1. NO. 14-91070 TEAM 25
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
______________________________
__________________
BEN HARMON,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
________________________________________
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourteenth Circuit
______________________________
__________________
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
_____________________________
TEAM NO. 25
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
MARCH 4, 2015

2. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) Can a police officer’s mistake of law provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth
Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop?
(2) After a law enforcement officer has completed a stop for a traffic infraction, does the
continued detention of the driver to conduct a dog sniff, without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to believe that the vehicle contains contraband, violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures?
i

3. TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED............................................................................................................ i
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................ ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................v
OPINIONS BELOW........................................................................................................................x
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION................................................................................................x
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED....................................................................................x
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................................................................................1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................4
ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................................7
I. MCCLAINE’S MISTAKE OF LAW CANNOT PROVIDE THE REASONABLE SUSPICION NECESSARY TO
JUSTIFY A FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZUR.……………………………..………...………….……18
A. Precedent Dictates That Reasonable Suspicion Should be Measured Against the
Correct Interpretation of the Law, Not Against the Officer’s Incorrect Interpretation of
the Law………………….....…………………………………………..………………….…18
B. Mistake of Law is Not Analogous to Mistake of Fact, Thus They Should Not be Treated
Equally in the Reasonable Suspicion Analysis ………...……………………..…………..21
C. Refusing to Allow Officers’ Mistakes of Law to Provide Reasonable Suspicion for Traffic
Stops is in the Public Interest ……………………………………………….………..…..23
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION BECAUSE HARMON’S
DETENTION BEYOND THE COMPLETION OF THE TRAFFIC STOP FOR PURPOSES OF A DOG SNIFF
IS A VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROHIBITION AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEIZURES ……………………………………………………………...……………….....25
A. Bright-Line Rule is the Appropriate Standard……………………………..…25
B. The Stop Was Not Independently Justified by Reasonable
Suspicion…………………………………………………………………………………...…31
CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………………..40
ii

4. iii

5. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. amend. IV…………………………………………………………………………….7
US SUPREME COURT CASES
Arizona v. Gant,
556 U.S. 332 (2009)………………………………………………………………….…..19
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318 (2001)…………………………...…………………………………………13
Cheek v. United States,
498 U.S. 192 (1991)……………………………………………………………………...10
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32 (2000)……………………………………………….…………..14, 15, 17, 19
Davis v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011)………………………………………………………….………..13
Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979)…………………………………………………………….7, 9, 14, 18
Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491 (1983)……………………………………………………………….…14, 16
Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405 (2005)………………………………………………………………….15, 16
Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177 (1990)…………………………………………..………………………….10
Knowles v. Iowa,
525 U.S. 113 (1998)………………………………………………………...……………14
Maryland v. King,
iv

6. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013)…………………………………………………..……………….13
Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692 (1981)…………………………………………………………….………..19
Navarette v. California,
134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014)……………………………………...……………………………13
Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188 (1972)………………………………………………………...……………20
Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690 (1996)……………………...……………………………………………7, 20
Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106 (1977)…………………………………………………………………...…18
Reid v. Georgia,
448 U.S. 438 (1980)…………………………………………………..………………….20
Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878)………………………………………...……………………………..10
Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968)……………………………………………….……………15, 18, 19, 21
United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266 (2002)…………………………………………………………..………….20
United States v. Johnson,
457 U.S. 537 (1982)…………………………………..………………………12, 13, 14, 16
United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973)…………………………………………………………......……….13
v

7. Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 (1996)……………………………………………………………...7, 8, 9, 13
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT CASES
United States v. Boyce,
351 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 2003)………………………………………………….………16
United States v. Carrate,
122 F.3d 666 (8th Cir. 1997)…………………………………………….………………22
United States v. Chanthasouxat,
342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003)………………………...…………………………9, 11, 13
United States v. Coplin,
463 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 2006)……………………………………………………….………8
United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado,
891 F.2d 1414(9th Cir. 1989)………………………………………………………….22
United States v. Lopez–Soto,
205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000)…………………………………………..…………8
United States v. Jones,
269 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2001)……………………………………………...……………..21
United States v. Martin,
411 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2005)…………………………………………………………….11
United States v. McDonald,
453 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2006)………………………………………………..………..8, 13
United States v. Meikle,
407 F.3d 670 (4th Cir. 2005)……………………………………………..……………..16
United States v. Miguel,
368 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2004)………………………………………….……………….11
vi

8. United States v. Miller,
146 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1998)………………………………………………………….8, 10
United States v. Mosley,
454 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2006)………………………………………………………………8
United States v. Nicholson,
721 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2013)……………………………………………...……………7
United States v. Rivera,
906 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1990)…………………………………………………………….17
United States v. Stepp,
680 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2012)…………………………………………………………….17
United States v. Tibbetts,
396 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2005)…………………………………………..…………….8, 9
United States v. Werking,
915 F.2d 1404(10th Cir. 1990)……………………………………….………………….17
United States v. White,
81 F.3d 775(8th Cir. 1996)…………………………………..………………………16, 17
United States v. Wilson,
413 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2005)……………………………………………………………16
STATE SUPREME COURT CASES
North Carolina v. Heien,
737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012)……………………………………………………………….8
STATE DISTRICT COURT CASES
Whitfield v. State,
33 So. 3d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)…………………………………………..…….17
vii

