Commercial Application of Military Airlift Aircraft (CAMAA) Utilizing Boeing BC-17 Variant of C-17A Globemaster III

Commercial Application of
Military Airlift Aircraft
(CAMAA) Utilizing Boeing
BC-17 Variant of C-17A
Globemaster III
A Historical Narrative

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Commercial Application of Military Airlift Aircraft 1

Commercial Application of Military Airlift
Aircraft
Commercial Application of Military
Airlift Aircraft (CAMAA) is a joint
initiative between the United States Air
Force (USAF), Boeing, and academia
designed as a means to mitigate
Congressionally ordered end-of-Cold War
force reduction through directives such as
the Base Realignment and Closure Act
(BRAC).[1] In its original form in October
2000, it was found to be inadequate or
possessed limitations not necessarily
conducive to project success in the
estimations of program participants. A
second iteration was approved for A C-17 performing a medical evacuation in Antarctica, August 2007.
development as representative of atypical
levels of industry and government collaboration. The Heavylift initiative is an outgrowth of the intent and focus of
the CAMAA program utilizing a very modestly modified commercial variant of the military Boeing C-17
Globemaster IIIs, designated BC-17, so as to facilitate a duality of mission. In pursuit of this, modifications are kept
to an absolute minimum (fuel tank armor designed to withstand a 23mm round retained; military radios kept locked
and stowed, a steel plate fitted over the dorsal aerial refueling aperture and de-energizing of the rear cargo door to
prevent in-flight deployment during commercial use) thus rendering these aircraft operational in under an hour by
Air Force crews in times of national emergency, particularly those missions requiring flight into potential conflict
areas.

Background
In the mid-1990s as end-of-Cold War realities settled in with their unique brand of impact on the Military-industrial
complex, McDonnell Douglas began to market the C-17 Globemaster III to commercial civilian operators, under the
name "MD-17".[2] After McDonnell Douglas merged with Boeing, the program was renamed "BC-17".[3] Strong
impetus was provided to advance this initiative through a collaborative effort between the USAF and Boeing in
2000, designated Commercial Application of Military Airlift Aircraft (CAMAA) as a means to mitigate
Congressionally ordered force reduction through directives such as the Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC).
The intent of this presentation is to provide an in-depth analysis of the CAMAA gestation period as it developed over
a decade, and the current status.
The document Final Report: Commercial Application of Military Airlift Aircraft[4] was presented to then-Secretary
of the Air Force F. Whitten Peters in October 2000. The program was subsequently inherited by his successor Dr.
James G. Roche, who moved the program forward. CAMAA came to the attention of Dr. Sheila R. Ronis and Myron
D. Stokes, who were involved with the Air Force and Boeing on other matters, in early 2001. According to Dr.
Ronis, the limitations of the program in its original iteration did not become apparent until later that year, but were
then conveyed to the Secretary.[5] This led to a request by Dr. Roche that a paper outlining project concerns was
crafted.[5]


Three weeks after receipt of the analysis, the Secretary called for a complete review of this C-17-based program,
leading to a revised approach incorporating aspects of the Ronis/Stokes paper.[6] The results of those
recommendations to the Air Force are outlined in the following compilation of data, which include documents not
previously available to the public and few others.
It is the expectation of parties who were core to the crafting of this "exercise in acquisition reform" that it will come
to fruition in the coming months. For them, it is inarguable that the C-17 — the most versatile airlifter ever devised
as a matter of record — is a critical element of national security in an increasingly dangerous world.[7] [8] [9]

