Haskins_seniorcomp

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Municipal Administration in the Post-Industrial Great Lakes Region:
A Case Study of Detroit and Pittsburgh
By Emily Brooke Haskins
A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science,
Saint Mary’s College, Notre Dame, Indiana
in partial fulfillment for the degree of Bachelor of Arts
December 28, 2014
Professor Savage, Supervisor

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Abstract
The purpose of this research is to show the positive or negative effects of public policy on post-
industrial Detroit and Pittsburgh. I believed that cities of the Great Lakes region had enough
inherently in common that a blueprint for success could be applied universally, thus the goal of
this research was to be applicable to municipalities across the Rust Belt and offer considerations
for Detroit’s next step in revitalization. The research draws primarily upon books, scholarly
articles, journalism articles, and interviews. Concluding findings are that Detroit and Pittsburgh
have different histories and political dynamics; hence Detroit cannot follow the Pittsburgh
model. However, Detroit can capitalize on its proximity to Canada and its status as a major
airport hub city.

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Table of Contents
I. Introduction: A Tale of Two Shells………………………………………….4
II. Literature Review………………………………………………………....….5
III. ResearchDesignand Methodology…………………………………………7
IV. Analysis……………………………………………………………...………..9
De-mystifying the Rust Belt…………………………………………………9
Chapter I: The City of Detroit………………………………….…………11
Global War Creates a World Class City………………………………….…14
Sowing the Seeds of Decline………………………..………………………15
1970s-1990s: Things Fall Apart…………………………………….………17
The 2000s: Things Get Worse…………….………...………………………19
Chapter II: The City of Pittsburgh……………………… ………………23
Renaissance I……………………………………………………..…………24
Renaissance II…………………………………….…………………………31
Renaissance III……………………………...………………………………38
V. Conclusion………………………………………….. ………………………43
Can Detroit Follow the Pittsburgh Model......................................................45
The Current Situation, and Next Steps………...……………………………49
VI. Appendix……………………………………………………………………52
Abbreviations……………………….………………………………………52
Interview Questions…………………...……………………………………52
VII. Bibliography………………………………………………………….……55

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I. Introduction: A Tale of Two Shells
Fifty years ago, Detroit was the 5th largest city in the United States, with nearly 2 million
residents.1 The Motor City boasted the nation’s highest per capita income, the highest rate of
home ownership of any black urban population, and an unemployment rate of 3.4%.2 In March
2013, Detroit was declared to be in a state of financial emergency by Michigan Governor Rick
Snyder. Five months later it became the largest U.S. municipality to every file for bankruptcy.3
Statistics reported by Kevyn Orr, the city’s emergency manager appointed by Snyder
immediately following the declaration of financial emergency, seem to reflect a war ravaged
developing nation: 40% of the city’s street lights do not work, and the police need up to 58
minutes to respond to a 911 call.4 Census data from 2010 reveal that four years ago city residents
numbered just over 700,000—over 60% shy of the population Detroit built up and out to
support.5 A community featuring some 78,000 abandoned structures and 66,000 abandoned
business lots has a hard time justifying “city” status. A more apt description would be “shell.”
Twenty-first century Detroit is a shell of its former glory; indeed, The Economist has described
this urban flight as a “demographic catastrophe unparalleled in the developed world.”6
1 Shikha Dalmia, “Detroit, Michigan,”Reason 45 (2013): 38.
http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/ehost/detail?sid=17d990a2-9929-4bbb-9671-
1d7c2aa3f53c%40sessionmgr4003&vid=1&hid=4214&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d
%3d#db=aph&AN=90618663.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Clarke,Kevin, “Can this City Be Saved?” America 209 (2013):12-13.
http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/ehost/detail?sid=e1bafa08-c64c-4177-9a54-
1afc5d11750a%40sessionmgr4003&vid=1&hid=4214&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d
%3d#db=mth&AN=91677943.
5 Dalmia,“Detroit, Michigan,”40.
6 Ibid.

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What Detroit is to the automobile industry, so Pittsburgh is to steel: once the backbone
and nerve center of its respective industry to the point of being metonymic, now having to
manage despite the breakthrough of global competition and much of what remains of American
steel production having moved outside of the city limits. It is a story slowly unfolding across the
Rust Belt, an area named specifically for the economic decline, population loss, and urban decay
in the postindustrial region of the Northeastern and East North Central states.
Nonetheless, Pittsburgh is not a shell. On the contrary, Pittsburgh has reinvented itself
into a modern renaissance city by building a technology and research sector right on top of the
ashes of the steel industry, rather than desperately trying to fan those moribund flames. Unlike
Detroit, Pittsburgh has avoided bankruptcy by cutting city pension packages and creating
initiatives for start-up companies to relocate to the Steel City. Straddling the Alleghenies,
Pittsburgh could quite literally be the ‘City on a Hill’ other Rust Belt cities aspire to become.
Policy-wise, what does it look like for a post-industrial city in the Great Lakes region to
emulate Pittsburgh, as opposed to Detroit? Economically, these two cities came of age
concurrently. They were almost completely dependent on one industry, and then the American
manufacturing sector of that industry collapsed. Politically, Pittsburgh made its exit through the
front door, and Detroit went out the back. This paper will examine what political factors have the
ability to ameliorate or worsen the fiscal consequences of the large-scale loss of industrial jobs
(or possibly keep those jobs from disappearing in the first place), and the universal applicability
of those factors. The desired result of this research is a blueprint for a successful municipal
administration in a post-industrial Great Lakes city, and an answer to the question, how should
Detroit invest what little resources it has to revitalize?
II. Literature Review

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I became engrossed in the story of Detroit during the summer of 2013, following the
bankruptcy in newspapers and reading a cover spread put out by TIME. I wanted to know how
one of the strongest, most prosperous cities in America could find itself filing for chapter 9. I
wanted to know what was going to happen to employees on the municipal payroll, and I wanted
to know if Detroit’s story arc was the future of America. So, apparently, did numerous others.
Pete Saunders, a Detroit native who now works as an urban planner and consultant out of
Chicago sums the public fascination with the Motor City:
“My hometown of Detroit has been studied obsessively for years by writers and researchers of all types to
gain insight into the MotorCity’s decline. Indeed, it seems to have become a favorite pastime for
urbanists of all stripes.How could such an economic powerhouse, a uniquely American city, so utterly
collapse?”7
Literature and journalism chronicling Detroit’s rise and fall are abundant. The databases
for scholarly journals at Cushwa-Leighton Library, Saint Mary’s College, and Hesburgh Library,
University of Notre Dame, proved helpful with initial readings. The Brookings Institution’s U.S.
Metro Areas portal also led me to a host of articles.
The more I researched Detroit, the more I became overwhelmed by the city’s incredibly
complex and significant history of race, class, and discrimination. To give the subject the
attention it deserves would require several volumes, for which I recommend two: Whose
Detroit? Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern American City, by Heather Ann Thompson and
Detroit Divided, by Reynolds Farley, Sheldon Danziger, and Harry J. Holzer.
Finding a city to serve as a foil for Detroit was more difficult, as the Rust Belt is not
known to the rest of the country for its examples of modern success. However, once a professor
at Saint Mary’s suggested I take a look at Pittsburgh, I found that that the literature was there, if
7 Pete Saunders,“The Reasons Behind Detroit’s Decline,” Urbanophile, February 21, 2012,
http://www.urbanophile.com/2012/02/21/the-reasons-behind-detroits-decline-by-pete-saunders/.

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a bit obscured. Urban analyst Aaron Renn explains the difference in quantity of writing about
Detroit and Pittsburgh with the newspaper adage if it bleeds, it reads:8
“You can’t stop watching a train wreck. Detroit really is a true disaster; and it’s not as if Pittsburgh is
overtaking Manhattan or San Francisco. There are some things called “mezzo” facts: the weather changes
constantly,the speed of light never changes,but the reputation of a place changes very slowly over time.
Look at how we refer to Pittsburgh-we still call it “Steel City,” even though that era is long over.”
The University Library of American University, provided access to the past century of
politics in both cities and provided all of the books listed in the bibliography. Most helpful
among these are Gregory Crowley’s The Politics of Place: Contentious Urban Redevelopment in
Pittsburgh and Louise Jezierski’s “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City” in Regional
Politics: America in Post-City Age, edited by H.V. Savitch and Ronald K. Vogel.
III. ResearchDesignand Methodology
My research attempts to answer the following question: how have political actions on the
municipal level impacted the financial well-being of Pittsburgh and Detroit, two cities sharing a
common Rust Belt heritage? To measure my independent variable, I studied metrics such as the
level of public-private partnership in each city, how city land was utilized, city hall-led economic
initiatives, and the level of cohesion between the city proper and surrounding municipalities in
the region. Similar factors have been analyzed in papers such as “Regional Restructuring and
Urban Regimes: A Comparison of the Pittsburgh and Detroit Metropolitan Areas” by Hyung Je
Jo and “Detroit’s Urban Regime: Composition and Consequence” by Leda McIntyre Hall and
Melvin F. Hall. In addition to consulting many secondary sources in looking for patterns in the
cities’ recent histories, I attempted to answer my research question by conducting original
8 Aaron Renn (urban analyst),in discussion with the author, April 2014.