9. SECONDARY MATERIALS
Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not
Enough Fourth Amendment,
102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843, 1871 (Aug. 2004)…………………………………………..16
viii

10. OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW
The relevant decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit is
Harmon v. United States of America, No. 015-0010, is unpublished. The District Court’s
relevant opinion, Memorandum, and Order denying Mr. Rodriguez’s Motion to Suppress are also
unpublished. United States v. Harmon (June 4, 2014). The United States Magistrate Judge
issued Findings and Recommendations from the bench. The Magistrate Judge’s subsequent
Findings and Recommendation and Order is also unpublished. United States v. Harmon (May
22, 2014).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the Fourteenth Circuit Court
of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006).
ix

11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ben Harmon (“Harmon”) and Johnny Morgan (“Morgan”) were driving on Interstate
twenty-one (“I-21”) early in the morning on December 10, 2013. (R. at 1). Harmon was driving
while Morgan slept in the back seat of the car. (R. at 1). At the same time, Officer Haiden McClaine
(“McClaine”) was watching traffic on I-21 looking for signs of criminal activity by drivers and
passengers. (R. at 1). McClaine noticed Harmon drive past her and thought Harmon appeared
nervous as he was gripping the steering wheel at 10 and 2 and looking straight ahead.1
(R. at 1)
As such McClaine began following Harmon. (R. at 1). After noticing that one of Harmon’s brake
lights did not illuminate when braking, McClaine initiated a traffic stop. (R. at 1).
Upon arriving at Harmon’s vehicle, McClaine recognized a strong odor of air freshener,
which arose her suspicion.2
(R. at 1). McClaine then asked Harmon for his license, registration,
and proof of insurance. (R. at 1). Both Harmon and Morgan were also notified they were stopped
because of the non-functioning brake light. (R. at 1). While speaking with Harmon, McClaine
noticed that Morgan was smoking a cigarette, had his baseball hat lowered over his eyes, and was
not making eye contact with McClaine. (R. at 1). This led McClaine to believe that Morgan too
was nervous. (R. at 1).
Thereafter McClaine asked Harmon to step out of his vehicle and accompany McClaine
back to the police cruiser in order to complete some paperwork. (R. at 1). Harmon calmly asked
if he was required to do so and McClaine replied “No.” (R. at 1). As such, Harmon returned to his
vehicle, indicating that he would prefer to wait there for McClaine to finish the paperwork. This
1
It has not escaped the petitioners that holding the steering wheel at 10 and 2 and looking straight
ahead while operating a motor vehicle is recommended by every driving school across the country.
2
According to Officer McClaine, the use of air freshener is a common tactic for covering up the
scent of contraband. It should be noted that the use of air freshener is more commonly used to
cover up any odor such as foul smelling garbage or the body odor.
1

12. seemed suspicious to McClaine and because of these actions she felt Harmon was concealing
something. Nevertheless, McClaine continued on to her cruiser and called in Harmon’s
information for a records check. (R. at 1).
After calling in Harmon’s information, McClaine returned to Harmon’s vehicle to question
Morgan. (R. at 1). McClaine requested Morgan’s identification, asked where he and Harmon came
from, and where they were headed so early in the morning. (R. at 1-2). Morgan replied that he and
Harmon were returning from Old York, New York where they were looking at a vintage car they
considered buying. (R. at 2). Morgan also informed McClaine they did not purchase the vehicle
because the owner could not produce the vehicle’s title. (R. at 2). McClaine asked if Harmon and
Morgan were given a photo of the vehicle before making the trip to Old York and both replied no.
(R. at 2).
McClaine admitted that Morgan did not appear nervous while talking about the vintage
vehicle, but did find it odd that the men drove to Old York to buy a car they had never seen. (R. at
2). Further McClaine thought it was odd that the Harmon and Morgan would drive back to Brick
City in the early morning hours. (R. at 2). McClaine failed to inquire as to how long the men had
been in Old York, what time they met the vintage car owner, or whether they had engaged in any
other stops or activities before or after the meeting. (R. at 2). Next, thirteen minutes after the traffic
stop was initiated and after talking with Morgan, McClaine returned to her cruiser for a records
check on Morgan. (R. at 2).
While performing the records check on Morgan, McClaine decided she wanted to walk her
drug detection dog, Stanley, who was housed in her cruiser, around Harmon’s car regardless of
whether consent had been given. (R. at 2). Yet instead of immediately proceeding with the walk-
around, McClaine called for back-up and wrote Harmon a warning ticket. (R. at 2). McClaine
2

