A constraints led, interdisciplinary model for survival, growth and winning in the game. Visit the bettersoccermorefun channel on YouTube for videos that expand on these ideas. Organizations interested in holding a workshop on decision/action models can contact me at larry4v4-at-hotmail.com for details.

1. A Decision/Action Model for Soccer
A constraints led, interdisciplinary look at
survival, winning, and growth in the game
“You need players who are ‘SOB’s’. There is no room for compassion on the
pitch. Outside the pitch the “street fighter” becomes a different person, just
as in the case with soldiers at the battle lines. This survival instinct brings out
forces that were unknown before. And, playing at the top-level is a battle for
survival. The story that it is just a game is ‘bullshit.’”[112]
Rinus Michels,
“He who can handle the quickest rate of change survives.”[115]
John Boyd
1

2. What is a model?
“When Gullit tried to transplant this Dutch art to Newcastle he was trying to do
something impossible. He was bound to fail.”[17]
“A model, in the context of science, is a simplified
representation of some “real” phenomenon. Scientists
supposedly study nature, but in reality much of what they do is
construct and study models of nature… Models are ways for our
minds to make sense of observed phenomena in terms of
concepts that are familiar to us, concepts that we can get our
head around…” [113]
Models are what separate art from science. In soccer you need
both. [62,77]
A model is a tool that helps to communicate an idea between
people.
2

3. Examples of models
“The map is not the terrain”
Metaphors,
analogies,
heuristics[29,68,69,87]
W=fd
a2+b2=c2 3

4. Common soccer models
“Because the difference between making it and not making it is so small.
You find there are certain rules.” [11]
Technique, tactics, Pressing-counter attacking[112]
psychology, fitness[152] Interval training[75]
TIC[156] Small-sided games[117,149,152,170]
SPIT, or TIPS[91,92] Scientific management[137]
Teambuilding[93,112] Whole, part, whole[34,146]
Coerver coaching[156] Block training[35,149,156]
Why goals are scored[84] Work to rest ratios[158]
Charles Reep statistical Training load analysis[158]
analysis[174] Principles of play[161]
Dutch Vision[156] 1st, 2nd, 3rd attacker & defender[177]
Periodization[158] Flat back four[171]
Zonal marking[118] Youth development models[76,152,156,170]
Deliberate practice[37,40,59] Psycho-kinetics[118]
10,000 hour rule[72] McDonaldization[125]
4

5. Limits on models
“Naturally, an incongruence between a model and reality often exists” [15]
There are descriptive i.e. ‘what’ models, predictive i.e. ‘how’
models or a combination.[62]
Descriptive models are analytical; predictive models are
synthetic.
They will be based on open or closed systems rules.[15,45,120]
“All models are wrong, some are useful. The problem is to
determine how wrong the model is before it is no longer
useful.” George Box
Models are context dependent. In soccer the context is a
problem to be solved or created, usually having to do with
goals. Problems are neutral, transient, dynamic, complex and
everywhere.[82]
5

6. So, what’s the problem?
“Everything you know about is not a problem” [11]
Simplistic problems: where there is only one answer and its easily
available; what is the score? [128]
Deterministic problems: where there is one answer that requires the
use of a formula, algorithm or protocol, requires work; off side. [128]
Random problems: where there is space for only one answer but a
number of possible correct ones; who will win the EPL this year? [128]
 Note; the difference between random and deterministic problems may only be a question of time
scales. In a match that time may not be available.[106]
Indeterminate problems: where the answer itself is complex, hard to
identify or changes with time, these are ‘wicked problems;’ starting a
club.[128]
6

7. Wicked problems
“Some problems are so complex that you have to be highly intelligent
and well informed just to be undecided about them.” [39]
As Rittel defined them, wicked problems are distinguished by the following characteristics:
1. You don’t understand the problem until you have developed a solution.
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong, just better or worse in context.
4. Every wicked problem is essentially unique and novel.
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one-shot operation,’ learn by trial-and-error.
6. Wicked problems have no given alternative solutions, there is no clear model. [39]
Closed system, linear problem-solving model Open system, two player complex model
7

8. Observe, Orient, Decide, Act
“The only special thing I have is insight; I see things a fraction earlier, and can
play the ball a fraction earlier to where it should be.” [11]
To create and solve problems in soccer:
Information is gathered through sensors; psychophysics. [135,157]
Players must understand their situation; distributed situational awareness.
[3,6,141,166]
Decisions have to be made; strategies for stopping points. [12,50,80,116]
Action must be taken and the process starts over again;
realization of the decision. [27,44,66,106,159]
Note: To take action in soccer all four
phases are needed. Eliminate any one
aspect and you’re dead.
8

