1. IPCC Oversight and confidence
2013/14
Casework and Customer Service pilot
projects
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Direction and control
Access
Local resolution
Quality of investigations
Learning and recommendations
Interim report

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Interim report
Acknowledgements
We would like to extend our thanks to those complainants who participated in our
telephone survey and to Ian Hearnden, who conducted the telephone survey on our
behalf. This provided useful insight.
We are grateful to all the participating professional standards departments for their
cooperation and assistance and demonstrating their willingness to learn.
Finally, we would like to thank our IPCC colleagues for their work and comments on drafts
of these project reports.

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Foreword
An important part of the IPCC’s statutory responsibility is to improve public confidence in
the police complaints system. At a time when police behaviour and integrity are under
increased scrutiny, it is clearly important that complaints from the public are handled well,
and that lessons are learnt if those complaints are valid.
Over the next three years, we will be increasing our own capacity to investigate serious
and sensitive matters independently. However, it will still be the case that the great
majority of the 30,000 or so complaints made against the police every year will be dealt
with locally, by forces themselves – and it must be right that the police themselves seek to
resolve complaints as swiftly and effectively as possible.
The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (PRSRA) reinforced the responsibility of
local forces, by making them rather than the IPCC the appellate body for less serious
complaints, and by seeking to support greater use of early resolution. It also created the
office of Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) – and many PCCs are quite rightly taking
a great interest in the way their force handles complainants and complaints.
Now that fewer appeals come directly to us, we need to exercise our responsibility for
oversight of the whole complaints system differently. These first reports are the outcome
of five pilot projects to explore ways of doing so, and will help us develop our oversight
and confidence strategy for the future, so that, in cooperation with others, we can feed
learning from our complaints work back into the system.
Some underlying themes emerge from these reports. The first is the inherent complexity of
the complaints system itself. Some changes were made in the PRSRA, but we believe
there are strong arguments for a more radical reform of a system that is still over-legalistic,
over-bureaucratic and over-focused on blame rather than resolution. As a consequence,
and particularly where matters are dealt with at local rather than force level, it is clear from
these reports that forces struggle to apply the legislation and guidance properly.
That was not in general because forces were deliberately trying to exclude people from
the system, or dismiss their valid complaints. In part, it was because those making the
decisions did not properly understand the intricacies of the legislation; all the PSDs
involved were very clear that they needed better training, support and guidance in
applying it. But it was also because the approach to complaints handling in local
investigation and resolution was not sufficiently consumer-focused: fully engaging with and
communicating to complainants, rather than taking a defensive and formalistic approach.
We are very grateful to the forces that participated, which all cooperated fully and helpfully
to this analysis of their work. We hope that these reports will be helpful not only to them,
but to all PCCs, chief officers and professional standards departments in examining their
own practice and approach.
Dame Anne Owers

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Contents
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1
Direction and control ......................................................................................................... 2
Access............................................................................................................................... 3
Local resolution ................................................................................................................. 5
Quality of investigations .................................................................................................... 6
Learning and recommendations ........................................................................................ 7
Further work ...................................................................................................................... 9

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Introduction
1.
The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) has a statutory
duty to secure and maintain public confidence in the police complaints
system in England and Wales, under the Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA).
The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011(PRSRA), which
came into force in November 2012, changed the way most complaints are
handled. Key changes were:

Some appeals in less serious cases no longer come to the IPCC
but are handled within the force, by the chief officer or his/her
delegate.

Issues of ‘direction and control’, rather than specifically about the
conduct of officers, now have to be recorded as complaints.
Previously, they were outside the PRA complaints system.

There is more of an emphasis on resolving less serious matters
locally and quickly, through ‘local resolution’, which no longer
requires the explicit consent of the complainant.
2.
These changes mean that some matters that could come to the IPCC on
appeal will no longer do so. Our direct oversight of the complaints system
is reduced, therefore. This is of concern, as we have seen a significant
increase in the number and proportion of appeals that we uphold. In local
investigations this has risen from 23 per cent in 2010-11 to nearly half in
2013. In addition, in half the cases appealed to us, we find that complaints
that should have been recorded have not been. If there is to be public
confidence in policing and in the complaints system it is vital that the front
end of the system, the local handing that deals with the vast majority of
complaints, works as well as it can.
3.
For those reasons, we need to ensure that we retain oversight of the
whole of the complaints system, but in a different way. We have therefore
been developing a model of oversight, carrying out five pilot projects to
explore different areas and methods. We chose areas where changes in
legislation have provided opportunities to promote best practice, or those
where the IPCC no longer has direct oversight. The subject areas chosen
were:


access

local resolution

quality of investigations

4.
direction and control
learning and recommendations
This report summarises the findings of those pilot projects, and outlines
how we propose to develop this work as part of the IPCC’s expansion.
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Direction and control
5.
Until November 2012, complaints about direction and control matters1
(broadly speaking, matters that related to force policies and operational
matters, rather than the conduct of individual officers) did not need to be
recorded under the Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA). However, those whose
complaints were not recorded, for whatever reason, could appeal to the
IPCC. 70 per cent of those appeals were successful, and a significant
number were because the complaint had been wrongly categorised as a
direction and control, rather than a conduct, matter. Since the PRSRA
came into force, direction and control matters are now recordable
complaints, which is helpful. However, they form a separate category of
complaints, with no effective right of appeal – either against the fact that
they have been categorised as direction and control, or against the
outcome of the complaint itself.
6.
Given that we know that a high proportion of complaints were wrongly
categorised under the previous legislation, there is clearly a concern that
this will continue to be the case, without any oversight; or indeed that
forces might be tempted to categorise complaints in this way precisely to
avoid appeal rights, or to avoid appropriately enquiring into an officer’s
conduct.
7.
We decided to examine specific Professional Standards Departments’
(PSDs’) approaches to this. We identified six PSDs, which had high rates
of upheld non-recording appeals under the previous legislation, and which
would also provide enough cases to sample. We contacted those PSDs for
further information about the number of direction and control cases they
had recorded under the new legislation, and from those responses
selected four PSDs. We then audited selected files and had discussions
with a member of the relevant PSD.
8.
We found that 80 per cent of the cases sampled (95 out of 120) were
incorrectly categorised as direction and control. However, the evidence did
not show that this was done deliberately to avoid due process, appeal
rights or proper investigation. We found that 75 per cent of the cases were
concluded in a satisfactory way, appropriate to the complaint.
Nevertheless, a significant minority were not, and the mis-categorisation
deprived those complainants of appeal rights.
9.
None of the PSDs sampled had heard of the relevant case law (North
Yorkshire Police Authority v IPCC (Jordan) 2010) for defining direction and
control complaints, as opposed to conduct matters. This lack of knowledge
was responsible for 48 per cent of the incorrect decisions. In particular,
they were applying the definition of ‘general policing standards’ too widely:
if an issue is specific to a complainant, it cannot be considered to be about
1
A) Operational management decisions directed to the police force. B) The drafting of operational policing policies and
the process leading to their approval. C) Organisational decisions D) General policing standards in the force
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general policing standards.
10.
In 34 per cent of cases, the categorisation decision was made because of
a quick assessment: it appeared that the officer had followed procedure
and had done nothing wrong. However, if that were the case, this should
be the outcome of an investigation into conduct, not a reason for
categorising it as not being about conduct.
11.
75 per cent of wrongly categorised complaints (58 out of 77) were dealt
with appropriately, but 25 per cent were not. Even though there is no
evidence that the miscategorisation was deliberately designed to avoid
this, the fact remains that, for those complainants, there is no appeal right
against the decision. It is, therefore, very important that forces are properly
trained and supervised in making correct decisions about categorisation.
12.
We believe that more training and guidance is needed. We will issue
specific guidance on assessing complaints as direction and control, for our
own staff and for PSDs. In the meantime, the North Yorkshire Police
Authority v IPCC (Jordan) decision will be on the agenda of regular IPCC
meetings with PSDs.
Access
13.
There are some complaints – a small minority – that do not need to be
dealt with in the complaints system set up under the Police Reform Act
(PRA). If these exemptions apply, complaints may not be recorded at all,
or recorded and then ‘disapplied’ (that is, the force can choose to deal with
them in some other way), or the investigation can be stopped –
‘discontinued’. Effectively, this prevents people from having access to the
complaints system that is overseen by the IPCC.
14.
In many cases, applying these exemptions involves a subjective
assessment of the merits of the complaint. There are three such
exemptions in the PRA: that complaints are vexatious, oppressive, or an
abuse of procedure. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act
(PRSRA) added a fourth exemption in 2012: that a complaint is fanciful. If
so, it need not be recorded2.
15.
Our experience under the PRA was that the three existing exemptions
