Forum 2013 Climate change: new challenges, new approaches
1. Climate change:
new challenges and new approaches
Workshop moderated by
the
Gaëtan Lefèvre
Insurance Manager CMI Group,
Chairman of BELRIM, Member of
scientific committee of FERMA
01/10/2013 -
Inspire
1
2. Climate change:
new challenges and new approaches
Lucka Kajfez-Bogotaj
Professor for Climatology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
“Climate change: facts & choices”
Tommaso Capurso
Head of Internal Audit Division “ Operations and Technical Systems”, SNCB Holding
“Practical application of “Cyndinics” – the science of danger – for risk managers”
David Cadoux
Property & Casualty Chief Risk Officer, AXA
“Macro-economic trends, political risk management & insurability”
Jeremy Hindle,
Head of Enterprise Risk Aggregation, XL Group
“Climate change risk assessment: impacts & opportunities”
2
3. Climate change:
new challenges and new approaches
Facts & choices
Lučka Kajfež Bogataj
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
01/10/2013
3
5. Key questions
1. Can 9 billion people be fed
equitably, healthily and
sustainably?
Increased demand
50% by 2030 (IEA)
Energy
2. Can we cope with the future
demands on water?
Climate
Change
Food
Water
Increased demand
50% by 2030
Increased demand
30% by 2030
(FAO)
(IFPRI)
Biodiversity
The Perfect Storm? (Beddington, 2009)
3. Can we provide enough
energy to supply the
growing population coming
out of poverty?
4. Can we mitigate and adapt
to climate change?
5. Can we do all this in the
context of redressing the
decline in biodiversity and
preserving ecosystems?
5
7. Greenhouse gases climb
Earth’s energy imbalance: more energy coming in than going out
Additional radiative forcing from GHG above
preindustrial times is now 2.9 Wm‐2
(32% increase since 1990)
7
8. The climate change challenge in a nutshell
Average temperature of the earth has risen by 0.8
degrees Celsius since 1900
Expected rise in global temperature of 3°C or more by
the end of the century
Temperature rise results in extreme weather events and
impacts (e.g. flooding, droughts, sea level rise, etc.)
Human action mainly responsible for observed and
projected climate change
Risk of major economic and social disturbances
particularly in developing countries
Swift action required to:
Reduce the causes of climate changes (mitigation)
Prepare for the impacts of climate change (adaptation)
8
11. Observations for northern hemisphere land
global warming is already increasing extreme weather events
Extreme summer heat anomalies now cover about
10% of land area, up from 0.2% (1951-1980)
Frequency of occurrence (vertical axis)
local standard deviation (horizontal axis).
Temperature anomalies in the period 1951-1980 shown in green
Hansen et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 2012.
11
12. Hazard intensity and frequency increasing
linked to climate variability and change
Intensity
Socio-economic Impacts of
weather and climate-related
extremes on the rise !
Strong Wind
Heavy rainfall / Flood
Drought
Heatwaves
Frequency
12
13. Climate change scenarios
Available theories on causaility
agreement on these theories
For instance,
World economy
in 100 Years
For instance,
climate system
For instance,
Weather next
week
Information on relevant parameters
13
15. Provisional scenario analysis 2050-2100
High Climate
Sensitivity
Worst
Case
Failed
Mitigation
Policies
3-6ºC
6-8ºC
2-5ºC
Best Case
2-3ºC
Successful
Mitigation
Policies
Low Climate
Sensitivity
15
16. Climate change impacts
Physical
systems
(ice, rivers, etc.)
Climate
Change
Impacts
Food yields
Biological
cycles
Direct health
impacts (heat,
extreme events...)
Stern Report (UK, 2006)
Indirect
impacts
Economy:
infrastructure,
output, growth
Wealth (and
distribution); local
environment; etc.