13. subsequently (after the traffic stop was entering its twentieth minute) returned to Harmon and
Morgan’s vehicle and returned all documents collected from both. (R. at 2).
At this point McClaine had taken care of all business related to the traffic stop. (R. at 2).
However, McClaine did not allow Harmon or Morgan to leave. Instead, McClaine asked Harmon
if she could walk Stanley around his vehicle. (R. at 2). Harmon indicated he had an issue with the
request and McClaine ordered Harmon to turn off the vehicle and stand in front of her squad car
until her backup arrived. (R. at 2). Harmon, not free to leave the scene, rolled up his car windows
and complied with McClaine’s order. (R. at 2).
After the stop had entered its thirtieth (30) minute Special Agent Kyle Spencer (“Spencer”)
arrived on scene and McClaine walked Stanley around Harmon’s vehicle. (R. at 2). Stanley
performed his walk-around approximately seven to eight minutes after McClaine had completed
all business related to the traffic stop. (R. at 2). Stanley alerted and Harmon was arrest and
subsequently charge with possession with intent to distribute fifty (50) grams or more of
methamphetamine. (R. at 3).
3

14. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. MCCLAINE’S MISTAKE OF LAW CANNOT PROVIDE THE REASONABLE SUSPICION NECESSARY
TO JUSTIFY A FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURE.
McClaine’s mistake of law cannot provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a
Fourth Amendment seizure because existing Supreme Court precedent mandates otherwise. Under
that precedent, to determine whether an officer’s mistake can establish reasonable suspicion for a
traffic stop, courts must apply the established facts of the case to the correct interpretation of the
law. If the law was violated, the stop was reasonable, but if no actual violation occurred, the stop
was an unreasonable seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
Here, Harmon was driving his car with one rear brake light out, but he still had one working
brake light. McClaine believed that the law required two working brake lights. However, upon
further investigation, nothing in the statute requires there to be two working brake lights.
Therefore, because no actual law was violated, the stop was unreasonable and all evidence
collected is fruit of the poisonous tree.
The Circuit Court reached the opposite conclusion by analogize mistake of law to mistake
of fact. Most courts will allow a reasonable mistake of fact to form the reasonable suspicion for a
traffic stop. This comparison was improper because the justifications for granting officers leeway
with regard to mistakes of fact do not apply equally to mistake of law. Further, for equities sake,
this Court should hold officers to the same standard it holds its citizens to by holding them
accountable for their mistakes of law.
Allowing a mistake of law to provide to basis for reasonable suspicion would hurt the
public interest by removing the incentive for officers to learn the correct law and by exposing
innocent citizens to traffic stops for wholly innocent conduct.
4

15. However, even if this Court accepts that it is possible for mistake of law to satisfy the
reasonable suspicion analysis, the Circuit Court still erred because an overly aggressive application
of an ambiguous statute is not a reasonable mistake of law. Even opposing counsel will agree that
only a reasonable mistake of law provide the basis for reasonable suspicion. Examples of
reasonable mistakes of law are those that require officers to depend on a third party’s legal analysis,
which ends up being incorrect. However, where an officer makes an overly aggressive mistake
with regard to an unsettled point of law, it is no longer reasonable. Here, McClain was not relying
on a third party’s legal analysis but chose to interpret an ambiguous law over-broadly. This fact
makes her mistake an unreasonable one.
II. HARMON’S DETENTION BEYOND THE COMPLETION OF THE TRAFFIC STOP FOR PURPOSES OF A
DOG SNIFF IS A VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROHIBITION AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEIZURES.
Harmon’s detention beyond the completion of the traffic stop was an unreasonable seizure
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment because McClaine had no reasonable suspicion that Harmon
was participating in further criminal conduct. A traffic stop ends once the purpose for the stop is
accomplished and the officer returns the driver’s documents. Once that moment occurs, the officer
has no authority to detain the driver without independent suspicion that that driver is still
participating in illegal conduct. Here, as admitted by the Magistrate Judge, no reasonable suspicion
existed to extend the traffic stop.
The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that so long as the extended detainment was
reasonable, the absence of reasonable suspicion will not invalidate the dog sniff. However, the
approach taken by the Court of Appeals causes a number of problems. First, it causes ambiguity
in the law and forces officers to make decisions on a case-by-case basis as opposed to providing
clear guidance. Next, the basis for applying the de minimis standard comes from an inappropriate
5

16. analogy to a case that is legally and factually distinguishable from ours. Finally, it exposes
innocent citizens to traffic stops for wholly innocent conduct.
Because the traffic stop had ended, the dog sniff can only be validated by the existence of
independently reasonable suspicion. However, here, not only did the Magistrate Judge establish
that reasonable suspicion was not present, but the reaming four pieces of evidence relied on by
McClaine are insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion.
6

17. ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING BECAUSE A POLICE
OFFICER’S MISTAKE OF LAW CANNOT PROVIDE THE INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION
NECESSARY TO SATISFY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S REQUIREMENTS.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.” U.S. Const., Amend. IV. “[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitute[s] a ‘seizure’” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653 (1979). A traffic stop occurring without reasonable and articulable suspicion that a
crime is being committed constitutes an unreasonable seizure and the Fourth Amendment prohibits
it. Id. at 663. Determining the reasonableness of a stop is an objective test that examines the
totality of the circumstances. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996).
A. Precedent Dictates That Reasonable Suspicion Should be Measured Against the
Correct Interpretation of the Law, Not Against the Officer’s Incorrect Interpretation
of the Law.
To determine whether a mistake of law can provide the reasonable and articulable suspicion
necessary to justify a traffic stop, this court must decide whether to apply the facts of our case
against the “correct interpretation of the law” or against the officer’s reasonable misinterpretation
of the law. United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1244 (10th Cir. 2013). Of the courts that
have addressed this issue, including this Court, the majority have established that the proper
analysis involves measuring the historical facts against the correct interpretation of the law.
For example, this Court’s ruling in Ornelas established a traffic stop is unreasonable if “the
rule of law as applied to the established facts . . . is not violated.” Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 697 (1996). This analysis involves applying the facts of the case to the applicable rule
of law. “Either the law was violated and the stop is reasonable, or the law was not violated and
7

18. the stop is not reasonable.” North Carolina v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 360 (N.C. 2012) (Hudson,
J., dissenting). Accordingly, under the test set forth by this Court, it does not matter whether the
officer subjectively believes a law is violated, but whether the facts of the case establish an actual
violation of the law.
Further, in Whren, this Court once again established the need for objectivity in assessing
the reasonableness of a traffic stop. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. In that case, this Court analyzed the
reasonableness of a traffic stop that was originally initiated for a minor traffic violation, but that
led to the recovery of two large bags of cocaine. Id. at 808–09. The defendants moved to suppress
on the grounds that the officer had no reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle for a drug
violation. Id. This Court rejected that argument on the grounds that an officer’s subjective
intentions are irrelevant in determining the legality of a traffic stop. Id. The Court of Appeals’
holding is directly contrary to the precedent set by this Court because it values an officer’s
subjective interpretation of the law over its objective, correct meaning.
Finally, of all the Circuits that have directly addressed this issue, the First, Third, Fifth, Ok,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh have held mistake of law alone cannot be the basis for reasonable
suspicion, while only the Eighth has held otherwise. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
was the first to address this issue directly, relied heavily on Whren to reach its decision. United
States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 812–14) (holding
where no actual violation of Texas law occurred, no objectively grounded legal basis existed to
justify the stop). The other Circuits have all cited Miller favorably. See e.g., United States v.
Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 260 n. 16 (3d Cir.
2006); United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Lopez–
Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th
8

19. Cir. 2005); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2003). These
decisions are not binding on this Court, however, the reasoning employed by most of these courts
is based on this Court’s decisions in Ornelas and Whren. In order to ensure predictability and
consistency in the courts, this Court should resolve the circuit-split by adopting the majority view
that an officer’s mistake of law cannot form an objectively reasonable justification.
Here, the Fourteenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision contradicts the established
standard set by this Court and the majority of the circuit courts. These courts have consistently
held a valid reasonable suspicion analysis involves applying the facts of the relevant case to the
correct interpretation of the law. This method is consistent with the overall purpose of the
reasonable suspicion standard, which aims to “constrain the exercise of discretion” of law
enforcement officials. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). The courts that employ a
bright-line rule when analyzing reasonable suspicion provide officers with much needed guidance
in enforcing laws, while also providing the necessary level of protection guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment. But, the Eighth and Fourteenth circuit's rules create unpredictability in Fourth
Amendment cases and undermine the objective analysis by allowing an officer’s subjective legal
mistakes to outweigh the plain language of the statute.
This Court’s precedent establishes a proper reasonable suspicion analysis involves
applying the established facts of a case to the correct rule of law, while giving no weight to the
officer’s subjective beliefs. The majority of circuit courts who have addressed the issue have
adopted this Court’s reasoning. Because adopting this reasoning would enhance judicial efficiency
by maintaining predictability in the law, while furthering the purpose of the reasonable suspicion
analysis, this Court should formally adopt the bright-line rule rejected by the Court of Appeals.
9

20. B. Mistake of Law is Not Analogous to Mistake of Fact, Thus They Should Not be
Treated Equally in the Reasonable Suspicion Analysis.
The Fourth Amendment grants officers a large amount of leeway to conduct traffic stops
so long as their “legal justification [is] objectively grounded in a correct interpretation of the law.”
United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998). Because officers face many ambiguous
factual situations while executing their duties, courts only require factual judgment calls be
reasonable, not necessarily correct. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–186 (1990).
Accordingly, a mistake of fact will not invalidate an otherwise reasonable search, so long as the
mistake of fact was objectively reasonable. Miller, 146 F.3d at 279.
However, the justifications for deferring to police officers for split second factual
determinations do not apply equally to mistakes of law. The concept that the law is “definite and
knowable” is at the heart of our legal system. Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 199 (1991).
Each of the justifications discussed above are focused on an officer’s superior position, relative to
the courts, to evaluate the relevant facts and their significance as they unfold. However, no
authority suggests officers possess a level of expertise in legal analysis that justifies the same
deference as factual determinations. In fact, it is the courts, not the officers, who are in the best
position to interpret the laws.
Also, courts should hold law enforcement officials responsible for the law as correctly
interpreted. The courts have long held criminal defendants liable for their mistakes of law, no
matter how reasonable. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Just as ignorance of the
law does not excuse ordinary citizens, nor should it excuse officers seeking to justify reasonable
suspicion.
10

