Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history, vastly exceeding other major disasters like fires in Chicago and San Francisco. After the storm, New Orleans' population was less than half of pre-Katrina levels, over 60% of the city was uninhabited, and public services like schools, libraries and mail delivery were severely limited. The presentation discusses preparing for disasters through risk management and business continuity planning, highlighting both abstract concepts and specific steps taken by The Historic New Orleans Collection in response to Hurricane Katrina. These included regular drills, prioritizing collections, evacuating staff, securing buildings and technology, and initial post-storm coordination despite damaged infrastructure.
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Not the Unthinkable, But What We Didn’t Think Of: Preparing For and Recovering From Disaster
1. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Not the Unthinkable, But What We Didn’t
Think Of
Preparing For and Recovering From Disaster
Charles Patch
Director of Systems
The Historic New Orleans Collection
2. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive natural disaster in
U.S. history. The overall destruction wrought by
Hurricane Katrina, which was both a large and powerful hurricane
as well as a catastrophic flood, vastly exceeded
that of any other major disaster, such as the Chicago Fire of
1871, the San Francisco Earthquake and Fire of 1906,
and Hurricane Andrew in 1992.
– The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned.
Department of Homeland Security, February 2006
Disaster in the Real World
The Official Word
4. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Living in a post disaster world
City population < half of pre-Katrina levels
> 60% of city uninhabited
20 public schools in operation
15% of student body
5 of 14 branches of public library open
No second class mail delivery
Most museums and archives not open until late February
5. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Living in a Post Disaster World
Condition of Public Libraries in LA Post-Katrina
6. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract
TERMS:
Business Activities
Business Continuity Plan
Business Impact Analysis (BIA)
Business Interruption Event
Business Process
Business Resource
Business Resumption Plan
Control
Key Business Process
Maximum Acceptable Outage (MAO)
Outage
Procedures
Resources
Risk Event
Risk Management Plan
Service Area Contingency Plan
7. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract
Business Continuity Management (BCM)
is part of a larger Risk Management Plan
Disaster Recovery is a subset of BCM
Risk Management considers both
negative and positive risk
The Prime Directive: Plan for the best,
prepare for the worst
Proactive design and implementation of
controls to prevent risks from occurring
Reactive design of controls to mitigate effects
of adverse events that occur.
8. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract:
Overview of Risk Management Process
Review operation and continuing
suitability of controls
Monitor and Review
Establish plan. Implement controlsImplement Controls
Identify, analyze, rate and prioritize
risks
Evaluate design of existing controls.
Redesign controls if necessary
Identify and Assess
Risks
Determine key business objectives,
processes and resources
Establish Context
9. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract: Organizational Context
Organizational Objectives
Output Group Output Group
Output Group
key business
process
key business
process
key business
process
key business
process
key business
process
Business Support
Process
Business Support
Process
Business Support
Process
10. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract: Organizational Context
Collect, Interpret, Display
Cultural Materials for General
Public
Administration
Collections
Management
Information
Systems
Payroll
Facilities
management
Accounts
Payable
Acquisitions
Data storage
File hours with
Paychecks Inc.
Create loan records in
Collection Management
System
Create semi-weekly
backups of all data
11. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract: Risk Management Process
No
Yes
No
Yes
Determine
Possible Risk
Events using risk
framework
Determine
likelihood and
consequence
without control in
place
Determine risk
level and
compare with
acceptable risk
Acceptable
?
Evaluate design
of existing
controls
Determine
likelihood and
consequence
with control in
place
Determine risk
level and
compare with
acceptable risk
Acceptable
?
Redesign
controls
Record in Risk
Register
Identify
Analyze
Evaluate
Control
Document
12. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract: Risk Identification
13. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract: Analysis & Evaluation
Is a risk minor (acceptable) or major (unacceptable)?
What is “acceptable”?
What are the consequences in terms of resources?
Do they have a detrimental impact on
Staff
Facilities
Collections
Telecommunications
Information Systems
Rank the consequences on the degree of impact on these resources
What is it worth to you?
A consequence can be minor if its fullest possible impact will not be
detrimental to institutional resources.
Last question: will a consequence have an impact on normal
business operations?
Events which have detrimental impacts on resources are likely to
impact business operations <- remember this!
14. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract: Controls
Preventative Controls
Stop the risk from occurring in the first place
E.g.: require passwords to access the computer system
Ban flammable solvents from processing areas
Corrective Controls
Minimize the consequence of a risk event once it has occurred
Emergency conservation supplies
Backup tapes for computer system
Evaluate current control mechanisms
If the consequences remain unacceptable, redesign them
15. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract: Monitor and Review
Incorporate risk management into normal business operations
Strategic planning
Budget process
Facilities Maintenance
Make risk management part of operational management
Supervisors and key workers participate in planning and analysis
Sign-offs by managers on risk controls
Practice procedures
Structured walk-through
Review for validity
Confirmation of supplies needed
16. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract: The BCM
A Business Continuity Plan is a Corrective Control
An interruption in a Business Process is an adverse consequence
of a risk event
A complete interruption of this sort is an Outage.
How long can an Outage be tolerated before the viability of the
organization is threatened?
This duration is the Maximum Acceptable Outage (MAO)
Risk
Management
Conrols
Preventative
Corrective
Disaster
Recovery
Business
Continuity
17. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract: The BCM
Business Continuity in 6 arduous steps
Initiate the project:
Identify Key Processes:
Conduct a Business Impact Analysis:
Design Continuity Controls
Implement the controls
Test and Maintain the plan
18. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Abstract: The Controls (but only for
the collections)
1. Design Continuity Controls
Review existing controls
Identify and evaluate options and alternatives
Select the alternative activities and resources
2. Implement the controls
Establish recovery teams
Document “Service Area” action steps
Establish event escalation process
Obtain and consolidate contact and inventory lists
Document recovery management process
3. Test and Maintain the plan
Paper test
Manual Verification
Supply validation
Supply, Service and equipment availability
Structured walkthrough
Unannounced team assembly
19. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World:
Background: The Yearly Drill
Street flooding is common
Hurricane / Tropical Storm alerts are yearly events in New Orleans
20. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World:
Cindy – Wednesday 7/6/05
21. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World:
Dennis –Sunday 7/10/05
22. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World:
Katrina – Monday 8/29/05
23. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World:
Living With the Past
24. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World: What we did right
Routine procedures
Keep Buildings maintained and up to code
Fire alarms, fire extinguishers checked on semi-yearly basis
Routine roof inspections
Plumbing and electrical services kept to code or better
Lighting and signage maintained properly
Given the choice, try not to put things where they could
be harmed
Follow best practices for data management and storage
Make duplicates or copies of important documentation
and store them offsite
E.g.: All accession records and documentation microfilmed
at the end of each year, including updates to active
collections
Stored in two difference places, one offsite
25. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World: What we did right
Routine procedures
File plans with local fire and police departments
Be sure that room and floor designations are the
same in all documentation, including insurance,
collections management systems and fire
department plans.
Consider requiring third-person contact numbers
Keep current contact lists for vendors, lenders,
staff and emergency services
26. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
What We Did Right: Disaster Preparation
Disaster preparedness planTHE HISTORIC NEW ORLEANS COLLECTION
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PLAN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Mission Statement/Staff Assignments Page 4
II. Emergency Prevention Strategies Page 8
III. Communication in the Event of Page 10
an Emergency
IV. Visitor Safety
A. Fire Page 11
B. Illness
Page 11
C. Accidents Page 12
D. Robbery Page 12
E. Vandalism Page 12
F. Bomb Threat Page 13
V. Emergency Resources Page 15
Building Resources Page 16
Collections Resources Page 17
VI. Supplies
Page 20
VII. Fire Prevention Page 21
VIII. Hurricane Preparedness Page 22
IX. Disaster Preparedness
A. 533 Royal Street
1. General Page 24
2. Fire Page 24
3. Hurricane Page 25
(General, fire, hurricane are addressed for each building)
B. 714 Toulouse
C. 718 Toulouse
D. 722 Toulouse
E. 726-728 Toulouse
F. 410 Chartres
G. 521 Tchoupitoulas
X. After a Disaster Page 41
Appendix A - Maintenance Checklist Page 42
Appendix B - Information Flow Table Page 43
Telephone Lists Page 44
Appendix C - Bomb Threat Page 46
Appendix D - Williams Residence Priority List Page 48
Appendix E - Chartres Street Receptionist Guidelines Page 52
Recovery assistance
Collections Kid Gloves, Inc. 733-6765
Ron Grose (chandeliers) 831-1669
Ellis S. Joubert (metals) 899-1746
Conservators
Book/paper Christine Smith (703) 836-7757
Northwest Document Conservation Center (508) 470-1010
Alan Balicki (212) 873-3400 ex.287
home (718) 855-1723
Jim Stroud (512) 471-9117
Chris Young (615) 227-0538
Painting Richard White 822-4567
Cynthia Stow (615) 269-3868
Barry Bauman (312) 944-5401
Perry Huston (817) 595-4131
Claire Barry (212) 737-4786
Louise Beeson (and frames) 241-2587
27. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
What We Did Right: Staff Preparation
Regular testing of alarm system and drills
Training of docent staff in emergency procedures
All areas kept stocked with emergency supplies
28. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World
What We Did Right 3: Disaster Preparation
Prioritization of materials
29. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World: What We Did Right
Storm monitored by Disaster Coordinator from first appearance
early in the week when still a tropical storm
Emergency supplies checked, calls made to confirm that all
staff has copy of Disaster manual
Preparation Meeting held Friday morning, August 26th
in
directors office
Emergency message activated
Staff put on alert
Head count of who is available this day and the next
Initial clean-up of processing areas completed
Storm monitored throughout day
Saturday, escalation of probable hit, staff called in at 7:30 AM,
16 people respond.
30. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World
What We Did Right: Set Up
Saturday 7:45AM:
Fresh computer backup tapes produced
Collection Management System data and
Membership/Development data compressed and sent via FTP
to vendors
Computer system shut down and disconnected from power
source
Major servers moved to second floor of buildings and covered
with plastic sheeting
Phone system shut down and disconnected from power source
Art work removed from exterior walls
Sunday:
Remaining staff either evacuates city or takes protective
measures at their homes
Hurricane raised to Category 5, then Category 4 status; Direct
hit procedures invoked. Five staff return to carry out
remaining preparations
Removal of all work remaining materials in processing from
floors and surface areas
Relocation of all art works on first to second floors
31. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World
What We Did Right: Set Up
Building
Preparation
32. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World:
August 28, Sunday: The Evacuation
Mayor declares mandatory evacuation on
Sunday morning
Extremely difficult travel conditions
prevail
8 to 12 hours to reach Baton Rouge (80
mile)
Director contacts all department heads by
phone to establish whereabouts
Director and several other staff members
stay to ride out storm
33. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World:
8/29 – 9/3 : Katrina “misses” New Orleans
Hurricane tracks to the East of the city
Power and phone service throughout
Southern part of state lost during most
of Monday
Monday night, most believe New
Orleans has “dodged the bullet” again
and plan return to the city on Tuesday
morning.
Tuesday morning television reports
80% of city is under water
Phone service dysfunctional, cable and
Internet access extremely rare
By Wednesday there are 100,000 extra
people in Baton Rouge
Wednesday NO School board
announces that school is suspended for
the year
Initial reports suggest it will be months
before the city can be inhabited again
Most evacuees begin looking for long-
term living arrangements
34. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World
What we did right: The Evacuation
We learned to work the damaged phone system
Lesson: cell phones worked via text message in the New Orleans area and
with voice when calling outside the New Orleans area code.
First Contact: Tuesday night, August 30
Staff members in the area organize rescue of valuable materials.
Initially planned for September 2, delayed because of conditions until
September 8
“High Priority” materials were clearly marked and were stored in easily
accessed locations
Offsite location for materials established upstate
Movers retained on special contract called in
Google Group created 9/1 after contact with Minisis Inc.
Staff assured of continued employment, salary and benefits
This is the first message posted to the list that is not a response to the “Where are you?”
query.
Staff web page created 9/5
Most valuable collections rescued 9/8
Network gear rescued 9/8
Personnel Database created 9/13
38. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World
What Went Right: The Evacuation
Staff stayed of their own volition
Our vendor becomes our go-between
Staff members found the Google Group
Our web master took the site with him on his laptop
Our network manager was close enough to join the
convoy
Our vendor anticipated our need for a personnel database
The French Quarter was spared and sufficient staff were
on hand to open the facility on October 3.
39. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World
What We Could Have Done Better
No designated essential personnel
Compounded by timing issues
A failure to communicate
Dependence on phone system for
communications
No working email addresses
No common contact point for reaching
individual staff members
Administration chose to stay close to the
physical institution rather than
communication hubs.