Human
Well-being
16
17. Climate risk as an enterprise risk
Enterprise Risks
Example Specific to Climate Change
Hazard risks:
liability torts, property damage,
natural catastrophe
Financial risks:
pricing risk, asset risk, currency
risk, liquidity risk
Operational risks:
customer satisfaction, business
continuity, product failure,
reputational risk
Strategic risks:
competition, social trend, capital
availability
o
Property damage or increasing maintenance costs from
floods, hurricanes, droughts
o
Insurance or business loans that rise in price or become
unavailable in flood-prone or coastal areas
Energy or other commodity price shocks or volatility
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Changing requirements for equipment or heating and
cooling
Changing resource availability and quality (water, power)
Customer obligations not met due to supply interruption
Market shifts, reduced product demand
First mover advantage for meeting new market demands
Possible public responses to resource constraints (water
access, public health concerns) leading to compliance or
regulatory costs
www.C2ES.org. , 2013
17
18. Climate change mitigation in a nutshell
Fossil Fuels are Cheapest Energy
Subsidized & do not pay costs (solution: rising price on carbon)
Technology Development Needed
Driven by certainty of carbon price (government role limited)
Regulations also Required
Efficiency of vhicles, buildings...spatial planning
18
19. Realities of reducing CO2 emissions
Stabilizing at 450 ppmv CO2-e means 2050 global CO2 emissions must be
reduced by ~7-9 GtC/yr
To understand the size of this challenge, consider some examples of what
avoiding 1 GtC/yr in 2050 requires…
- energy use in buildings cut 20-25% below BAU in 2050, or
- fuel economy of 2 billion cars ~4 l/100 km instead of 8 l/100 km, or
-1 million 2-MWe wind turbines replacing coal power plants or
- 2,000 1-GWe(peak) photovoltaic power plants replacing coal power plants
- cutting 2005 tropical deforestation rate in half worldwide
Socolow & Pacala, 2004
19
20. Adaptation is now inevitable...
The only question is “will it be by plan or by chaos”?
IPCC, 2007
20
22. Adaptive capacity
“is the ability or potential of a
system to respond successfully
to climate variability and
changes.“
(IPCC 2007)
Awareness
Technology and infrastructure
Economic resources
Institutions
22
23. Vulnerability to climate
change
“ is a function of the character,
magnitude, and rate of climate
variation to which a system is
exposed, its sensitivity, and its
adaptive capacity.”
(IPCC 2007)
Countries which expect a high
increase in impact seem to be less
able to adapt
Climate change would trigger a
deepening of the existing socioeconomic imbalances between the
core of Europe and its periphery.
Future runs counter to territorial
cohesion ?
23
24. Projecting changes in both physical and human systems is
necessary for anticipating future risks from climate change
IPCC SREX (2012)
Progress requires closer
integration of research on climate
science and human systems
24
25. Taxonomy of the future
www.gtinitiative.org/perspectives/taxonomy.html
25
26. Conclusions
Climate Change is a Large Issue : majority of the sciences
and engineering disciplines are involved, business/industry has a
stake, every sector of the economy affected, involves citizens and
politicians, all aspects of our lives touched: jobs, health, politics,
national security, etc.
Exploration of future climate is relevant : Where are we heading?
Actions now influence the future: Inertia (lifetime avg. power plant > 40
years; lifetime CO2 in atmosphere > 100 years. Climate system may
change irreversibly, we may pass thresholds…
We shall (or need) to act: prevent certain futures from happening,
adapt to certain futures
Companies must address climate risks: not only financial, operational
and strategic risks, but also regulatory, liability, or reputational risk
26
27. Climate change:
new challenges and new approaches
Practical Application of
"Cindynics“
The Science of Danger
for Risk Managers
Ir. Tommaso Capurso
MIA, CCSA, CIA, QA, EFARM, CRMA
Internal Audit, SNCB Holding,
Belgian Railways, Belgium
28. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Agenda
1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Q/A
–
–
Major accidents: generic and specific lessons learned
The dilemma of "antagonist" and/or not prioritized objectives
–
–
–
–
–
Why the cindynics now, since other methodologies are available
No theory here, just a few recalls and definitions
Key concepts in the methodology of cindynics
Seven-step process/tool kit for systematic application
Illustrations based the major accident of Fukushima
–
Conclusions
–
One may ask the
question: is there
a feeling of risk?
Yes !
Discussion
28
29. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Major accidents (1/2): generic lessons learned
• "Experience shows that catastrophes … never have a single and simple
cause. There is always a complex chain of events and deficiencies that
leads to these kinds of accidents. Causes can almost always be traced
back to managerial, organisational and human interface factors.
