3. Inhalt
Abbreviations............................................................................................................................3
Acknowledgments....................................................................................................................4
Introduction...............................................................................................................................6
ICTs as enablers...........................................................................................................................................................................................6
Purpose..........................................................................................................................................................................................................7
Methodology...............................................................................................................................................................................................8
Assessment method..................................................................................................................................................................................8
Kenya: HealthTrack..................................................................................................................10
Country profile..........................................................................................................................................................................................10
Project description and objectives....................................................................................................................................................13
Conclusions................................................................................................................................................................................................16
Lebanon: Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections .................................................18
Country profile..........................................................................................................................................................................................18
Project description and objectives....................................................................................................................................................20
Conclusions...............................................................................................................................................................................................23
Madagascar: The Wisdom of the Crowds to Guide the Future............................................25
Country profile.........................................................................................................................................................................................25
Project description and objectives....................................................................................................................................................27
Conclusions................................................................................................................................................................................................31
Malawi: RapidSMS Malawi......................................................................................................33
Country profile..........................................................................................................................................................................................33
Project description and objectives....................................................................................................................................................35
Conclusions................................................................................................................................................................................................40
Mexico: Cuidemos el Voto!......................................................................................................42
Country profile..........................................................................................................................................................................................42
Project description and objectives....................................................................................................................................................43
Conclusions...............................................................................................................................................................................................48
Opportunities and challenges in mobile governance..........................................................50
Overall lessons learned..........................................................................................................................................................................50
Overall conclusions.................................................................................................................................................................................54
Annex .......................................................................................................................................56
Framework for e-governance..............................................................................................................................................................56
Core components.....................................................................................................................................................................................56
Cross-cutting components...................................................................................................................................................................57
Bibliography............................................................................................................................58
5. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 3
Abbreviations
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BCG Bacille Calmette Guerin vaccine for tuberculosis
CEINPOL Congreso con Rostro, México
CLOE Coalition Libanaise pour l’Observation des Elections,
Coalition for the Observation of Elections, Lebanon
Cofetel Federal Commission of Telecommunications, Mexico
DVI Division of Vaccines and Immunization, Kenya
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit
FEPADE Fiscalía Especializada para la Atención de Delitos Electorales,
Special Prosecutor for the Attention of Electoral Crimes, Mexico
FOSS Free/open source software
GDP Gross domestic product
GNI Gross national income
GPS Global positioning system
HDI UNDP Human Development Index
HDR UNDP Human Development Report
ICTs Information and communication technologies
ICTD ICTs for development
ITU International Telecommunications Union
INEGI National Household Income and Expenditure Survey, Mexico
LADE Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections
MCV Meningococcal conjugate vaccine
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
NDI National Democratic Institute, United States
NGO Non governmental organization
PBS Public Broadcasting Service, United States
PPP Purchasing power parity
ROAR Results Oriented Annual Report
SIM Subscriber identity module
SMS Short message service
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children‘s Fund
USD United States dollars
WHO World Health Organization
6. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 4
Acknowledgments
This publication was developed by the e-governance and Access to Information team in the Democratic
Governance Group at UNDP’s Bureau for Development Policy in New York. It was written by Raúl
Zambrano, Senior Policy Adviser, and Ruhiya Kristine Seward, Ph.D., Research Specialist. This report is
based on five assessments of m-governance programmes conducted in Kenya, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi
and Mexico, carried out by Mari Denby, Oscar Salazar, Stephanie Ludwig and the e-gov team from 2008-2012.
The team would like to acknowledge the support and inputs from all those involved in the assessments. We
would like to acknowledge the assistance offered by all employees and staff of the programmes and imple-menting
agencies for providing information, arranging meetings, and helping to conduct interviews and sur-veys,
as well as those who offered time for personal interviews and filled questionnaires.
In particular, we are grateful to the following people and projects: Thanks to Gideon Nzoka from Pinnacle
Relational Database Systems and Dr. Ali Arale and Duncan Seda from the Kenyan Ministry of Public Health
and Sanitation‘s Division of Vaccines and Immunization (DVI) for providing information on HealthTrack in
Kenya. Thanks to the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) and the Coalition Libanaise
pour l’Observation des Elections (CLOE), and in particular Ian Schuler of NDI for his time in contributing to
this case study. In Madagascar, thanks to Deleau Razafimanantsoa and Lalaina Pascal Rakotozandry from
UNDP for providing information and evaluation reports of the mobile governance project there. In Malawi,
thanks to Professor Pratima Kale, Sean Blaschke, Kirsten Bokenkamp, Roxana Cosmacuic, Beza Hailu, and
Ray Short from Columbia‘s School of International and Public Affairs, as well as Stanley Chitekwe, Benson
Kazembe, Chris Fabian, Erica Kochi, Adam McKaig, and Evan Wheeler for the time that they contributed
toward this project. Thanks also to UNICEF Malawi, in particular Piyali Mustaphi, who leads UNICEF Nutrition
work there, as well as UNICEF‘s Division of Communications‘ Innovations Team and USAID. In Mexico, many
thanks to Andrés Lajous, José Oviedo, Jorge Soto, Luis Blackaller, David Moreno and Raquel Hernandez
in partnership with Congreso con Rostro, CEINPOL, Somos México, Tendiendo Puentes, AtncnMX, eflyer,
AxiomBox, FEPADE and MIT‘s Center For Future Civic Media. Also thank you to Aleida Ferreyra for giving her
input on Cuidemos el Voto! and Observación Electoral 2012.
8. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 6
Introduction
UNDP has been supporting the use of ICTs for human development since the Rio Earth Summit 1992. In
the last 20 years, developing countries have confronted a wide range of development demands needing
short, medium and long term commitment and support.
Early on, concerns centered on the digital divide - that is, the differential access to ICTs between developing
and industrialized countries - and ameliorating this division became a priority in many ICT-related program-mes.
As a result, infrastructure and connectivity were often prioritized as standalone goals, with little to no
connection to glaring social and economic development gaps. Yet since then, ICT for development have
rapidly evolved. The new millennium brought forward the strategic use of innovative ICT solutions by public
institutions and private actors to tackle issues related to costs, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, uni-versal
service delivery and, significantly, augmented stakeholder participation.
Being that as it may, developing countries continue to face many challenges. Although countries have indeed
made critical progress in terms of MDG targets and other internationally agreed development goals, there are
still many struggling to keep up with basic development needs.
ICTs as enablers
Today we are in the midst of another ICT revolution. The emergence of so-called Web 2.0 technologies such
as social networks, accompanied by the even more impressive and explosive growth of mobiles across the
world - have supported new dimensions of access to information and participation. Digital communication
devices are in the hands of billions of people for the first time in history. Broader access has demonstrated
a critical trait of ICTs: the potential to transform not only the way in which people interact among themselves
(globally, nationally and regionally) and with governments, but also the way in which governments and the
private sector provide services and information to people.
New feedback channels, such as via crowdsourcing, are offering people new opportunities to voice their
needs and to be integrated in decision and policy-making processes. Linking this back to the traditional
development “divides” - it is possible to see the real potential of ICTs. If we really want to address and close
such divides then we need to think out of the box and look for ways to innovate not only in the technological
sense but also on the economic, social and governance levels.
With this in mind, UNDP sees ICTs as enablers for development, offering the means to enhance human
development, not as end goals in themselves. This is a simple but critical view often lost in complex ICT for
Development (ICTD) agendas, policies and engagements. What is most needed is to find new, innovative
and scalable solutions to enduring development problems. This is where the real potential for both old and
new ICTs is evident.
Twenty years after the emergence of the Internet, the global inter-network is still only available to 2.5 billion,
most of whom are in developed countries. Mobile diffusion by comparison has far surpassed the reach of the
Internet. The latest estimates (ITU 2012) suggest that there are 6.2 billion mobile subscribers1 and 75 percent
of them are in developing countries. With this kind of reach, in a way, it can be argued that digital divide has
almost closed, and MDG Target 8 is close of being achieved.2
It is critical to understand with the diffusion of mobile technology that most people in the world still cannot
1 There are likely between 3.35 and 4.43 billion individual users - among a global population of nearly seven billion.
Subscription numbers come from total SIM cards sold and individual subscribers often have multiple and/or inactive
cards, around 1.4 - 1.85 per person (Informa Telecoms and Media 2012; mobiThinking 2013).
2 See UNDP‘s 2012 report on Mobile Technologies and Human Empowerment: Enhancing human development
through participation and innovation..
9. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 7
connect to the Internet, even with access to a mobile device. This is because the majority of people only have
access to basic (non-smart) phones with SMS capabilities. This reality must be taken into consideration with
new “social media” or social networking platforms, or for those who only focus on the “digital divide.” And the
urban/rural divide still poses a serious obstacle in most poor countries, and regions which could benefit the
most from ICT innovations are usually the last to receive services.