CAMAA history
According to a recently released internal document "The Commercial Application of Military Airlift Aircraft
(CAMAA) Program: Observations and Recommendations",[10] which was prepared at the direction of former
Secretary of The Air Force Dr. James G. Roche in August 2001 by national security strategist and National Defense
University (NDU) Foundation board member[11] [Dr. Sheila Ronis], Director, MBA/MSM Programs Associate
Professor, Management, Walsh College[12] [13] (also a visioning group leader for the Project On National Security
Reform[14] and industry analyst Myron D. Stokes,[15] currently Managing Member of Global HeavyLift
Holdings,(GHH) the initiative was described as "an experiment in acquisition reform." GHH is a Defense Logistics
Agency listed[16] entity formed in 2002 to bring together the intellectual resources to craft architecture for global
infrastructure of a new US/NATO-controlled Heavy and Outsized subset of the air cargo industry utilizing new and
used commercial variants of the C-17 Globemaster III designated BC-17.[17] [18]
Notably, the Ronis/Stokes paper to SECAF Roche pointed out the limitations of the CAMAA program, as originally
conceived, and made recommendations to the Secretary to help ensure the program's success. These
recommendations and changes were directed by the Secretary to be implemented within a revamped framework
co-crafted by Ronis and Stokes in strong collaboration with USAF and Boeing personnel.
Impact of September 11, 2001 Attacks on Program
Just 18 days after delivery of the Roche paper, the 9/11 attacks occurred, bringing with them a sharp change in focus
in how C-17s were deployed and whether any could be spared for the CAMAA program (which called for expanding
Civil Reserve Air Fleet capacity to include commercial C-17 based Heavy and Outsized capability) in an era of
asymmetric warfare[9] requiring new levels of force projection and rapid deployment globally as only the C-17 could
accomplish. The authors of the Roche paper had already suggested that the solution for the Congressionally imposed
limitations on equipment acquisition strategies, while meeting CAMAA and USAF mission goals, was to have
Boeing build more C-17s to capitalize on economies of scale, thus resulting in lower costs.
A scheduled meeting between Dr. Ronis, a co-crafter of the Hart-Rudman report,[9] and DoD officials that was to
have taken place at the Pentagon was instead shifted to her Birmingham, Michigan office, and these representatives
were arriving at Detroit Metropolitan Airport as attackers struck the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon
on September 11. Concerns by the Roche paper authors relative to the inability of FDNY first responders to extract
WTC victims trapped above the aircraft impact points before structure collapse led to the immediate development of
a revised first response strategy using off-the-shelf- fire fighting and rescue technology, coupled with improved
process. Termed as IN-S.E.R.T (Skyscraper Emergency Response Team) the paper outlined a strategy for creating a
globally implementable template for first responders using commercial/military C-17s carrying a full contingent of
elite first response personnel and highly specialized equipment.[19]
The concept was presented to 18 Argonne National Lab scientists and two FEMA personnel just 37 days after the
WTC/Pentagon strikes.


Continued evolution of HeavyLift strategy
CAMAA modification strategies recommended to Secretary Roche led to the development of 17 case studies of
actual let projects – conducted by the Air Force and Boeing with some of the world’s largest corporations including
ExxonMobil, DuPont, Conoco Philips and Halliburton – to demonstrate the ability of the BC-17 to significantly
reduce costs associated with global exploration, extraction and exploiting of oil, gas, gold and diamond resources. A
25 year business plan proving the viability of the heavylift initiative was also produced.[20] The value of projects
around the world involved in the development of these studies, exceeded US$ 400 billion, according to the Air Force
and Boeing document BC-17X Risk Reduction Study, MDC 04K1712, 19 December 2004 and Risk Reduction Report
on the Short Austere Market, Council for Logistics Research, Inc, 8 September 2003.
The Roche paper authors also recommended in 2004 that used C-17s –- acquired directly from the Air Force – be
considered as a means to reduce costs, create earlier profitability and compress the program implementation
timeframe. The strategy was encapsulated in a process known as "Transformational Recapitalization".[21]

Business Case for Commercial C-17 (BC-17)
The Report to the Congressional Defense Committees on Expanding the Civil Reserve Air Fleet with Outsize Cargo
Capacity states specific concerns about business case viability which have been raised since program inception, are
addressed through the answering of model questions presented in the report as follows:[20]
"What level of risk will be borne by the U.S. government, the commercial carriers and by the C-17 contractor?"
US Gov: The largest risk is loss of access to the capacity if the commercial operator declares bankruptcy after
aircraft have been placed in commercial service. To reduce the risk, Air Mobility Commands' (AMC) position
requires the organic fleet to be at least 180 C-17s. There is also the possibility that the government might be unable
to the sell the aircraft at the expected fair and quitable price (as outlined in the Transformational Recapitalization
Strategy) subsequent to ordering new C-17s, thus resulting in a funding deficit for the purchase of new aircraft.[20]
Commercial Carrier: The owner takes the most risk, as is normal in commercial ventures. That risk is quantified in
the business case and is reflected in interest rates and bond ratings. the used aircraft option reduces the capital risk
and eliminates the need for government investments or buy-backs.
C-17 Manufacturer: Assuming the operator can fly for revenue while any outstanding certification issues are
addressed, then the Boeing Company has almost no financial risk.
"What is the business case for the commercial carriers?"
A custom 25-year operator business case model was developed for this aircraft. Careful consideration was given to
the services BC-17 would provide to the project market and the heavy and outsize market (air transport of goods to
large or outsize fit in any door of any 747 or similar size freighter). The project market report (Council on Logistics
Research study previously noted) demonstrated a premium revenue yield for the short field capability of the aircraft
and when combined with a competitive heavy and outsized market revenue rate at a 60%/40% market split, it was
demonstrated that the aircraft had the ability to generate revenue of $50M per aircraft per year. Careful analysis was
done on the cost of operating the aircraft, the corporate and overhead structure the business would best operate under
and a reasonable financing structure acceptable to Wall Street firms. These assumptions were placed into the
operator business case model, which generates income and cash flow streams over the 25 year period, and
demonstrated a 15% Internal Rate of Return (IRR) with a $120m aircraft notional price. The model also
demonstrated an excellent 35% operating profit and an NPV of $790M (11% discount rate.) The $120M aircraft
price results in $30M being available for FAA certification and modification cost to yield the USAF's expected
$90M stated in the previous discussion. At the time of this writing, the FAA appears open to a minimum change
configuration. If approved, the costs would be considerably less than the $30M increasing the potential return for the
USAF for the used C-17.[20]
"What is the business case for the U.S. government?"