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research in the form of interviews. I began by examining a list of think tanks in the United States,
and then zeroing in on the ones that dealt with regional politics and urban planning, especially
concerning the Rust Belt area. A cold call to the Allegheny Institute of Public Policy (AIPP), a
conservative leaning policy institute in Pittsburgh with an emphasis on free market principles
and local government, put me in contact with Mr. Eric Montarti. Mr. Montarti is an AIPP senior
policy analyst with a M.A. in public policy analysis and a B.A. in political science from
Pittsburgh’s Duquesne University. The most beneficial question in my interview arsenal was “do
you know anyone else I can talk to?” because the cold call to AIPP led to two more sources.
After our interview, Mr. Montarti referred me to the Allegheny Conference on
Community Development (ACCD), a nonprofit private sector consortium that has played a
crucial role in the Pittsburgh area for the past 70 years, where I was recommended to speak with
Mr. Brian Jensen, the Senior Vice President. Mr. Jensen was also Pittsburgh educated, receiving
his Ph.D. in history and policy from Carnegie Mellon University, as well as a B.A. in political
science from Ball State University in Indiana. Mr. Jensen was a uniquely qualified source to
address the connections between policy and economics, as he has also served as the executive
director for the Pennsylvania Economy League of Greater Pittsburgh since 1988. Mr. Jensen then
put me in touch with his colleague Mr. Eric Lupher at the Citizens Research Council of
Michigan (CRCM). Mr. Lupher serves as Research Director at the CRCM, a nonpartisan
organization that provides factual information on issues of state and local concern to Michigan
policymakers. Mr. Lupher is Michigan-educated, receiving a B.A. in international relations from
Michigan State University and an M.P.A. from Detroit’s Wayne State University.
An article in the online version of The Fiscal Times caught my attention for its analysis of
why Detroit cannot follow the Pittsburgh model for success, and I was particularly impressed by

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the insight of one urban affairs analyst quoted, Mr. Aaron Renn. Internet searches of Renn lead
me to his website, Urbanophile, which focuses on non-partisan, in-depth analyses of the
problems facing American cities. An email to Renn resulted in a telephone interview, after
which Renn directed me to Pete Saunders, whom he described as the “expert on Detroit,” and
Jim Russell, the “guru of all things Pittsburgh.”
Mr. Saunders, an urban planning consultant and blogger, truly is an expert on Detroit,
having grown up in the Motor City. He has over twenty years’ experience in urban planning and
economic development, in the public, private, and non-profit sectors. Mr. Saunders received a
B.A. in urban planning and consulting from Indiana University and a M.A. in urban planning
from the University of Illinois at Chicago. Mr. Russell is currently a blogger for Pacific Standard
Magazine and located in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, but is a native Pittsburgher
with an expertise in the “Pittsburgh Diaspora”: the out-migration of Steel City residents
following the collapse of the American steel industry. Mr. Russell co-founded the Pittsburgh
Expatriate Network, and organization that exists to connect and engage the Pittsburgh expatriate
community, and has also worked as a consultant for Global Cleveland, an organization dedicated
to bringing talent to the Rust Belt city of the group’s name. Mr. Russell holds a B.A. in
geography from the University of Vermont and a M.A. in geography from the University of
Colorado.
My final interview was an email correspondence with Dr. Stephanie Ryberg-Webster, of
Cleveland State University. Ryberg-Webster was quoted in Palesh Ghosh’s article “A Tale of
Three Cities: Detroit, Toronto, and Pittsburgh in a Post-Industrialized World,” which appeared in
the online version of the International Business Times. Ryberg-Webster is a professor of urban
affairs at Cleveland State University; not only is she an expert in cities, but she understands them

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in the Rust Belt context. She holds her M.A. and Ph.D. in City and Regional Planning from the
University of Pennsylvania.
All interviews were held in April 2014, and with the exception of Dr. Ryberg-Webster,
were all conducted over the telephone. A list of questions asked can be found in the appendix.
This paper will use “region” as an analytical unit designating a metropolitan area and its
suburbs. “Region” is synonymous with Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). According to the
U.S. Census Bureau, a MSA requires a core population of at least 50,000 and consists of the
counties containing the urban core “as well as any adjacent counties that have a high degree of
social and economic integration (as measured by commuting to work) with the urban core.”9 The
counties included in a city’s MSA vary from year to year; the table I have included below uses
Census Bureau information from February 2013.10
Urban Core City Counties Within MSA
Detroit, Michigan Lapeer, Livingston, Macomb, Oakland, St.
Clair, Wayne
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Butler, Fayette,
Washington, Westmoreland
IV. Analysis
De-mystifying the Rust Belt
The Great Lakes industrial corridor includes parts of New York, Pennsylvania, West
Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin, with notable cities including Buffalo,
9 “Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas Main,” U.S. Census Bureau, May 6, 2013,
https://www.census.gov/population/metro/.
10 “Delineation Files-Feb. 2013,” U.S. Census Bureau, February 2013.
http://www.census.gov/population/metro/data/def.html

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Pittsburgh, Youngstown, Cleveland, Gary, Detroit, Chicago, and Milwaukee. Tax revenues in the
area from Michiana (a region in northern Indiana and southwestern Michigan centered on the
city of South Bend, Indiana) to western upstate New York rely more heavily on manufacturing
than any other region in the U.S.
Factors of geography and history combined to predispose the region to become an
industrial powerhouse in the second half of the 19th century and first half of the 20th century. The
favorable geography is a proximity to the Great Lakes. All of the Great Lakes are naturally
connected to each other and to the Atlantic Ocean by the St. Lawrence River, but until the United
States developed a fascination with building canals in the early 19th century this water route to
the continent’s interior was not navigable due to impediments such as Niagara Falls and rapids.
For example, the 1820 census counted roughly 8,000 residents of Michigan, compared to
600,000 in nearby Ohio.11 After the Erie Canal was completed in 1826, and travel to the
Michigan territory was no longer limited to overland, Michigan’s population reached 31, 639.12
The success of canals brought an enthusiasm for paved roads and railroads. By 1848, a rail line
connecting Detroit to Lake Michigan was completed, and in 1855 the Chicago to New York line
was completed. It included: “rail travel from Chicago to Detroit; a ferry across the Detroit River;
a rail line across southern Ontario; a bridge into the U. S. near Buffalo; and finally a rail line
across New York State.”13 Michigan’s population alone doubled in the 1840s and again in the
1850s.14 The favorable geography of the Great Lakes region also includes the temperate and cool
11 Reynolds Farley, Sheldon Danziger, and Harry J. Holzer, Detroit Divided, (New York: The Russell SageFoundation,
2000): 16.
12 Ibid.,17.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.

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climate that comes from being located near the water—a crucial factor for factory workers before
the advent of air conditioning.15
The market for the region’s industrial goods grew as limitless as the potential for a better
life offered to prospective factory and mill workers. Great Lakes industrial cities became a
magnet for immigrants, as the blue-collar jobs did not require a formal education, or even a firm
grasp of English. For the factory and mill owners, this wretched refuse provided an inexpensive
labor resource. Each city and its surrounding metropolitan area grew through a particular
industry: “Detroit had cars, Pittsburgh had steel; Toledo had glass; and Cincinnati had
manufacturing.”16
The industrial corridor’s peak in relative economic importance to the country occured
during World War II, as assembly lines and forging fires lifted the nation out of economic
depression and to victory abroad. The fall came shortly after, with returning soldiers making use
of the G.I. Bill and relocating their families to the rapidly developing suburbs. The center of
American manufacturing shifted to the Southeast, and many of those jobs were outsourced to
developing nations to reflect lower labor costs. The liberalization of foreign trade policies acted
as a catalyst for the current era of internationalization. Technology was also a factor: the increase
of automation means a cheaper product for all, but at the expense of reducing labor needed in
factories. As each of the industries mentioned in the paragraph above declined, the city declined
with it. Why did Detroit alone fall to the depths of bankruptcy?
Chapter I: The City of Detroit
“Detroit turned out to be heaven, but it also turned out to be hell.” –Marvin Gaye17
15 Eric Lupher (research director),in discussion with the author, 2014.
16 David Francis,“Why Detroit Won’t Have a Pittsburgh Renaissance,” The Fiscal Times, July 24, 2013,
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/07/24/Why-Detroit-Wont-Have-a-Pittsburgh-Renaissance.
17 CharlieLeduff, Detroit: An American Autopsy (New York: Penguin Group, 2013).

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Both sides of the aisle have an opinion about what factors are to blame for Detroit’s
decline. To the left, racism and inequality are the culprits. Thomas Sugrue expounds this theory
in The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit:
“…highways and rising wages in union-dominated inner cities caused capital to flee to the Rust Belt after
World War II, much before the race riots of the 1960s. But blacks couldn’t follow because discrimination
prevented them from buying homes in the new neighborhoods,trapping themin dying urban areas without
jobs.”18
The roles of race and inequality will be addressed later, but this argument does not stand
on its own. Discrimination did not debilitate blacks prior to the 1950s, when they migrated from
the South and relatively thrived. Why would it debilitate them just as the civil rights movement
was finally making headway? Theoretically, white flight would have left opportunities wide
open for minority groups. In actuality, it was the flight of anyone who could afford to (e.g.,
middle class blacks). Other minority groups created thriving neighborhoods outside of the city
limits; for instance, Dearborn, Michigan, has the nation’s largest Arab population.19
The right’s theory, championed by Charles Murray, Thomas Sowell, and Lawrence
Mead, does not hold up well either: that “the progressive welfare state subsidized the breakdown
of inner city families.”20 It is not a rationale specific enough to the Rust Belt, let alone Detroit.
To understand the economic and political factors behind Detroit’s collapse, one must be
familiar with the history of the city. Detroit’s role as Motor City is attributed to more than just its
proximity to the Great Lakes and the good fortune of being the stomping ground of a young
Henry Ford and William C. Durant (of General Motors (GM) fame), for the city already had a
18 Dalmia,“Detroit, Michigan.”
19 Jim Russell,in discussion with the author,April 2014.

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lock on being economic capital of the state by the end of the 19th century.21 Detroit, on an
isthmus between Lake St. Clair and Lake Erie in southeastern Michigan, is located midway
between the iron ore fields of northern Michigan and the coal reserves of Appalachia (both
crucial to automobile production), as well as being on one side of the busiest international border
crossing in North America.22 Detroit was founded as the ideal location for a trading post by
French explorer Antoine Cadillac in 1701: the soon to be city was a navigation point where
Midwestern and Appalachian suppliers, American and Canadian merchants, railroad barons, and
Great Lakes shippers could all converge.23 The city already had blast furnaces and brass
foundries; because by that time manufacturing was established as driving the regional economy.
Detroit had emerged as a national manufacturing center in response to the Union army’s demand
for armaments during the Civil War.24
This meteoric rise pre-dated effective public transportation, so Detroit grew as a walking
city: workers had to live close to their factory jobs, “so ethnic neighborhoods sprang up around
factories throughout the city.”25 Detroit’s mechanical orientation also pre-dates the automobile,
with engineers, designers, and laborers already drawn to the area for its metalworking, ship
building, and carriage building industries.26 A corner on the carriage making market was a boon
to Detroit landing the automobile industry: carriages and automobiles are similar in their bodies
and wheel designs, both utilized component production and contracting, assembly production,
and virtually the same market and dealer networks.27 In 1900, Detroit was the nation’s 15th
21 Pete Saunders (urban planner and consultant),in discussion with the author,April 2014.
22 Joe T. Darden, Richard Child Hill,JuneThomas, and Richard Thomas, Detroit: Race and Uneven Development,
(Philadelphia:Temple University Press,1987),14.
23 Farley,Detroit Divided, 14.
24 Ibid.,20.
25 Ibid.
26 Saunders,in discussion with the author.
27 Darden, Detroit: Race and Uneven Development, 14.