9. Observing, orienting, deciding and acting is a process
“More than ever the focus should be placed in the mental training
in the learning process from a young age on.” [112]
All process models are based on the principles of “open
systems.”[15,20,30]
The OODA loop is a process made up of discrete iterations of
itself.[101,157]
In a time competitive environment like soccer, whoever moves
fastest through these cycles gains an advantage. For greater
action speed you can:
 Decrease the time of each cognitive cycle in your loop. Increase your
opponents cognitive cycle time.
 Decrease the number of cycles in your loop. Increase the number of cycles
in your opponents loop.
 Speed is relative to an active opponent.[106]
9

10. Observing
“The basis of coaching is observation.” [156]
Observation involves selecting and monitoring input among
multiple sensory systems over numerous frequencies and
channels, often in conflict against a background of noise. [ 106,173]
Observation influences what is being observed. [31,36]
In soccer observation is reciprocal and transient. [78]
It faces significant system constraints. [44,78,159]
It combines an active search for, and a passive reception of,
meaningful data. [89,90,135]
It includes symbolic signals and intuitive patterns. [67,68,87]
10

11. Observing
“‘His technique is no good.’ ‘How can you tell?’ Cruyff said: ‘It’s obvious.
When he kicks the ball, the sound is wrong.’”[172]
The primary sensory channels are visual, auditory and tactile. [159,173]
While vision is the dominant, default sense it can be overridden by
sound and touch. [159,173]
The visual system is divided along a soft boundary between the
foveal and peripheral sub-systems. The foveal system is our
“center of attention.” The peripheral system provides the ‘field for
action’ and contains the ‘targets for attention.’[2,44,66,90,159,173]
11

12. Orienting
“Behind every action there must be a thought.” [17]
Orientation is the phase where genetic heritage, cultural
traditions, previous experience and learning strategies meet
unfolding circumstances and new information. This includes
feedback from our own decisions and actions. It is an unfolding
cognitive experience. [19,20]
As observations enter orientation a fundamental unconscious
decision is made, “do ‘I’ proceed directly to action or do ‘I’ need
to make sense of the experience?” [19,20]
This is the beginning to the most important question a person
can ask, “what do ‘I’ do next”? [62,101]
12

13. Deciding
“But you must choose and in soccer you have to choose very fast.
It happens in an instant.”[172]
All decisions are binary. It’s ‘yes’ to one and ‘no’ to all others.[12]
Decision cycles are not instantaneous points, they unfold over
intervals. They have a “soft boundary.” [47]
This works through unconscious parallel and conscious serial
processes;
“The brain begins to prepare several actions in parallel while collecting evidence for
selecting between them… The only points in the cognitive cycle where seriality is
enforced are the conscious broadcast and the action selection process…”[7,62,101]
13

14. Streams for deciding and acting
“Despite the apparent independence of the two streams, coordinated action is dependent
upon a higher degree of cooperation between the two pathways.” [173]
“System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense
of voluntary control.”[87,150] It is driven by ambient vision, intuition, ‘Fast-and-Frugal
thinking, and uses the Dorsal stream to bypass System 2. It’s fast, but limited in
understanding, the ‘Just do it’ survival mode.[7,67,89,99,101]
“System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it,
including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated
with the subjective experience of agency, choice and concentration”.[87] It’s the
‘book smart,’ thrive/optimal mode and uses the slower Ventral stream.
The two systems continually interact through conscious and unconscious processes.
S1 answers the implicit ‘how or where’ questions while S2 provides the explicit
‘what’ context.[62]
Planning and action ‘leapfrog’ each other. [122] “Action is seen, as it were, through
the prism of ‘a decision’… ‘A decision reached’ is a manner of speaking abstractly
about the myriad of decisions that occur in the process of responding to a patients
disorder. It is not a decision but a sequence of acts of deciding being described as
though it were a single decision. Language is always reducing complexities.” [116]
14

15. Acting
“Football is best when it’s instinctive, when it comes from the heart.
You talk about things after: in the game you just play.”[172]
“What I see depends heavily on what direction some set of
muscles turns my head, and in what direction some other set
turns my eyes. Sensory activity depending on motor activity. A
loud noise off to my left will result in an almost automatic turning
of my head to the left. Motor activity depending on sensory
activity. Sensorimotor activity, the essence of structural
couplings, cannot be easily teased into two. Also, sensing and
acting are not easily disentangled from cognition. All three are
intricately interwoven. [16,17,44,62,155]
15