Needless to say, ICT access alone cannot guarantee human development. Nor does access to a digital
device guarantee that critical development gaps will be solved in a trickle-down fashion. Instead, the mobile
“revolution” has opened the possibilities for greater human-centered innovation - or social innovation - al-lowing
people to take action into their own hands. People are no longer simply dependent on governments,
the traditional private sector or donors to address localized development gaps.
At the same time, new initiatives involving the development of mobile applications are not always scalable
and cannot easily be replicated in other contexts. It is here where policy development and forging multi-stakeholder
partnerships are essential.
Programmes and policies supporting ICTD that target the poor and vulnerable are vital. There are also criti-cal
policy links that must be developed in the ambitious and complex aid agendas to create an environment
that enables ICT diffusion to marginalized areas. UNDP can leverage its knowledge and support of pro-poor
policies to improve ICTs impact in development and look for ways that ICTs can facilitate better development
outcomes for the poor and marginalized.
Purpose
UNDP’s end goal is to foster human development using all possible avenues, and ICTs are one of them.
With this in mind, reviewing a selected number of mobile technology projects and programmes can provide
useful insights to both UNDP Country Offices and development practitioners on how ICTs can be harnessed
to address some of the challenges mentioned above.
The mobile technology projects assessed include:
1. HealthTrack, Kenya
2. Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections, Lebanon
3. Wisdom of the Crowds, Madagascar
4. RapidSMS Malawi
5. Cuidemos el Voto!, México
The selection of the projects reviewed here was based on two factors: 1) The area of work is closely linked to
either democratic governance or support for MDG achievement; and 2) The level of innovation relative to the
time the projects were launched. In terms of the first aspect, three of the five projects (2, 3 and 5) focused on
core democratic governance themes such as electoral processes and participation of stakeholders in policy
and decision-making processes. The other two (1 and 4) clearly supported themes that are part and parcel
of the MDG targets. Furthermore, most of these projects were indeed pioneers in their respective areas of
work and thus can be seen as innovation leaders that open new paths to tackle traditional development work.
This paper reviews these cases in order to distill lessons learned and good practices for future m-governance
development in UNDP’s Country Offices and Regional Bureaux. The intention is to capture the real impact
of m-governance programming on the ground, contributing to a better understanding of m-governance and
ICTD practices overall, and helping UNDP to better plan and implement innovative projects in the future.
10. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 8
Methodology
These case studies were assessed and aggregated through a combination of inputs from UNDP Country
Offices, consultant evaluations and desk reviews from those involved in the projects.
Evaluation criteria
These case studies employ UNDP’s framework for evaluating e-governance implementations. The catego-ries
of assessment criteria are as follows:
• Relevance and fulfillment of the project goals: The relevance and functionality of the project,
how it was designed and the degree to which the specified goals and outcomes were achieved,
as well as the appropriateness of the project to the environment within which it operated.
• Efficiency and effectiveness: Resources spent in order to achieve project results, i.e. how well
inputs/means have been converted into activities in terms of quality, quantity and time, and the
quality of the results achieved.
• Impact of the project: The impact in terms of the variety of outcomes experienced by each sta-keholder
and beneficiary, as well as the impact on the wider environment.
• Sustainability: The survival of the project after its official end, including follow-up activities and
activities related to knowledge management.
• Replicability: The feasibility of repeating the project in other areas, locations, etc.
• Scalability: The feasibility of scaling up the project at the national, local, or organizational level.
Assessment method
For the reviews, projects were assessed using a combination of the following:
• Interviews: Formal and informal interviews were conducted with focal points, stakeholders and
individuals responsible for the implementation of the project face to face or via email;
• Questionnaires: When available, questionnaires were filled out by relevant people involved;
• Personal observations: Where relevant, the personal observations of reviewers were integrated
into the assessments;
• Desk review: Project documentation was reviewed and analyzed (when available), including initial
project documents, terms of reference, annual work plans/progress reports, mid-term reviews
and final evaluations.
12. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 10
Kenya: HealthTrack
Kenya is aiming for universal immunization of all preventable diseases for its citizens. Ensuring this hap-pens
means improving the outreach to between 12 and 20 percent of the population who have not yet
been immunized.3 Part of the problem is disruption in the immunization supply chain across the country, with
only rudimentary monitoring and redistribution of stocks available to the Kenyan Ministry of Public Health
and Sanitation’s Division of Vaccines and Immunization (DVI). With that in mind, HealthTrack was developed
locally by Pinnacle Relational Database Systems, a Kenyan-based software development company, in con-sultation
with the DVI, to address the lack of comprehensive monitoring of vaccination supply chains around
the country. The aim was to provide better monitoring of vaccine supplies and to enable better communica-tion
and planning for the DVI.
Country profile
Development background
Kenya has a population of 42.7 million, 24.4 percent of which is urban (UNDP 2013). Though it is considered
a low human development country in UNDP’s Human Development Report (HDR) - ranking 145 out of 186
on the Human Development Index (HDI)4 - it is now one of the most important economic hubs in East Africa
(UNDP 2013). The economy has grown substantially over the past decade, bolstered by strong tourism and
healthy exports of coffee, tea, fish, cement, and petroleum products. In 2012, Kenya’s total gross domestic
product was US$37.23 billion (World Bank 2013), which in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) translates
into US$62.7 billion (UNDP 2013).5 And while most Kenyans are employed in agriculture, the industry and
services sectors employ around 25 percent of the labor force, and is expected to grow as the country ex-pands
its ICT sector.6 GDP per capita stands at $1,507 PPP and GNI per capita is $1,541 PPP.7
At the same time, 43 percent of the population lives on less than $1.25 a day, 46 percent of the population
lives below the national poverty line and 20 percent live in severe poverty (UNDP 2013).8 Moreover, according
to multidimensional poverty calculations, nearly 48 percent of Kenyans face deprivation9 (UNDP 2013) and
3 Anywhere between 12 and 20 percent of the population has yet to be immunized. Immunization coverage according
to UNICEF’s latest data (2011): BCG (92%); DPT1 (95%); DPT3 (88%); Polio3 (88%); MCV (87%); HepB3 (88%); Hib3
(88%); Newborns protected against tetanus (73%).
4 The HDI is a composite index that measures the average achievement of countries along three dimensions of hu-man
development: health, education and income.
5 According to Trading Economics, from 1960 to 2010, Kenya’s GDP averaged 9.0 billion.
6 Kenyan manufacturing accounts for around 14% of GDP while agriculture - like coffee and tea cultivation - remains
a main revenue source for 70% of the population. Also see next section on Mobile Telephony.
7 GDP in PPP terms, according to the World Bank, refers to the “sum of value added by all resident producers in the
economy plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output, calculated without mak-ing
deductions for depreciation of fabricated capital assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.
Value added is the net output of an industry after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. When
expressed in US$ terms, it is converted using the average official exchange rate reported by the International Mon-etary
Fund. An alternative conversion factor is applied if the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an ex-ceptionally
large margin from the rate effectively applied to transactions in foreign currencies and traded products.
When expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) US$ terms, it is converted to international dollars using PPP
rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP that the U.S. dollar has in the United States”
Source: World Bank. 2012 from UNDP Human Development Reports. GNI per capita refers to the “aggregate in-come
of an economy generated by its production and its ownership of factors of production, less the incomes paid
for the use of factors of production owned by the rest of the world, converted to international dollars using purchas-ing
power parity (PPP) rates, divided by midyear population.” Source: HDRO calculations based on data from World
Bank (2011), IMF (2011) and UNSD (2011). See the UNDP HDR website.
8 According to the World Bank, the national poverty rate is the percentage of the population living below the national
poverty line; estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys.
9 This refers to the percentage of the population with a weighted deprivation score of at least 33 percent.
13. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 11
unemployment is estimated to be around 40 percent.10 Endemic poverty is complicated by environmental
challenges, such as repeated droughts, and by governance issues, government accountability and
transparency issues among others. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index places Kenya
in the 139th position out of 179, where it shares its ranking with Azerbaijan, Nepal, Nigeria and Pakistan
with a score of 27 out of 100. It is considered a hybrid regime11 by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU)
Democracy Index, where it is ranked 104th out of 167, with an overall score 4.71 (EIU 2012a).
Economic growth was slowed by post-election violence in early 2008 and the unfolding global financial crisis,
which reduced GDP growth from seven percent in 2007 to 6.6 percent in 2009.12 Yet with the largely peaceful
election of Uhuru Kenyatta in March 2013, sworn in as Kenya’s fourth president in April 2013, GDP is expec-ted
to grow again, from an estimated 4.6 percent in 2012 to 5.3 percent in 2013 (EIU 2013a).
