CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya. 2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks. 3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
September 13, 2016

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite
armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown
and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight
against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology.
2
1
3

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri identified the movement’s main efforts: 1) to move the battlefield into the West; 2) to unite
the ranks of the mujahideen; and 3) to support and shape popular revolutions. Zawahiri additionally focused on black
Americans in his statement commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Zawahiri urged them to turn to
shari’a and al Qaeda for justice, which he stated had failed them in the United States. Zawahiri decried the Islamic State of
Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which has polarized the Salafi-jihadi movement and he emphasized al Qaeda’s power as providing
a unifying “message” instead of a physical group.
Jabhat Fatah al Sham may have a support base that extends outside of Syria. The leader of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate,
Jabhat al Nusra, established Jabhat Fatah al Sham to be without “affiliation to any external entity”—a reference to al
Qaeda—on July 29 and announced the end of Jabhat al Nusra operations. Jabhat Fatah al Sham’s objectives remained the
same as Jabhat al Nusra’s, but the group sought to galvanize local Syrian support within the armed opposition. An Emirati
man who reportedly pledged allegiance to Jabhat Fatah al Sham attempted to kill an American citizen with his car in the
United Arab Emirates and may have intended to attack media targets in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. It is not clear whether there
is a direct operational link between Jabhat Fatah al Sham and this attack in the UAE.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to build its global network by embedding within local Salafi-jihadi groups and marginalized
populations.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Saudi-led coalition and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government hardened their stances against the al
Houthi-Saleh alliance. The coalition announced a new phase of military operations targeting al Houthi-Saleh forces and
leadership responsible for attacks on the Saudi border. Hadi government officials refused to return to negotiations until the
al Houthi-Saleh Sana’a-based governing body, the Supreme Political Council (SPC), is abolished. President Hadi said that
his government will not make any concessions to the al Houthi-Saleh alliance.
Outlook: Peace talks are unlikely to resume under current conditions.
Security
Hadi government forces continued shaping operations in preparation for an offensive to seize control of Sana’a city,
Yemen’s capital. Hadi government and allied forces seized positions east of Sana’a in Sirwah district, Ma’rib governorate
and northeast of Sana’a in al Ghayl district, al Jawf governorate. Hadi government forces also attacked al Houthi-Saleh
forces in Kirsh and Hayfan districts, on the border between Taiz and Lahij governorates. The Saudi-led coalition intensified
airstrikes against al Houthi-Saleh positions in northern Yemen.
Outlook: Hadi government and allied forces will not achieve a decisive victory in Sana’a.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP maintains a support base in southern Yemen. AQAP detonated three suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices (SVBIEDs) targeting Hadi government-allied security forces in Abyan governorate on September 8 and 11.
Separately, three militants declared the formation of an unconfirmed ISIS wilayat (province) in al Mahrah governorate, an
AQAP support zone. The U.S. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency confirmed the Critical Threats Project’s
assessment that AQAP and ISIS cooperate on a “tactical level” against common domestic enemies in Yemen, but do not
collaborate on external plots. ISIS probably does not have the capability to direct external attacks from Yemen.
Outlook: AQAP will remain as the dominant Salafi-jihadi organization in Yemen.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
2
5
4 3
1
1) 11 SEP: AQAP
detonated a SVBIED
targeting security
forces in al Wuday
district, Abyan.
2) 11 SEP: Hadi
government forces
interdicted an AQAP
VBIED in Aden city.
3) 10 SEP: Hadi
government forces
seized Sirwah district,
Ma’rib.
4) 08 SEP: Saudi-led
coalition airstrikes
killed 30 civilians in
Arhab district, Sana’a.
5) 11 SEP: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces seized
Saudi positions and
equipment in al
Hanjar, Asir region.