The USAF may spend $230M to purchase a new C-17 and should get $90M in credit for each C-17 it sells without
giving up access to the capability when CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet) is activated. To date, there has been
extensive analysis to determine the fair and reasonable value of the used C-17. Independent (Office of The Secretary
of Defense) assessment of the analysis should be complete by late 2005. (Assessment was completed). The USAF
will avoid $11M in modifications and $10M per year in operations and maintenance cost for each C-17 it sell
without giving up access to the capability during war. If a sale takes place in FY07, fewer C-17s would be delayed
approximately 6 months to the end of FY08. In addition, this provides a basis for a recapitalization plan that helps
with aging aircraft (refer to Transformational Recapitalization document) by replacing 10-15 year old C-17s,
provides industrial base support, and enables the Fly America Act. Although CRAF BC-17s would experience
operating limitations when compared with military aircraft and crews, the CRAF portion of the airlift system would
be more capable. Also, due to the expense of operating BC-17s, annual payments to CRAF carriers could
increase."[20]

Status of BC-17 Initiative: 2006-2011
Congressional Testimony on the National and Economic Security Role of C-17/BC-17
Testimony has been given to the Congressionally mandated United States China Security Commission[22] by Dr.
Sheila Ronis and Myron D. Stokes relative to the critical role that C-17 and BC-17 production and operation have
played and will play in matters of national security. Such testimony is indicative of the continuous relationship
maintained with policy makers by individuals associated with this project since inception.[23] [24]
Congressional Authorization for Sale of C-17As to Private Sector; FAA Exemption to 14 CFR 21.27 Requirement
In FY06, FY07, FY08, FY09 and FY10 Defense budgets, language was submitted and will be submitted again
through Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) staffers directing the Secretary of Defense to authorize the
USAF to sell first generation C-17s (there is precedent for military equipment resale activity in FY98 and FY00) to
the private sector for the purpose of expanding the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to include Heavy and Outsize capacity –
thus removing current dependence on Russian/Ukrainian AN-124 aircraft (operating in the US on daily FAA
waivers) to fulfill US military airlift shortfalls for Iraq and Afghanistan operations. Furthermore, the FAA is
instructed through this mechanism to consider exemption to FAA 14 CFR 21.27, which requires that aircraft
declared "military surplus" be go through recertification; a time consuming and costly undertaking as noted
previously. The rationale, according to USAF documents, is "The language also allows the FAA Administrator to
use an existing FAR to certify the aircraft. Under 14 CFR 21.27 the FAA Administrator can grant a Part 25 type
certification in the transport category using military experience to demonstrate air worthiness. However, 14 CFR
21.27 applies to surplus aircraft, therefore, a legislative exemption is required because these aircraft fulfill part of the
military airlift requirement and are not surplus. Since this exception does not change the intent of 14 CFR 21.27, the
FAA has coordinated on the use of this language."
"The language also clearly maintains State Department oversight of the commercial operation through the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 CFR Part 121, US Munitions List. An advisory opinion from
the DoS has been obtained for this operation, and commercial industry has reluctantly accepted the
methodology."[25]
Elements of the HeavyLift initiative strategy teams began working directly with the offices of then SASC Chairman
Senator John Warner R-VA; then ranking member now Chairman Carl Levin D-MI; and Senator Joseph Lieberman,
I-CT, in 2005 to accomplish resale and exemption language requirements through inclusion in the National Defense
Budget.
Additionally, the team had direct interaction with the Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne, and J. David
Patterson[26] , former Principal Under Secretary of Defense and Comptroller for the Department of Defense during
this time.[27] [28]
Threat To C-17 Production Line Continuance