Public health, immunization and vaccines
Kenya also suffers from numerous public health challenges. Life expectancy at birth is just 57.7 years (UNDP
2013). The HIV/AIDS epidemic remains a serious concern, with an estimated HIV prevalence rate of over six
percent of the adult population (aged 15-49), and around 1.6 million people infected (UNICEF 2011).13 Lower
respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, tuberculosis, and malaria are leading causes of mortality, and only
59 percent of the total population uses an improved water source (a figure which drops to 52 percent for the
rural population) (UNICEF 2011).14 Thus, though Kenya has fared better in development than many of its sub-
Saharan neighbors - the country still has its share of challenges.
Figure 1: Kenyan measles immunization coverage for one-year-olds
Kenya has made important progress towards
the goal of universal immunization for pre-ventable
diseases, though more improve-ments
are needed to ensure that all Kenyans
receive the full spectrum of necessary vacci-nations.
UNICEF estimates that as of 2011,
12 percent of Kenyan children did not recei-ve
their DTP3 vaccination - the third dose of
the diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis vacci-ne
- a common indicator of total immunizati-on
coverage, and a critical intervention to
protect children from preventable diseases.15
Although immunization coverage typically
improves from year to year, the figures
suggest that anywhere between 12 and
20 percent of the population remains
unprotected. Research also shows that
children born into poverty or to mothers with lower levels of education have the greatest risk of not obtaining
full vaccination (see Figure 1: Kenyan measles immunization coverage for one-year-olds). Furthermore,
UNICEF reports that there are wide regional disparities in immunization coverage. It is estimated that at least
10 CIA World Factbook. Latest available figures from 2008.
11 According to the EIU, a regime is considered ‘hybrid’ when “elections have substantial irregularities that often
prevent them from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be
common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies - in political culture, functioning of
government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society
is weak. Typically there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is
not independent” (EIU 2012a: 28).
12 World Bank data on Kenya.
13 According to UNDP (2013), the rate for youth (15-24) is 4.1 percent among women and 1.8 percent among men
(UNDP 2013).
14 See also World Bank data.
15 See Kenya‘s WHO estimates of immunization coverage and WHO/UNICEF figures.
14. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 12
31 percent of districts have less that 79 percent DTP3 coverage. In the North Eastern Province, just 48 percent
of children were fully immunized in 2008 (Kenya 2010).16
Though the difficulties of ensuring full vaccination to Kenya’s child population are rooted in social and eco-nomic
dynamics, disruptions in the vaccine supply chain across the country contribute to the problem by ob-structing
the reliable delivery of immunization stocks to health clinics. No systematic monitoring programme
currently enables the country’s health clinics to guarantee a sufficient level of vaccination stock according to
local demand. There is also no formalized system for health clinics to re-distribute vaccine stocks when, for
example, one clinic is overstocked in a particular vaccine that is under-stocked at a neighboring clinic. The
WHO reports that at least one Kenyan district has experienced vaccine supply disruption every year since
2004. Moreover, wastage of immunization supplies also remains very high with 90 percent of tuberculosis
(BCG), 70 percent of yellow fever and 65 percent of meningococcal (MCV) vaccines going bad before use
in 2011 (compared with 60 percent for BCG, and 50 percent for both yellow fever and MCV in 2008) (WHO
2013).
Mobile telephony
Over the last decade Kenya has seen exponential growth in mobile telecommunications and is now one of
Africa’s fastest growing mobile and internet markets.17 The telecommunications industry currently makes up
over 6.3 percent of Kenya’s GDP,18 which in 2010 translated into $1.89 million dollars in revenue (ITU 2012).
The high proportion of GDP attributable to telecom revenue, bolstered by the growth of mobile technology
services, suggests that this sector is a major contributor to economic growth (ITU 2012: 138).
The extraordinary growth of the mobile industry, now covering over 89 percent of the population, is bringing
to Kenyans one of the highest relative decreases in ICT prices globally (ITU 2012; ITU 2011: 17). In 2002, just
3.7 Kenyans in 100 had mobile phone subscriptions; now there are over 72 subscriptions per 100 people and
growing (ITU 2013). And since many Kenyans share mobile phones, the prevalence of cell phone use in the
country is probably much greater than official statistics indicate.
Competition between the four mobile providers in Kenya has helped to make cell phone use more affordable.
Whereas in 2008, the mobile sub-basket19 represented 31.5 percent of GNI per capita, by 2011, this number
had dropped to 6.8 percent, with mobile sub-basket costing around US$4.5, or US$9.5 PPP.20 According to
ITU, competition flourished when the Communications Commission of Kenya lowered mobile termination ra-tes
and the second largest operator, Airtel, reduced voice call rates by half and cut the price of SMS in 2010
and 2011 (ITU 2012: 86). There has been a resulting boom in small mobile start ups and in the development
of mobile applications in Kenya.21 There has also been a subsequent proliferation of applications developed
which aim to assist the country’s growth - from mobile banking (which now constitutes over fifty percent of
banking in Kenya22) to mobile health applications.
The increasing ubiquity of mobile telephony in Kenya since 2002 is contrasted by little-to-no-growth in land-based
telephone lines during this same time, where ownership of land lines has remained at 0.7 per 100
people since at least 2002 (ITU 2012).
16 Latest available figures. From the Government of Kenya, Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2008-09, pub-lished
June 2010.
17 Internet users doubled between 2010 and 2011, to 28 percent of the population (ITU 2012: 28), and by 2013 this
figure had reached 32 percent (ITU 2013).
18 According to Trading Economics, telecommunications revenue - consisting in the provision of telecommunications
services such as fixed-line, mobile, and data services - was 6.32 in 2008 (from World Bank data). While Kenya is
one the most industrially developed countries in East Africa, manufacturing accounts for around 14% of GDP while
agriculture, such as coffee and tea cultivation, remains the main source of revenue for 70% of the population.
19 The ITU includes in the mobile sub-basket the price of 30 outgoing calls for peak, off-peak and weekends to the
same and other mobile and fixed networks, along with 100 SMS (ITU 2012).
20 ITU and World Bank 2012. Also World Bank 2009. The mobile sub-basket fell by 62 percent between 2010 and 2011,
from 17.8% GNI to to 6.8%of GNI within a year (ITU 2012).
21 See: “Kenya‘s startup boom” in Technology Review.
22 See more about Kenya’s mobile app market.
15. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 13
Project description and objectives
HealthTrack was developed in Kenya by Pinnacle Relational Database Systems in consultation with the
Kenyan Ministry of Health’s Division of Vaccines and Immunization (DVI) to provide better monitoring of
vaccine supplies in health clinics, to enable better communication and planning in the DVI, and to ensure
citizens have regular and reliable access to immunization treatments.
Before the introduction of HealthTrack, Kenya’s Ministry of Health had no systematic means of monitoring
vaccine stocks in health clinics across the country. As a result, some sites were overstocked in immunization
supplies while others had run out. The difficulty in accurately managing the distribution of vaccines between
clinics resulted in some citizens being unable to receive necessary immunizations due to poor supply coor-dination,
not to a lack of overall supplies.
In response to this challenge, HealthTrack al-lowed
health workers to store and retrieve data
on vaccine stock levels from a central database
using text messages. One of HealthTrack’s most
useful features was its ability to estimate the la-test
balance of vaccine stocks at any given lo-cation,
enabling the DVI to anticipate when vac-cines
would be out of stock in any participating
clinic, thus improving the distribution of vaccines
throughout the country. For example, health wor-kers
would send an SMS to the central database
to update the level of a certain vaccine held at a
clinic. When the database received the informa-tion,
it would recalculate the vaccine stock levels
for the clinic, and send the worker a confirmation
text message. All data was meant to be stored
on a server in the DVI’s central office in Nairobi.
As of June 2009, HealthTrack was deployed in 19 of Kenya’s 60 districts. In each district, three health workers
were trained in the use of the system: a public health nurse, an immunization nurse, and the district records
officer. The Ministry of Health had plans to scale the HealthTrack project up to the remaining districts over the
next year, ensuring all vaccine stocks could be monitored at a national level. However, according to Pinnacle,
procurement issues prevented the wider adoption of HealthTrack.
Results
Since the DVI has no benchmarking data on vaccine distribution, quantifying the effect of HealthTrack’s SMS
tracking system is not possible. Yet anecdotal evidence suggests the project has had the following impact on
the DVI, patients and participating health clinics:
• Improved vaccine availability to patients
• Improved efficiency and accuracy of vaccine distribution between centralized stock suppliers and
clinics, as well as among clinics
• Shorter time periods of stock-outs of specific vaccines at health clinics
• Reduced wastage of immunization stock due to expiration
• Increased accountability and responsiveness of the DVI’s vaccine suppliers to health clinics
• These improvements suggest greater immunization coverage of Kenya’s population, which in
turn, reduces mortality and morbidity, especially among young children.