16. The mature OODA loop
“Our study of command and control theory starts with a simple model of the command and control process
known as the OODA loop. The OODA loop applies to any two-sided conflict, whether the antagonists are
individuals in hand-to-hand combat or large military formations.” [106]
“Note how orientation shapes observation, shapes decisions, shapes action, and is in turn shaped by the
feedback and other phenomena coming into our sensing or observing window.
Also note how the entire “loop” (not just orientation) is an ongoing many-sided implicit cross-referencing
process of projection, empathy, correlation, and rejection”. [25]
16

17. The LIDA cycle [101]
“Psychophysics began with a law and an inspiration. The law is Weber’s law, which tells us that, except
at extremes, a just noticeable change in a stimulus is a constant fraction of that stimulus.” [135]
“During each cognitive cycle the LIDA agent… first senses its environment and tries to recognize familiar objects,
individuals, etc (perception phase). It then associates percepts with memories and other percepts and decides what
portion of this situation is most in need of attention (understanding phase). Broadcasting this portion (bringing it to
consciousness) enables the agent to choose a number of actions applicable for the current situation and to select
the action best serving its goals (action selection phase), and to finally execute the selected action.” [101]
17

18. What is the goal of human nature?
“When you put on your shirt and lace up your boots, you have to win.
Otherwise you should stay home and watch television.” [175]
“Survive, survive on own terms, or improve our capacity for
independent action.”[20]
“The competition for limited resources to satisfy these desires
may force one to: Diminish adversary’s capacity for independent
action, or deny him the opportunity to survive on his terms, or
make it impossible for him to survive at all.”[20]
18

19. How do we do that?
“It fits how von Clausewitz describes a coup d’oiel: ‘the rapid discovery of a truth which to the ordinary
mind is either not visible at all or only becomes so after long examination and reflection.’” [52]
“The degree to which we cooperate, or compete, with others is
driven by the need to satisfy this basic goal. If we believe that it
is not possible to satisfy it alone, without help from others,
history shows us that we will agree to constraints upon our
independent action—in order to collectively pool skills and talents
in the form of nations, corporations, labor unions, mafias, etc. —
so that obstacles standing in the way of the basic goal can either
be removed or overcome. On the other hand, if the group cannot
or does not attempt to overcome obstacles deemed important to
many (or possibly any) of its individual members, the group must
risk losing these alienated members. Under these circumstances,
the alienated members may dissolve their relationship and remain
independent, form a group of their own, or join another collective
body in order to improve their capacity for independent action.”[20]
19

20. Prioritize: people, ideas & tools, in that order
“The most important factor is the quality of the players.” [112]
Models are the tools that we use to get ideas across to other
people. [113]
The tools have to match the situation, otherwise they’re wrong. If
the people you targeted aren’t getting the idea you’re using the
wrong tool, or the right tool incorrectly. [113]
People are the ultimate ends, ways and means, they are both the
tool and the target.
 “Key players that are team tactically mature and have credibility are invaluable
extensions of the coach during training sessions and matches.” [112]
20

21. Constructing a model toolbox
“In 1931 Kurt Gödel created a stir in the World of Mathematics and Logic… He
accomplished this by proving, first, ‘that any consistent system… is incomplete.’” [20]
Chris Anderson’s Long Tail model. “The long tail refers to the
statistical property that a larger share of the population rests within the
tail of a probability distribution than observed under a “normal” or
Gaussian distribution.”[Wikipedia]
 When your only tool is a hammer, all your problems look like nails.
Use many loosely coupled models from different fields, the more
the merrier.[17,109,173] No dogma because…
Box’s problem,[slide 5] Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem[20] and
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety[113].
 Someone always has a bigger toolbox.
21

22. People in systems, constraints on the OODA
“Panic ensues when members of a group lack superordinate goals-goals that
transcend the self-interests of each participant.“ [166]
Subjective, the individual in isolation. The ‘subject’ of “small-world”
psychological models. This state is the goal for isolation, author.
“Inter-subjective meaning occurs when a persons thoughts, feelings,
and intentions are merged into conversation in which the individual is
transformed from me to us. People are joined or merged.”[13]
Generic subjective, “Organizations are included in the next level, the
level of social structure. ‘Social structure’ implies a generic self, an
interchangeable part – as filler of roles and follower of rules…”[13]
“Culture is extra-subjective. A generic self that occupies roles is now
replaced by ‘pure meanings’ (Popper, 1972) without a knowing
subject.”[13]
22