were sometimes misapplied. We were therefore concerned about the
addition of a further, even more subjective, exemption. In addition, the
IPCC is no longer the decision-maker in relation to the great majority of
decisions to disapply; this is now dealt with in the force, usually by the
2
Fanciful: if, and only if, no reasonable person could lend any credence to it.
Vexatious: made without foundation which is intended, or tends, to vex, worry, annoy or embarrass.
Oppressive: made without foundation and is intended, or likely, to result in burdensome, harsh or wrongful treatment
of the person complained against.
Abuse of procedure: where there has been manipulation or misuse of the complaints system in order to make or
progress a complaint which, in all the circumstances of the particular case, should not have been made or should not be
allowed to continue.
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chief officer or his or her delegate. If complaints are not recorded at all,
there is a right of appeal to the IPCC; but, if a complaint is recorded and
then subsequently disapplied, the appeal right is usually to the force. As a
consequence, forces could use disapplication as a way of avoiding any
IPCC oversight of the complaint, using what we have termed the
‘disapplication loophole’.
16.
We chose six PSDs that had made a comparatively greater number of
applications to dispense or discontinue complaints on subjective grounds
under the previous legislation, and of which the IPCC had refused a
proportion. We asked for further information on the number of complaints
not recorded, disapplied, or discontinued, under the new legislation.
Numbers were too low for analysis, so we extended the request to six
more PSDs. This resulted in nine PSDs being sampled, using an audit of
59 files, supplemented by discussion with a member of each PSD.
17.
We found that 36 per cent of cases sampled had been incorrectly
categorised as fanciful, vexatious or abuse of procedure. This was most
pronounced in relation to allegedly fanciful cases, where only two of the 18
cases sampled were correctly classified. Half of the allegedly vexatious
cases (three out of six) were wrong; but, most of the abuse of procedure
cases were correctly classified (19 out of 24), as were both of the
oppressive cases. In one out of ten cases, there was insufficient
information or rationale to decide whether the decision was correct or not.
Just over a quarter of the complainants involved had a stated mental
health issue, communication difficulties, or behaviour that could indicate
mental health problems.
18.
In the ‘vexatious’ cases, it was clear that the incorrect decisions were
because the complainant, rather than the complaint, was being judged. In
the ‘fanciful’ cases, the most common reason for a wrong decision was
that the decision-maker was making a judgment about the likelihood of the
original incident or assertion having happened, rather than judging the
complaint.
19.
We found that the standard of explanation provided to complainants varied
widely, In many of the incorrectly decided cases no explanation was given.
One PSD, however, sent letters of an excellent standard, with explanation
and a customer focus.
20.
We checked whether there was a disproportionate number of
disapplications (with no right of appeal to the IPCC) compared to nonrecorded complaints (where there is a right of appeal to us), to see
whether forces might be using disapplication, rather than non-recording, to
avoid appeal rights. We found evidence to suggest that the ‘disapplication
loophole’ was being used to prevent IPCC oversight of recorded cases in
only one of the nine PSDs.
21.
While a relatively high proportion of the complainants in this sample had
mental health or communication difficulties, we were unable to carry out
the additional work needed to establish whether this is proportionate to the
number of complainants in general. More work needs to be done to
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establish whether access for these protected groups is being restricted.
22.
The standard of explanation in letters sent to complainants was often
inadequate. In three cases, no letter was sent; in a further 41 per cent of
cases there was no explanation to support the decision. One PSD,
however, sent letters of an excellent standard, clearly written and with a
customer service focus.
23.
None of the PSD assessors had received specific training on making these
decisions, and all would welcome training and further guidance.
Local resolution
24.
Under the new legislation, the complainant’s consent is no longer needed
to resolve a complaint locally. However, complainants now have a right of
appeal against the outcome of the local resolution process, whereas
previously they could only appeal about whether the process had been
followed. These changes were expected to improve the quality of local
resolutions, ensure a focus on reaching a resolution, and reduce
bureaucracy.
25.
For this project, the IPCC was keen to identify good practice that could be
shared. We looked for PSDs that had the highest rate of local resolution
under the previous legislation, with a relatively low rate of appeal and of
appeals upheld. This would indicate PSDs that had tried to develop and
expand customer-focused local resolution. We contacted six PSDs, and
looked at the number of local resolutions carried out and not appealed