Most were in rural areas with poor or
no Internet access
Nearly all communication from the
administration was by cell phone,
which worked only sporadically
Administration did not take advantage of
communications channels
Tended to wait until staff contacted
them rather than contacting staff
Rarely posted information on the staff
web page or the Personnel DB bulletin
board
No alternative admin site
And no policy for defining how to recognize
a workable alternative
No back-up network site
Inadequate conservation supplies on site
Most suppliers for recovery materials listed
in handbook were local
40. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World
What We Could Have Done Better
Some things we didn’t think of (that might have been caught in
a risk analysis)
Book Trucks
The Real Truck:
Who was going to drive this?
The giant image files that weren’t backed up
Network “single point of failure” (actually 4 potential failure points)
Magnetic Locks (no electricity, no security)
Time lost to making ad hoc arrangements
No pre-arranged alternative “home” for rescued collections
No pre-arrangements for care of “essential staff” before or after
disaster
No plan for setting up network in alternative location while staff
was disbursed
(as opposed to securing backups)
41. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Real World
What Didn’t Go Well?
42. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future
Lessons Learned
Increases in scope and intensity increase impact of a disaster.
Impact can vary in regard to timing:
As intensity increases, the greater the need for fast recovery
measures
The recovery of materials may be time-dependent
Severely damaged physical plants need immediate stabilization
As scope increases, recovery becomes more difficult to execute
Common services and infrastructure may be unavailable
Scope and intensity can affect how you recover
Materials
Human Resources
Property
Both scope and intensity hamper the execution of business
processes
A widespread disaster can prevent access to facilities as much as
an intense but localized disaster
43. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future
Lessons Learned
Roles:
Disaster Recovery Coordinator
Service Area Teams / leaders
Vendors / Service Providers
Chosen on an “as available” basis
44. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future: Lessons Learned
The Inconvenience of the personal lives of personnel
“Normal” personnel issues
Employees with dependents
Employees with physical disabilities
Extended absences of employees with critical knowledge
Disaster issues that exacerbate personnel problems
People with dependents need more time to prepare for an
evacuation
People with dependents cannot respond as quickly to emergency
calls as those without dependents
People with dependents may not be able to return as early as
others
E.g.: no school in New Orleans until January 2006
E.g.: inadequate medical care
45. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future
Lessons Learned?
Most forms of communication will fail
No single source will provide adequate information concerning real
events
Individuals or small groups working independently were most effective
Data redundancy is highly desirable
Professionals involved in activities unrelated to what authorities regard
as the central economic interests of the city and region will be
marginalized
46. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future
Lessons Learned?
Communications 101
Mechanics:
Create multiple forms of asynchronous communication
Out-of-Region phone bulletin board
Web discussion groups/web pages/staff directories
“Real” bulletin board on site for leaving paper messages to
other staff
Develop policies for choosing administrative sites that
provide for access to the disaster area AND good
communications
47. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future
Lessons Learned?
Communications 201
Semantics:
Create a protocol for communicating with staff
Procedures for posting staff supplied information
Scheduled administrative updates and news
“Test the channel”
No news is bad news
48. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future
Information
Weigh all information carefully and
whenever possible, rely on trusted
sources in the area
If the images were to be reduced to a sentence in the minds of
Uptown New Orleans, that sentence would be: Crazy black people with
automatic weapons are out hunting white people, and there's no bag limit!
"The perspective you are getting from me," one of Fort Huger's foot
soldiers said, as he walked around the living room with an M-16, "is the
perspective of the guy who is getting disinformation and reacting
accordingly.“
-Michael Lewis
Wading Toward Home
New York Times Magazine, Oct 9, 2005
“We heard stories about helicopters being shot. But you’ve been in
helicopters, and you know how noisy they are. The only way you
know you have been shot at is if there’s a bullet hole,” Landreneau
said. “There were no shots fired at our helicopters.”
-Maj. Gen. Benny Landreneau, Louisiana National Guard commander , quoted in
“What We Signed Up For” by John Hill, Louisiana Life Magazine, March 2006
The media’s willingness to report thinly attributed rumors
may . . . have contributed to a cultural wreckage that will not
clean up easily. . . . Victims, officials and reporters all took
one of the most horrific events in American history and made
it worse than it actually was,”
Lecture by New York Times media reporter David Carr, September 2005
“Four weeks after the storm, few of the widely reported
atrocities have been backed with evidence,” - Times-Picayune
September 26, 2005
The New York Times has confirmed that one person was
murdered at the Convention Center and one at the
Superdome, and the Times-Picayune has confirmed that a
National Guardsman was attacked by an assailant wielding a
metal rod in the darkened Dome. The coroner’s early report
implies that the murder rate among those stranded in
Katrina’s aftermath was at least five times New Orleans’s
normal murder rate. This real, not imagined, violence
prevented New Orleans from getting the level of volunteer
and professional help it needed after Katrina.