23. Interaction and isolation
“Football, he explained, eventually became for him a system of twenty-two elements – two
sub-systems of eleven elements… If one were stronger, it would win.” [174]
“Interaction permits vitality and growth while isolation leads to
decay and disintegration.”[23]
“The strategic game is one of interaction and isolation. A
game in which we must be able to diminish adversary’s ability
to communicate or interact with his environment while
sustaining or improving ours.”[23]
Three paths of influence come to mind:
1. Moral; the social and cultural bonds between people.
2. Mental; the ability to rapidly make sense and communicate.
3. Physical; the ability to physically out act the opponent.
 Authors interpretation of Boyd.
23

24. Friction, the fog of war
"The odds are stacked against them (QPR). City are in good form, at home. On the face of it you expect City
to win, but as long as humans are humans you hope something stupid to happen."
Alex Ferguson – 05/11/2012
Clausewitz’s beautiful trinity; reason, emotion and chance.[31]
The unified concept of a general friction:
 Danger, which breeds fear.
 Physical exertion, which breeds fatigue.
 Uncertain information, which breeds doubt.
 Resistance within one’s own team, which breeds discord & discontent.
 Chance, which breeds confusion and hesitation.
 Physical and political limits, which constrains action.
 The opponent, an active obstacle with veto power that cannot be ignored.
 Disconnects between ends and means, poor planning, no way forward. [165]
24

25. Sun-Tzu, cheng ch’i and yin yang
“A system is not supposed to behave outside the boundaries of the model… In sharp contrast to this stands
the fact that organisms thrive on alternative behaviors – adaptation to and anticipation of changing
environmental conditions is what they are all about.” [16]
Sun Tzu:
 “If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred
battles.”
 “Opportunities multiply as they are seized.”
 “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”
 “The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike
and destroy its victim.”
 “All war is deception.”[31,36]
Cheng is the orthodox, the expected. Ch’i is the unorthodox, the shocking. Use
Cheng to set up Ch’i. When they suspect Ch’i use Cheng.[115,133]
Yin yang, “is used to describe how polar opposites or seemingly contrary forces are
interconnected and interdependent in the natural world, and how they give rise to
each other in turn. Opposites thus only exist in relation to each other… Yin yang
are not opposing forces (dualities), but complementary opposites, unseen (hidden,
feminine) and seen (manifest, masculine), that interact within a greater whole, as
part of a dynamic system.” Wikipedia
25

26. Surprise = deception, ambiguity & stealth
“Two additional concepts are particularly useful in generating
combat power: ‘surprise’ and ‘boldness.’ [103]
“There are three basic ways to go about achieving surprise. The first is
through deception—to convince the enemy we are going to do
something other than what we are really going to do in order to induce
him to act in a manner prejudicial to his own interests. The intent is to
give the enemy a clear picture of the situation, but the wrong picture.[103]
The second way is through ambiguity—to act in such a way that the
enemy does not know what to expect. Because he does not know what
to expect, he must prepare for numerous possibilities and cannot
prepare adequately for any one.[103]
The third is through stealth— to deny the enemy any knowledge of
impending action. The enemy is not deceived or confused as to our
intentions but is completely ignorant of them. Of the three, deception
generally offers the greatest effects but is most difficult to achieve.” [103]
26

27. Tempo
“Players who can set the pace of the match
are the diamonds of the team.” [112]
Since soccer is an “open system” one is never at ‘rest.’ You are
continually moving from one space/time flow to another.
“Merging onto a highway is a small scale example… you must usually
bootstrap action while absorbing the current state of the situation.”
“Once you are settled into a routine in a domain, and attuned to the
local rhythms, your next challenge is to operate efficiently within it…
which I’ll call going with the flow.”
Pace-setting is the art of harmoniously driving the natural tempo of
your environment away from its current state and towards your
preferred state – slower or faster – in non-disruptive ways.”
Dissonance: Disrupting the flow. To create dissonance in artful ways,
you must develop a musicians aesthetic sensibilities. This is what will
turn a potentially dangerous and stupid sort of behavior into a
productive one.” [122]
27

