CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters, potentially disrupting shipping routes and routine maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandab Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance fired a missile at an Emirati vessel off the coast of Mokha port city in western Yemen on October 1. A video shows the destruction of the vessel. The UAE foreign ministry described the attack as an “act of terror.” Separately, al Houthi-Saleh forces are probably using American citizen Peter Willems as a human shield against Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh forces detained Willems on September 20 after an airstrike hit an intelligence headquarters in the capital. 2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the imminent loss of its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces. ISIS militants who fled Sirte as the U.S.-backed offensive began have conducted multiple attacks behind the Sirte frontline since mid-September, including an ambush that caused dozens of casualties on October 2. The U.S. air campaign is entering its third month. 3. Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments in the contested Kashmir region. Tensions rose when India blamed a Pakistan-based militant group for attacks on Indian security forces. The Indian and Pakistani militaries have since exchanged fire across the Line of Control. India is preparing fortifications for a possible military escalation.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
October 4, 2016

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in
Yemeni waters, disrupting shipping routes through the Bab al Mandab Strait.
2. ISIS is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the loss of
its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces.
3. Political and military tensions are escalating between the Pakistani and Indian
governments in the Kashmir region.
3
2
1

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Pakistan claimed that an
“unprovoked” Indian operation killed two Pakistani soldiers along the Line of Control on September 29. India described the
attack as “surgical strikes” against Pakistani militants in the area. Militants attacked an Indian paramilitary camp on October
3, and Indian and Pakistani militaries exchanged fire across the Line of Control. Indian security forces are increasing their
operations against Pakistani militant groups, especially Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). The escalation began
when India blamed JeM for attacks on Indian security forces in Uri, Jammu, and Kashmir.
Outlook: The governments of India and Pakistan will attempt to de-escalate tensions along the Line of Control.
Salafi-jihadi groups may exploit rising tensions in the Kashmir region to bolster recruitment. A Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP) spokesman called for attacks on Indian security forces, contradicting a previous statement from the TTP’s Umar
Media claiming that the group would stay out of the Kashmir conflict. It is unclear which faction of the TTP has called for
attacks on Indian security forces. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) urged Kashmiris to join jihad in order to
liberate Pakistan.
Outlook: Elements of the TTP may join the Kashmir conflict, but other TTP factions will continue to focus their military
activities within Pakistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Rising anti-government sentiment and support for self-determination in southern Yemen are growing challenges to
internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government. Southern Movement leaders
advanced plans to establish an independent political council. Yemeni protesters demonstrated against unpaid wages and
failing government services in southern cities.
Outlook: Southern Yemenis will support Hadi’s government in the short-term as a practical alliance against the al Houthi-
Saleh faction and to gain access to international resources funneled through the government.
Security
The al Houthi-Saleh alliance escalated tensions in the Bab al Mandab Strait, which may disrupt shipping lanes. Al Houthi-
Saleh forces fired a missile at an Emirati HSV-2 Swift catamaran on October 1, causing significant damage. The catamaran
was likely delivering military supplies, despite coalition claims that it was carrying humanitarian aid to Aden. Al Houthi-Saleh
forces may also be using a detained American citizen, Peter Willems, to deter Saudi-led coalition airstrikes on the National
Security Bureau in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh militants kidnapped Willems in Sana’a on September 20. Separately, Hadi
government and allied forces continued shaping operations in Ma’rib and al Jawf governorates as part of an ongoing effort
to sever al Houthi-Saleh supply lines in northern Yemen.
Outlook: The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
Efforts to target AQAP and ISIS commanders are not reducing the groups’ attack capabilities in southern Yemen. U.S.
airstrikes and Emirati-backed security forces killed or captured multiple AQAP regional commanders, but AQAP retains a
strong support base in southern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan assassinated two government security officers in Aden
city after a month of inactivity.
Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will persist in the absence of adequate government services, representation, and stability.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 29 SEP: AQAP
militants detonated an
IED in Bi’r Nasir,
northern Lahij
governorate.
2) 29-30 SEP: ISIS
militants assassinated
two security officers in
al Mansoura district,
Aden.
3) 01 OCT: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces fired a
missile at an Emirati
logistics ship near Bab
al Mandab Strait.
4) 01 OCT: Militants
detonated a SVEST in
Crater district, Aden.
5) 03 OCT: Hadi
government and allied
forces claimed to
seize the main road in
Sirwah district, Ma’rib.
2
5
43
1

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somali officials are unlikely to meet new parliamentary and presidential election deadlines. The UN Special Envoy to
Somalia indicated that the most recent delays may be politically motivated and that additional postponements are likely.
Upper House elections, coordinated by Somalia’s Federal States, have begun in some regions, but face delays in others.
Unrest in Ethiopia may draw Ethiopian forces away from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). A stampede
among Oromo protesters in Ethiopia killed at least 52 individuals on October 2. The majority Oromo ethnic group began
protesting the planned expansion of Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, into Oromo farmland in late 2015.
Outlook: Somalia will likely have to establish a caretaker administration due to incomplete elections in early 2017.
Security
Regional tensions sparked anti-American protests in northern Somalia. U.S. forces conducted an airstrike targeting al
Shabaab militants near Galkayo on September 28. Galmudug administration officials claimed that the strike killed local
security forces, prompting civilians to burn American flags and images of President Barack Obama. Galmudug officials
claimed that Puntland intelligence forces purposefully provided the U.S. with inaccurate intelligence. Puntland and
Galmudug forces have clashed over territorial disputes in the past.
Outlook: The Galmudug-Puntland conflict is unlikely to escalate further, but may harm coordination against al Shabaab.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab is conducting a wave of attacks targeting Somalia’s intelligence services. Militants detonated a suicide vehicle-
borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) targeting Somali National Intelligence and Security (NISA) forces at a
restaurant in Mogadishu on October 1. Militants also conducted a grenade attack targeting the Jubbaland Administration’s
intelligence building in Kismayo, Lower Jubba region on October 4.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to target intelligence forces throughout Somalia.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1) 28 SEP: A U.S.
airstrike killed nine al
Shabaab militants
near Galkayo, Mudug
region.
2) 29 SEP: U.S.-
backed Somali SOF
raided an al Shabaab
position in Kalishunba,
Lower Jubba region.
3) 01 SEP: Al
Shabaab militants
detonated a SVBIED
at a restaurant
frequented by
intelligence officials in
Mogadishu.
4) 02 OCT: SNA and
AMISOM forces raided
an al Shabaab training
camp near Dinsoor in
Bay region.
1
2
3
4