Figure 2: Kenyan Healthtrack vaccination stock reports
16. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 14
However, due to procurement rules and regulations in Kenya’s Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation, this
pilot project was not adopted in the Ministry for scaling up to the rest of the country. Instead, Pinnacle Relati-onal
Database Systems - owner of the software, source code and all the components - leveraged the lessons
learned from HealthTrack into another system called HealthReminder - which sends out appointments and
medication reminders via SMS. HealthReminder has been adopted by USAID in western Kenya in at least
20 health facilities.
Relevance and fulfillment of project goals
The introduction of the program in 19 of Kenya’s districts is thought to have significantly reduced vaccine
stock-outs and wastage, allowing more citizens to receive the immunizations they needed and improving
efficiency in the DVI. In doing so, the project directly addressed some of the most challenging MDGs, inclu-ding
Goal 4 aiming to reduce the mortality rate of children under-five by two-thirds by 2015, as well as Goal
5 aiming to improve maternal health.
In terms of relevance, Kenya is well-suited for such a project. Ownership of mobile devices is relatively high,
especially among participating health professionals. The SMS format is also useful given the high adult
literacy rate - 87.4 percent (UNDP 2013). Though costs are high for mobile air time and text messaging in
Kenya - the limited number of necessary text messages exchanged for HealthTrack’s operations makes costs
relatively modest. Reimbursing text messaging expenses incurred by participating clinics added between $3
and $5 to the monthly budget of each clinic.
The implementation of the pilot phase of the project ran smoothly, though in the end, there was a lack of tech-nical
capacity for the full maintenance of HealthTrack’s systems within the Ministry of Health, since the DVI
office has no server administrator. For the project to be sustainable, the DVI would need to undergo training
and/or hire competent technology administrators. Thus far, the pilot phase has not translated into a longer
term vaccine-tracking system, and the system is no longer functioning.
Efficiency and effectiveness
From the perspective of health workers and patients, HealthTrack represents a means of demanding a more
efficient and just distribution of vaccination supplies. Before this pilot system, no running tally of vaccination
supplies was kept by clinics in Kenya; by in large, when vaccination supplies need to be counted, health
workers have to physically go to clinic stock rooms and count through vaccine provisions. Not only is this a
time and labor intensive process, but a substantial percentage of vaccines also go to waste due to expiration,
especially when particular vaccines are overstocked in one clinic. For the cost of a text message, mobile
tracking of vaccine supplies would significantly reduce the costs associated with this wastage, and would help
empower health workers and patients to demand efficient and fair vaccine distribution.
The operational costs of running HealthTrack amounted to around US$3-5 per month per health facility, mostly
for SMS-related expenses, though were the system to scale up, the development and training costs of the
system could be substantially more. It is estimated that the development of the proprietary software and roll-out
of the programme to all 5,000 health clinics throughout Kenya would cost upwards of $300,000, with half
of this allocated to training health workers. Annual operational expenses for a full national programme could
be approximately $40,000, with $30,000 going to maintenance costs and $10,000 to texting fees - although it
is possible that Kenya’s mobile service providers would be willing to reduce rates on text messaging fees as a
corporate social responsibility gesture or as part of a broader public-private partnership.
Given the modest cost of the programme and its impact on the health of Kenyan citizens, HealthTrack is a
relatively inexpensive human development intervention. Yet since there was no formal vaccine supply mo-nitoring
programme predating the HealthTrack programme, these costs represented new short-term expen-ditures
for the Ministry of Health and thus demanded a shift in budget allocations. This is perhaps one of the
main reasons the system was not broadly adopted.
17. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 15
Impact
Whereas before health workers scrambled to receive appropriate supplies through informal interactions, an
SMS-based system like HealthTrack formalizes the logistical distribution of supplies and lays bare any short-comings
of decision makers in budgeting, planning, and maintaining responsive operations. The result is a
subtle shift in power that makes policy-makers more accountable to health workers on the ground and to the
Kenyan people more generally by increasing the transparency of decision-making processes at the highest
levels of governance.
Yet, in terms of the larger public health context, HealthTrack could only have a minimal impact since it was
a pilot project in a small number of districts. On the other hand, if the program [or something similar] were
to scale up to all health clinics in Kenya, it could have a very large impact, especially as newer and more
expensive vaccines are introduced. An SMS tracking system would reduce the amount of wastage - estima-ted
to be almost 90 percent for some vaccines (WHO 2012). Tracking and monitoring immunization supplies
ensures not only that health clinic workers can more easily request and receive supplies but that citizens
receive the vaccines they need. Moreover, it empowers health workers to demand better distribution, and
improves policymakers’ ability to identify gaps in immunization coverage and act quickly when failures in
supply chains occur.
Sustainability
The project’s sustainability had three major challenges: technical competency, staff turnover and Ministry of
Health procurement. Due to DVI’s lack of technical capacity to administer the project’s servers and computer
systems, the technology side of HealthTrack was overseen by the programme’s developers, Pinnacle Rela-tional
Database Systems, which in the long run was not sustainable. Without significant development of the
technical competency in the DVI, the project could not be entirely handed off. Moreover, the need for greater
staff training and new staff members to manage the tech aspects of HealthTrack within DVI raised costs for
the project. Secondly, since nearly half of the costs for the program’s introduction were directed toward trai-ning,
staff turnover among participating clinics escalated costs and endangered the longevity of this (or any
similar) project. Third, according to Pinnacle, the developer, procurement hitches at the Ministry of Public
Health and Sanitation prevented the full roll-out of the system to the rest of the country - a situation which
almost led to the collapse of the small start up. The costs associated with developing new platforms are so-metimes
prohibitive for public initiatives, and suggests larger issues of closed versus open source software.
At the same time, whatever the challenges, HealthTrack was developed by a Kenyan-based start-up com-pany
- supporting local resources and the local economy without any need for external technology experts.
Indeed, even though the viability of passing the technical administration of the project over to the DVI was an
issue, project ownership was nevertheless firmly established within Kenya. As a home-grown initiative, pro-ject
expertise remains in the country, making replication or expansion of project goals - perhaps leveraged in
other initiatives - a real possibility. At any rate, local innovation seems to be a key ingredient that enhances
the success potential of projects such as HealthTrack.
Scalability and replicability
The HealthTrack platform was designed for flexibility and scalability to allow the DVI the ability to adapt
collected information according to the Ministry’s changing needs. The expenses associated with scaling
and replicating the project would have involved training and operational costs, as well as further software
development costs for the proprietary software.
Training a larger number of health clinic employees to update and check vaccine stock levels using the sys-tem
would have strengthened the scalability of the programme, since one of the issues was health clinic staff
turnover. In the post-pilot stage, DVI was in negotiations with UNICEF and WHO to scale up the programme
to other districts - and while it initially appeared that donors would contribute a portion of the funding neces-sary
for the expansion - in the end, HealthTrack was not adopted.
18. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 16
Nevertheless, the pilot was successful, which can in part be attributed to Kenya’s relatively high adult literacy
rate, the availability of funding to develop the pilot, and the increasingly sophisticated ICT-driven industry,
which has increased mobile phone usage and ownership. Going forward, similar mobile health implemen-tations
will benefit from the greater likelihood that health clinic participants will own their own mobile phone,
which eliminates the need to provide new phones and reduces the amount of training needed to teach SMS
basics. The relatively high adult literacy rate of 87 percent also ensures that participants are able to com-municate
via text message with limited entry errors due to spelling or numeracy issues. There is also fairly
good network coverage in Kenya - around 89 percent of the population is covered by a mobile network (ITU
2012) - which will ensure the timely delivery of text messages to a central database.
Conclusions
HealthTrack represents a potentially high impact mobile technology for health in a low human development
context. The programme - and similar initiatives - stand to dramatically improve the accessibility of criti-cal
immunizations to patients, reduce mortality and morbidity associated with poor coordination of vaccine
supplies in Kenya and have a direct impact on achieving MDG 4. Although the expense of developing the
platform resulted in relatively high upfront investments, there is good reason to believe that the programme
would have paid for itself in reduced vaccine wastage over time, particularly if adequate steps had been ta-ken
from the very start to increase the ownership by the Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation. At any rate,
the critical importance of ensuring immunization of preventable diseases in the Kenyan population outweighs
HealthTrack’s operational costs.
Unfortunately, the pilot did not become a permanent fixture in the DVI and made the initial investment in the
system less-than-optimal. Better initial planning and tighter links to policy makers might have led to a more
sustainable tracking system. While building up technical capacity to keep an SMS tracking program is impor-tant,
broader policy, diffusion and scalability issues should have been considered in the overall design and
implementation process.
20. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 18
Lebanon:
Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections
During Lebanon’s June 2009 parliamentary elections, the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections
(LADE) teamed up with the Coalition Libanaise pour l’Observation des Elections (CLOE) to deploy an exten-sive
SMS reporting system, the first SMS-based reporting system used in the region. CLOE, a consortium
of 55 NGOs and eight universities, helped in recruiting and training volunteers, and with LADE sent 2,500
volunteer citizen observers throughout the country to 5,181 polling stations.