A catastrophe is an accident of the organisation …"
(ERA, European Railway Agency, Railway Safety Performance in the European Union, 2010)
• "An accident generally arises from a failure of the dynamic interactions in
the whole system rather than the local failure of one or more parties"
(René Amalberti)
• "In technological systems, it is not possible to avoid all serious accidents,
regardless of the effort invested in safety, because their complexity
reaches levels that prevent us dealing fully with all the eventualities"
(Charles Perrow, "Normal Accidents", Princeton, 1999)
29
30. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Major accidents (2/2): specific lessons learned
(Fukushima)
“It was a profoundly manmade disaster”.
« We believe that the root causes were the organizational
and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for
decisions and actions, rather than issues relating to the
competency of any specific individual ».
Official report of The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC), July 4th, 2012
30
31. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
The general dilemma of the decision-maker/manager:
"antagonist" and/or not prioritized objectives
I just want
that one !
Sorry, they
are sold
together !
Enterprise
Service
Performance
Productivity
Budgets
Schedules
…
Risk
In particular
in the field
of safety
The Management to the Chief engineer :
« Take off your engineer's hat and put on your manager's hat »
31
32. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Little or no systematic methodology for the
systemic analysis of incident/accident risks
Most of the existing approaches are using :
The thematic approach, not necessarily using a specific/exhaustive typology
The chronological approach (event-based)
To be pointed out the air crash investigations approach (by an "AAIB" or Air
Accident Investigation Bureau)
– Reconstructing the event
– What happened?
– Why did it happen?
– Understanding the phenomena
– Updating codes and models
– Publishing recommendations
Inventor
of the wheel
Inventor
of risk
He should have
applied
cindynics!
32
34. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Definition of a « new » word : cindynics
• The concept of “cindynics” was presented in 1987 by Georges-Yves
Kervern at the UNESCO international conference in Paris on
technological risk management
• Litterally, its meaning is “science of danger”, from the greek
“kindunos” (“danger”)
• The concept is based on the “theory of systems”, organizations
being considered as complex, open and interacting systems
• In the cindynic approach, the danger can be characterized by:
– the different networks of actors confronted with “dangerous” situations;
– the way they look at the situation;
– the structuring of the different views according to 5 “dimensions”,
“perspectives” or “axes” (facts, models, goals, rules and values);
– the identification of "dissonances" between the networks of actors;
– the deficits that affect each of these dimensions.
34
35. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Seven-step application of the cindynic approach
to incident/accident studies
The 7-step tool kit.
Step
Aim
I
Defining the cindynic situation
II
Developing a description of the system or organisation
III
Developing and studying the hyperspaces associated with
networks of actors
IV
Identifying systemic cindynogenic deficiencies, deficiencies in
cindynic systems and dissonances
V
Establishing a summary matrix correlating actors with cindynic
failures
VI
Drafting a narrative summary
VII
Deducing actions to reduce deficiencies and dissonances
EFARM presentation of the “mémoire” on the application of cindynics, 06/04/2011, AMRAE/Carm Institute, T Capurso
35
36. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Step I: Defining the cindynic situation
Description of the situation:
• Prospective view: risk analysis (potential danger)
• Retrospective (after-the-fact) view: observations (incident, nearmiss, accident, catastrophe)
– The facts characterising the problem, whether potential or real
(statistics, data, KPI’s,… and context)
– Example from the nuclear plant context (adapted from source EPRI,
11/2011): accidents remain possible, despite years of continuous
Chernobyl
risk analysis
(04/1986)
(03/1979)
(03/2011)
36
37. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
4. Questions/Answers
3. Conclusions
Step II: developing a description of the system
or organisation
Attempt to model the network of Fukushima actors
CABINET
OFFICE
NSC
AEC
OECD
NEA
[UE]
IRS
(International Reporting System)
→ Timeframe:
Data base
~ 40 to 50 years (~8000 incidents reported)
→ Limits on the
network of
actors: TEPCO
and the various
national and
international
stakeholders
involved
(Nuclear safety
Commission
(Atomic Energy
Commission)
(Nuclear Energy Agency)
Input =
nuclear philosophy
Regional Authority
NB: Directives for radio
protection, but no harmonization
of safety
MEXT
(Ministry Energy,
Education...