28. Psychological present & interval logic
“Different schools of thought have called this ability "capacity of
apprehension," "short-term memory," or "very short-term memory.“ [61]
“The psychological present corresponds to the duration of a experiential process and not to
a given period of duration. However, it has an upper limit which hardly exceeds 5 sec, and
has an average value of 2 to 3 sec. Within these limits one can speak of the perception of
duration, which thereby becomes a quantity whose beginning has not yet been stored in
memory.”[2,61]
“Popular decision-making models rely on what you might call point logic: the idea that a
decision is a point, a fork in a temporal road… a better scheme, which organizes
understanding of time around intervals rather than points, was worked out by… James
Allen… This scheme called interval logic, is a way of thinking about time that can raise the
sophistication of how you merge, go with the flow, set the pace, disrupt it, and put it all
together in your moments of inspiration.”[122]
28

29. Centers of gravity & critical vulnerabilities
“Boyd blames Clausewitz for not seeing ‘that many non-cooperative, or conflicting, centers of gravity paralyze
the adversary by denying him the opportunity to operate in a directed fashion.’” [115]
“We ask ourselves: Which factors are critical to the enemy? Which
can the enemy not do without? Which, if eliminated, will bend him
most quickly to our will? These are centers of gravity.” [103]
“We obviously stand a better chance of success by concentrating
our strength against some relative enemy weakness. So we also
ask ourselves: Where is the enemy vulnerable… Therefore, we
should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a
vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage
to the enemy’s ability to resist us.”[103]
“Center of gravity and critical vulnerability are complementary
concepts.”[103]
29

30. Command & control
“We talked always about speed of ball, space and time” [175]
“Any system comprising multiple, interacting elements, from
societies to sports teams to any living organism, needs some
form of command and control. Simply put, command and
control in some form or another is essential to survival and
success in any competitive or cooperative enterprise. Command
and control is a fundamental requirement for life and growth,
survival, and success for any system.”[106,177]
“Our study of command and control theory starts with a simple
model of the command and control process known as the OODA
loop.”[106]
30

31. Command & control
“What obstacles must our command and control system overcome and what must it accomplish? First and
foremost, the system must deal effectively with the twin problems of uncertainty and time.” [106]
“Command and control is thus an interactive process involving
all the parts of the system and working in all directions. The
result is a mutually supporting system of give and take in which
complementary commanding and controlling forces interact to
ensure that the force as a whole can adapt continuously to
changing requirements.”[106]
“The defining problem of command and control that
overwhelms all others is the need to deal with uncertainty.
Were it not for uncertainty, command and control would be a
simple matter of managing resources. In the words of Carl von
Clausewitz, “War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of
the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog
of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating
judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the
truth.”” [106]
31

32. Information flow in command & control
“But the big change in Dutch Football happened when these ideas became words,
when Cruyff and Michels started talking about space.” [175]
“We initiate communications under two basic principles: supply-push
and demand-pull. A supply-push system pushes information from the
source to the user either as the information becomes available or
according to a schedule. The advantages of supply-push are that the
commander does not need to request the information and that the
information generally arrives in a timely fashion. The challenge with a
supply-push system is to be able to anticipate the commander’s
information needs. The danger of information overload arises primarily
from supply-push.” [106]
“By contrast, a pure demand-pull system does not rely on the ability to
anticipate information needs; it is inactive until a demand is made on
it. In a pure demand-pull system, the user generates all information
requirements. If the information is readily available the demand can be
filled quickly and efficiently. However, if the information is not readily
available, the demand typically triggers a “demand cascade,”… [106]
32

33. Tension in command & control
“Every disadvantage has its advantage.” [175]
Intentional vs. emergent behavior, i.e. command vs. control;
 “The commander commands by deciding what needs to be done and by
directing or influencing the conduct of others. Control takes the form of
feedback—the continuous flow of information about the unfolding situation
returning to the commander—which allows the commander to adjust and
modify command action as needed.” – [106]
Task vs. system maintenance;
 “Autopoiesis is a process whereby a system produces its own organization and
maintains and constitutes itself in a space. e.g., a biological cell, living organism
or a society… Allopoiesis the process whereby an organization produces
something other than the organization itself.” - Web Dictionary of Cybernetics and Systems
Entropy vs. complexity;
 Physical systems move towards maximum entropy, i.e. no organization while
organic systems move towards complexity through evolution to survive. We are
organic systems made up of physical components.
33