LADE was founded by civil society activists in 1996 as an independent, nonprofit organization specializing
in elections. The organization promotes free, fair and transparent elections through election monitoring and
advocates for reforms to Lebanon’s electoral system according to international democratic electoral stan-dards.
23 LADE works with political parties, student groups and unions, and educates citizens on electoral
issues, laws, and voters’ rights.
Country profile
Development background
Lebanon is ranked 72 out of 186 countries on the HDI, which places it in the high human development cate-gory
and above the mean of other states in the region. Life expectancy in the country is an average of 72.8
years, with an average GDP per capita of US$$12,900 PPP (UNDP 2013).24 The literacy rate in Lebanon
is relatively high, at nearly 90 percent, and of the population of 4.3 million, around 87.4 percent are urban
dwellers (UNDP 2013).
There are no figures for multidimensional poverty or for the population living under $1.25/day, but according
to UNDP Lebanon, poverty does remain a serious problem. The UNDP Lebanon Country Office estimates
that around eight percent of the population lives in extreme poverty, meaning that nearly 300,000 people are
unable to meet their basic needs, and further that around 28 per cent of the population lives below the “upper
poverty line,” subsisting for around US$4 per capita per day (UNDP Lebanon). These issues are exacerbated
by the disparities in wealth between different regions, with Hermel, Baalbeck and Akkar seeing the highest
poverty rates, compared to Beirut which is comparatively affluent. At the same time, suburban areas of
Beirut, Tripoli and Saida struggle with issues of poverty, child labour, overcrowding and poor environmental
conditions (ibid.).
While development and economic indicators position Lebanon among other high development countries,
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index places it in the 128th position out of 179, where it
shares its ranking with a less developed Togo. According to the EIU’s Democracy Index, Lebanon is a hybrid
regime, ranking 99th out of 167, with an overall score 5.05 (EIU 2012a).
After 15 years of civil war (1975-1990), national reconciliation was brokered by the Ta’if Accords, ensuring
parliamentary seats are equitably distributed between Muslims and Christians.25 The national legislature,
called the Assembly of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwab), now has 128 seats and members are elected
for four-year terms by popular vote on the basis of proportional representation. There are 64 seats each for
Christian and Muslim communities, which is further divided by the numerous religious sects within each (EIU
2012c). Candidates from a particular constituency, regardless of religious affiliation, must receive a plurality
23 LADE has monitored many elections since 1996, including four parliamentary elections (1996, 2000, 2005, and
2009), two municipal elections (1998 and 2004), and several partial elections in north Metn (2002, 2007), Beirut
(2007), and one that took place in 2002 after the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the country.
24 See also IMF.
25 Previously there was a built-in majority favoring Christians.
21. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 19
of the total vote. The system was designed to minimize inter-sectarian competition and maximize cooperation
as candidates are opposed only by co-religionists, but must seek support from outside of their own faith in
order to be elected.
Reforms to the parliament have not prevented political crisis however. In early January 2011, the ‘national
unity’ government collapsed after all ten opposition ministers and one presidential appointee resigned due to
tensions stemming from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which was expected to indict Hezbollah members
in the 2005 assassination of former prime minister Rafic Hariri, the former prime minister and prominent anti-
Syrian leader.26 After this, the opposition March 8 Alliance27 gained a majority in parliament, and Najib Mikati
was appointed as the prime minister, tasked with the duty of creating a new government. Mikati’s government
was composed largely of members of the March 8th alliance, and was dominated by members and allies of
Hezbollah. It was countered by the March 14th bloc - the nationalistic Christian-Sunni coalition,28 although the
March 8th-March 14th division has been largely replaced by the Christian-Sunni-Shia divisions that prevailed
during the civil war (EIU 2012c: 4).
Then in March 2013, Tammam Salam, an independent Sunni member of parliament, took over as prime
minister when Mikati resigned during a standoff with Hezbollah over political appointments and veto-power
over cabinet posts. Salam, according to the EIU, is struggling to form a cabinet amidst the many competing
demands of the country’s fractured political system. The political cleavages have been made worse by the
civil war in Syria, with factional fighting between supporters of the Syrian government and those who oppose
it spilling over into Beirut. There remains a risk that Lebanon will be pulled further into the Syrian civil war.
The March 8th and March 14th factions currently have a nearly even share of seats in the parliament and
though parliamentary elections were scheduled for 2013, at the start of June, the parliament voted to extend
its terms to 2014 (EIU 2013b).29
Mobile telephony
Mobile telephony in Lebanon is among the most expensive of the region, ranking between Syria and Morocco
as the top three highest in the Arab region, and 68th out of 161 countries globally (ITU 2012).30 The Arab
Advisors Group (AAG) also ranks Lebanon’s mobile rates as one of the region’s priciest,31 though this has
not prevented mobile penetration rates from increasing - now estimated at 93.2 mobile subscriptions per
100 people (ITU 2013).32 The price basket for mobile telephone service is US$19 or $28.8 PPP,33 which
indicates that people spend around three percent of GNI per capita (ITU 2012) - although figures from the
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) are closer to eight percent of GDP per capita (PPP). On the
26 The unity government was an uneasy alliance formed between Hezbollah and the March 14th Coalition - a nation-alistic
Christian-Sunni coalition, named after the date Syria withdrew its forces after Mr. Hariri’s killing (EIU 2012c).
27 Named after the mass demonstration on 8th March 2005 that coalesced in response to the ‚Cedar Revolution‘
demonstrations triggered by Hariri‘s assassination on February 14, 2005.
28 There was a five month delay between Mikati‘s appointment and the formation of a government. According to the
New York Times, “While bickering over posts in the cabinet and their distribution among sects and political powers
was the ostensible reason for the delay, the arguments underlined a country deeply divided over questions of ideol-ogy,
the power of foreign patrons and which community would hold sway over Lebanon’s political landscape.” See:
New York Times August 2012.
29 The legality of this extension was challenged by President Michel Suleiman, but failed when the quorum needed to
debate the issue was not achieved (EIU 2013b: 3).
30 Mobile telephony still outstrips internet users who, according to the ITU (2013), make up around 61.25 percent
of the population. In fact, Lebanon (and Brazil) had above-average increases in the percentage of households
with a computer (72%) and households with internet access (62%) (ITU 2012: 40). This is largely due to the India-
MiddleEast-Western Europe (IMEWE) submarine cable ‘going live’ in 2011, which nearly doubled the international
internet bandwidth per Internet user (ITU 2012: 41). There is still very little mobile broadband in use - only around
two percent of households connect to the internet via 3G networks (ITU 2012: 41).
31 Ya Libnan News 2010.
32 Note that Lebanon‘s Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) indicates an 81% penetration of mobile
phones as of December 2011.
33 The average mobile sub basket includes the price of 30 outgoing calls - for peak, off peak and weekend periods and
to the same and other mobile networks - plus 100 sms (ITU 2011: 67).
22. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 20
other hand, for people living below the poverty line (around 28 percent of the country - see above) the price
of mobile service could represent upwards of half the average monthly income.
SMS - which is priced quite differently across the Arab States region - is third highest in Lebanon, behind
Morocco and Qatar, which have the highest rates.34 In a 2008 report from the AAG (the last freely available
data), the price of a single text message sent within the country came to $0.17 USD when calculated to
2008 purchasing power parity, while on-network calls reached $0.52 USD (PPP, 2008) for one minute during
non-peak hours (AAG 2008). Approximately 100 percent of the population is also now covered by mobile
networks, and according to Arab Advisors Group, 37 percent of the total cellular handsets in Lebanon are
smartphones (AAG 2012a).
Project description and objectives
LADE and CLOE developed the first SMS-based election observation reporting system used in the region
in order to monitor the parliamentary elections in June 2009. The purpose was to document violations and
to ensure respect for the rule of law 1) in public administration, to ensure proper organization and running
of elections; 2) among candidates, to ensure their adherence to laws and norms; 3) with media, to ensure
respect for chapter three of Lebanese law; and finally 4) with citizen’s overall voting behavior. The objectives
of this project were to:
• Use text messages to report incidents, crimes, and frauds during the parliamentary elections on
June 7th 2009.
• Deploy volunteer citizen observers at polling stations throughout the country.
• Provide a trustworthy and efficient platform for electoral observation.
LADE and CLOE organized around 400 training workshops, recruiting and training 3,200 independent vo-lunteers
in the law and election observation and deploying 2,500 volunteer citizen observers throughout all
5,181 polling stations around the country. Two types of volunteer observers were employed on elections day:
• Mobile monitors (1,700) whose job was to observe the elections in the polling stations and in
their surrounding areas. They documented all violations and immediately reported incidents to
the central database operational room via SMS. Database analysts then analyzed the informati-on
and followed up on critical incidents. When necessary, LADE reported to the Interior Ministry
through its volunteer present inside the ministry.