under the new legislation. We carried out an audit of files and spoke to a
member of the PSD. We also commissioned independent researchers to
carry out a separate telephone survey of 25 complainants who had gone
through local resolution.
26.
Our file sampling found that a very high proportion of cases had been dealt
with appropriately. 91 per cent had been correctly classified as suitable for
local resolution; 84 per cent had an appropriate action plan; 86 per cent
had appropriate outcomes. However, the results of the survey of
complainants were disappointing: only five of the 25 felt that their
expectations had been fully met, and nearly two-thirds were fairly or very
dissatisfied with the final outcome. Communication and the effective
engagement of the officers involved appear to be crucial issues. Mediation
was under-used.
27.
We found some examples of good practice, with good quality
communication and outcomes, where investigators had considered the
bigger picture and wider learning. The most effective local resolutions had
evidence of: involving the complainant, particularly with the action plan;
providing appropriate information about the process, including its
limitations; telling complainants the outcomes; and, providing officers’
explanations for their actions or behaviour. Most complainants had had, or
been offered, face-to-face meetings. The quality of the meeting was
sometimes inadequate, however. Outcomes were often communicated by
letter, which does not provide meaningful resolution. Some of those
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interviewed said they had not been told about, or were unaware of, the
outcome.
28.
We did not see evidence of local resolution being imposed, even though
complainants’ consent is no longer required. The six PSDs recognised that
the process would not work if a complainant was entirely opposed.
29.
Complainants were offered a face-to-face mediated process with the
officer(s) complained about in very few cases. This appears to reflect a
continuing reluctance on the part of many officers to take an active and
reflective part in such proceedings. Even when mediation was attempted,
the few people involved did not feel it was successful; it clearly requires
specialist skills.
30.
The discrepancy between the actual outcomes in these cases, in PSDs
that are committed to effective local resolution, and the perceptions of
complainants surveyed is a concern. This suggests the need for more
specific training and support for those involved, and/or the use of external
expertise.
Quality of investigations
31.
32.
There are still significant concerns about effective complaints handling at
local level. Two years ago, we upheld 23% of appeals from those whose
complaints had been investigated by the force itself: in 2013, this had risen
to 45%. The Home Affairs Select Committee’s recent report referred to the
‘complaints roundabout’ whereby ineffective local investigations are
appealed to the IPCC, but on return to forces, the re-investigation is also
inadequate, and there is a further appeal. The IPCC’s recent findings on
the Metropolitan Police Service’s handling of complaints alleging race
discrimination raised some fundamental issues about the way
investigations into complaints in general were handled. It showed there
was a lack of customer focus, and a failure properly to apply the IPCC’s
statutory guidance or the requirements of the legislation.
33.
3
Even with an expanded IPCC, the great majority of complaints, even those
that require some investigation, will be dealt with by local forces. In
2012/13, 28,901 allegations were investigated locally3. Under the new
legislation, the IPCC is no longer always the appeal body for complainants
dissatisfied with the process or outcome of those investigations. For the
system to work effectively, with the best use of everyone’s resources, it is
essential that these local investigations are thorough and effective – and
that was the reason the IPCC launched its Right First Time campaign in
2011. The aim was to reduce bureaucracy, and the need to reinvestigate
complaints that were not handled properly.
For those reasons, we wanted to do further work to see what is happening
and help us assist PSDs to improve their customer focus and get
investigations right first time. For this pilot project, we chose one large
All 43 territorial police forces and British Transport Police
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force which accounts for a large number of appeals we receive, a high
proportion of which are upheld. We analysed upheld appeal decisions
made in the last six months, to identify any trends. We then conducted a
focus group with a number of investigating officers of all ranks to help us
understand the underlying reason for those trends.
34.
We found that 73 per cent of upheld appeals had been investigated at
local management level, rather than by the force’s PSD. In over half of all
cases (53 per cent), we disagreed with the conclusions reached; in 20 per
cent of cases, not all the allegations had been addressed; in 19 per cent of
cases, the decision had been poorly explained, with a lack of information
to the complainant.
35.
In six per cent of appeals, allegations of discrimination had not been
effectively investigated - either not investigated at all, or not following the
IPCC’s guidelines.
36.