Technology)
Trade & Industry)
[WENRA]
Western European
Nuclear Regulators Association
IAEA
METI
(Ministry
JAEA
(Japan Atomic
Energy Agency)
NISA
(Nuclear Safety and
Industry Agency)
Basic design
Controls
"Preparedness"
Emergency plan
Annual input from R-Ex (return of rexperience)
by country: description; codification;
lessons learned; correctives actions )
Basic
Law
SAFETY
REGULATOR:
Supervision
& audit of
safety
regulation
OFF-SITE
CENTER
TSO
(Technical Safety
Organization)
(JNESO)
R-Ex
Network of
TSO's
(= ETSON network in
(Nuclear Regulatory
Commission)
Initial design rules
WANO
World Association
Nuclear Operators
Proposal of
standards and
design criteria
Exchanges R-Ex
Peer review independent of the TSO
s
on
cti
pe
Ins
l
va
pro
Ap
US NRC
Europe)
TEPCO
37
38. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Step III: developing and studying the hyperspaces
associated with networks of actors
Each actor/organisation is modelled by its hyperspace of danger, which has 5 axes
Rules (norms, laws, standards and ethical
codes, inspections etc.)
Representations and models
(based on facts)
Ethics
(rules)
Epistemics
(models)
Teleology
(objectives, missions, goals)
Statistics
(or memory)
(memory of facts
and figures)
Facts (memory, history, data
and statistics, lessons learned)
Objectives
(goals, reasons for
working)
Axiology
(values)
Culture (value systems)
The interactions between the various hyperspaces of danger are identified and
located based on the missions/roles/responsibilities given to each actor (internal or
institutional) → "cindynic flowchart" (interaction diagram with numbering if necessary).
38
39. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Step IV: identifying systemic cindynogenic deficiencies,
deficiencies in cindynic systems and dissonances (1/2)
The specific typology of G-Y.Kervern, with … specific semantics
10 main
Systemic
Cindynogenic
Deficiencies
DSC
4 cultural
deficiencies
2 organisational
deficiencies
4 managerial
deficiencies
DSC1 Infallibility
DSC2 Oversimplification
DSC3 Non-communication
DSC4 Navel-gazing
DSC5 Overemphasis on
productivity
DSC6 Dilution of responsibilities
DSC7 Failure to learn lessons
DSC8 Lack of adaptation to
experience
DSC9 Lack of cindynics training
DSC10 Lack of crisis preparation
5
Dissonances
D
Statistical
dissonance
Epistemic
dissonance
Teleological
dissonance
Ethical
dissonance
DS
Axiological
dissonance
DA
DE
DT
DD
According to G-Y Kervern
Hyperspace gaps
Cindynic system
deficiencies
Space gaps
Dsc 6 to 10
Disconnects
Dsc 11 to 18
Degeneration
27
Dsc 1 to 5
Dsc 19 to 23
Blockages
Dsc 24 to 27
Dsc
39
40. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Step IV: identifying systemic cindynogenic deficiencies,
deficiencies in cindynic systems and dissonances (2/2)
Models
"Technology" vs. "socio-technics"
Rules
Empowerment to laws and regulations?
Legitimacy of rules? Understandability?
Ergonomy?
Appreciation of complexity?
(simplism, infaillibility,
development in stand alone) ?
Knowledge tranfer formalised? Training?
Comparisons (benchmarking)
Way of using installations :
integration in the "design"?
Change management ?
Socio-technical countermeasures to
human and organizational factors ?
Process of re-visiting
and up dating of models?
Process of trade-off of strategic priorities ?
Attitude when facing perturbated situations :
principles or rules based to manage safety?
Clear segregation of duties ?
(decision, management, control)
Using the lessons learned ?
Collection of data : systematic lessons learned,
follow-up/reporting, concrete action plan ?
Statistics
Questions based on the development model of
socio-technical systems
Questions based on the components of an
integrated safety model
Intellectual
integrity:
- "healthy
scepticism"
- no complacency
The methodical doubt in 3 steps
1)
2)
3)
You
doubt
You
doubt
You
doubt
Are
you
sure ?
Motivation towards safety :
reactive or proactive ?
Values "corporate" ?
Safety policy/charter ?
Objectives "SMART"?
Culture of rik management ?
Safety culture :
"no blame" philosophy?
Culture/values
Interactions among actors
Cindynic flowchart
(interactions/deficiencies)
(illustration) (real picture is A1format)
Generic questions from reference systems such as
SDLC (System Development life Cycle)
What level of safety is settled ?
Data base facts ?
Sufficient attention to "weak" signals ?
People involvement ?
Are the corporate goals prioritised?