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largest city. But by 1920, it was 4th, behind only New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia.28 Yet
the automobile industry alone did not create the modern Detroit.
Global War Creates a World Class City
The manufacturing demands of WWI contributed to growing Detroit “in a manner no one
could have foreseen.”29 Not only did this war require the chemicals, steel, and munitions that
Detroit had produced during the Civil War, but it demanded motor vehicles to get them to the
East Coast.30 In 1914, Detroit manufactured 25,000 trucks; in 1918, the last year of World War I,
that number soared to 227,000.31 The Motor City had arrived.
The war and the Immigration Act of 1924 severely curbed European immigration, but
there was still a growing demand for labor in Detroit’s automobile industry. Henry Ford led the
way in attracting blacks, southern whites, and Mexicans to work in his plants: Coleman Young,
Detroit’s first black mayor, “described the employment situation in his youth by recalling that
Ford sent buses to the city’s Black Bottom neighborhood every day to recruit factory hands.”32
Due to the booming auto industry, Detroit’s black population grew more rapidly than its
counterparts in any other northern city in the 1920s.33 By the 1930s Detroit had grown so that it
literally could not expand anymore—Michigan had “adopted restrictive annexation laws in 1926
limiting the physical expansion of the city,” ensuring that future growth with happen in adjacent,
but separate, municipalities (suburbs).34
If WWI gave birth to the modern Motor City, WWII catapulted it to an even greater
standing, temporarily switching out the automobile moniker for the sobriquet, “Arsenal of
29 Ibid.,22.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.,31.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.,25.

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Democracy.” “Thousands of trucks, jeeps, tanks, planes, and weapons built on Detroit’s
assembly lines helped bring the Allies to victory,” and in the post-war boom Detroit enjoyed a
reputation as a city where blue-collar workers of any ethnic background could achieve the
American dream.35
Sowing the Seeds of Decline
A TIME article titled “Decline in Detroit” opened its expose with this paragraph:
“If ever a city stood as a symbol of the dynamic U.S. economy, it was Detroit. It was not pretty. It was, in
fact, a combination of the grey and the garish: its downtown area was a warren of dingy, twisting street; the
used-car lots along Livernois Avenue raised an aurora of neon. But Detroit cared less about how it looked
than about what it did—and it did plenty.”36
That article was from 1961.
The seeds of Detroit’s were sown in the decades before the American automobile
industry lost its competitive edge. In the 1950s and 1960s, the city was characterized by three
trends: increasing influence of the automobile industry, suburbanization and concentration of
wealth moving outside the city, and intensifying tension in race relations. Each of these played a
role in the fall.
For the first part of the decade following WWII, employment continued to surge.37 The
city expected sustained growth and prepared itself for a population of two million, so it came as a
shock when Detroit actually experienced an unemployment rate of 10% in the late 1950s, due to
the recession of 1957 and 1958 which put three auto-makers—Hudson, Kaiser-Fraser, and
Packard—out of business.38
35 Ibid.,1.
36 Saunders,“The Reasons Behind Detroit’s Decline.”
38 Ibid.

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At the same time, Detroit’s wealth began concentrating outside of the city limits.
Between 1947 and 1955 the Big Three built 25 new manufacturing plants in the metro area, and
not one was within the Detroit city limits.39 Even though the factories were technically moving
outside of Detroit, public policy within the city was becoming increasingly automobile-
directed.40 For example, until the 1950s Detroit had an “elaborate” and popular streetcar
system.41 That system was converted into one of diesel buses after GM lobbied the city,
“stressing that diesel-fueled buses were an effective lower-cost alternative to
streetcars….Coincidentally, GM produced exactly the kind of buses that would easily facilitate
the transition.”42 GM, for all intents and purposes, was the government. “Detroit went “whole
hog” into industrialization,” says Saunders, “and let corporations rule the roost. The closest
comparison would be California’s Silicon Valley. Should the tech industry ever go the way of
the auto industry, it would devastate that area.”43
The theory of Harvard economist Ed Glaeser is that the Big Three “killed Detroit’s
culture of entrepreneurship with their decades-long supremacy” and rewarding of the “company
man mindset, rather than the start-up mindset.44 He continues that the federal government
reinforced this mindset with cash bailouts and corporatist interventions on behalf of auto giants:
“Had central planners allowed natural market forces to prevail…Chrysler and GM might well
have dissolved decades ago and been replaced with smaller, nimbler companies.”45
The tipping point for already tense race relations in the city came in the summer of 1967. Early
in the morning of July 23, Detroit police engaged in a routine raid on a party in the inner city
39 Darded, Detroit and Uneven Development, 16.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
45 Ibid.

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welcoming home a black soldier from Vietnam.46 The officers arrested 82 people and set off the
costliest riot in U.S. history47. By 8:30 am, Michigan governor George Romney felt it was
necessary to survey the ensuing violence and chaos via helicopter, after which he decided to call
out the National Guard.48 When the military finally wrestled the city under control five days
later, 43 people were dead, 347 were injured, 3,800 were arrested, 5,000 were homeless, over
1,000 buildings had been burned to the ground and 2,700 businesses had been ransacked.49 The
damage totaled $50 million.50 The 1967 riot accelerated white flight so much that within a
decade, Detroit’s population changed from 55% white to 34% white, leaving a considerable
difference in the property and income tax bases.
An attempt was made by the business community to address the tense race relations
following the 1967 riots from the perspective of Detroit’s economic interests.51 Organizations
such as New Detroit, Detroit Renaissance, and the Detroit Economic Development Corporation
(DEDC) appeared on the scene; however, due to a lack of overarching leadership no regional
coalition was formed.52 Ironically, this failure can be attributed to segregated interests. The
Detroit Renaissance and pre-existing Detroit Regional Chamber represent the white corporate
community while New Detroit and the DEDC “are seen as the structures for the articulation of
black elite preferences.”53
1970s-1980s: Things Fall Apart
46 Heather Ann Thompson, Whose Detroit? Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern American City, (Ithaca,NY: Cornell
University Press,2001):46.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Darden, Race and Uneven Development, 72.
50 Ibid.
51 Hyung Je Jo, “Regional Restructuringand Urban Regimes: A Comparison of the Pittsburgh and Detroit
Metropolitan Areas,” University of Michigan Transportation Institute, Office for the Study of Automotive
Transportation (2002): 16.
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/1511/96549.0001.001.pdf?sequence=2.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.

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The white flight left a consolidated electoral support base of black voters.54 Coleman
Young, Detroit’s first black mayor, exacerbated this emigration with a “racially charged rhetoric
that chased white residents and businessmen out of the city,” and by dividing the police
department along racial lines with separate layoff lists for white and black officers. 55 Young,
described as “politically invincible,” would serve five terms as mayor and Detroit would come to
resemble Chicago for the number of viable political parties in town (this is comparable to the
entrepreneurship argument: one political party, unopposed, does not have to be quick on its feet.
It is held to a high tolerance of corruption.).56 In the twenty years of Young’s administration,
there was little political cohesion in the region, attributed to the fact that “political autonomy
based on racial segregation in the central city did not force Mayor Young to cooperate with
suburban governments.”57
It is important to note here that city government power in Detroit is heavily concentrated
in the mayor’s office.58 This is due to a new city charter in 1973 that ended “ended much of the
fragmentation in mayoral agencies and consolidated control in the mayor’s office;” essentially,
giving the mayor the power to ignore “city council attempts at legislative oversight.”59
In the mid-1970s the Michigan House of Representatives witnessed an ambitious effort to
introduce regional governance legislation.60 The bills never passed, and the municipalities of the
Detroit region remained fragmented and isolated, without the legal capacity to coact.61
55 Ibid.
56 Hyung, “Regional Restructuring and Urban Regimes,” 17.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.,16.
61 Ibid.

20
One group that did have the wide influence to push for regional restructuring did not.
Labor unions, specifically those of automobile workers, were long established in Detroit and
“had the organizational power to realize their interests.”62 However, they were only able to see
the short-term objectives of raising their wages and keeping their jobs as German and Japanese
imports were flooding U.S. markets, rather than realizing the potential economic stability
fostered by regional cooperation.63
It was not until 1994 that Detroit elected a new mayor. Dennis Archer’s “actively tried to
revitalize downtown Detroit,” through the entertainment projects strategy.64 Although the new
casinos, sports stadiums, and convention center were relatively successful, Archer did not
promote regional cooperation any more than the previous administration.65 The long-term value
of these projects can also be debated, in light of Detroit’s economic situation. Politicians have
been misreading their constituents: residents neither want nor need new stadia, casinos, and
athletic venues; they want good public services and to jobs.
The 2000s: Things Get Worse
It was during the administration of the succeeding mayor, Kwame Kilpatrick, that Detroit
took on new, unfavorable nicknames: “Arson Capital of America,” “Murder Capital of
America,” and “Most Dangerous City in America.”66 “Detroit got really bad just as America
was entering the era of the 24 hour news cycle,” said Lupher. “It has become really well-
publicized in the American consciousness.”67 For that, Kilpatrick’s name has become
synonymous with incompetence and corruption. On March 11, 2013 Kilpatrick was convicted on
62 Ibid.,18.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
67 Lupher, in discussion with the author.