21. Further, courts routinely distinguish between mistakes of law and fact for the purposes of
a reasonableness analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (8th Cir.
2005) (distinguishing question of fact whether the right brake light was broken from the question
of law whether two working brake lights were required); Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1272, 1274
(distinguishing question of fact whether van had inside rear-view mirror from the question of law
requirements for cars to have inside rear-view mirrors); United States v. Miguel, 368 F.3d 1150
(9th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing mistake of law prohibiting driving an unregistered vehicle with
mistake of fact of relying on inaccurate information regarding vehicle’s registration status.
Here, McClaine based her stop on her mistaken belief that a single brake light constituted
an equipment violation. This is similar to the mistake of law at issue in Chanthasouxat, and unlike
the mistakes of law discussed by the courts in Martin and Miguel. Thus, this court should follow
the lead of those courts and distinguish between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact for purposes
of a reasonable suspicion analysis.
Additionally, its is necessary to discuss why, without the mistake of law serving as
reasonable suspicion, there are not likely enough facts present to justify the stop. The only fact
beyond the broken light that McClaine relied on to make the stop was the fact Harmon was driving
with his hands at the 10 and 2 position looking straight ahead. (R. at 1). McClaine said Harmon
looked “stiff and nervous.” (R. at 1). Far from being incriminating evidence, this evidence, when
viewed independently, actually indicates Harmon was doing his very best not to violate any traffic
laws and maintain safe roadways. Standing alone, this evidence is not enough to independently
provide objectively reasonable suspicion Harmon was committing a crime.
Because the justifications for deferring to officers’ factual determinations do not apply to
legal analysis, and because courts currently distinguish between mistakes of fact and mistakes of
11

22. law while performing reasonable suspicion analyses, this court should not accept a mistake of law
as an objectively reasonable justification for a traffic stop.
C. Refusing to Allow Officers’ Mistakes of Law to Provide Reasonable Suspicion for
Traffic Stops is in the Public Interest
1. Law enforcement officers should be encouraged to learn the correct law
If this Court were to allow officers to rely on mistakes of law as the basis for reasonable
suspicion, it could remove any incentive officers have to learn the most accurate reading of the
law. Officers who wished to increase the frequency of traffic stops would be encouraged to employ
the broadest plausible interpretation of any given traffic violation.
This application of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence presents significant problems in
weighing the rights of the people against legitimate concerns for public safety. Further, giving
officers this wide berth of authority puts it in conflict with a number of well-established canons of
lenity and vagueness. These canons establish that, when an ambiguity exists in a criminal statute,
the statute must be read narrowly to ensure the protection of individual liberties.
The only way to align these interests is to establish that mistakes of law cannot provide
reasonable suspicion, thereby providing an “incentive to err on the constitutional
behavior.” United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982).
2. Excusing officers’ mistakes of law would greatly expand the power of officers to
misinterpret ambiguous statutes, exposing citizens to traffic stops for innocent behavior
When comparing reasonable interpretations of traffic codes to correct interpretations of
traffic codes, the scope of conduct covered by the reasonable interpretation would expose citizens
to a substantially broader scope of conduct than the correct interpretation. In fact, the position
taken by the Court of Appeals exposes citizens not only to traffic stops for existing laws, but any
law that could reasonably exist.
12