-“Who’s Killing New Orleans?” Nicole Gelinas, City Journal, Autumn 2005,
http://www.city-journal.org/index.html
Information: Who To Believe?
49. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future
Information: Local Discussion Lists
50. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future
Information: Local Discussion Lists
51. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future
Facilitate Independent Agency
Provide materials for short term survival as
well as collections care.
Leverage the actions of individuals by
providing some method of coordinating
among disparate players
“Response to Katrina is less dependent on traditional disaster
plans than on improvised actions as conditions permit.”
-Report of Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment:
Debra Hess Norris (Heritage Preservation)
Richard Pearce-Moses (Society of American Archivists)
David Carmichael (Council of State Archivists)
21 September 2005
52. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future
Have Have More More Than One One
Off-site storage of data
Meta-data tagging of individual digital
assets
Cooperative arrangements for
network operations with sister
institutions
Cooperative arrangements for
physical storage with sister
institutions
53. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future
Have Have More More Than One One
Just a few miles west of Pass Christian, the Hancock County Historical
Society in Bay St. Louis fared much better with very little water
damage and a vault that held, protecting thousands of documents,
including family diaries and thousands of local photographs.
Charles Harry Gray, the executive director, was prepared in case
disaster struck. Over the years he had been making copies of all of the
group's most treasured documents, including 30,000 pictures. Not one
single photograph or record was lost.
They are the pieces of Bay St. Louis' 306-year history that made the
town of 8,230 what it is today, he said. Many of the copies were on
computer disks and hard drives, others were sent to the University of
Southern Mississippi, two hours north in Hattiesburg.
"It is imperative that you have copies in other locations because you
never know what's going to happen, what the next catastrophe is
going to be, and there certainly will be one," Gray said.
54. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Responding to Disaster in the Future
Disenfranchisement
Though archivists began asking for re-entry into the
city on August 31…(all) requests for attention to
historic paper records were denied…The
Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism
failed to include archivists on planned
reconnaissance trips into the city or to include
anyone from the archival community in its planning
meetings
Susan Tucker
Curator of Archives at the Newcomb College Center for Research on Women
Email, 10/14/2005
55. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
If this ever happens again…
All staff should have a web-based email address .
Publish and update as part of the recovery documentation
All staff should provide a contact phone number outside of the region
We should establish a telephone bulletin board outside of the institution
We should consider a subscription to a satellite phone service
All department heads should have lap-top computers
Online forum should be set up permanently with a single instructional
message
At least one institutional email address that is hosted on an off-site
server
Staff-only emergency web page should be set up permanently
Policy for alternative administrative site
Not necessarily choose an actual location but develop criteria for
choosing one
Develop cooperative arrangements with other institutions for storing
collections
Develop cooperative arrangements with other institutions to host our
computing equipment and run our network
Contract for archiving of digital assets that are difficult to transmit or
store easily to tape
56. Harvard Art Museums April 11, 2006
Web Sites of Interest
Business Continuity Management
NEDRIX - New England Disaster Recovery Information X-change
http://www.nedrix.com/
Risk Management Standards
http://www.incom.com.au/enterprise-risk-management-standards.htm
Better Practice Guide - Business Continuity Management - Keeping
http://www.anao.gov.au/WebSite.nsf/Publications/4A256AE90015F69B
4A2568EE0010062B
National Archives of Australia - Business continuity planning for di
http://www.naa.gov.au/recordkeeping/er/guidelines/9-continuity.html
Business Continuity Planning & Disaster Recovery Planning World
http://www.disasterrecoveryworld.com/
Editor's Notes
The Cabildo fire of 1988 exemplified the benefits of advanced planning. Although it appeared that firefighters delayed needlessly before turning hoses on the fire that destroyed much of the third floor of the historic structure, they were in fact following a disaster plan that involved covering valuable artifacts with waterproof tarps. This act saved a major portion of the museum’s furniture collection.
In add
Hundreds of gigabytes of image files were stored on a NAS that, at that particular point in time, could not be backed up by the existing tape backup system. As the period of time that the museum remained closed and without power extended, these files were increasingly at risk.
One way trusted information was dispensed was through the creation of targeted discussion lists that hosted information from people on the ground. This is web-discussion list created for a neighborhood association in an uptown neighborhood.