21
24 charges, including racketeering, extortion, bribery, mail fraud, wire fraud, and filing false tax
returns; he was already serving time for perjury.68 The excesses of the Kilpatrick administration
allowed the media to unfairly paint Detroit as a city that had a higher than average tolerance for
corruption among one-party cities. A look at New Orleans, Miami, Providence, and any number
of cities in New Jersey provide relevance, not to ignore the Windy City: “Detroit certainly hasn’t
cornered the market on political corruption, as long as Chicago exists.”69 Before Kilpatrick, there
were actually very few instances of corruption in Detroit. Young was accused of bad racial
politics more than actual corruption.70 Far more prevalent than corruption is the incompetence:
“elected officials are not very good at what they were elected to do, and the workers they hired
were not trained to do what they needed to do.”71
Ironically, Detroit amended its city charter in 1918 to allow for a city council elected
entirely at-large instead of from districts in response to the national Progressive Movement
pushing for local government reform.72 The greatest legacy of this policy was that it
unknowingly precipitated white flight. The votes of remaining white enclaves did not carry much
weight in an increasingly black city; a common refrain of those leaving for the suburbs was, “if
only I had had political representation, I would have stayed.”73 The charter was amended in 2013
to allow for council members from seven districts and two at-large spots, because the
neighborhoods where people live are in absolute degradation, and the people wanted
representation.74 Today, government is the city’s largest employer, and that is more than enough
68 Tresa Baldas,“The Charges Former Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick isFacing,” Detroit Free Press, February 16, 2013,
http://www.freep.com/article/20120902/NEWS01/309020130/The-charges-former-Detroit-Mayor
-Kwame-Kilpatrick-facing.
71 Ibid.

22
rope for City Hall to hang itself.75 In early 2013 Detroit launched Operation Compliance, the
goal of which was to shut down or force compliance from 20 illegal businesses operating without
proper permits each week.76 It was a questionable use of funds for the city only weeks away from
bankruptcy, and hardly conducive to an entrepreneurial renaissance. “In some state capitals, it
works, but it is neither financially safe nor sustainable for a city like Detroit to have an economy
driven by bureaucracy,” says Russell. “The public sector is not dynamic. You need a healthy
private sector, to import wealth in.”77
After Kilpatrick, the trajectory towards bankruptcy has been both dizzyingly fast and
painfully slow. “Unionized rapacity,” government corruption, bad race relations, and
deindustrialization were all contributing factors to the city being declared “insolvent.”78 Local
sentiment towards the bankruptcy is mixed. Some see it as a refreshingly honest take on the
situation and an opportunity to start fresh, while others resent the state’s involvement as a
takeover. It has undoubtedly further eroded the confidence of Americans outside of Michigan in
the Motor City.79 One resident interviewed by journalist Kevin Clarke for America takes the
optimistic outlook: “If it will allow things to become arranged where, economically speaking, the
city can begin and start anew as far as their finances, it could be good. Detroiters are fighters, I
know that from experience. I deeply believe that Detroit will bounce back from (the
bankruptcy).”80
76 Ibid.
77 Russell,in discussion with the author.
78 Clarke,“Can This City Be Saved?,” 13.
79 Dr. Stepahnie Ryberg-Webster, in discussion with the author, 2014.
80 Kevin Clarke,“Can This City Be Saved?,” 13.

23
Post-bankruptcy, Detroit has gotten some breaks. Dan Gilbert, CEO of Quicken Loans,
moved his firm’s headquarters from suburban Farmington Hills to downtown Detroit in 2007.81
That means more than 7,000 employees are commuting into downtown Monday-Friday.82 After
Gilbert purchased more than 15 buildings and two parking garages in the downtown area,
Quicken Loans is the third-largest landowner in Detroit, after the city and GM.83
Concurrently, suburban Detroit is doing fine to the point of thriving. The greater
metropolitan area has a population of 4.3 million and a GDP of nearly $200 million.84 The region
has an economic base, but it has become divorced from its urban core.85 For that to change the
attitudes of the wealthy and the suburbanites have to change; they have to want the urban core
again.86
Chapter II: The City of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh may be considered a Rust Belt city despite being over 100 miles from the
nearest of the Great Lakes, but Pennsylvania is a stand-alone hybrid. Although sharing a western
border with Ohio, no geographer ever considers the Commonwealth a part of the Midwest. Nor
does it get grouped in with the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic region, despite bordering Delaware,
Maryland, New Jersey, and New York. Pennsylvania is a “demographic bridge.”87 It should
come as no surprise that Pittsburgh is breaking the Rust Belt mold—it never fit too comfortably
within it to begin with.
81 Bruce Katz and Jennifer Bradley,“A Growth Strategy for Post-Bankruptcy Detroit,” Brookings Institution (2013).
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/07/19-detroit-bankruptcy-katz-bradley.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Palesh Ghosh,“A Taleof Three Cities:Detroit, Toronto, and Pittsburgh in a Post-Industrialized World,”
International Business Times, October 9, 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/tale-three-cities-detroit-toronto-
pittsburgh-post-industrialized-world-1417742.
86 Ibid.
87 WilliamH.Frey and Ruy Teixeira,“The Political Geography of Pennsylvania:Not Another Rust Belt State,”
Brookings Institution (2008), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/04/political-
demographics-frey-teixeira.

24
Pittsburgh began as Ft. Pitt in 1758 to oversee the new “western” frontier.88 Its strategic
location as the source of the Ohio at the confluence of the Monongahela and Allegheny Rivers
provided control and access to riverways, land, and trade downriver. With the advent of the
railroad the strategic location lost its strategic-ness, “except in the case of steel distribution.”89
Like Detroit, the industrial character of the “Iron City” was set by the Civil War. Area towns
grew due to the presence of natural resources such as oil, natural gas, and coal; later on it was the
production of iron, glass, textiles, steel, and machinery production that spurred Pittsburgh’s
expansion and rise.90
Renaissance I
In the period between the end of WWI and the end of WWII, Pittsburgh was the modern
Detroit.
It was the era of muckraking journalism, and the Steel City was the “favorite target” of
many headlines: “Is Pittsburgh Civilized?” (Harper’s, 1930) and “Pittsburgh: What a City
Shouldn’t Be” (Forum, 1938) are just a few examples.91 H. L. Mencken wrote of “unbroken and
agonizing ugliness…sheer revolting monstrousness of every house in sight.”92 At the end of
World War II, as Detroit was hailed as the “Arsenal of Democracy,” the Wall Street Journal
rated Pittsburgh a “class D” city.93 The air was polluted, there was sewage in the water, rats ran
in the streets, and city blocks displayed poorly built and ill-maintained homes. The rivers that
gave Pittsburgh its beneficial location were threatening to flood every spring, property values
88 Louise Jezierski,“Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,”in H.V. Savitch and Ronald K. vogel, eds., Regional
Politics: America in a Post-City Age (Thousand Oaks,CA: Sage Productions,1996):162.
89 Jezierski,“Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,”162.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Dan Fitzpatrick,“The Story of Urban Renewal,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 21, 2000, http://old.post-
gazette.com/businessnews/20000521eastliberty1.asp.

25
dropped an average of $10 million every year, and 40% of existing office space sat empty. 94
Several of the city’s largest corporations—Alcoa (aluminum), Westinghouse (electric), and US
Steel, to name a few—“had purchased real estate in New York with intentions of moving east.”95
“Pittsburgh in the 1940s was not a place you wanted to be,” says Brian Jensen, Senior
Vice President of the ACCD. “The quality of life was low-grade; the streetlights literally came
on at 10 o’clock morning because there was so much smog and air pollution.”96 These conditions
set a “foundation for cooperative action within the private sector.”97 Voluntary associations were
springing up across the city to address a collective concern for the direction the city was taking,
the most elite of which “proved to be the crucible of regional physical, environmental, and social
planning.”98 Such groups supplied corporate commitment, consolidated the network of
organizations, and prioritized the redevelopment agenda.99 The Pennsylvania Economy League
(PEL) and the Pittsburgh Regional Planning Association (PRPA) were born of this movement
and continue to serve as the primary research arms for both downtown and regional concerns.100
However, these efforts were not enough to bring about effective legislation. The private sector
was form without substance; it “could not implement plans without the legal authority provided
by the public sector, and this power was relatively weak.”101
In 1939, a community group was organized to bring famed New York Parks
Commissioner Robert Moses to the city to make recommendations.102 He suggested “the city
build a new park at the Point, build several new highways and clear the Lower Hill District, a
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Brian Jensen (Senior Vice President, ACCD), in discussion with the author, April 2014.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Fitzpatrick,“The Story of Urban Renewal.”

26
neighborhood of blacks and immigrants plagued by overcrowding, faulty sanitation, and
absentee landlords.”103 It does not happen: “a succession of Republican governors in Harrisburg
denied the city’s Democratic mayors any funds.”104
A New Dealer named Wallace Richards, desperate to reverse the tide of urban decline in
his hometown, reached out to staunch Republican R.K. Mellon, executive of a vast banking
empire with connections to nearly every large company in western Pennsylvania, and leader of
one of the world’s richest families.105 The unlikely pair became friends and partners in their
mission to save Pittsburgh. Discussing the future of the city midway through WWII in
Washington, D.C., where Mellon was stationed, Mellon said “We’ve either got to do something
about that place or give it back to the Indians.”106
Mellon became president of the PRPA in 1941, a “vehicle by which top business leaders
sought to facilitate action on the improvement of downtown.”107 To consolidate effectiveness in
setting the redevelopment agenda, Mellon backed the creation of the ACCD with considerable
effort and money in 1943.108 There was a now a clear division of power: “the PRPA drew up the
plans, the Economy League did research and organized funding, and the ACCD worked with
public authorities.” 109The ACCD would unexpectedly gain power in 1945 when David
Lawrence, a populist, won the mayoral election.110 The ACCD had wanted the Republican
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Gregory Crowley, The Politics of Place:Contentious Urban Redevelopment in Pittsburgh,(Pittsburgh: University
of Pittsburgh Press,2005): 46.
108 Ibid.