• Fixed observers (400) were present for the duration of the electoral process in polling stations
from opening at 7 am to the end of counting. Their job was to provide data at intervals during the
day from assigned polling stations. The representative statistical sample permitted LADE to form
projections about the electoral process as a whole.
Observers were distributed across regions mainly according to electoral district. Mobile observers were
organized into groups of three and rotated around three to five polling stations each, depending on the size
of the electoral district and the intensity of the electoral battle. Fixed observers were deployed to particular
polling stations where they remained throughout the day. LADE also established 27 district offices under the
management of 45 district coordinators and assistants to ensure contact with local communities, candidates,
local authorities, and to volunteers. The district office network served to recruit volunteers, communicate with
voters, allow the submission of complaints, and monitor the electoral process on polling day.
34 According to the Arab Advisors Group in a report released in April 2012 (accessed August 2012), Sudan and Pales-tine
have the lowest average SMS rates, while Morocco and Qatar have the highest. Morocco’s high rates - which
includes state taxes - are followed by Qatar, Lebanon, Syria, Mauritania, Kuwait, Algeria, Libya, UAE, Egypt, Jor-dan,
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Tunisia, Oman, Bahrain, Palestine and Sudan.
23. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 21
The SMS platform allowed observers to report violations instantly, and a 24-hour dedicated hotline also
received complaints of electoral fraud and/or infringements. The system facilitated the rapid transmission of
information from volunteer observers at polling stations to a central database of incidents, and followed the
progress of the elections throughout the day and after polling stations had closed. Incidents were immedi-ately
reported to relevant authorities and the media, and were also displayed on a map on LADE‘s website.
Figure 3: LADE Violations Map
Results
Anecdotal evidence suggests the project had the following impact on election monitoring, compared to tradi-tional
reporting and data collection methods:
• Reduced reporting delays;
• Improved the accuracy of reporting;
• Improved the data entry and analysis process;
• Engaged greater numbers of people to volunteer as electoral observers.
Data compilation, analysis and visualization was not as strong, and could be improved to be a more useful
monitoring tool. For instance, a more user-friendly interface, such as NDI’s Afghanistan Election data inter-face
would enhance data visualization and provide better tools for analyzing the data collected, and thus help
election officials and observers more easily identify trends.
Relevance and fulfillment of project goals
LADE successfully deployed SMS-based reporting during the parliamentary elections. They closely follo-wed
the political campaigns two months prior the election day and organized 400 workshops and training
courses all over Lebanon to train observers and educate the electorate in preparation for the elections. They
established 27 district offices to communicate with voters and to recruit and coordinate over 2,500 volun-teer
observers. Along with a dedicated 24-hour national hotline, district offices became the focal point for
receiving complaints of electoral violations and irregularities, and the SMS system provided rapid monitoring
information for tracking violations on polling day.
24. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 22
Effectiveness and efficiency
LADE was effective in building partnerships and recruiting electoral observers. The partnership with CLOE
also played an important role in recruiting and training volunteers by providing venues for training workshops
and hosting recruiting events for LADE. LADE mobilized 2,500 volunteer observers to monitor the elections,
including more than a thousand university students, through university events and seminars, partner NGOs
and members of CLOE and through the electoral district offices.
In terms of efficiency, the operational costs of running LADE and the SMS-based monitoring platform are
not publicly available, making an assessment of efficiency difficult to ascertain. According to an NDI mission
update, LADE was founded by a grant from USAID.
Impact
The SMS platform allowed LADE to monitor all the districts and polling stations, and coordinate activities
with governmental and civil society organizations, voters, and candidates. Although the lack of benchmarks
makes a thorough evaluation difficult, LADE’s methodology and SMS reporting had a positive impact on the
observation process and proved successful for election observing.
Sustainability
The sustainability of the project has two major challenges: funding and technical competency (for administ-ration
and to improve mapping and visualization). While LADE’s project has strong local ownership as it was
developed by a small team of Lebanon-based developers, the SMS platform requires high-level technical
capacity and money to make improvements. The SMS system was funded by a grant from USAID and it is
not clear if local service providers were involved in the financing of this project. It is also not clear who is
administering the system, and approving and verifying reports.
On the other hand, as with other election monitoring platforms, such as Cuidemos el Voto in Mexico (see
later in this report), election monitoring is not an everyday exercise, and SMS platforms can be deployed on
an ad hoc basis. Thus, the sustainability of the platform is an issue only inasmuch as it is needed to monitor
elections. LADE has over 15 years of experience in Lebanon and is still very active and engaged with electo-ral
processes and democratic governance issues. As an organization, it has its own sources of funding and
support, and long term experience with election monitoring, SMS based and otherwise.
In fact, a report from International Media Support in 2012 indicated that LADE is still employing a mobile/
SMS/internet-based system in electoral observations via Twitter.35 For 32 municipal elections in 2012, LADE
deployed 145 volunteer monitors to report on election violations. According to the report, the observers found
cases of illegal campaigning, voter intimidation, improper voting procedures, and poor assistance for people
with special needs. Because monitors were using Twitter, LADE generally received the information straight
away, with photos and videos that lent credence to concerns of electoral violations and gave the LADE team
a chance to deal with issues immediately. Sometimes reporting was held up because of poor internet access,
but in general reports were sent in a timely manner. Additionally, the Twitter feeds from LADE volunteers
were followed by Lebanon’s major national newspapers, meaning the reports were not only published in the
media, but were also forwarded on via Twitter to the newspapers own 70,000 followers (Odgaard 2012).36
35 “Tweeting from every corner of Lebanon, election monitors reported instantly on incidents of intimidation, illegal
campaigning and corruption during recent municipal elections” (Odgaard 2012).
36 According to Odgaard, LADE is developing a smartphone app for violations monitoring for the 2013 parliamentary
election. Social media tools are seen as complementary to the SMS-based systems.
25. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 23
Scalability and replicability
Scaling up LADE’s SMS-based electoral monitoring platform requires stronger relationships with more nati-onal
NGOs to ensure greater participation and support prior to and on election day. Technically, this project
is similar to Ushahidi’s now-defunct sharek961 project, with the main difference being the use of official
electoral observers and the coordinated reporting on election day. Instead of using open crowdsourcing,
LADE used structured crowdsourcing. Funding, partnerships and local capacity building are paramount for
success.
Conclusions
LADE’s project demonstrated the utility and effectiveness of using text messages for real-time election mo-nitoring.
Official electoral observers were provided a faster and more accurate reporting mechanism, and
both LADE staff and political parties received a collection of official reports during the election that helped
in tracking and monitoring.
Going forward, the information generated during the monitoring process needs to be made available for pub-lic
use and the data visualization enhanced through the use of a map or other tool that makes the information
accessible to a wider audience. Alternate methods for reporting - such as via the internet or email should
also be available, since relying on a single mechanism - SMS - can compromise the outcome, especially if
the cellular network fails, which is not uncommon during elections in developing countries.
27. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 25
Madagascar:
The Wisdom of the Crowds to Guide the Future
This project aimed to promote and broaden youth participation in Madagascar using new and traditional
media such as mobile phones and radio. The project facilitated discussions face-to-face and via SMS
among 14-35 year old citizens about Madagascar’s development in two selected areas, Sambaina, a Mill-ennium
village in central Madagascar, and Toliara/Tulear on the southeastern coast. The small pilot allowed
young people, historically shut out of decision-making, for the first time to have a voice in policies and de-velopment
strategies. The project faced several interlocking challenges, including the fact that it started just
before the 2009 political crisis in Madagascar and had to be temporarily suspended when the country was
declared a special development situation (SDS) by the UN. This created unforeseen delays in staff recruit-ment,
technology procurement and implementation. Yet as a first of its kind in Madagascar, the pilot offers
good lessons for m-governance projects, particularly in times of political change.
Country profile
Development background
The Republic of Madagascar is considered a low human development country on the HDI, ranking 151 out of
186 countries (UNDP 2013). The country consists of the main island and a few smaller islands in the Indian
Ocean, off the southeastern coast of Africa.
Madagascar regained its independence in 1960, after 64 years under French control, and held its first free
presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992-1993. The country’s weak integration into the international
market meant that it was largely unaffected by the financial crisis of 2008, and maintained strong economic
growth - around seven percent - in 2008 (Adriamihaja 2008). Then in 2009, in a move widely viewed as
unconstitutional, the elected President Marc Ravalomanana was forced to hand the government over to the
military, and the opposition leader and former mayor of the capital city (Antananarivo), Andry Rajoelina, was
installed as the new head of state (Ploch 2011; BTI 2012).
Regional and international crisis mediation and diplomatic efforts to broker a resolution to the crisis - led
by the Southern African Development Community, the African Union, the Organisation Internationale de la
Francophonie, and the UN - were unable to establish a transitional government and timetable for national
elections until 2009.