From analysing the cases, and from discussions with the investigating
officers, it was clear that complainants were often not contacted at the
start to establish terms of reference and the scope of the investigation.
Evidence-gathering was often one-sided, focusing on police evidence
only. There was a lack of training in interview techniques, so that officers
were not asked for more detailed information when interviewed. We also
identified a number of other standard investigative practices that were not
followed.
37.
There is clearly a need for better support and guidance for those
investigating complaints, especially when they are handled at local
management level. The IPCC needs to ensure it uses its powers to direct
re-investigations consistently; PSDs should examine all such directions to
see what lessons need to be learned and to ensure that the reinvestigation is thorough.
Learning and recommendations
38.
39.
4
There are 43 territorial police forces and four special police forces4 in
England and Wales. Each force has a different structure and different
ways of handling and implementing learning and recommendations that
are made, either internally or externally. The IPCC is about to acquire the
power to require forces to respond formally to our recommendations, and
the planned expansion will give us the opportunity to change the way we
interact with forces and communicate learning and recommendations. We
will need to ensure that we are consistent in what we share and
recommend; and we also need to be sure that there are effective
mechanisms for implementing required changes.
We asked 39 PSDs to provide details of the mechanisms they use to
share learning or recommendations. Thirty-three PSDs responded. We
British Transport Police, Civil Nuclear Constabulary, Ministry of Defence Police and the National Crime Agency
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also looked at our own internal mechanisms for sharing information.
40.
As expected, each PSD had a different way of sharing learning and
recommendations, though there were similarities. We identified some
risks: mixed messages; duplicated data entry; a lack of active auditing or
monitoring. The IPCC itself needs to improve its knowledge management
strategy, and link the different systems for communicating with forces.
41.
A number of PSDs handled recommendations from different sources in
isolation from each other, resulting in mixed messages to staff. Several
forces stored data in several different locations, some of them with
restricted access. Often this meant updating several systems for one
matter.
42.
Most of the mechanisms for auditing described to us were passive in
nature – there were no obligations for the intended audience to confirm
that the message had been received and understood. If auditing did occur,
it was often only maintained as a result of one individual’s persistent effort.
Mechanisms for on-going monitoring of whether changes had in fact been
implemented varied significantly between PSDs, both in terms of the
seniority and personnel involved.
43.
The IPCC has three routes for communicating information and learning to
forces: through its casework and customer services directorate, its
investigations directorate, and its Learning the Lessons bulletin. These
systems are not well linked, and are supported by a number of different
databases, without any overall responsibility for tracking and monitoring.
44.
Ensuring positive change following complaints or investigations is critical
to public confidence in policing. That is why a crucial part of the IPCC’s
expansion programme is to improve our analytical and knowledge
management capacity, and to work effectively with other bodies, such as
the College of Policing and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, and with
Police and Crime Commissioners. Forces need also to ensure that they
have the capacity and capability to effectively implement learning and
recommendations.
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Further work
45.
We have created the Oversight Digest, a publication scheme for sharing
guidance and advice as a result of our oversight work.
46.
Each edition will either be generated from a review of the oversight issues
raised by day-to-day operational IPCC work, or by the findings of targeted
projects on particular themes. Good practice in recent investigations or
PSDs may feature. Editions will include practical guidance as well as case
studies.
47.
In addition, the North Yorkshire Police Authority v IPCC (Jordan) 2010
judgement has been placed on the agenda of every IPCC PSD meeting.
48.
The PSDs that participated in the direction and control, access, local
resolution and quality of investigations projects have been sent their
individual reports.
49.
The detailed reports on direction and control, access, and local resolution
have been published. The quality of investigations and learning and
recommendations reports will be published once further work has been
done.
50.
The learning from these pilots will inform the IPCC’s change programme,
in particular in relation to knowledge management and working with others
to improve practice and increase confidence in the complaints system.
51.
We will consult with external stakeholders on some of the issues identified
in our projects and seek their views on our work for 2014/2015.
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