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Reutov, yunusov, nagibin random numbers take ii

par le 27 novembre 2012

  • 9,941 vues

 

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  • pierrej Pierre Joye btw, drop me a mail at pierre@php.net, something I work on may be interesting for you and who knows, maybe you can give a hand :) Il y a 6 mois
    Êtes-vous sûr de vouloir
  • pierrej Pierre Joye Managers? security@ is a group of core devs, distributions security people and some security companies. Dropping a mail there or to internals to propose your solution will work just fine. The RFC process will even allow you to get it in the next release, if approved :) Il y a 6 mois
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  • arseniyreutov Arseniy Reutov, специалист at Positive Technologies @pierrej We tried, but didn't manage to get the manager that contacted us understand the issue. Going to try again! Il y a 6 mois
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  • pierrej Pierre Joye btw, you are more than welcome to submit suggestions and patch to internals or security@php.net :) Il y a 6 mois
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  • pierrej Pierre Joye @arseniy Afair it was simply due to the lack of the entropy feature back then. Also one should really simply pass it instead Il y a 6 mois
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  • arseniyreutov Arseniy Reutov, специалист at Positive Technologies @pierrej Glad to see this. But our major concern is that GENERATE_SEED macro uses php_combined_lcg() while not utilizing external crypto providers. Why not implement this? Il y a 6 mois
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  • pierrej Pierre Joye @arseniy You can set the hash to any other stronger hash. That's why we created it. I would like to set the default to something strong but there were some oppositions back then. The entropy source is also now definable, and there is also something at compile time telling that no reliable entropy source has been found. About the doc, yes, just pinged the doc team to add strong notices there :) Il y a 6 mois
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  • arseniyreutov Arseniy Reutov, специалист at Positive Technologies Hi, Pierre! ini setting session.hash_function - sha1 can be easily bruteforced as well, not so fast as md5 but still LCG relying on urandom or similar devices - I am confused by this statement. I suppose you meant the use of urandom in PHPSESSID generation in PHP 5.4. What we tried to tell is that no external crypto provides are used while seeding PRNGs, namely LCG and MT. It is a big difference. md5 supposed to be secure? serioulsy? - sha1 cannot be considered secure as well mt_rand and rand are well known as totally unsafe random sources. - put a security notice in the documentation then, like other sane languages. Il y a 6 mois
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  • pierrej Pierre Joye Some missing info, making this deck almost totally outdated and only about spreading outdated informations about php being unsecure: - ini setting session.hash_function - LCG relying on urandom or similar devices - md5 supposed to be secure? serioulsy? :) (user fault) - mt_rand and rand are well known as totally unsafe random sources. It should be clearly documented as such tho' - openssl's pseudo random bytes functions (or mcrypt equivalent) should be used too instead However one positive effect of this deck is to tell users to finally implement good things :) Il y a 6 mois
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  • hearttrapwall Dake Trap Wall at AKI good Il y a 6 mois
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Reutov, yunusov, nagibin   random numbers take ii Reutov, yunusov, nagibin random numbers take ii Presentation Transcript