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Libyan National Army (LNA) Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar is growing more powerful as the UN-backed Government of
National Accord (GNA) weakens. Haftar, who does not recognize the GNA’s authority, controls several of Libya’s recently
reopened oil ports and is expanding his military rule in eastern Libya. Haftar rejected the GNA’s attempt to include him in a
unified Libyan army. The GNA’s willingness to negotiate with Haftar risks alienating the GNA’s support base, which includes
militias that view Haftar as an enemy.
Outlook: Haftar’s rise will increase political polarization and further delegitimize the GNA.
Security
The LNA may be committing human rights violations against civilians in Qanfouda, Benghazi. Amnesty International
reported that fighting between the LNA and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC), an Islamist militant group
with ties to al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, has trapped more than 100 families inside Qanfouda. The LNA denied
allegations that it prevented families from leaving Qanfouda. The LNA has rejected plans to allow civilians to leave
Qanfouda in the past, citing security concerns.
Outlook: The LNA will continue to besiege Qanfouda. The BRSC will build popular support by positioning itself as the
protector of the civilian population.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS is reconstituting its attack capabilities outside of Sirte, its former stronghold. ISIS maintains forces and ammunition in
the desert east of Sirte, from which it ambushed GNA-allied militias behind the Sirte city frontline on October 2.
Outlook: ISIS will launch attacks from behind the frontline, which may prolong U.S.-backed militias’ efforts to clear Sirte city
and allow ISIS militants currently trapped in Sirte city center to escape.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 28 SEP: U.S.
airstrikes hit an ISIS
resupply base in Sirte,
Libya.
2) 29 SEP: ISIS
militants detonated an
IED targeting a military
vehicle west of Sirte
city.
3) 30 SEP: The LNA
besieged the BRSC in
Qanfouda district,
Benghazi, where 130
families are trapped.
4) 02 OCT: ISIS
militants ambushed
GNA-allied militias in
Siwawah, Sirte district.
2
1 3
4

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Tunisian, Algerian, and Moroccan security forces continued to crack down on potential ISIS cells. Moroccan authorities
disrupted an all-female ISIS cell, some of whose members are related to militants fighting in Iraq and Syria.
Outlook: Familial networks and returning foreign fighters may facilitate Salafi-jihadi attacks in Morocco, despite the
country’s strong security apparatus.
Uqba ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
Tunisia and Algeria remain on high alert for militants attempting to cross over the Libyan border. Algerian forces interdicted
multiple convoys and arms caches near the Libyan and Nigerien borders. The Tunisian military has conducted almost 40
raids in the past month in Kasserine Governorate, a rumored safe haven for ISIS militants formerly based in Libya.
Outlook: Salafi-jihadi militants will attempt to infiltrate the Tunisian-Algerian border region from southwestern Libya.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
The collapse of the Algiers peace accord, which ended hostilities in northern Mali in 2015, raises concerns for renewed
conflict throughout northern Mali. Local support is growing for GATIA, a pro-government militia coalition that is currently
inciting conflict between Algiers signatories. Defections from within a former separatist coalition, which also participated in
the Algiers accord, may also exacerbate tensions.
Secular insurgencies and humanitarian crises may undermine the Nigerian military’s recent successes against Boko Haram
in northern Nigeria. A Fulani herdsman insurgency is challenging the state in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, and the Niger Delta
Avengers group is targeting hydrocarbon infrastructure in the south. The Nigerian government is ill-equipped to manage
famine, drought, and other crises in formerly Boko Haram-held terrain.
Outlook: The Nigerian army will struggle to maintain its advances against Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 29 SEP: The
Algerian army killed
five militants in
Tazoult, Batna,
Algeria.
2) 30 SEP: The
Algerian army
detained five
suspected militants in
Illizi province, Algeria.
3) 03 OCT: Tunisian
border forces clashed
with a Libyan militia
near Ras Jedir border
crossing.
2
1
3

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
1) 27 SEP: Boko
Haram militants
overran two villages
near Chibok town in
Borno State, Nigeria.
2) 27 SEP: ISIS
Wilayat Gharb
Ifriqiyya, also known
as Boko Haram,
detonated a SVBIED
in Abadam village,
Borno State, Nigeria.
3) 30 SEP: Ansar al
Din fired rockets at
French barracks in
Abeibera, Mali.
4) 03 OCT: Suspected
Ansar al Din militants
fired mortars at a
MINUSMA camp in
Ageulhoc, Kidal, Mali.
2
1
3
4

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569