Recognizing the absolute importance of C-17 production line continuance (which has been, and continues to be,
under threat) to BC-17, the HeavyLift team, while maintaining close relationships with USAF and Boeing project
personnel, crafted a concomitant, systemic, strategy addressing platform survival along with resale and exemption
policy modification issues. One of the most direct threats came in the form of the PA&E (Pentagon Office of
Program Analysis and Evaluation) developed Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS) ordered with the intent to identify
near, mid and long-term force mobility on land, sea and in air. Regarding the latter category, strategic airlift, MCS
concluded that 180 C-17s was enough, when combined with 112 Lockheed Martin Lockheed C5A[29] and C5B
Galaxys. The bulk of the Galaxys had been ordered retrofitted with new engines and avionics under the RERP and
AMP Modernization programs[30] (owing to a dismal reliability record and a maximum age of 35 years at time of a
USAF-protested 2004 Congressional mandate to retain C-5 fleet strength at existing levels until 2008) and
designated as C-5M Super Galaxy.
The MCS study, completed in the fall of 2005 months behind schedule[31] but never publicly available – although a
summary of its conclusions was – by order of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, came under immediate fire by
the GAO and later by Congress[32] itself, as being based on flawed analytics and unsupportable conclusions.[33] The
fact that the study recommended killing C-17, a relatively new weapons systems based on an operational date of
1993 and whose performance has met and exceeded expectation, while supporting the spending of billions in
retrofitting C-5s, which had become operational in 1970 (and to date has only achieved, according to AF records, a
56 percent mission completion rate) seemed at best questionable.
U.S. Army General Barry McCaffrey (Ret.), an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, United States Military
Academy, stated in his October 2007 after-action report subsequent to a visit to Nellis AFB, that owing to excessive
over-utilization of C-17s operating in two war theaters and engaged in humanitarian/disaster relief missions, 600+ of
these aircraft are ultimately required.[34]
The Roche paper authors, among others, having become aware early of the conclusions being reached by the MCS
study in advance of its release, (with a particularly disturbing conclusion that the shutdown down of the Boeing Long
Beach C-17 production line and the "warm storing"[35] of the tooling for future possible use, would have no
appreciable negative impact on the industrio-economic base) recommended to USAF and Department of
Commerce[36] colleagues, through Dr. Ronis, that a countering, comprehensive study be prepared immediately.
In November 2005 the study National Security Assessment of the C-17 Globemaster Cargo Aircraft’s Economic &
Industrial Base Impacts. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE was completed (contributors included Dr. Ronis),
but for reasons not clear, wasn't released to the public despite being announced on the DOC website[36] (an executive
summary was provided). Additionally, the courtesy copies usually supplied to appropriate parties in Congress were
only provided if requested, at least initially. Early in 2006, conclusions reached in the Mobility Capabilities Study
relative to airlift – echoed by the Quadrennial Defense Review[37] of 2005 (issued February 2006) – were released
without access provided to the actual document. And, because of the recommendations being made that 180 C-17s
(AF leadership inclusive of Gen. John W. Handy (USAF Ret.)[38] [39] had stated 222 C-17s were needed to meet
organic airlift requirements) were enough while storing the tooling at an undisclosed location, Boeing was preparing
to shut down Long Beach and discussing retirement/severance packages with its employees.[40] [41]
Congressional Intervention
Seeking to draw attention to the still unreleased Department of Commerce Impact Study, Stokes[42] (who had met
with SASC Chairman Senator John Warner by coincidence in a Senate Building restaurant in early December 2005
during 2006 Defense Budget deliberations; strongly encouraging him, Sens. Levin and Lieberman to provide for
more C-17s as a means to maintain the momentum of the HeavyLift initiative issued a press release in early February
2006 alluding to the document as quite critical to the life of C-17.[43] It is of relevance, perhaps, that the following
April, and through still unidentified pathways, the study was released to the public via an InsideDefense.com
analysis[44] written by John T. Bennett.


