1. The IMT Verification Report
On the January 25, 2015
Mamasapano Incident

2. Overview
• IMT is a neutral body tasked to assist in the
monitoring of the implementation of the
ceasefire agreements between the GPH and MILF
• Authorised to conduct a Verification Mission on
the Mamasapano incident; mission conducted
with support from GPH and MILF ceasefire
committees
• Submitted via email to the GPH Panel on 5 April
2015

3. Overview (cont)
• Objectives: As a neutral body, to
– Verify allegations of violations of the ceasefire
agreement provisions
– Propose recommendations to avoid recurrence of
similar incidents and enhance the ceasefire
mechanisms
• Report submitted by email to GPH Panel on 5
April 2015

4. Limitations
• Area: not granted access to site where
Marwan was killed due to security
considerations
• Mission limited to “verification only… not to
make “thorough investigations.”

5. Summary of Findings
• Valid law enforcement operation by the PNP
• Ceasefire protocols not observed during planning and execution of
Oplan Exodus
• Site of encounter between the 55th SAF and MILF-BIAF is accepted
to be an MILF area/community under the control of BIAF base
commanders
– Raises questions on clear definition of what constitutes and MILF
area/community other than those referred to in signed documents
(i.e. Joint Acknowledgement of 10 Feb 1999 and Joint Statement of 17
Feb 1999)
• After raid on Marwan’s hut and subsequent clash between 84th Sac
and BIFF, the PNP-SAF at some point engaged the MILF-BIAF which
went from “the status of deliberately uncoordinated movements to
a disastrous firefight between the 55th SAC and elements of the
BIAF 105th BC.”

6. Findings on Possible Ceasefire
Violations
1) On MILF providing sanctuary to criminal or
lawless elements:
• No evidence to show that the MILF as an organization
provided sanctuary or assistance
• However, this does not dispel claims that some
members of the MILF might have had knowledge of the
whereabouts of Marwan and Usman

7. Findings on Possible Ceasefire
Violations
2) On PNP SAF’s lack of coordination with the
MILF prior to Jan 25, 2015:
• Para 6, part VI of the Implementing Guidelines of the
Joint Communique of 6 May 20012 may be interpreted
in two ways with respect to LEOs against HVTs: i) AHJAG
can inform CCCH less than 24 hours before or within
reasonable time for civilian evacuations and to avoid
armed confrontation between GPH and MILF forces; OR
ii) exemption

8. Findings on Possible Ceasefire
Violations
2) On PNP SAF’s lack of coordination with the
MILF prior to Jan 25, 2015:
- To avoid uncertainties, the IMT recommended this
provision be clarified by its crafters. Until clarification is
made, any LEO against HVTs AHJAG must still inform
CCCH less than 24 hours prior to the operations and
within reasonable time to allow evacuation of civilians
and to avoid untoward incidents
- Failure of PNP SAF to have prior coordination with AFP,
other PNP forces, CCCH and AHJAG is a violation by the
GPH of Article II of the AGCH of 1997.

9. Findings on Possible Ceasefire
Violations
3) On alleged aggressive actions such as attacks,
raids, ambuscades and offensive military
actions:
- There is probable cause to assume that the PNP SAF
opened fire resulting in the two KIA from the BIAF side
when said BIAF fighters tried to cross the bridge in
Mamasapano as supported by the bullet marks and
blood stains on the bridge.
- This indicates a “full firefight rather than a mere
uncoordinated movement.” This is a violation by the
GPH of Para 3b, Article I of the AGCH of 1997
(aggressive actions such as attacks, ambuscades, etc.

10. Findings on Possible Ceasefire
Violations
3) On alleged aggressive actions such as attacks,
raids, ambuscades and offensive military
actions:
- BIAF’s actions can be seen as a response to the non-
coordinated movements which cannot be categorized
as a violation of Article I of the AGCH of 1997
- However, BIAF’s entry into the cornfields which led to
an armed clash with the 55th SAC may be considered as
a violation of para 3b, Article I of the AGCH ogf 1997

11. Findings on Possible Ceasefire
Violations
4) On the conduct of terrorist acts such as robberies and
summary executions:
- No violation on the part of MILF BIAF against Article I of the AGCH,
para 3A (Summary executions and IHL) nor violated IHL; But the
IMT posited that the MILF BIAF “should have respected their
counterparts and the SAF commandos consistent with the Rome
Statue and RA 9851 forbidding pillage.”
- Items taken by MILF BIAF from fallen PNP SAF are considered
military and not personal items (i.e. cellphones though personal
items being used as communications tools or as military items in
this case)
- No sufficient evidence that summary executions against PNP SAF
that the IMLF BIAF were the perpetrators (no witnesses).
- PNP SAF (member, 55th SAC) who killed 4 sleeping MILF fighters on
Jan 26 is a violation og Art I of AGCH para 3A (summary execution
and OHL)

12. Findings on Possible Ceasefire
Violations
5) On the civilian protection aspect:
- Two civilians killed on January 25, 2015, one after being
apprehended by the PNP SAF 55th SAC. Cause of death was
crossfire but verification did not yiled conclusions as to who
fired the fatal shots.
- Violation of Agreement on CPC of 2009: Indiscriminate use
of force: Most MILF fighters carry firearms while interacting
with civilians adding confusion to law enforcement agencies
and which could result to civilian casualties
- If it can be proven that PNP SAF failed to take precautions to
protect civilians: violation of IHL and RA 9851 Section 4(c) (7)

13. Recommendations
To resolve the issue or deter future similar cases from occurring, the
IMT recommended that:
• The GPH coordinate and initiate the use of the conflict preventive
mechanisms available when launching LEO in known MILF areas
• There is a need to clarify further what is provided in Part VI
(Mechanics of Implementation) Paragraph 6 of the AHJAG
Implementing Guidelines on the Joint Communiqué of 6 May 2002.
• A higher ranking PNP Office should be assigned to GPH CCCH
• The MILF BIAF strengthen its command and control among its ranks
as well as intelligence in their organization
• The Parties should uphold and observe the laws of war,
international humanitarian law, and their respective rules of
engagement and codes of conduct
• The PNP and BIAF combatants found to have committed crimes
should be penalized accordingly under RA 9851