27
opponent to win; Lawrence “railed against the city’s elite,” of which the ACCD board was
comprised.111
ACCD attorney Arthur Van Buskirk suggested that Mellon meet with Lawrence and
bring a gift to break the ice. Mellon walked into Lawrence’s office and offered 13.5 acres of his
land for use as a park.112 The private-public partnership was born. David Fitzpatrick stated in the
first part of a five-part series on Pittsburgh’s urban renewal, “in Lawrence, Mellon found a
politician willing to back the Allegheny Conference’s ideas and play the role of thug…In
Mellon, Lawrence found someone willing to poke the business community with a sharp stick.
When coal companies resisted new smoke controls, Mellon leaned on Consolidated Coal, the
city’s largest coal company. Mellon could do that because he was Consolidated’s largest
stockholder. When the Pennsylvania Railroad balked at the new regulations, Mellon dialed up
the railroad’s president. Mellon could do that because he was a director at the company.”113 The
28 directors of Mellon Financial held 239 seats on the boards of 185 different companies in the
region; this extensive network of social capital lead Lawrence to remark that Mellon was “a sort
of bell cow in Pittsburgh; as he moved, others moved with him.”114
Later in 1945, Mellon and his deputies Richards and Van Buskirk lobbied the state to
approve the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), a “powerful tool that allowed Pittsburgh to
seize private properties through eminent domain.”115 Before the URA, the municipal government
had neither the technical staff nor the funds to develop redevelopment plans.116
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Jezierski,“Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 165.

28
The nonpartisan, cooperative effort of the PRPA, PEL, ACCD, Allegheny County, and
the City of Pittsburgh developed “The Pittsburgh Package,” a group of bundled proposals put
through the Pennsylvania legislature in 1946.117 The goal of these collective proposals was “to
create a more attractive physical environment to keep corporate headquarters from leaving.”118
Van Buskirk, as vice chairman of the URA (Lawrence was chairman), used his position as
finance chairman of the Allegheny County Republican Committee to push the Pittsburgh
favorable legislation in Harrisburg.119 The governor was persuaded to pass eight of the ten bills
in the so-called Pittsburgh Package, including county smoke control legislation that overrode
railroad exemptions (Pittsburgh would be the first major city to have environmental
regulations),120 countywide refuse disposal, expansion of county planning commission control
over suburban subdivision plans, the creation of a Pittsburgh parking authority, a county transit
and traffic study commission, a Department of Parks and Recreation, expedition of the Penn-
Lincoln Parkway, and a broadening of the Pittsburgh tax code to include sources other than real
estate.121 Another piece of legislation was passed in 1947, allowing insurance companies to
invest in redevelopment areas.122
Van Buskirk’s efforts also persuaded the state to purchase land and provide funds for
Point State Park and convinced Equitable Life Insurance (a New York based insurer) to buy land
adjacent to the park, pay annual fees to the URA, and put up the stainless steel office buildings
that would later be known as the Gateway Center.123
117 Ibid.,166.
118 Ibid.
120 Jensen, in discussion with the author.
122 Ibid.

29
The Point State Park and Gateway Center plan was a long shot. Mellon and Van Buskirk
had to persuade companies to commit to space not yet built, with rent higher than downtown, and
on land prone to flooding. The gamble paid off; in 1956 Life referred to the Point and Gateway
Center as “Mellon’s Miracle.”124
Other “Pittsburgh Package” initiatives did not work out so well. Expedition of the Penn-
Lincoln Parkway was meant to “alleviate congestion and make (the city) more attractive.”125 The
opposite occurred: residents left for the suburbs in droves, a move they could afford thanks to the
G.I. Bill, “which gave WWII veterans access to long-term mortgages backed by the Veterans
Administration.”126 Despite public and private officials spending more than $5 billion in the
second half of the 20th century to repair Pittsburgh’s neighborhoods, the city’s population was on
a continuous decline, never again to surpass its mid-century count of 676,806.127
Like other post-industrial cities of the region, Pittsburgh suffered from this exodus to the
suburbs. The federal government gave the city money to clear the “slums” that developed in the
void left behind by the fleeing middle class and agreed to cover two-thirds of any loss.128
Eminent domain laws stipulate that land seized is seized with an alternative purpose in mind, and
the first redevelopment plan for a razed neighborhood was to be a civic auditorium with a
retractable roof.129 The Lower Hill District, an area very popular with minorities, was first
considered but later dismissed because the area’s density presented a “rehousing problem.”130
Lawrence and city administrators decided on Highland Park, a middle and upper class area
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.

30
mostly owned by Richard King, uncle to Richard King Mellon.131 Despite petitions and public
hearings against the project, Lawrence refused to budge until King’s lawyer threated the city
with an injunction.132 Opposition from local residents aside, Lawrence smelled defeat: “taking
land from a Mellon relative in a wealthy neighborhood may have posed a serious legal threat to
Lawrence’s larger urban redevelopment plans.”133
In the end, Lawrence chose to clear the Lower Hill District.134 Politically, it was the right
move as the lively but overcrowded neighborhood could not assemble cohesive opposition.135
Official reasons cited for the demolition included that 681 of the 901 homes were “substandard,”
and the crowding encouraged the spread of disease.136 The URA took the neighborhood in 1956,
removing 1,300 buildings, 413 businesses, and 8,000 people.137 To say the relocation did not go
well would be an understatement; no reparations were made and “homeowners had no contact
with the city until the acquisition had been made.”138 Families forced to leave the integrated Hill
moved mainly to neighborhoods that reflected their own race, creating a segregation problem
where there was not one before, so that “by 1960 Pittsburgh was one of the most segregated big
cities in America.”139
Despite the formation of groups who wanted the city to abandon its demolition plans in
favor of anti-poverty programs,140 local architects attacking the European Modernism on which
the redevelopment was based, and preservationists taking on restoration projects and
campaigning against the demolition of historic buildings, the URA pressed on with
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.

31
redevelopment by means of demolition.141 After the Lower Hill District was cleared, the URA
took on East Liberty, another Pittsburgh neighborhood. 1,200 homes were razed, the size of the
shopping district was reduced by 1 million square feet, and the middle of the neighborhood was
closed to automobiles. The neighborhood lost hundreds of small businesses and 4,500 people in
four decades. Not even the mayor’s boyhood streets escaped the larger redevelopment vision.
Lawrence was there to tear down “The Point” on May 18, 1950.142 133 buildings and 2 bridges
in the Point came down, leaving 59 acres empty.143 Over the next two decades the area would be
filled with stainless steel office towers, a hotel, an underground parking garage, a luxury
apartment building, a new state park, and a centerpiece fountain.144 What was formerly known
as the Point was now the “Golden Triangle.” Pittsburgh, it would appear, was on its way back:
“(in reference to Golden Triangle project) Of the $118 million in costs,only $600,000 came from public
coffers. By 1967, 22,000 people worked in the area, compared with 4,000 before 1950. The project,
which spurred a mid-century transformation known as the “Renaissance,” elevated Lawrence from a
political boss into a big-city mayor and governor, landed multibillionaire banker Richard King Mellon on
the cover of TIME and thrust Pittsburgh into the national spotlight for the first time since the age of
Andrew Carnegie, George Westinghouse,and Henry Clay Frick.”145
As mayor, Lawrence used his clout in county politics to influence the state legislature,
but as governor, he provided Pittsburgh with ties to state-level political power.146 During his four
year term, Pittsburgh benefitted from roadside improvements and bridge construction, a $100
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.

32
million flood control project, $300 million for further construction of the Pittsburgh airport, and
a statehouse-backed pressure on public authorities to coordinate development and financing.147
In “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” Doctor of Sociology Louise Jezierski
places the first Pittsburgh Renaissance between 1943 and 1970.148 However, all of the Pittsburgh
experts interviewed were in consensus that the two most instrumental decades were the 1940s
and 50s. Jensen said, “Renaissance I fundamentally changed the way Pittsburgh operates.
Without the groundwork it laid, both in improving basic quality of life and in creating long
lasting public-private partnerships, the successes of Renaissances II and III would not have been
possible.”149 The decisions made were a tough sell in the short term, but they saved the city for
the century to come.150
Although Renaissance I mostly focused on downtown development, there was also a
post-war investment of more than $1 billion into the steel valleys, even though America’s steel
industry was already losing some of its edge.151 Labor unions, churches, and neighborhood
groups were still supportive of a strategy to keep “Old Pittsburgh” by “mobilizing against
economic disinvestments in the manufacturing sector.152 “Although the public-private
partnership Renaissance I did succeed in preserving Pittsburgh as a corporate headquarters city,
it failed to stop either the gradual decline of steel and other manufacturing or the continued loss
of jobs;” hence, the stage was set for Renaissance II.153
Renaissance II
147 Ibid.
153 Ibid.

33
The era of the second Pittsburgh Renaissance is identified as one and the same with the
mayoral administration of Richard Caliguiri, from 1977 to 1988. Caliguiri, a Democrat, was
president of the city council when Mayor Peter Flaherty was appointed Deputy Attorney General
for the Carter administration in 1977.154 Before leaving office, Flaherty delivered on his election
promises to sever close ties with the ACCD and existing political machine, “promoting
neighborhood as opposed to downtown development, while dismantling the machine through
major cuts in personnel, thus depleting its patronage reserves.”155 Caliguiri did in fact become
the second mayor to “defeat the machine,” but it was not through the attacking style of his
predecessor.156 Rather, Caliguiri treated the political and growth machines with indifference, and
so community development corporations (CDCs) entered into the tradition of public-private
partnership.157
Taking over as interim mayor, Caliguiri inherited a foundation of established formal ties
to neighborhoods to build on. On his first day in office, Caliguiri re-normalized relations with the
ACCD by phoning their office and declaring his intention to focus on partnerships.158 At first
Caliguiri insisted he would not be seeking re-election and thus opted out of the Democratic
primary in the spring of 1978.159 After changing his mind later in the year, Caliguiri sought re-
election in the general election as an independent on the slogan, “It’s another Renaissance.”160
The Pittsburgh-for-Caliguiri ticket edged out the party-endorsed candidate, Thomas Foerster, by
approximately 5,300 votes (out of a rough total of 147,000). 161 With re-election a renewed
154 Barbara Ferman, Challenging the Growth Machine: Neighborhood Politics in Pittsburgh and Chicago, (Lawrence,
KS: University Press of Kansas,1996):39.
155 Ferman, Challenging the Growth Machine, 39.
156 Ibid.
159 Ferman, Challenging the Growth Machine, 39.
160 Ibid.,94.
161 Ibid.