23. Citizens have a private interest in avoiding traffic stops because traffic stops are a
substantial infringement on a person’s liberty and it interferes with people’s ability to come and
go as they please. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996); Navarette v. California, 134
S. Ct. 1683, 1697 (2014). The potential repercussions of a traffic stop include discretionary arrests,
involuntary searches, and potentially the collection of DNA samples. Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Maryland v. King,
133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
Because the exposure to traffic stops for wholly innocent conduct is negative effect caused
by the Court of Appeals’ decision to excuse officers’ mistakes of law in attempts to justify their
traffic stops, this Court should refuse to allow mistakes of law to satisfy the reasonable suspicion
standard.
D. Even If This Court Holds That a Mistake of Law Can Provide Reasonable Suspicion
to Justify a Traffic Stop, This Court Should Still Reverse the Court of Appeals’
Decision Because a Misinterpretation of the Traffic Code is an Unreasonable Mistake
of Law.
When officers rely on the legal analysis of third parties and that reliance results in a mistake
of law, there is nothing to deter. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2011). However,
when an officer takes an “overly aggressive view of a legal issue on which legal minds may differ,”
deterrence has an important role to play. Id. at 1267. Of the three courts that have discussed this
issue, all three have held this is the type of conduct worthy of deterrence, normally by deeming
such seizures unconstitutional. Id.; see also United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003).
For example, in Johnson, this court held that suppression is appropriate when officers make
a mistake in the absence of any third-party directive about an “unsettled” point of law. United
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24. States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982). In Johnson, this Court suppressed evidence based
on a mistake of law because it determined the mistake was an aggressive misinterpretation of a
statute.
Here, like the officer in Davis, McClaine did not rely on someone else’s legal analysis
when she decided to initiate the traffic stop on Mr. Harmon’s vehicle. McClaine, based only on a
broken taillight and Harmon’s proper driving technique, initiated the traffic stop believing criminal
activity was afoot. Just like in Johnson, this Court should hold that McClaine’s actions were
overly-aggressive because she initiated a traffic stop based on an “unsettled” point of law.
Therefore, even if this Court chooses to allow reasonable mistakes of law to serve as the
basis for reasonable suspicion, it should still reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision because
McClaine’s mistake of law was not objectively reasonable.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION BECAUSE
Pulling over an automobile for allegedly committing a traffic violation constitutes a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). To be
reasonable, all seizures must be supported by an individualized suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). Further, because traffic
stops are comparable to Terry stops, they must be “justified at its inception and limited in
duration and scope,” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983), and, narrowly focused on the
initial reason for the stop. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998).
A. Bright Line Rule is the Appropriate Standard
1. Precedent Supports a Bright-Line Rule
This Court’s precedent mandates a bright-line rule regarding the acceptable duration of a
traffic stop. Under Caballes and Edmond, a traffic stop ends when the purpose for the stop is
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25. accomplished, and any extended detention is an unreasonable seizure unless it is independently
supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
For example, in Caballes, this Court held that when an officer initiates a traffic stop for the
primary purpose of issuing a ticket, the officer may not then extend the stop beyond the time
reasonably necessary to complete that task. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). In fact,
once all of the reasons for the stop are out of the way, the officer loses all authority to detain the
driver. Id. at 407. This means that the motorist shall not be detained, even for a “reasonable” time,
absent the officer’s independent individualized suspicion that they are engaged in criminal
activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Also, in Edmond, this court rejected that argument that officers may conduct suspicionless
seizures whose “primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38. In that case, this Court held that traffic checkpoints
designed to subject a set number of vehicles to dog sniffs were unreasonable seizures under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 35. The goal of the checkpoints was to decrease drug crime
citywide. Id. The court reasoned that it could not sanction stops based on “the generalized and
ever-present possibility that . . . any given motorist has committed some crime.” Id. at 44.
Here, once McClaine returned Harmon’s documents and wrote him a warning, she had no
authority to extend the traffic stop to walk her dog around the vehicle without consent or
individualized suspicion. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. Also, when McClaine instituted a seizure
between seven and eight minutes after she concluded the traffic stop, she did precisely what this
Court prohibited in Edmond. In fact, because McClaine’s seizure was likely more intrusive than
the checkpoints at issue in Edmond, it is likely that Edmond’s reasoning applies with even greater
force to our case. McClaine extended the stop not because she had any reasonable articulable
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26. suspicion that Harmon was engaging in criminal activity, but rather for the generalized possibility
of revealing some ordinary criminal activity—such as trafficking of narcotics. See id. at 42
(including narcotics trafficking in is definition of ordinary criminal wrongdoing).
Because McClaine initiated a dog sniff seven to eight minutes after issuing Harmon a
written warning for his brake light and without reasonable suspicion that Harmon was involved in
criminal activity, McClaine violated the Fourth Amendment’s restriction on unreasonable seizures.
(2) De Minimis Rule is Bad
a. De minimis creates ambiguity in the law
The proposed bright-line rule does not create an “artificial” boundary, but rather offers
clear guidance in gauging the constitutionality of a traffic stop. Because in most traffic stops, the
traffic infraction acts as the purpose of the stop, the stop can not exist longer than necessary to
complete purpose of rectifying the traffic infraction. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407; Royer, 460 U.S. at
500. If the courts use a de minimis extension to resolve artificial boundaries, then all Fourth
Amendment cases would fall into absurd “horseshoe” results where just being close counts. Wayne
R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough
Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843, 1871 (Aug. 2004).
This Court has stated a traffic stop ends when the police have no more need to finish the
purpose of the scene and letting the vehicle drivers they may leave. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333.
Objective factors indicate the end of a traffic stop. Courts agree usually traffic stops end with the
issuance of citations or warnings and return of the driver’s documents. See, e.g., United States v.
Meikle, 407 F.3d 670, 673 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 386-87 (3d Cir.
2005); United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1106 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. White, 81
16