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somali officials have not resolved controversies on the composition of the upcoming parliamentary and presidential
elections. Officials from the Jubbaland and Puntland state walked out of talks due to a dispute about Upper House
representation on September 11. Officials also failed to resolve disputes between Hiraan and Middle Shabelle region elders
over the formation of the Hiraan-Middle Shabelle state. Regional heads of state are expected to discuss the Somali
elections during the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit in Mogadishu on September 13.
Outlook: Unresolved disputes between Somali regional governments may delay the Upper House elections.
Security
Somali Special Operations Forces (SOF) continue to target al Shabaab militants in southern Somalia. U.S.-trained SOF
from the elite Danab unit killed an al Shabaab commander and six militants in Qoryoley, in Middle Shabelle region on
September 12. Southwest Administration SOF killed at least 12 militants near Labaatan Jirow in Bay region September 9.
SOF raids targeting al Shabaab commanders and High-Value Targets (HVTs) have become more frequent since May 2016.
Outlook: Raids targeting HVTs will continue on a limited scale, but the leadership deaths will not reduce al Shabaab’s
territorial control in southern Somalia.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab may be recruiting women to conduct attacks on soft targets. Three women armed with petrol bombs and knives
attacked a police station in Mombasa, Kenya on September 11, wounding two police officers. The attack comes
approximately one week after a Swahili jihadi magazine called for women to play a more active role in jihad. A recent IGAD
publication noted al Shabaab’s Kenyan affiliate al Hijra’s efforts to expand its recruitment of women. Pro-Islamic State of
Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) media claimed that the female attackers had pledged allegiance to ISIS.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely recruit more female operators to conduct suicide missions as Somali security forces become
more effective at identifying male operatives.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Libyan National Army (LNA) scuttled efforts by the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to resume oil
exports from eastern Libya. The LNA, led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports from GNA-allied militia forces on
September 11. The House of Representatives (HoR), a rival government supported by the LNA, is now encouraging Libya’s
National Oil Company to resume oil exports from the ports under LNA control. The GNA’s Presidency Council (PC) issued
conflicting responses to the takeover, indicating internal dissent. The U.S. and its European allies condemned the takeover.
Outlook: The LNA’s takeover will weaken the GNA and may spark armed conflict with GNA-allied militias over oil sites.
Security
Armed actors in Tripoli may be targeting GNA sites and GNA-allied Misratan militias in the capital. Some Salafi militias in
Tripoli have begun to push back against the dominance of Misrata-based armed groups in the GNA. Popular support for the
GNA has waned due to a series of governance failures, including worsening blackouts and an ongoing liquidity crisis.
Outlook: Violence levels may spike in Tripoli in the near term as local militias seek to capitalize on the GNA’s weakness.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS militants are operating behind the frontline in Sirte. GNA-allied militias paused operations to clear the few remaining
ISIS-held neighborhoods in Sirte due to the threat of attacks from the rear. Likely ISIS militants conducted three attacks on
the militias’ line of communication between Sirte and Misrata in the past two weeks. Misratan security forces apprehended
two suspected ISIS suicide bombers en route to Misrata on September 7.
The Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC), an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia,
demonstrated its ability to defend its safe havens with a series of attacks on LNA forces in contested Qawarsha, Benghazi.
Outlook: ISIS may attempt to conduct retaliatory attacks against the GNA and allied forces in Misrata and possibly Tripoli.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

8. 8
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 07-12 SEP: GNA-
allied militias clashed
with ISIS militants in
Sirte.
2) 09 SEP: The al
Saadawi militia
clashed with a
Misratan militia in Sidi
al Masri, Tripoli.
3) 09 AUG: The LNA
conducted airstrikes
targeting the
Mujahideen Shura
Council of Derna.
4) 09 SEP: The
Benghazi
Revolutionary Shura
Council attacked LNA
forces in Qawarsha,
Benghazi.
5) 11 SEP: The LNA
seized four oil ports
from the PFG.
2
1
5
3
4

9. 9
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
AQIM leadership continues to rally support to the al Qaeda network in North and West Africa. The leader of AQIM’s Council
of Notables, Abu Obeida Yousef al Annabi, called on fighters, especially those in prison, to remain steadfast in an audio
speech commemorating the Eid al Adha holiday. He praised mujahideen in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and the Sahara region.
Outlook: AQIM will continue to support the formation of a Salafi-jihadi base in the Maghreb and Sahel regions.
Uqba ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
Escalating economic protests in Tunisia threaten to destabilize the new unity government and provide opportunities for
Salafi-jihadi groups to attack. Protests began on September 7 after a resident of Fernana, northwestern Tunisia self-
immolated to protest the municipality’s closure of his workplace. Similar protests in Ben Guerdane, a poverty-stricken town
on the Libyan border, will include a general strike in late September. Officials called for peaceful demonstrations and warned
that Salafi-jihadi militants may seek to infiltrate protests. The Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade called for assassinations in Tunisia,
indicating that the group may seek to resume offensive operations during a period of unrest.
Outlook: Tunisian security forces will divert counterterrorism resources in order to quell social unrest.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
A schism within Boko Haram may strengthen ISIS in West Africa. ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, formerly known as Boko
Haram, attacked members of the Boko Haram faction led by Boko Haram leader Abubakar al Shekau in Borno State,
northeastern Nigeria in early September. ISIS recognized Abu Musab al Barnawi as the governorate of Wilayat Gharb
Ifriqiyya in early August, sidelining Shekau.
Outlook: The pro-ISIS faction of Boko Haram will likely grow stronger, expanding ISIS’s network in West Africa.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

10. 10
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

11. 11
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569