34
commitment to economic development and to economic-political partnerships was set in motion
and the administration boldly decided to call this plan Renaissance II.162
In addition to the close partnership with the ACCD that he initially sought, Caliguiri set
up contacts with neighborhood groups and philanthropic foundations.163 “Caliguiri strengthened
the formal linkages between city government and neighborhood organizations and increased the
flow of resources to those organizations;” this system would be referred to as the “politics of
group mobilization.”164Described by Jezierski as “a dual-state structure of consisting of an
electoral sphere and a quasi-state sphere typical of partnerships,” the emphasis on neighborhood
politics “allows the state to avoid the constraints of the electoral system.”165
The new decade brought with it some challenges demanding a response. Firstly, the
American economy was deindustrializing. Japan’s economic star was rising, and low-cost
manufacturing states in east and southeast Asia were quick studies.166 In 1963, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and China held a
combined share of 5.9% of world manufacturing output; by 1994 these same countries held
29.2%, and in the same period of time the U.S.’ share fell from 40% to 26.9%.167 Mirroring these
statistics was manufacturing sector employment numbers for the two regions. The steel industry
was not exempt from the transition to Asia, as American steel producers utilized new automation
technology where they could and outsourced production where they could not.168 U.S. Steel,
based in Pittsburgh, began investing in developing countries that exported steel in the early
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Crowley, The Politics of Place, 91.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.

35
1970s, and “announced in 1979 that it would permanently close twelve steel plants, half of which
were in Pittsburgh, resulting in the loss of 14,000 jobs in southwestern Pennsylvania.”169
Meanwhile the other last name in Steel City, Mellon, acquired controlling interests in
LTV Corporation, a large conglomerate. LTV “bought out J&L Steel, closed its Pittsburgh
plants, and entered a partnership with Sumitomo Steel Company of Japan.”170 The total cost of
deindustrialization to Pittsburgh was the loss of over 100,000 manufacturing jobs between 1979
and 1987.171 The service sector experienced sharp growth in compensation, but the opportunities
were inferior to previous ones in the unionized mills. At the time, the average annual income in
the region for a laborer in manufacturing was $36,989, compared to $24,442 for a service worker
of equal educational background. Despite more jobs created in the twenty year period between
1970 and 1990 than lost (approximately 170,000 and 100,000, respectively), the postindustrial
transition was one of economic hardship for Pennsylvanians. Secondly, not only was the
manufacturing base eroding, but federal aid to cities was being cut. Pittsburgh’s allocated
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) money went from $26 million in 1980 to $17
million in 1986.172
Together, these factors were a catalyst for the administration’s conscious effort to
diversify the local economy and step up as the region’s capital. In 1986 Caliguiri publicly
observed that “the steel industry is down. It might come back, and I hope it will, but in the
meantime we must attempt to revitalize our economy…The future, as I see it, is in high
Technology, it is in our educational and health institutions, in our research and development.”173
The rebalancing towards technology and services to diversify the region planted the seeds of
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.,101.
173 Ibid.

36
Renaissance III; taking what could be saved from the manufacturing base—the research and
development arm—and running with it.174
By the early 1980s, the “New Pittsburgh” strategy endorsed by corporations, civic
leaders, and non-profits such as the hospitals and universities was unchallenged, due to the
“competitive edge of the region’s steel industry being totally destroyed.”175 With the rapid
collapse of the steel industry, conflicts within business organizations were irrelevant and
demands from labor unions received little attention.176 The moniker “Steel City” was the only
remnant of “Old Pittsburgh.”
To better understand what “New Pittsburgh” meant for the regional economy, the ACCD
organized an Economic Development Committee (ECD) in 1981.177 The ECD’s final report, “A
Strategy for Growth: An Economic Development Program for the Pittsburgh,” was issued in
1984 and outlined their proposed economic development strategy for the region in five vital
points:178
1. “The forces that caused Pittsburgh’s decline are irreversible, and the area will never return to
primary metals and durable goods manufacturing.Nor will Pittsburgh be allowed to be so vulnerable
to a single type of industry in the future. The economy must diversify to enjoy continued stability.”
2. “A development strategy should pursue a mix of business in different industries,both product- and
service-oriented industries, and a mixture of mature and new activities.”
3. “The strategy should be long term and avoid quick fixes. There is no way to solve the massive
unemployment problem within a year or two, but a long-term solution of developing employment
sources is less likely to have severe cycles of unemployment in the future.”
4. “The strategy should be oriented to the private sector and market driven, and it should encourage
private investment. A strong and supportive public sector is important,however, to provide
transportation improvements,training and retraining,tax policy,and a supportive climate for
investment.”
176 Ibid.
178 Ibid.

37
5. “The strategy should call for coordinated action rather than central planning.”179 (all emphasis
mine)
Like the ambitious proposals of Renaissance I, implementing the ECD’s proposals
required state funding and “increased authority capabilities.”180Along with city council officials,
the ACCD prepared a bundled package of proposals called “Strategy 21” for presentation to the
state legislature.181 Spending requests included $97 million for improvements at Pittsburgh
Airport, $57.5 million for three Pittsburgh redevelopment projects (Three Rivers Stadium, Strip
Districts, and Herr’s Island), $49 million for 11 redevelopment projects in the Monongahela
Valley, $150 for highway improvements, and $71 million for advanced technology research at
city universities.182 Even outlined for officials in Harrisburg to see exactly where the money was
going and why the immoderate amount was necessary, Strategy 21 invoked controversy.
Remarks Jezierski,
“The Partnership professed that its goals were designed in the public’s interest, yet all the budget
requests were for large capital improvements that did not directly address the needs of neighborhoods
or labor. The partnership saw small business development as the key to structural unemployment.”183
The ACCD assessed the area’s resources and “decided that pursuing high tech was a
viable economic strategy.”184 According to the Regional Industrial Development Corporation of
Southwestern Pennsylvania (RIDC), the Pittsburgh MSA already had “more than 25,000 resident
scientists, engineers, and technicians; 170 research laboratories, a combined corporate budget of
more than $1.5 billion spent annually on research and development.”185 The same year that the
ECD’s report came out, southwestern Pennsylvania employed more than 40,000 in over 400 high
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.,173.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid.

38
tech firms.186 This base of technologically knowledgeable workers was owed to the city’s
manufacturing legacy—in addition to locating their headquarters in Pittsburgh, firms such as US
Steel, Alcoa, PPG, and Westinghouse also kept their centers of research and development
there.187 These firms understood that to survive they could not be stuck in the past and focused
on developing “new products such as optics…., robotics, and industrial automated controls.”188
Rather than aggressively recruit high tech firms from outside the region to relocate to Pittsburgh,
or “chip chasing,” the strategy pursued was to build a local “farm system, drawing on inherent
regional strengths in software and automation.”189
An organizational infrastructure was quickly set up: the High Technology Council (HTC)
was set up in 1983, with board members from the RIDC, local universities, and small and large
corporations.190 By 1985 the HTC boasted 300 organizational members, representing 131 high-
tech companies, 136 professional service companies, and 24 civic, academic, and entrepreneurial
organizations.191 The same year that the HTC was set up, the local universities created their own
group, the Western Pennsylvania Advanced Technology Center (WPATC), to focus on the
development of robotics, biological and biomedical technology, high-tech materials, and coal
processing.”192 This information may seem repetitive, but it is included to emphasize the
dedication and cooperation of public and private Pittsburgh to heed the advice of the EDCs
report. University research is key to new industry development, so linkages with those
universities are absolutely essential.193 The Enterprise Corporation of Pittsburgh (ECP) aids in
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.,174.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.

39
fostering these linkages between the universities and larger corporations, and manages the pool
resources for venture capital.194 With the infrastructure firmly in place, Renaissance III was
poised to take Pittsburgh through the 1990s and into the next century.
Interestingly, near the end of Caliguiri’s administration, Pittsburgh voters passed a
referendum to establish district elections for the city council, instead of electing all members at-
large.195 Despite Caliguiri’s emphasis on neighborhoods and cooperative partnerships, or
perhaps because of it, citizens decided they would be better served as constituents in separate
districts rather than the city as a whole. This separated the mayor’s office from the city council,
and created the potential for even greater divisions among the branches of Pittsburgh
government.196
After Caliguiri died in office in 1988, city council president Sophie Mastoff took over as
mayor.197 Her administration continued the “strong relationship between neighborhoods and
City Hall,” but the late 1980s the economic initiatives organized earlier in the decade had
matured to sustain economic development without close political oversight.198
Renaissance III
Renaissance III almost did not get off the ground, as the organizational infrastructure set
up at the end of Caliguiri’s administration stalled in the early 1990s. Pittsburgh and Allegheny
County continued to suffer net population losses through the 1990s, especially of college-
educated young adults (the phenomenon known as “brain drain”).199 In 1992, the Pittsburgh
194 Ibid.
196 Ibid.,111.
198 Ibid.

40
metropolitan area had the slowest employment growth in the U.S.200 In that same year, the
ACCD published another report, pinning the new decade’s malaise on the unfamiliar lack of
regional cohesion: “Key stakeholders from business, labor, government, education, civic
organizations and foundations in Southwestern Pennsylvania do not have a widely shared vision
of what the region’s economy can be.”201 The report went on to reference the “sheer
proliferation” of public-private cooperation since the era of Renaissance I.202 In 1993 there were
over 200 active organizations in the region (compared to the fewer than 25 during Renaissance
I), but the exceptional coordination was not there; instead the organizations were plagued with
“factionalism, fragmentation, and overlapping agendas which divert attention from solving real
problems.”203
Naturally, the solution to this discontent was to create more organizations, with more
clearly defined initiatives. Two of the most important groups created during the 1990s were the
Pittsburgh Downtown Partnership (PDP) and the Pittsburgh Urban Magnet Project (PUMP).204
PDP was created by the ACCD in 1994 with the mission to foster a “clean, safe, accessible, and
vibrant downtown.”205 The group works with other agencies to help market downtown as the
business and cultural center of the region, with a special focus on the Golden Triangle (aka “The
Point” of Renaissance I focus).206 PDP created a business improvement district in 1997 to pay
for cleaning, marketing, and other services for businesses in the Golden Triangle.207 PUMP was
formed in 1995 by a University of Pittsburgh graduate student “in order to advocate issues
200 Ibid.,105.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.