KPI's - Performance management ?
Goals and missions of the various
stakeholders identified and aligned ?
Ishikawa's “5 " questions
Roles and responsibilities are
controlled and respected ?
Goals
Cindynic questionnaire
(illustration) (abstract)
Questions inspired by the "5 axes" of cindynics
applied to the problem and its context
Preparation of a cindynics questionnaire
40
41. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Step V: establishing a summary matrix correlating actors
with cindynic failures (1/3)
x
Symbol of
systemic
deficiency
AIEA
x
Description of the Observations/interpretations in relation to
deficiency
Fukushima
NSC
US NRC
X
JAEA
NISA
X
X
MEXT
TSO
i
METI
Relationship
no.
TEPCO
The matrix in step V aims to (try to) consolidate the cindynic potential of the organisation and the main stakeholders.
Examples.
DSC2
j
X
X
X
X
DSC6
k
X
X
X
X
X
X
DT
DSC6
In terms of preventing Serious Accidents
Cultural deficiency: Given the "cognitive limits" at a particular time, the
"oversimplification". lack of a legal framework and clear, harmonised
guidance (standards) in terms of design
(scenarios/hypotheses
to
consider:
earthquakes+tsunamis; power supplies-SBO; multiunit issues etc.)
In terms of inspections.
Organisational
Lack of independence, transparency of operation and
deficiency: dilution
authority on the part of the regulatory bodies
of responsibilities
In terms of "emergency plan" (crisis management)
Lack of emergency preparedness
Goal dissonances.
Excessive
organisational
Dilution of
fragmentation/specialisation.
responsibilities.
Communication and coordination difficulties (crisis
management, evacuation, operation of the off-site
centre, etc.)
41
42. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Step V: establishing a summary matrix correlating actors
with cindynic failures (2/3)
Or according to the 5 cindynic axes, Fukushima (1/2)
1.
2.
3.
Risk axis
Deficiencies
Facts (memory, Dsc22, Dsc18-dE/S
history, data and DSC7
statistics, lessons
learned)
Representations Dsc21-DE
and models
(based on facts) DSC1, Dsc21-DE
Objectives
DT, DSC6,Dsc23-DT
(goals, reasons for
working)
Dsc23-DT
A few examples of systemic deficiencies.
Cognitive and learning deficiencies (historical, scale/probability of
tsunamis etc.)
Lessons/feedback, nonetheless reinforced by the cooperation between
the Japanese TSO (JNES O) (associate member in 2010) and the
European TSO network, "ETSON"
Failure to adapt models to experience
Inadequate ability to question the design and the operational
hypotheses
Lack of clear priorities between objectives (NISA vs TSO in
particular: separation of functions).
Organisational fragmentation and administrative formalism
"The Fukushima accident revealed a significant need for consultation between TSO’s so that they
can share information and ensure that analyses are consistent" (IRSN communiqué, 24/11/2011)
42
43. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Step V: establishing a summary matrix correlating actors
with cindynic failures (3/3)
Or according to the 5 cindynic axes, Fukushima (2/2)
4.
Risk axis
Deficiencies
Rules (norms, DSC2
laws,
standards and
ethical codes,
procedures,
inspections
DSC6
etc.)
DSC10
5.
Culture
(value
systems)
DSC2
A few examples of systemic deficiencies.
Lack of a legal framework (clear, harmonised guidance: standards) in
terms of design and safety evaluation (earthquakes, serious accidents)
Failure to take account of "complex" events (multi-site impact, SBO
etc.)
Lack of independence, transparency of operation and authority on the
part of regulatory bodies in terms of inspections
Lack of preparation for the management of a nuclear emergency
(coordination and harmonisation of methods and national technical
support resources)
Failure to disseminate an organisational culture of safety ("safety
consciousness") through all the bodies involved in nuclear activities
"Whatever to plan, design and execute, nothing can be done without setting assumptions. At the same
time, however, it must be recognized that things beyond assumptions may take place.
The Accident presented us crucial lessons on how we should be prepared for such incidents that we had
not accounted for."
(Investigation Committee, December 26, 2011)
43
44. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Step VI: Drafting a narrative summary (1/2)
This aims to:
• "tell the story", i.e. reconstruct
the sequence of events, their
causes and the decisions taken
in the form of a summary,
preferably free of jargon,
putting the deficiencies and
dissonances identified in
context
• avoid the reader having to
decode the "cindynic flowchart"
(often complex) and the table
(potentially long) of correlations
between actors and
deficiencies
The goal is to join the "dots" of the
deficiencies identified. Child's play?