27. F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rivera, 906 F.2d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1990).
That is not to say the act of returning of a driver's documents and issuing a traffic citation
has Tolkienesque magical qualities, making all police actions before that moment constitutional
and everything afterwards unconstitutional without independent justification. Were that the case,
an officer knowing this rule could delay the ticket until she has conducted all other investigatory
inclinations she may have, thereby circumventing the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 662 (6th Cir. 2012). In cases like that, the Court must analyze
when the activities involved in the traffic stop should have been completed to determine the
reasonableness of the stop.
The de minimis rule provides no guidance to courts but instead asks them to conduct a case
by case evaluation. If the Court takes such a rule, one can easily see the slippery slope that follows,
as courts and officers try to determine whether eight, then ten, then fifteen minutes is de
minimis. Whitfield v. State, 33 So. 3d 787, 794 n.11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (conducting a
reductio ad absurdum scenario to highlight the necessity for a bright-line rule: “If a one-minute
delay is de minimis in case No. 1, the two-minute delay in case No. 2 is only a de minimis amount
longer than the acceptable delay in Case No. 1, and so it goes . . . .”).
These difficulties inherent in determining “how much is too much” demonstrate why a
bright-line rule for the “reasonableness” of a traffic stop is warranted. Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1044
(Scalia, J., concurring). Rather than leave the protections of the Fourth Amendment to a “balancing
of multifarious circumstances presented by different cases,” this Court should reaffirm the bright-
line test of reasonableness it has already set forth. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.
b. Mimms is not applicable to post-stop detentions
17

28. The concept of a de minimis intrusion was adopted by this Court in Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106 (1977). In Mimms, this Court held that ordering a driver to get out of his vehicle
during a traffic stop was a de minimis intrusion on the motorist’s personal liberties. Id. at 111. The
Fourteenth Circuit’s attempt to compare the intrusion of being asked to stand outside your vehicle
during a permissible traffic stop and being detained for a dog sniff once after the traffic stop was
complete is a twisted view of the Fourth Amendment that this Court should reject flatly.
To determine whether ordering the motorist out of his vehicle qualifies as acceptable, the
court weighed officer safety against the intrusion upon a citizen who has already seized by a lawful
detention. Id. at 110–11. The Court reasoned that an officer could reasonably feel safer with the
driver outside of the car in plain view, while the issue for the driver was not whether he would be
detained, but whether he would be inside or outside his vehicle. Id. This balancing test led the
Court to conclude that asking the driver to stand outside was not a serious intrusion upon his
sanctity, and was therefore reasonable. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17).
Mimms was a highly specific case that dealt exclusively with the additional burden placed
on a citizen in the scope of an ongoing investigation. Officers are free to pursue their legitimate
interests while the investigation is occurring, and will most likely be given a large amount of
latitude in doing so. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658. When a citizen is being legally detained, and the
intrusion from police practices is incremental, very rarely will the balance of equities tip in favor
of the driver’s private interests. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109.
However, the facts of our case substantially differ from those in Mimms, and thus, warrant
a separate analysis. The justification for permitting in-stop intrusions does not apply equally when
attempting to justify a post-stop detention. Once the traffic stop ends, officer safety is reduced to
general interest in preventing crime, which cannot alone justify intrusions not independently
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29. supported by reasonable suspicion. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44. In addition, when a citizen is no
longer being legally detained, their individual liberties weigh far heavier on the scale than before.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (“[C]itizens are entitled to protection against police conduct which is over-
bearing and harassing”).
Therefore, because a dog sniff conducted during a suspicionless detention is significantly
more intrusive than the mid-stop intrusion discussed in Mimms, any attempt to apply Mimms’s
reasoning to a post-stop detention must fail.
(3) Bright Line Properly Balances Interests of Law Enforcement Officials and Innocent
Motorists (Policy)
Balancing competing interests present in a Terry analysis will more likely to yield workable
rules if decided on a categorical basis. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981). These
types of rules provide much need guidance to officers and allow for less incorrect interpretations
of the law. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 353 (2009) (Scalia, J. concurring).
Establishing a bright-line at the end of a traffic stop is beneficial because it creates a win-
win scenario for all involved. By requiring officers to possess individualized suspicion before
conducting a dog sniff after the conclusion of a traffic stop will significantly decrease the number
of innocent motorists who will be subject to embarrassment associated with being detained for a
drug dog sniff. Further, the bright-line rule provides officers with easy to follow instructions,
rather than having them analyze what exactly de minimis is every time they wish to conduct a dog
sniff. In addition, officers still have the option of obtaining consent to perform a drug dog sniff,
which studies show the majority of people are willing to consent to.
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30. Because the bright-line rule simplifies traffic stops, protects innocent motorists, and leaves
officers with the tools necessary to effectively fight crime, this Court should adopt that rule and
reverse the Circuit Court.
C. The Stop Was Not Independently Justified by Reasonable Suspicion
The post-stop detention is not independently justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. A trial court has “superior access to the evidence,” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
276 (2002), as well as superior knowledge of “distinctive features and events of the community.”
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). As a consequence, a court reviewing
reasonable suspicion must “review findings of historical fact only for clear error and . . . give due
weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges . . . ” Id., see also Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188, 203 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining “‘two-
court rule,’” where deference is given to trier of fact who has had “a firsthand opportunity to
observe the testimony and to gauge the credibility of witnesses”).
Even without the necessary deference, the facts on this record do not provide the
particularized and objective justification required to uphold Harmon’s post-stop detention. Officer
McClaine offered four grounds for suspecting Harmon was involved in criminal activity: (1) an
overwhelming odor of air freshener emanating from the vehicle; (2) Morgan’s nervous behavior;
(3) Harmon’s decision not to sit in Officer McClaine patrol car while Officer McClaine
investigated the traffic violation; and, (4) Morgan’s explanation for why the two men had been in
Old York, which Officer McClaine did not find believable. None of these factors, individually or
in concert, provide grounds for a post-stop detention.
Here, first, although criminals use air fresheners to mask the smell of illegal narcotics, air
fresheners also have legal uses, which they are manufactured and marketed to eliminate the smells
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31. of everyday life. Reasonable suspicion may not properly be based upon circumstances which
“describe a very large category of predominantly innocent activity, Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438,
441 (1980). When Officer McClaine smelt the air freshener, she unreasonably invented suspicion
the air freshener indicated a cover up of narcotics, because air freshener has a large use in innocent
activity (R. at 1).
Second, Morgan’s nervousness similarly weakly indicates criminal activity. The courts
have indicated nervousness must be treated with caution because all motorists can exhibit varying
degrees of nervousness during contact with law enforcement officers at traffic stops. United States
v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919,929 (8th Cir. 2001). Indeed, the conduct McClaine considers nervous
behavior is in fact completely innocuous and an understandable reaction (R. at 2). Morgan pulled
his cap down so it would not be in the way, continued to smoke his cigarette, and did not look at
Officer McClaine, who did not speak to him in any case. (R. at 2). And later, when Officer
McClaine was directly questioning Morgan about the purpose of the trip, Officer McClaine did
not mention any nervousness (R. at 2). This fact undercuts the judgment Officer McClaine made
about Morgan’s earlier behavior (R. at 1-2).
Third, the next event raising officer McClaine’s suspicion was Harmon’s decision to not
accompany him to the police car (R. at 1). A citizen is not obligated to answer the questions from
police officers or to any officer in the car during the traffic stop. Terry, 392 U.S. 1,14 (1968).
Refusing to go with McClaine to the police car was was not a cause of suspicion, but Harmon
asserting his constitutional rights. Any assertion of an individual's constitutional rights cannot be
used in any determination as to whether there is reasonable suspicion as to drug activity.
Fourth, Officer McClaine was also suspicious of the reason for Harmon and Morgan’s
travel (R. at 1-2). Morgan had stated he and Harmon had driven to Old York to look at a vintage
21