Very quickly, it came to be viewed by Congressional and industry leaders as a significant boost to C-17 preservation
efforts, as it spelled out in exact terms, the profoundly negative impact on the economy of 702 Boeing C-17 suppliers
in 42 states shutting down.[45] In so doing, it sharply disagreed with the conclusions (minimally negative
industrio-economic impact deriving from line closure) reached by the Mobility Capabilities Study and subsequently
by the Quadrennial Defense Review 2005 document.
An immediate result of the study’s more general availability – in addition to the General Accounting Office (GAO)
expressing concerns in a September 2005 letter to then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld[33] that the study
methodology was flawed and could cause incorrect assessment of strategic airlift needs by House Appropriations
Committee – was Department of Defense officials, inclusive of Secretary of The Air Force Michael Wynne and
Chief of Staff Michael Moseley, being called before Congressional representatives to comment on the apparent
discrepancies.[46]
On May 19, 2006, it was reported in InsideDefense.com that the Senate Armed Services Committee had rejected the
USAF’s proposal, based in large part on the questionable MCS and QDR analyses, to discontinue the C-17 line.
Moreover, the pathways were created via a Senate Bill authorizing up to $657.7 million for two more C-17s and
advanced procurement.[47] In all likelihood, C-17 line closure was staved off near term.
The negative response by Congress to MCS 2005 continues to 2009 as statements within House Report H.R. 110-652
DUNCAN HUNTER NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009[48] indicate.
Presentation of Blueprint for Global BC-17 based Heavy and Outsized Air Cargo Operations During SpeedNews
Aerospace and Defense Conference; The Jonathan Club, Los Angeles, CA 9 May 2007
Global HeavyLift Holdings personnel provided aerospace and financial sector attendees, which included
Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Jeffries Quarterdeck and GE Capital, a detailed strategy for
implementing a US/NATO-controlled Heavy and Outsized air cargo industry operating from four main bases
designated as "epicenters" in the US. Europe, Middle-East and Asia.[49]
WTO Issues Raised By AIRBUS-EADS Relative to BC-17 Subsidization
AIRBUS-EADS, supported by the European Union, claims that the United States government inappropriately
provides subsidization to Boeing for commercial/military C-17 (BC-17) development. This activity can be seen as
part of the framework of their strategy to make further incursions into the Boeing dominated Tanker and Strategic
Airlift U.S. Department of Defense sales arena. It is not known with surety whether Boeing considers this as a viable
stance.[50] [51]

Significant Interest by Potential Operators
Contrary to some assertions that the BC-17 initiative was not necessarily viable, the facts belie the assertion: In a
May 2007 Flight Global Article "Boeing Close to Launching BC-17", Boeing acknowledged significant interest in
the BC-17 with Program Manager and Vice-President Dave Bowman stating: "We have several customers with
money that have given us requests for proposals. I've never received RFPs before." Notably, Global HeavyLift
Holdings, LLC submitted an RFP (Request For Pricing) for 30 new aircraft, acknowledged by Boeing, and then
through its lead bank representing a consortium of financial entities late last year, presented senior leadership with a
strategy for accomplishing a quadruple and simultaneous capital raise of USD18.4 billion in four geographic locales.
This strategy allows access to multiple funding resources globally, rendering it less vulnerable to the expected
financial sector meltdown.[52] [53] [54] [55] [56]
Response to Flight Global Blog on Presumed Demise of BC-17 owing to FAA Denial of Exemption to 14 CFR
21.27
Responding to comments by noted aviation writer Stephen Trimble of Flight Global alluding to a final demise of the
BC-17, Global HeavyLift Holdings, LLC management maintained that the program was far from dead and well past
the "idea" stage.[57]