Talks in Maputo, Mozambique in August 2009 produced a power-sharing deal signed between the govern-ment
and the main opposition leaders (BTI 2012). In 2011, with the continued support of the military, Ra-joelina
appointed a new cabinet, and cleared the way for elections. In August 2012, the national election
commission announced that new presidential elections would be held in June 2013, with Rajoelina and exiled
Ravalomanana both in the running; parliamentary elections were to follow in July 2013.37 As of August 2013,
elections have not taken place.
The crisis has had a destabilizing impact on development efforts. While the average GNI per capita in PPP
terms was $944 in 2008, by 2012, this had dropped to $828. Similarly, GDP per capita in 2008 was $972 PPP,
but dropped to $853 in 2012 (UNDP 2013; UNDP 2011). The country’s overall GDP of $9.8 million (18.2 million
PPP) in 2012 has seen low to negative growth in recent years, but is now predicted to grow by 2.6 percent
with mining and agriculture contributing to more growth in 2013.
At the same time, a locust plague threatening rice production and other vegetation and a tropical cyclone
which damaged staple crops in the south-west both threaten food security and increase risks for malnutrition.
37 See: VOA News. 2012. Madagascar Sets Presidential Election Date (August 1).
28. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 26
It estimated that around 81 percent of the population lives on less than $1.25 PPP per day, with 69 percent of
the population living below the national poverty line and 67 percent living in multidimensional poverty (UNDP
2013).
The UN now classifies Madagascar as a special development situation because of ongoing political instabili-ty
and its slide back into authoritarianism. After two decades of democratic gains, the country is now ranked
as an authoritarian regime in EIU’s Democracy Index (117 out of 167) (EIU 2012a).38 And the continued
political turmoil over elections could invalidate the electoral process and usher in potentially violent clashes
between supporters of different parties and with security forces (EIU 2013c: 10-13).
Youth
The population of Madagascar is relatively young, with a median age of 18.2 years. The population of over
22 million people grows at a rate of three percent per year, and the 5.7 million adolescents and young people
aged between 10 and 24 represent a third of the total population (UNDP 2013; EIU 2013c; UNICEF Mada-gascar
2011). Thirty percent of the population lives in urban areas, and eight percent of the total urbanized
population lives in the capital Antananarivo (UNDP 2013).
While access to education has been enhanced over the past decade, many young people still struggle to
receive an adequate education. The population over 15 years of age has a 64.5 percent literacy rate, and
a combined gross enrollment in education of 67 percent (UNDP 2013). On average, children can expect to
receive 10.7 years of schooling,39 although for adults, the mean years of schooling is only 5.2 (HDR Stats
2012).40
According to the African Development Bank, youth employment and under-employment poses a challenge
for Madagascar, with 5.9 percent of under-25s out of work, compared to overall unemployment at 3.8 percent
(AfDB 2012: 2). Unemployment among urban young people is even worse, at 8.9 percent, compared to rural
youth unemployment of 3.9 percent (AfDB 2012). Political and institutional instability has also meant that
government support mechanisms, such as the national job support programme, are not available to help
address high youth unemployment (ibid.).
Many development issues are related to and influence the lives of youth, although young people have few
opportunities to participate in decision-making and governance. Madagascar has a tradition of local gover-nance
through village councils - fokonolona - made up of elders and other local leaders. Fokonolona organi-ze
aid for members in need, arrange village projects, and coordinate support during planting and harvesting
time. Power in the fokonolona is defined by age, kinship and class affiliation, and the councils give elders
substantial say in community life (IBP 2006). If individuals in the community are not economically indepen-dent
from the parental home, they are considered “young” and have few rights in decision-making, and are
discouraged from speaking up in the councils (IBP 2006).41 The challenge is to institutionalize young people’s
engagement at the regional and national levels (Okojie n.d.).42
38 Madagascar has an average value of 3.93 out of ten on EIU’s index, with political participation and political culture
at 5 and 5.63 points respectively out of 10 (EIU 2012a). See also: Bertelsmann Transformation Index which indicates
that political participation, freedom of expression and association and free media are moderately available.
39 This indicates the “number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevail-ing
patterns of age-specific enrolment rates persist throughout the child’s life” (HDR Stats 2012).
40 This indicates the “average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older, converted from
education attainment levels using official durations of each level” (HDR Stats 2012).
41 The fokolona is also used to discipline community members, and there is rarely open confrontation between speak-ers,
leaving little room for dissent.
42 Okojie, Christiana E.E. n.d. Presentation on youth participation in decision-making in Sub-Saharan Africa, New
York: UNDESA/ECOSOC/Youth Social Policy and Development Division.
29. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 27
Mobile telephony
There are 8.6 million mobile phone subscriptions in Madagascar, which translates into between 4.6 and 6.1
million individual mobile phone users (ITU 2013; UNDP 2013; UNDP calculations).43 Around 21 percent of the
population owns a mobile phone,44 and mobile coverage and ownership is higher in urban areas.45
Madagascar is considered one of the least connected countries in the world, according to the ITU, and is
the least connected of all the countries in this study, though it is closely followed by Malawi (ITU 2012).46 The
overall ICT price basket as a percentage of the countryʼs monthly GNI per capita is 64.6 percent, making
Madagascar the most expensive of countries in Africa, ranking at the bottom of the ICT Price Basket index
(ITU 2012). Of the three ICT services - fixed telephone, fixed broadband and mobile phone - the mobile pho-ne
is the least expensive, with a monthly sub-basket cost in PPP terms over $35, around 43 percent of GNI
per capita.
Madagascar has three mobile network operators - Orange Madagascar (France Télécom S.A.), Zain Madagascar
(Bharti Airtel Limited), and Telecom Malagasy (Telma Mobile SA) - making the mobile market relatively more
competitive than many other countries in Africa, which typically have only two operators. However, while there
is more competition, the country’s geography makes coverage challenging and services high (ITU 2012). The
population density is low, which creates a large gap in coverage and a low penetration rate - around 38 percent
in 2011 - well below the continent’s 53 percent average (ITU 2012: 95).
Project description and objectives
The objective of this project was to broaden youth participation in innovative and cost effective ways. Mobile
phones were selected as the optimal ICT tool for engaging with youth as mobile penetration is much higher
than internet penetration in Madagascar. Designed by UNDP Madagascar and UNICEF and implemented
by UNDP, the project piloted an SMS-based system for collecting inputs from 14-35 year old citizens using
a quiz-like questionnaire in two areas: Sambaina, near the capital in central Madagascar, and Toliara/Tulear
on the southeast coast. The platform was intended to provide a space for discussions and the exchange
of opinions between young people and UNDP, to enable them to have a voice in policies and development
strategies.
43 Note that subscription numbers come from total SIM cards sold and individual subscribers often have multiple
and/or inactive cards. Figures for individual mobile subscriptions are calculated by UNDP based on recent global
research indicating that there are around 1.4 - 1.85 SIM cards per every mobile subscription (Informa Telecoms and
Media 2012; mobiThinking 2013).
44 Value calculated by UNDP based on calculated number of individual mobile phone users and the population in 2013
of 22 million (UNDP 2013).
45 See mobile network coverage map from Airtel Madagascar.
46 “Least connected countries” (LCCs) are those that fall within the lowest quartile of the 155 countries included in the
2011 ICT Development Index (IDI). Most of these countries are also low-income developing and least developed
countries (LDCs). According to the ITU, policy-makers at both the national and international levels need to give pri-ority
to these countries when considering ICT for development. Madagascar is tied with Papua New Guinea at 1.44.
Malawi fares only slightly better, with a 1.42 ranking.
Youth SMS Government
In July 2011, young people
between 14-35 were given a voice
in policy-making and development
strategy design.
Feedback from the youth was
integrated into local development
policy-making.
50,000 texts were
collected
Figure 4: How it worked
30. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 28
The project aimed for two main outputs: First, the production of a paper bringing together the views and
aspirations collected via text message of young people in the pilot areas, and second, the creation of de-velopment
policy influenced by the direct input of the youth. The project design, implementation and nego-tiations
with key stakeholders and telecom operators and final evaluation was led by UNDP Madagascar in
partnership with UNICEF. They organized the creation of the SMS platform for exchanging messages and
an awareness-building campaign to reach local youth organizations. The project partnered with the National
Youth Institute (INJ), which provided support during implementation by linking participants to the project and
mobilizing collaboration with civil society organizations. The project generated discussions among young
people about Madagascar’s development. In Sambaina, youth inputs were integrated into the annual com-munity
work plan.
There were also partnerships established with two of the national telecom operators to allow free text mes-saging,
as well as with the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the Government of Madagascar’s Directorates of
Youth Promotion and Communication, Mass Education and Civic Engagement, National and Regional Youth
Councils and other youth networks.
