past several
hundred years.
Additionally the Chinese adaptation
of communism did not lead to the
necessary modernization of their
military forces. Instead, as we saw in
the Korean war, the Chinese’s main
advantage for the past several
decades was their ability to undertake
The Great Wall of China,
“mass wave attacks” using ill-trained
a major military
and equipped foot soldiers.
innovation of its time
That is now changing…

16. Surprise and Asymmetric Means
• …the concept of taking on a superior force and
defeating it through surprise and with
asymmetric means pervades Chinese military
publications (and thinking). The U.S. is the
only such force to be contemplated, but,
equally significant in my view, is that these
methods are contemplated only in the situation
where China is faced with U.S. forces aimed
specifically at thwarting its essential (in
Beijing’s view) efforts with respect to Taiwan.
Source: Rear Admiral (U.S. Navy, Retired) Eric A. McVadon
Director of Asia-Pacific Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Consultant on East Asia Security Affairs, 15 September 2005

17. Hybrid Forms of Warfare
• The nature of tomorrow's irregular wars is not
completely clear. Most likely it will evolve into quot;War
Beyond Limitsquot; as described by a pair of Chinese
Colonels in a volume entitled quot;Unrestricted Warfare.quot; It
certainly will not break out as described in the
Pentagon's strategy, with enemies choosing discrete
options between conventional, irregular, catastrophic or
disruptive strategies.
We will face hybrid forms purpose built to exploit U.S.
vulnerabilities. This would include states blending high-
tech capabilities like anti-satellite weapons, with
terrorism and cyber-warfare directed against financial
targets or critical infrastructure. They will surely involve
protracted and extremely lethal conflicts like the
insurgency in Iraq. Such wars will be neither
conventional nor low intensity. Above all, the enemy
and his tactics will likely be “shapeless.”

18. Principals of Unrestricted War
• The worth of these principles and tactics [of Chinese unrestricted
warfare] will not be clear until they have been tested in an actual
war. [pg. 223 - 225] Here they are:
• Full Dimensional -- This is the starting point of unrestricted warfare
thought. Its basic demand is that in looking at battlefields and
potential battlefields all methods, plans and resources be brought
into play. There is no distinction between on and off the battlefield.
Politics, economics and culture are also battlefields.
• Simultaneity -- Operate in many different battlespaces at the same
time. Many kinds of tactics that were once down in stages can now
be done simultaneously. Modern communications made it possible
for one U.S. information warfare base to provide attack data for
4000 targets to 1200 aircraft within one minute.
• Limited Objectives -- Make an action plan within the scope of
available means. Always consider whether an objective is
practically attainable. Do not seek objectives that are not limited in
time and space. The mistake of General McArthur in the Korean War
is the classic case of expanding a limited objective. The experience
of the U.S. in Vietnam and of the USSR in Afghanistan prove the
same point. Means must be adequate to the objective in view.

19. China…Friend or Foe??
China…Friend
• ERRI’s current assessment would suggest
that diplomatic, economic, logistical and
other factors are likely to have significant
influence and impact on the potential for a
future U.S. conflict with China.
• If we are able to successfully use America’s
“soft power” and China continues to move
towards a more “capitalist society,” a future
confrontation with China may be able to be
averted.
• Otherwise, the United States must be
prepared to engage in an undoubtedly bloody
and asymmetric war with China’s 1.3 billion
people.

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© Copyright, 2005-6, Emergency Response & Research Institute and the author. All rights reserved.
This presentation contains military and law enforcement sensitive information and should not be
distributed to the general public. Contact ERRI/EmergencyNet News for more information about any
usage of this presentation.