Although the FAA has powerful influence in aviation regulatory and certification matters, they will not initiate a
special certification or 14 CFR 21.27 exemption process, but will follow strong recommendations or directive from
the Department of Defense, USAF or State Department. Nevertheless, they are not adverse to the program moving
forward; FAA personnel have been cooperative in ways not typical of agency response to overtures of this type. In
pursuit of an appropriate mechanism to create the desired exemption for C-17/BC-17, Senate Armed Services
Committee staffers worked closely with FAA, Boeing, USAF and Global HeavyLift representatives to craft
language for inclusion in the mark-up for the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). And although it
didn't survive the review process ultimately, the language developed, expressed as a "Sense of Congress" is
representative of critical thinking with an aim to shape the desired outcome:
"Sense of Congress on sale of new outsize cargo, strategic lift aircraft for civilian use (sec. 1040) The committee
recommends a provision that would express the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should:
(1) review the benefits and feasibility of pursuing a commercial-military cargo initiative for the C-17 aircraft and
determine whether such an initiative is in the national interest; and
"(2) if the Secretary determines that such an initiative is in the national interest, take appropriate actions to
coordinate with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to achieve the type certification for such aircraft
required by section 21.27 of title 14, Code 12 of Federal Regulations.
"The FAA has informed the committee that no fewer than six commercial operators have expressed interest in
procuring a commercial variant of the C-17 aircraft. According to officials within the FAA, the FAA cannot initiate
a type certification review that would be required to allow C-17 commercial operations on its own initiative. Some
other government entity, such as the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Congress,
etc., would have to decide that it would be in the national interest and so inform the FAA before it could begin such a
review. This provision would encourage the Secretary of Defense to decide whether it would be in the national
interest."[58]
A similar effort is being repeated for the 2010 NDAA, with Global HeavyLift recently announcing that it will pursue
an FAA exemption to 14 CFR 21.27 separate from Boeing.[59]
According to industry sources, Global HeavyLift management has stated in 2006 that it envisions the global heavy
and outsize fleet as incorporating a mix of BC-17, An-124 and A400M airlifters in a relationship that will play to the
strengths of each aircraft in pursuit of the HOM (Heavy and Outsize Market) and SAM (Short Austere Market)
opportunities.[60] To this end, it has already issued an RFP for 30 BC-17s and will submit RFPs for up to 20
commercially configured A400Ms and 4 An-124-200s with western engines and avionics first quarter 2009.[59]

BC-17 Issues Political, Not Financial
The real issues with BC-17 therefore appear to be far less financial, and more political, as the intense Capitol Hill
debates about the future of this aircraft have indicated.[57] [61] [62] Since the proposed level of demilitarization is
modest so as to allow BC-17 to fulfill its dual commercial/military role in accordance with CRAF (Civil Reserve Air
Fleet) mandates, the futures of C-17 and BC-17 are inextricably linked.
As a result of this prevailing reality and by design, the final arbiter of success or failure of the BC-17 initiative is
neither Boeing or the USAF – although both have substantive input – but Congress. And even that cannot be
construed as an absolute in view of an overarching importance, if not criticality, of C-17 to national and economic
security.[63] [64] [65]
C-17 Production Line Now Secured Until 2014 With USAF and Foreign Orders; Multi-year USD11.5Bil
Aircraft Maintenance Contract
Uncertainty surrounding the continuance of the Boeing Long Beach, CA production/final assenmbly facility has
caused significant concern on the part of U.S. HeavyLift initiative participants, but recent orders from the U.S.
Department of Defense and foreign governments have secured the line until at least 2014.[66] Further bolstering the


confidence of involved parties, inclusive of Global HeavyLift Holdings who has strongly supported the continued
production of C-17 as critical to its business strategy,[67] [68] [69] [70] [71] was the recent awarding of a
USD11.5billion joint USAF/Boeing Aircraft Sustainment Partnership, designed to service C-17s in service around
the globe through 2021.

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External links
• "Boeing close to launching commercial 'BC-17'" (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/05/29/214240/
boeing-close-to-launching-commercial-bc-17.html), Flight International, 29 May 2007.
• http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/
iaf-chooses-boeings-latest-c-17-for-heavy-lift-transport-aircraft_100204806.html "IAF chooses Boeing’s latest
C-17 for heavy-lift transport aircraft" ThaiIndian News, 14 June 2009

Article Sources and Contributors 10

Article Sources and Contributors
Commercial Application of Military Airlift Aircraft Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=457243748 Contributors: ASIMOV51, ASIMOV51a, ASIMOV52, BilCat, C.Fred,
Chris the speller, Dhpage, Diannaa, Dpenn89, Edward, Fnlayson, Frap, Gaius Cornelius, Hudicourt, Inferno, Lord of Penguins, Jevansen, MBK004, Rjwilmsi, SMasters, Tabletop, 12 anonymous
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Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors
File:Antarctic Medivac-20070828.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Antarctic_Medivac-20070828.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Benchill, MB-one,
Mattes, NDCompuGeek, Tas50, Telim tor

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Commercial Application of Military Airlift Aircraft (CAMAA) Utilizing Boeing BC-17 Variant of C-17A Globemaster III

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