44
45. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Step VI: Drafting a narrative summary (2/2)
One suggestion (there are others!)
of a "reading grid" for interpreting
the narrative:
the components of a "socio-technical"
system:
• The technology
• The human factor and safety
culture
• The governance ("organisation")
• The environment
Adapted from J-L Nicolet
45
46. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Step VII: Deducing actions to reduce deficiencies
and dissonances
According to one typology of socio-technical models.
Section
Reduction action. Examples relating to Fukushima.
Technology
• Reviewing the design of the installations' monitoring systems to acquire relevant information
and an overview and enable the appropriate decisions (evacuation etc.) to be made and the
necessary actions to be defined
• For emergency situations, providing means of (tele)communication that will remain
operational under "SBO" (Station Blackout) conditions
Human
• Technical culture → socio-technical culture → safety culture (controlledmanaged) ["No
blame", "accident culture" etc.]
• Disaster training (emergency response)
• Staff education upgrading
Organisation
• The regulator must define the methodology (guides, standards etc.) for the ad hoc
consideration of tsunamis, including design measures and criteria for evaluating their
effectiveness
• Emergency Preparedness: take steps to ensure operational functionality, especially off-site
(Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters) even in the event of a large-scale disaster
• Define cooperation modes (vs excessive fragmentation of work)
• Formal risk analysis, kept up to date and communicated to decision-making bodies
• Evaluate plant robustness (stress test)
• Improve the independence of the regulator (separate NISA from METI) with a unified agency
(e.g. the Environment Ministry). (Nuclear Safety and Security Agency)
The environment
• Update scientific and technical knowledge in the area of tsunamis (probability, severity, etc.)
( deep defences + barriers)
46
48. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Added value?
$
The cindynic approach:
• is general/generic in terms of risk management
• is adaptable to the complexity of the problem (increased complexity of socio-technical
systems, emergence of new risks, importance of lessons learned, multiplicity of
relationships/actors etc.)
• constitutes a qualitative systemic method for representing systems:
• dynamic interaction between actors
• putting in perspective the actors' context/knowledge in the danger situation
It enables us to:
• understand and model the "system" (organisational/procedural, cultural, technical,
environmental, communication/information) and its temporal evolution cycle (events,
decisions etc.)
• structure the results
• find what needs to be modified in the system to prevent the incident/accident recurring
or, at least, reducing its probability
• express an opinion (e.g. "deficiencies" vs "maturity" reading grid) about risk
management
48
49. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Yes, but …
I'll
never !
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Yes, you
will !
Modelling and evaluation based on an empirical typology, requiring
interpretation by the user
Omissions or redundancies possible in the formulation of
diagnoses/deficiencies
Expert judgement required to cover strategic and operational aspects
Need for learning (case study prototype before any truly
systematic/methodological application)
Limits in relation to operational specificities (development models for sociotechnical systems: J Rasmussen, N Levison, etc.)
Usefulness of cross validation via other approaches/models (J Reason's "Swiss
cheese", integrated safety model, etc.)
Multiple skills of the cindynician (methodological + business knowledge;
facilitation techniques; courage, etc.)
49
50. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
The cindynic approach has a well-deserved place
in an integrated approach to risk assessment
"The new trend in accidentology will be cindynic flowcharts!"
50
51. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
However, « cindynicians » must take the culture
and maturity of the company into account
Rome was not
built in a day !
The cindynics
either !
51
53. 1. Introduction
2. Cindynics
3. Conclusions
4. Questions/Answers
Mr Capurso,
take
a question
at random!
Can I
give an
answer
at random?
53
54. Executive summary
“Practical Application of "Cindynics", The Science of Danger, For Risk Managers”
Ir. Tommaso CAPURSO
Internal Audit, SNCB Holding, Belgian Railways, Belgium
Head of the "Operations & Technical Systems" Audit Division
tommaso.capurso@b-holding.be
“Cindynics”, the “science of danger”, word invented by Georges-Yves Kervern, is a discipline generally unknown to the large
public of risk managers.
Catastrophes of these last years (transportation; chemical industries; powerplants; oil platforms; financial crisis;…) are of multi
causal nature and an “accident of the organization".