41
affecting “young and young-thinking people” in Pittsburgh.”208 The rationale was, if 20-39 year
olds are the future of Pittsburgh, why not treat them like it? PUMP made the region more
attractive to young professionals by involving them in the political and civic scene.209 The City
of Pittsburgh gives credit to PUMP for helping to build its younger image by advocating for its
members to sit on the city’s organizational boards.210
The broader importance of the aforementioned groups is that because they are
“autonomous from local growth coalitions, but [have] stakes in local redevelopment issues,”
Pittsburgh “began to create a more pluralistic system of redevelopment politics” when State
Senator Tom Murphy was elected mayor of Pittsburgh.211
Murphy “responded to the region’s continued economic decline with an aggressive urban
growth agenda that emphasized investing in the preservation and strengthening of downtown and
reusing older industrial sites for business retention, expansion, and relocation opportunities.”212
The goal was to increase shopping, dining, entertainment in the downtown area, which was
declining because of growth in the suburbs.213
To finance his agenda, Murphy established the Pittsburgh Development Fund (PDF) and
the Strategic Investment Fund (SIF).214 PDF started with a budgetary commitment from the city
of $7 million annually, with banks and foundations agreeing to match the contribution, “resulting
in $120 million for low-interest, flexible financing of redevelopment projects.”215 SIF started
with “$40 million of private contributions from thirty regional corporations, foundations, and
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.,106.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.,108.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid.,109.
215 Ibid.

42
individuals.”216 It provided financial incentives (flexible loan terms and deferred interest) for
private developers to partner with the city on large-scale redevelopment projects.217
PDF and SIF financed several projects, including the 1.5 million square foot David L.
Lawrence Convention Center (named after the Mayor who ushered in Renaissance I) and Penn
Avenue Place, a $56 million renovation of turn of the 19th century dry goods department store
into a 560,000 square foot office and retail complex (the Pittsburgh Historical Landmarks
Foundation (PHLF) designated the building a historic landmark and it was carefully adapted to
be a high energy office and retail space.).218
Not all PDF/SIF projects were successful. A Lazarus department store, financed by
“absorbing $48 million in public subsidies,” folded in 2004, after only 5 years in operation.219
All of these large redevelopment deals were highly scrutinized by the public. It was a pluralistic
political environment, and most, if not all, of these projects made use of eminent domain and had
incredible price tags attached.220 This is another way in which the think tanks and autonomous
groups were important; they had the capacity to come in and “mobilize credible challenges to
corporatist-style redevelopment projects.”221
Eminent domain, which was not a tool of Renaissance II, was crucial to the strategy of
Renaissance III. The difference between Pittsburgh’s use of eminent domain during Renaissance
I and the 1990s was that “as the economy diversified, no longer could a single individual such as
R.K. Mellon speak for the entire business community.”222
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
221 Ibid.,110.
222 Ibid.,111.

43
In October of 1999, Mayor Tom Murphy presented his “bold new plan to remake
Pittsburgh’s distressed retail district.”223 The plan was called “Market Place at Fifth and Forbes”
and proposed a $480 million redevelopment of the downtown area, calling for the demolishment
of 62 properties and replacing 125 local businesses with upscale retailers and restaurants.224
Critics immediately compared the mayor’s Market Place agenda to the demolition and rebuilding
projects of Renaissance I. Officials from Murphy’s administration for two years had “kept the
community out of the planning process by not inviting participation and by keeping a tight grip
on information that opponents would have needed to adequately respond to the plan.”225 Pages
112 to139 of Crowley’s The Politics of Place chronicle the process by which various
neighborhoods groups, CDCs, and previously mentioned organizations, inspired by the
cooperation shown in Renaissance I, joined together to ultimately defeat the mayor’s plan, and
presented an alternative of their own.
Another incredibly important facet of the third Renaissance was the purposeful
investment in the already strong research university community. The Murphy administration and
URA worked together to get federal and state funding for the Carnegie Mellon University-NASA
Robotics Engineering Consortium Initiative with the purpose of exploiting the commercial
potential of robotics technologies.226 Today, Carnegie Mellon is leading the world in robotics
research, and people from outside the Pittsburgh region seek treatment at the University of
Pittsburgh medical system.227 Unlike industry, universities are incredibly invested in their
223 Ibid.,1.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.,127.
226 Brian Jacobs, Strategy and Partnership in Cities and Regions: Economic Development and Urban Regeneration in
Pittsburgh, Birmingham, and Rotterdam, (New York: St. Martin’s Press,2000):95.
227 Renn, in discussion with the author.

44
physical capital.228 They are not going to leave their location like a company could. Current
Mayor of Pittsburgh Bill Peduto had this to say about the “Eds & Meds” impact on his city: “The
[steel] mills never left. They just moved up the hills, and [now] they’re called [University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center], and Carnegie Mellon and the University of Pittsburgh.”229
V. Conclusion
Across the U.S., cities are very weak. The federal system divides power between the
federal government and the states, leaving cities as urban administrative divisions of their states.
Except for CDBGs, federal funding very rarely goes to cities; rather, it goes to the states to
allocate as they wish. Thus, the federal government has very little influence and control over
cities directly. It would be neither politically likely nor appropriate for the federal government to
intervene on behalf of city’s economic affairs. And in swing states, the government can be
competitive to the point of ineffectiveness: a Republican mayor is not going to give money to a
Democratic municipal administration, and vice versa. But in the case of Detroit, giving more
power directly to the cities is a bad idea—and Lansing agrees.230 “It is like the parable of the
talents in the Bible,” says Renn. “Until you prove you can be trusted with the little things, you
are not going to be trusted with the big things. Giving more power to an economic region is a
different story.”231
Regional cooperation, a dominant theme in Pittsburgh’s history of the past hundred years,
has been conspicuously absent in Detroit. The blame for this failure does not rest squarely on the
mayor’s office or the business community, but is rather shared:
228 Eric Montarti (policy analyst),in discussion with the author, 2014.
229 Ghosh, “A Tale of Three Cities.”

45
“The failure of Detroit’s regime to form a regional coalition cannot be reduced to the failure of an effective
mayor-center coalition to emerge but reflects inadequacies on both sides of the public-private fence and in
fence-building.”232
Detroit has also been plagued by “relatively weak participation in community-based
organizations,” further protecting the mayoralty from contending with popular discontent.233
Another crucial difference between Pittsburgh and Detroit is the linked factors of freeway
expansion and suburbanization. The two cities have had different experiences with highways.
Pittsburgh is among the largest of U.S. cities lacking a beltway (a highway encircling a city, as
opposed to going through it). “Getting around Pittsburgh is painful to travelers because going
through downtown is unavoidable. The benefit to Pittsburgh is that it is very easy to get
downtown; everything converges there in the Golden Triangle.”234
Detroit, in comparison, has more freeway miles per land area than most U.S. cities
because “the auto –dominated economy wanted a landscape that supported its values.”235 These
highways serve little purpose except to help suburbanites further avoid the city. The physical
location that was crucial to Detroit’s initial prosperity is a hindrance now: Michigan is a
peninsula; cross-country traffic does not pass through Detroit the way it does in cities such as
Indianapolis, or to a lesser extent, Pittsburgh.236 As for suburbanization, Pittsburgh’s lack of a
beltway combined with its significantly hilly topography to limit “the direction and scale of
outward expansion,” relative to Detroit.237 Detroit would lose over a million residents to the
suburbs, while Pittsburgh lost around 300,000. Pittsburgh’s population decline was significant,
233 Ibid.,18.
237 Dr. Stephanie Ryberg-Webster (professor of urban affairs),in discussion with the author, 2014.

46
but in this case, not comparable. Unlike Detroit, the region surrounding Pittsburgh never stopped
being absolutely dependent on its urban core.238
Can Detroit Follow the Pittsburgh Model?
A critical analysis of Pittsburgh’s political and economic policy in the 20th century shows
that its success cannot be easily (or quickly) replicated; unfortunately, there “is no silver bullet
for solving chronic Rust Belt problems.”239 Jezierski identifies three reasons why the Steel City’s
turnaround is not reproduced across the Great Lakes region:
“First, the particular and compelling leadership of the Mellon interests was crucial in organizing the private
sector. Second,the corporate resources available in Pittsburgh are shared by only a few metropolitan areas.
Third, local government had to extend decision making authority to private sectorgroups that could
underwrite the planning process.”240
However, if Detroit is to intentionally emulate the Pittsburgh model, there are five
specific obstacles to overcome.
First, it must be noted that Detroit cannot utilize the powers of eminent domain like
Pittsburgh did in Renaissance I, simply because it cannot financially afford to. Even though
blighted, abandoned structures are magnets for arson, crime, and injury, each building would
cost an average of $20-25 thousand to raze.241 That is a luxury Detroit does not at the present
have. There is also a lack of political will; with so many structures, where do you even begin?242
Second, concerning the “Eds and Meds” component: like Pittsburgh, Detroit does have a
downtown research university. Wayne State University (WSU) is the third largest university in
Michigan, offering more than 370 programs through 13 colleges (including a medical school and
239 Francis,“Why Detroit Won’t Have a Pittsburgh Renaissance.”