Results
The project evolved from its original purpose in 2008 when UNDP’s e-governance and access to information
practice and UNICEF’s innovation for development practice wanted to capture youth opinions for the 13th
African Union Summit in July 2009. Using new media such as mobile phones in combination with traditional
communications tools like radio to advertise the campaign, the project was originally envisaged as a chance
to bring youth input on education and future aspirations into the summit.47 It started in 2009 as a two year pilot
project funded through the Democratic Governance Trust Fund (DGTTF) and was put on hold that same year
because of political instability. The interlocking challenges in the project cycle offer good lessons for conflict
and post-conflict project implementation. Political upheaval created unforeseeable delays in negotiating con-tracts
with the three major telecom companies for free text messaging, as well as delays with instituting and
upgrading the tech platform designed to process the SMS input.
In October 2010, the project team convened again, and restarted the project in March 2011 after several
starts and stops with an amended design for collecting broader inputs from young people via a quiz/ques-tionnaire.
It was extended until the end of 2011. The team set up the infrastructure and set about recruiting
expert staff, developing an action plan, and creating the requisite tools and kits (registration guides, partici-pant
guides, and other awareness-raising materials). The project conducted an information and awareness
campaign to reach youth, using posters, flyers and radio commercials, and conducted interviews and focus
groups with young people, in particular vulnerable youth, young women and those without access to a mo-bile
phone or a laptop. A baseline survey was conducted along with the initial registration campaign, with a
sample of 1,845 young people aged 14 to 35 in one of four districts (Toliara I and II, Sakaraha and Betioky)
on the themes of youth employment, youth and road traffic and youth and ICT. The survey found that of
those sampled, 52 percent have access to mobile phones, 41.5 percent are already in the labor market, 21.3
percent are unemployed and 28.9 percent do not use ICT in their everyday lives.48
The project also targeted authorities and partners at the municipal, regional and national level to help instill
the idea that the information generated by the consultation should be/could be included in local policy ma-king,
although no formal processes were instituted to ensure this occurred. UNDP Madagascar developed
an Information - Advocacy - Lobbying - Diffusion strategy (IPLDV) for project awareness-raising, which was
validated during a planning workshop49 - though only preliminary advocacy activities were achieved because
of delays in information collection and budget shortfalls.
47 Survey questions included: What does my school need? What would I like to see for the future? How can I become
involved?
48 The survey also noted the costs of devices and associated contracts with telephone operators. In the validation
workshop, the team proposed a cost recovery for future consultations.
49 At the pre-meeting with technical and financial partners.
31. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 29
Collecting youth perspectives via SMS began in July 2011. Initially working in collaboration with the three
major telecom operators, the project registered over 44,000 youth in two pilot communities, allowing registe-red
youth to submit their opinions on several key topics via SMS, including their thoughts on change, human
rights, citizenship, and employment. Two of the main mobile operators, Orange and Telma, assisted in coll-ecting
over 50,000 text messages. The contract for free text messaging with the third mobile operator, Airtel,
was not established in the end and meant that SMS input from young Airtel subscribers was not received.
By the end of the year, a small lobbying campaign was started in Sambaina to promote the integration of
the youth opinion in policy processes and generated awareness around issues affecting the lives of youth.
With project delays, political instability, and budget shortfalls from unanticipated cost increases, the pilot
implemented about 80 percent of its activities. Delayed contracts and other challenges included the inability
to upgrade the technology platform in good time. In the end, the project still needed to:
• Establish a solid monitoring/evaluation system.
• Implement the strategy for disseminating information, including the advocacy/communication
campaign to promote the integration of youths’ needs in local, regional and national policy making.
• Strengthen the capacity of youth organizations to lobby and negotiate with information.
• Identify issues concerning youth in development policies and monitor the integration / inclusion
of youth in these policies.
Relevance and fulfillment of project goals
The project mobilized support from the major mobile operators, two out of three of which agreed to provi-de
free phone numbers for receiving the text messages. Yet the two proposed project outputs - the paper
summarizing views and aspirations of young people in the pilot communities and development policies influ-enced
by youth input - were only partially fulfilled. In 2010, the views of 1,100 young people were used in the
2011 annual work plan of Sambaina and in 2011, 44,000 young people registered in Toliara, and upwards of
50,000 text messages were collected. While an evaluation of the project was eventually produced in October
2012, a summary report of youth inputs is still forthcoming.
The final evaluation from October 2012 indicated that many participants in the pilot areas were confused
about the purpose of registering for the project, which was compounded by the lack of project feedback even
once they had registered. In places where there were facilitators (des animateurs), they were successful in
mobilizing young people in schools, churches, and around town, assisted by traditional authorities. But whe-re
there were no facilitators - and there was a shortage of facilitators overall for the project - young people
said that they did not really understand the objectives and the scope of the project. Along similar lines, some
respondents thought the themes should be improved and reformulated, and some found the questionnaire
too complicated. Even though SMS was seen as useful for collecting information, there were many technical
problems with text-based collection, including network connection and reception, and electricity access.
Also, many young people do not own their own phone, and tried registering via their friends phone; yet it was
only possible to register with one number per telephone.
Efficiency and effectiveness
With the starts and stops generated by political uncertainty, the overall efficiency of the project is difficult to
assess. The bulk of funding was spent in 2011 on the IT infrastructure and the mobilization campaign. Over
40,000 young people were registered, and over 50,000 text messages were received, making the pilot mo-derately
successful in the context of the political situation. As the first of its kind in Madagascar, the project
provides important information for how to conduct a participatory governance campaign, and the constraints
faced during political instability, though future iterations of the project could aim for greater efficiency.
32. Mobile Technologies and Innovation 30
Impact
The project had a threefold impact on youth participation and policy-making. First, youth who participated in
the project in the pilot areas showed a desire to speak out and this forum gave them the opportunity to share
their views and opinions with policy makers. Participants were able to give input anonymously and express
themselves freely without parental control.50 Second, participants were approached through youth organi-zations
which helped these organizations to see their role in bringing young people together to strengthen
their collective voice. Third, in Sambaina, feedback from youth was partly integrated into local development
policy making, helping local authorities to target measures appropriately to the needs of the burgeoning
young population.
However, because the national government was not well integrated into the overall process, national and
other local authorities could not fully benefit from the information provided by the youth. Evaluations con-ducted
by UNDP Madagascar suggest the national government may need support in integrating mobile and
online input, and other participatory approaches in public decision making in order to reach its younger po-pulation,
which the national government has not yet fully embraced. Moreover, while increasing numbers of
young Malagasy use mobile phones, the project found that many young people are still not fully accustomed
to using mobile technologies. The use of numbers, codes, and SMS are still limited skills for many young
Malagasy. The mobile phone remains a sign of wealth, particularly in urban areas, and especially for poorer
families in rural areas, the mobile phone is property of the whole family, not individuals.
Sustainability
Much of the budget supported by UNDP went to creating the IT platform and to the awareness-raising cam-paigns.
As it stands now, the project is neither economically self-sufficient nor sustainable. The enhanced
mobile-to-internet platform and capacities built during the two pilot phases can now run with less financial
input and new topics can be added to the existing quiz which may attract new participants and partners for
instance. However maintaining the system as a participatory governance mechanism requires greater input
from local partners to ensure maintenance costs are covered.
To strengthen the project’s sustainability, there needs to be greater buy-in from the national government and
local authorities. There should also be greater two-way feedback from government to participants to ensure
that input is integrated and that participants have a sense that their input matters.
Scalability and replicability
Building on the pilot phase, the project infrastructure could be scaled up nationally and extended to other
communities throughout Madagascar. The key challenges remain first, how to strengthen the project’s inter-nal
capacity for processing a substantially increased number of text messages from young people. The IT
platform and the communications protocol used to process SMS inputs need to be able to deal with an in-creasing
number of text messages to be scalable. Moreover, qualitative responses to those messages need
to be provided. So the second challenge is how to support the government in developing appropriate feed-back
mechanisms to citizen inputs, i.e. integrating participatory information and feedback into policy-making
processes and in processing the information it receives, i.e. how to integrate information in development
50 From email correspondence with Gilles Rakotobe of UNICEF, December 2011. According to Rakotobe: “The im-pacts
are different, but I can say that young people feel safe to be able to give their opinions via SMS, as it is
anonymous. So no parental control, expression and free and undisclosed. For the moment we do not touch the
whole population, but the small sample on which we worked, we can see a real desire to speak, speak. The other
impact we would say is that we focus on young people, and particularly to their opinion. We must not forget that the
Malagasy culture gives a voice to seniors, so the younger can’t talk, can’t give their opinions. Just taking the views
of young people, gives the youth the feeling that we are interested in them, and finally taking care of them. The ad-vantage
for them is that they can express themselves freely and in confidence and anonymously. This information
will be collected, processed and then we can use it as a plea for young people in order that the political use in the
programs of community development, regional or national...[though there was no feedback loop] because questions
weren’t sent....there will be a feedback to the youth.”