The practical application of the systemic concept of “cindynics”, by modelling the interactions of the actors’networks :
– illustrates the links of the complex chain of events and deficits, which may lead to an accident or a crisis,
– shows that “an accident/a crisis is usually a failure of the dynamic interactions throughout the system rather than a local
failure of one or more parties” ,
– provides a new, holistic perspective on risk assessment and management.
The human factor is only the apparent “weak link” that should not overshadow other factors fundamental and deeply rooted
(organization /procedure, culture, equipment, environment, communication/information).
Thereby, risk managers can play a new, significant and adding-value role in tackling and auditing sensitive areas, through risk
assessment, understanding of accidents/crisis, prevention of catastrophes or limitation of their impact …
In this session, participants will :
– Discover the key concepts of “cindynics”,
– Understand its potential usefulness , in various sensitive domains, not limited to industry ,
– Get a “7 steps tool kit” for a systematic and disciplined application ,
– Learn how the approach can be used, through concrete examples and illustrations (the accident of Fukushima).
54
55. A few bibliographic references
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
« Master Classes In Entreprise- wide Risk Management » EFARM (« European Fellow in Applied Risk Management »), Carm Institute,
Prof. J.-P. Louisot, Augerville, 27-29 september 2010
« L’archipel du danger », G.-Y. Kervern & P. Rubise, Ed.Economica, 1991
« Cindyniques – Concepts et mode d’emploi », G.-Y. Kervern & P.Boulanger, Ed.Economica, 2007
“Mémoire” EFARM about the application of cindynics, April 6th 2011, AMRAE/Carm Institute, T.Capurso
“Lessons learned from Fukushima – Application of cindynics”, T.Capurso, annual AMRAE Conference in Deauville, 8th february 2012
« Les décisions absurdes : sociologie des erreurs radicales et persistantes », C.Morel, Gallimard
”Executive summary of the interim report”. Investigation Committee on the Accidents at Fukushima Nuclear, Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power
Company (TEPCO), 26/12/2011
“Nuclear safety: new challenges, gained experience and public expectations”, Forum EUROSAFE on nuclear safety, Paris, 7&8 november 2011, and
particulalrly:
1. “JNES’s response to TEPCO Fukushima NPS accident” , Y.Nagakome
2. “Learning lessons from accidents with a human and organisational factors perspective: deficiencies and failures of operating experience feedback
systems”, N. Dechy, J.-M.Rousseau, F. JeffroY, IRSN (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire), France
“US industry response to the Fukushima accident”, EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute), J.P.Sursock. Presented to International Risk Governance
Council (IRGC), Lausanne, Swizerland, 3/11/2011
“Facts of and lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident”, H.Nariai, WEC2011 Special session Fukushima, Facts and
consequences, 07/09/2011
“Premiers enseignements de l’accident de Fukushima par l’Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire”, Pr. M.Bourguignon. Presentation at the SFEN (Société
Française d’Energie Nucléaire), 20/06/2011.
“Concepts de la démarche dans les centrales nucléaires. La défense en profondeur : principe fondamental de la maîtrise des risques”, IMdR, D.Vasseur,
EDF R&D, 10/04/2008
« Risques et accidents majeurs - Retour d’expérience cindynique », J.-L. NICOLET, Techniques de l’Ingénieur.
« Introduction to human factors in the field of ATM » (« Air Traffic management »), Cours de l’Ecole Nationale de l’Aviation Civile et DSNA, S.Barjou,
21/01/2008
Illustrations about risk : « Le risque d ’entreprendre », Série Polynômes, Essentiels MILAN, 1999
Editorial Volume : 2000-2 , Bernd Rohrmann, Dept. of Psychology, Univ. of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3052, Australia
« Consumer risk perception », http://www.safefoods.nl/en/safefoods/Elearning/Social-Science/1.-Introduction/1.2-Consumer-food-risk-perceptions.htm
55
56. Climate change:
new challenges and new approaches
Macro-economic trends,
political risk management
& insurability
David Cadoux
AXA P&C Group Chief Risk Officer
01/10/2013
56
57. Agenda
1. Increasing frequency and cost…
2. …with radical socio-economic impacts
3. Insuring and managing climate risk
57
59. …with radical socio-economic impacts
• Deep reshaping of the socio-economic environment:
Agriculture
Water
Health
• Significant damage to world GDP
59
60. Insuring and managing climate risk
• Insurability ?