47
college of engineering) to almost 29,000 students.243 Yet there are a crucial differences for
Detroit: WSU is a public university, whereas Carnegie Mellon University and Duquesne
University are private and the University of Pittsburgh is only state-related (a designation
specific to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; four of its universities receive non-preferred
financial appropriations from the state in exchange for offering tuition discounts to in-state
students, while the university legally remains a separate and private entity). And for native
Michigan students interested in medicine and engineering, not only is world-renowned
University of Michigan (UM) only 45 minutes away from Detroit in Ann Arbor, but the state’s
land grant university, Michigan State (MSU) is an hour away in the capital.244 WSU will never
be able to compete with UM and MSU, not that WSU’s second or third tier status among
research universities negates its status as an asset to Detroit:
“It is clearly important to a city/region to have the presence of major educational institutions from an
innovation and economic development perspective.Universities such as Wayne State fill an important
role in serving the population of their cities, many of whom are lower-income residents,first-time college
students and perhaps unable to attend or afford prestigious institutions such as Carnegie Mellon.
Therefore, It is worth investing in Wayne State - not because it might compete fully with UM or because
it will save Detroit, but rather because it fills an important role in serving Detroit's population.”245
On that note, Pittsburgh is so much smaller than Detroit, in both square miles and
population, that despite being a major U.S. city and regional capital with a diversified economy,
it is able to be dominated by the research university cluster.246
Third, Pittsburgh’s philanthropic legacy is nearly unparalleled. For generations,
Pittsburghers have grown up with a cadre of wealthy, influential people who have cared about
243 Katz, “A Growth Strategy for Post-Bankruptcy Detroit.”
245 Ryberg-Webster, in discussion with the author.

48
the community, as evident in the fact that “nearly every cultural institution has the Carnegie of
Mellon name on it.”247 Henry Ford was generous with his estate, but the Ford Foundation is
headquartered in New York City with a global mission to advance human welfare. Carnegie,
Mellon, and H.J. Heinz (Pittsburgh business magnate of the 57 varieties fame) had a different
focus. Mellon, described as shy and reluctant, stayed in Pittsburgh and spent his adult life
participating in public-private partnerships for the benefit of the city because his father “revered
Pittsburgh.”248 Heinz had a devout Christian faith that compelled him to philanthropy and civic
engagement—not only was Heinz chairman of the committee in charge of devising ways to
protect Pittsburgh from floods, but he left an endowment that is among the largest in the United
States, with a specific southwestern Pennsylvania outlook in its mission statement.249 As for the
steel tycoon himself,
“Carnegie instilled a civic soul in every Pittsburgher. He left for the city a legacy with a great emphasis on
educating the youth,which itself is a hallmark of Carnegie’s Scottish heritage and the Scottish golden age
of enlightenment. This tradition has really given the altruistic foundations in Pittsburgh the capacity to
pick the city up on their back when the need arose.”250
Fourth, even if Detroit does take steps to grow and diversify the local economy, they will
be late coming to that strategy. Pittsburgh, by
contrast, not only responded to the region’s
economic problems with public-private
cooperation, but they did so early, with gaze set
on the long-term. The ECDs report declaring that

49
the economy had to diversify if the city was to prosper, that decisions had to be made with the
long-term consequences in mind, and that private invest had to be courted, was published 30
years ago, and taken to heart then. Renaissance III would diversify Pittsburgh in the 1990s
during Mayor Murphy’s administration, with policies and economic initiatives out of City Hall
intentionally shifting the economic base to education, tourism, health care, medicine, finance,
and robotics. The change didn’t happen overnight; Pittsburgh would not be considered a
technology and research hub until the 2000s.
Finally, although the focus of the research intended to be purely economic and political,
with demographic differences as sharply contrasted as those in Detroit and Pittsburgh, the
addressing the question of the influence race has on a city is inevitable. Of the 100 largest
metropolitan areas of the United States, Pittsburgh comes second only to Scranton in
northeastern Pennsylvania when ranking the percentage of the white population, an incredible
87%.251 To put that in perspective, Pittsburgh is whiter than Amish Lancaster County,
Pennsylvania; whiter than the center of the world’s Mormon population, Salt Lake City; whiter
than agrarian centers such as Des Moines, Iowa; and whiter than isolated regions like Boise,
Idaho. Urban analyst Aaron Renn puts it bluntly: “Cities that are all white are just going to look
better statistically because white people have the best statistics. That’s why Pittsburgh, Portland,
and Seattle look so good.”252 There are historical and geographical factors for Pittsburgh’s lack
of diversity. Pittsburgh was settled largely by Scottish and Irish immigrants, which culturally are
clannish.253 Pittsburghers are very proud that the city has developed its own insular dialect,
251 WilliamH.Frey, “The New Metro Minority Map: Regional Shifts in Hispanics,Asians,and Blacks fromCensus
2010,” Brookings Institution (2011),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/8/31%20census%20race%20frey/0831censusr
acefrey.
252 Francis,“Why Detroit Won’t Have a Pittsburgh Renaissance.”

50
famous for saying “yinz” where people from the American South would say “y’all.”254 It can be
very hard for an outsider to move into a parochial, tightly networked community like that.255 The
previously mentioned effect of highways also affected migration: after WWII Detroit was easily
accessible, whereas Pittsburgh lacked a transportation network to get southern blacks into the
city.256
Detroit, by contrast, was 82% black as of the 2010 census.257 Both cities have the short-
term advantage that comes from being homogenous: it is easier done in an unvarying
environment because you do not have to reconcile competing views. However, it is not advisable
to actively eschew diversity.258
The Current Situation and Next Steps
With filing bankruptcy, Detroit can tell its citizens, “We know where rock bottom is: this
is it. This is the worst. Know at least that the financial state is out in the open.”259 Now that
Detroit is greatly relieved of its debt, the main priorities are finding a way to bring in new
revenue, becoming more effective at levying taxes, and getting substantially better at providing
services.260
It seems like a catch-22. Detroit has a hard time selling itself to future potential residents
and businesses for its rate of violent crime, poor education, sub-standard housing and services,
and degraded infrastructure, but these factors are hard to change without tax-paying residents
providing a tax base to fund city services and without jobs putting money into the local
257 “State and County QuickFacts:Detroit (city),Michigan,” United States Census Bureau (2014),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html.
259 Ibid.

51
economy. Which side has to give first? Some academics reason that “more people will move to
an expensive, high-tax city like New York, than a cheap, high-tax one like Detroit because of the
massive differential in services.”261 Others hold a more positive line— that Downtown and
Midtown are a stark contrast to the neighborhoods, and young people are attracted to the low
overhead cost and attractive start-over mentality.262 Lupher spoke for the Woodward Avenue
corridor: “People know that the police and fire departments have a presence in the area, so they
also see opportunity. Detroit will grow from there, just not as fast as before.”263 Another reason
for hope in Detroit is Michigan’s recent enactment of “schools of choice.”264 Previously couples
did not want to raise their families in Detroit for the poor school system, but now that there are
charter school options it is possible they will reconsider. “It’s hard to see it for the bleak
statistics, but it is there,” Saunders continues. “For a while, there will be two Detroits.”265
The seeds of Detroit’s renewal are there: even after losing 1.1 million people since 1950,
Detroit still maintains a population density on par with Portland and Minneapolis, and more than
Atlanta, Dallas, or Houston.266 The city now needs to find multiple new economic footholds.
Although Detroit has an out of the way location compared to the rest of the United States, it still
remains the apex of US-Canadian commercial traffic, which has only increased since the passage
of NAFTA.267 It is extremely unlikely that geographic advantage will ever ebb, so it should be
capitalized on, such as building a new bridge to span the Detroit River. Detroit can also look to
capitalize on the fact that the area airport is a major hub with many non-stop flights to Asia, a
261 Dalmia,“No Utopia for Detroit,” 10.
264 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
267 Ibid.

52
holdover legacy from the auto industry.268 There is also a push to reclaim the city’s music
heritage; to make an R&B equivalent to Nashville.269
Until the city finds a way to bring in new revenue, what little resources it has must be
invested wisely. If the remaining amount allocated for infrastructure is spent equally across the
city, if it will make little to no impact.270 Instead, local officials will have to spend it on
concentrated areas, which requires the hard task of telling residents on lonely blocks that they are
no longer going to invest in that area.271 The municipal finance system currently in place in
Michigan does not work very well, with the income from casino and gaming tax long ago having
surpassed its property tax counterpart.272 Hopefully Saunders in right when he boldly claims,
“Detroit is going to have a prominence by nature of its place in American history. It’s a big city.
Big cities don’t go away.”273
As for Pittsburgh, Mayor Peduto has gone on the record as saying “there will not be a
Renaissance IV.”274 Regardless, the city has retained the lessons of its three seasons of
redevelopment. Pittsburgh maintains an economy that is diversified and non-complacent, as well
as a workforce that is educated and nimble.275 For example, five years ago people were not
familiar with the terms horizontal drilling, fracking, or shale gas; “low and behold, there’s a lot
of money in that in southwest Pennsylvania. An entire new industry is growing out of that.”276
God forbid the technological industry is ever eclipsed, it will be interesting to see how Pittsburgh
reinvents itself once again.
270 Ryberg-Webster, in discussion with the author.
271 Ibid.
274 Montarti, in discussion with the author.
276 Ibid.

53
VI. Appendix
Abbreviations
ACCD Allegheny Conference on Community Development
AIPP Allegheny Institute of Public Policy
CDBG Community Development Block Grant
CDC community development corporation
CRCM Citizens Research Council of Michigan
DEDC Detroit Economic Development Corporation
GM General Motors
HTC High Technology Council
MSA Metropolitan Statistical Area
MSU Michigan State University
PEL Pennsylvania Economy League
PDF Pittsburgh Development Fund
PDP Pittsburgh Downtown Project
PHLF Pittsburgh Historical Landmarks Foundation
PRPG Pittsburgh Regional Planning Association
PUMP Pittsburgh Urban Magnet Partnership
RIDC Regional Industrial Corporation of Southwestern Pennsylvania
SIF Strategic Investment Fund
UM University of Michigan
URA Urban Redevelopment Authority
WPATC Western Pennsylvania Advanced Technology Center
WSU Wayne State University
Interview Questions
(for Detroit experts)
1. Do you think Detroit reflects America; that it is symbolic and representative of the US
industrial revolution, dominance, and decline? Or is it a city set apart, too unique to be
our national vanguard?

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