32. car for sale. Morgan did not have a picture before the two drove to Old York. They did not buy the
car, because the owner could not produce title. Officer McClaine thought to herself this was
abnormal behavior. Officer McClaine seems to imply to herself the two just went for the car and
returned immediately. Indeed, McClaine did not inquire further when they left Old York, when
they saw the car and what they did afterwards. A vast array of activities could have transpired from
going to diners or visiting family in Old York. Nevertheless, she speculated the two-hour trip had
a rapid turn-around in the middle of the night.
Overall, none of these observations provide reason for suspecting criminal activity
separately or in total. The fact Officer McClaine herself would not have made the same choices
does not make what Harmon and Morgan did suspicious. Certainly the government will try to
counter each of these innocent factors by suggesting the totality of the circumstances allowed for
such behavior and with McClaine’s status as a police officer. But, the court must view totality of
the circumstances in a reasonable suspicion inquiry through the lens of an officer’s experience.
United States v. Carrate, 122 F.3d 666, 668 (8th Cir. 1997). Although there is no evidence of
Officer McClain’s status, it seems her status in a rural community between Brick City and Old
York goes against her claiming to have knowledge of such stops one would expect experience in
urban areas.
Furthermore, the court must view acts supporting reasonable suspicion through the lens of
an objective basis, not the subjective impressions of the officer. United States v. Hernandez-
Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989). Additionally, no evidence supports Officer
McClaine assumptions that Harmon and Morgan had made a two-hour trip to see a car in the dark.
Given Officer McClaine did not ask when the men had left Old York, when they had seen the car,
22

33. or what they had done before or after seeing it, her conclusion as to their itinerary was nothing but
speculation.
Even assuming Officer McClaine was correct about the timing of Harmon and Morgan’s
trip, the timing does not indicate criminal activity. A vehicle, especially a popular vintage one, is
worth viewing in person before handing over a significant amount of money. Buyers and sellers
who work during the day may only have the evening hours for such activities. The detention
leading to the dog sniff of Harmon beyond the conclusion of the traffic stop violated his rights
under the Fourth Amendment.
In conclusion, the traffic stop completed when Officer McClaine handed Harmon his
warning ticket (R. at 2). At that point, Officer McClaine needed either reasonable suspicion or
consent to detain Harmon until the second officer arrived to conduct the canine sniff (R. at 2).
McClaine did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain Harmon after the warning ticket
was issued, and Harmon did not consent to prolonging the encounter (R. at 1). The prolonged
detention was not a de minimis extension of the stop, and thus resulted in an unlawful intrusion on
Harmon’s Fourth Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit.
Respectfully Submitted,
TEAM NO. 25
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
23