• Insurance industry can help society manage climate
risk:
Provider of expertise
Driver of sustainable economies
Means to change behavior
Partner for public authorities
60
62. Climate change:
new challenges and new approaches
Climate change
risk assessment:
Impacts & opportunities
Jeremy Hindle
Head of Enterprise Risk Aggregation
XL Group
01/10/2013
62
63. Agenda
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Potential Impacts for Insurers
Putting Recent Losses into Context
Gaps exist in Catastrophe Modelling
Risk Aggregation & Tail Risk Management is Key
The Opportunity
63
64. Potential impacts for insurers
What can we expect?
Increased drought, heat and extreme weather events
Climate change risk assessment report (UK Government 2012)
Many risks are not NEW, but adaptation to change is required
National Adaption Programme (2013): Flood Risk Management
The climate challenge (GDV 2011 – German Insurance Association)
Return periods of storm / Flood events are reducing
72% of house owners still do not have natural catastrophe
insurance
64
65. Putting recent losses into context
Floods, drought & severe convective storms continue to cause havoc
2013
2012
2011
Germany Floods May / June €12 billion?
Moore (USA) Tornado May $3.5 billion?
Germany Hail July €1.5 billion?
Post-Tropical Storm Sandy September $20 - $25 billion?
US Drought May/July - $11 billion?
US Tornadoes - $15 billion?
Thailand Flood - $12 billion?
However, the total cost so far in 2013 ($45 billion) is only 50% of 10year average (per Munich Re)
Floods caused 45% of insured losses
Meanwhile, tropical cyclone activity globally remains light
65
66. Gaps exist in catastrophe modelling
Many gaps exist in vendor
catastrophe models
Often these are for the
perils most impacted by
climate change
How do we capture
"Exposed but Not
Modelled"?
How do we model "Not
Enough Modelled" ["Model
Miss"]?
How to model "Not
Modelled" risks?
Country
Australia
Austria
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Japan
New Zealand
Puerto Rico
Switzerland
Thailand
United Kingdom
United States
x
x
x
x
Tropical
Cyclone
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Flood
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Severe
Windstorm Convective Winterstorm
Storm
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Wildfire
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
= Model Exists
= Material Gap
= Becoming Material
= less vital
66
67. Risk aggregation / tail risk management is key
Flood exposure is increasing in coastal cities1
Suggested tenfold increase in exposure by 2050
Ranking exposure by 1-100 year loss and annual average loss (AAL) yields
surprising results:
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Urban
Agglomeration
Miami
New York-Newark
Osaka-Kobe
New Orleans
Tokyo
Amsterdam
Nagoya
Rotterdam
Virginia Beach
Boston
100-yr
AAL (%
AAL $m
exposure
of GDP)
366,421
672 0.30%
236,530
628 0.08%
149,935
120 0.03%
143,963
507 1.21%
122,910
27 0.00%
83,182
3 0.01%
77,988
260 0.0026
76,565
2 0.0001
61,507
89 0.0015
55,445
237 0.0013
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Urban
100-yr
AAL $m AAL (% of GDP)
Agglomeration exposure
Guangzhou
38,508
687
1.32%
Miami
366,421
672
0.30%
New York-Newark
236,530
628
0.08%
New Orleans
143,963
507
1.21%
Mumbai
23,188
284
0.47%
Nagoya
77,988
260
0.26%
Tampa-St Petersburg 49593
244
0.0026
Boston
55445
237
0.0013
Shenzen
11338
169
0.0038
Osaka-Kobe
149935
120
0.0003
Future risk assessment must encompass Tail Risk (TVaR)
Correlated lines of business (non-property) contribute to loss
1
Future flood losses in major coastal cities - Nature Climate Change 3 August 2013
67
68. The opportunity
Data quality is key to sound decision making
Need industry leadership on data mapping / industry
classifications / industry exposure / loss databases
Limits tracking will assist in risk management
Insurance penetration is still low
Predictive modelling will be a competitive advantage for those
that use it
And a competitive disadvantage for those that do not!
"Big Data" business intelligence modelling will help
Requires courage and skill to underwrite when the "goal posts"
are moving
68
69. Please fill in the
session feedback
through the
FERMA Mobile app
69