34. Distributed situational awareness
“Emergent properties exist where the ‘characteristics of the whole are developed (emerge)
from the interactions of their components in a non-apparent way…’ Emergent behaviour arises
out of synergy, which is the product of interaction at a component level. Arguably, the goal of
any command and control system is to maximise this synergistic effect” [162]
“We assume that, in distributed team work, cognitive processes occur at
the systems level rather that an individual level. [141]
First, the ‘knowledge’ that underlies DSA is distributed across the
system. Secondly, there is implicit communication of information rather
than detailed exchange of mental models. [141]
However, distributed SA requirements are not the same as shared SA
requirements. Shared SA implies shared requirements and purposes,
whereas distributed SA implies different, but potentially compatible,
requirements and purposes. [141]
Assuming that performance will be most effective when there is ‘good’
DSA throughout the system as a whole, it follows that the network links
are more crucial than the nodes themselves in maintaining DSA.” [141]
34

35. Summary
“It is essential that early on young talented players come in contact with the importance of
teamwork while playing a match, not through tactical instructions made by the trainer or
coach… In our welfare state such a rock hard mental burden is not easy to deal with.” [112]
1. The dominant decisions/actions that players make in a game involves their interactions
with teammates, opponents, referees, coaches, fans, parents, the ball, environmental
and social factors. This is where cognition and the world interact. Theory meets reality.
2. These decision/actions form dynamic, transient iterative cycles that organically build
through work and decay through entropy. When cycles build they become more complex
and specific. When they decay they lose relevance, unity and purpose.
3. People are the most important component in decision/action cycles. They are the ends,
ways and means. Whenever people interact problems are created. These problems take
the form of friction. Cooperation aims to reduce friction; competition aims to amplify it.
4. Each player strives to survive on their own terms and sees the game from a unique
perspective. However, every player is constrained by their interactions with others. This
creates dynamic, transient, complex command and control systems and networks.
Players must intuitively know when, who and where to lead and or follow.
5. Each player must be concerned with how others are seeing the game unfold. Every
action should contribute to the teams harmony and cohesion by enabling interaction
while attempting to reduce the opponents cohesion by morally, mentally, physically
isolating it’s members. Other people, their perceptions and actions are the targets and
tools for growth and survival and their influence on us cannot be summarily dismissed as
an inconvenience. The battle on the field begins in the mind.
35

36. Selected references
1. ACKOFF, R. & ADDISON, H. 1988, Management F-Laws, How Organizations Really Work (Axminster, U.K: Triarchy Press).
2. ALLPORT, D. 1968, Phenomenal Simultaneity and the Perceptual Moment Hypothesis (British Journal of Psychology, 59,
395-406).
3. ARTMAN, H. GARBIS, C. 1998, Situation Awareness as Distributed Cognition (Proceedings of ECCE’98, Limerick).
4. ARTMAN, H. 1999, Co-operation Within and Between Hierarchial Units in Dynamic Decision Making (Ergonomics, Vol. 42,
No. 11, 1404-14-17).
5. ARTMAN, H. WAERN, Y. 1999, Distributed Cognition in an Emergency Co-ordination Center (Cognition, Technology & Work,
1: 237-246).
6. ARTMAN, H. 2000, Team Situation Assessment and Information Distribution (Ergonomics, Vol. 43, No. 8, 1111-1128).
7. BAARS, B. FRANKLIN, S. 2007, An architectural model of conscious brain functions: Global Workspace Theory and IDA
(Elsevier, Neural Networks 20, 955-961).
8. BACKSTROM, L-A. et al. 1988, Organizing Your Youth Soccer Team (Champaign, Il: Leisure Press).
9. BAKER, J. HORTON, S. et al, 2003, Nurturing Sport Expertise: Factors Influencing the Development of Elite Athlete (Journal
of Sports Science and Medicine 2003-2, 1-9).
10. BANDURA, A. 1978, The Self System in Reciprocal Determinism, (American Psychologist, Vol. 33, No. 4, 344-358).
11. BAREND, F. & VAN DORP, H. 1999, Ajax, Barcelona, Cruyff, The ABC of an Obstinate Maestro (London: Bloomsbury).
12. BARON, J. 2008, Thinking and Deciding, Fourth Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press).
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47

48. Thank you
“I’ll live or die by my own ideas.” Johan Cruyff [11]
Presentation created May, 2012 by Larry Paul, Prescott Arizona.
All references are available as stated.
All content is the responsibility of the author.
For further information, questions or to inquire how to arrange a consultation on
this topic you can contact me at larry4v4@hotmail.com, subject line;
decision/action model.
48