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Consumer Password Worst Practices
              The Imperva Application Defense Center (ADC)




              Summary
              In December 2009, a major password breach occurred that led to
              the release of 32 million passwords1. Further, the hacker posted
White Paper
              to the Internet2 the full list of the 32 million passwords (with no
              other identifiable information). Passwords were stored in clear-
              text in the database and were extracted through a SQL Injection
              vulnerability3. The data provides a unique glimpse into the way
              that users select passwords and an opportunity to evaluate
              the true strength of these as a security mechanism. In the past,
              password studies have focused mostly on surveys4. Never
              before has there been such a high volume of real-world
              passwords to examine.

              The Imperva Application Defense Center (ADC) analyzed the
              strength of the passwords.
ADC




              1
                http://www.rockyou.com/help/securityMessage.php
              2
                http://igigi.baywords.com/rockyou-com-passwords-list/
              3
                http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/14/rockyou-hacked/
              4
                http://blog.absolute.com/passwords-are-not-enough/
Consumer Password Worst Practices




The shortness and simplicity of passwords means many users select credentials that
will make them susceptible to basic, brute force password attacks. Furthermore, studies
show5,6,7 that about one half of the users use the same (or very similar) password to all
websites that require logging in. Ironically, the problem has changed very little over the
past twenty years. In 1990, a study of Unix password security revealed that password
selection is strikingly similar to the 32 million breached passwords8. Just ten years ago,
hacked Hotmail passwords showed little change9. This means that the users, if allowed
to, will choose very weak passwords even for sites that hold their most private data.
Worse, as hackers continue to rapidly adopt smarter brute force password cracking
software, consumers and companies will be at greater risk. To quantify the issue, the
combination of poor passwords and automated attacks means that in just 110 attempts,
a hacker will typically gain access to one new account on every second or a mere 17
minutes to break into 1000 accounts.
Key findings:
 » About 30% of users chose passwords whose length is equal or below six characters.
    » Moreover, almost 60% of users chose their passwords from a limited set of alpha-numeric
      characters.
    » Nearly 50% of users used names, slang words, dictionary words or trivial passwords (consecutive
      digits, adjacent keyboard keys, and so on). The most common password among Rockyou.com
      account owners is “123456”.




5
  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/6125081/Security-risk-as-people-use-same-password-on-all-websites.html
6
  http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/majority_use_same_password.php
7
  http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/200911/3184/Internet-users-still-using-same-password-for-all-Web-sites
8
  http://www.klein.com/dvk/publications/passwd.pdf
9
  http://www.switched.com/2009/10/07/hotmail-scam-reveals-most-common-password-123456/

Imperva White Paper                                                                                                   <   2   >
Consumer Password Worst Practices




Analysis
NASA provides the following Recommendations10 for strong password selection. The ADC used NASA’s standards
to help benchmark consumers’ password selection:
     1. Recommendation: It should contain at least eight characters.
        The ADC analysis revealed that just one half of the passwords contained seven or less characters. (Rockyou.com
        current minimal password length requirement is five). A staggering 30% of users chose passwords whose length
        was equal to or below six characters.
        Password Length Distribution
                                                                     13
                                                                12 1.32%
                                                              2.11%          5
                                                                           4.07%
                                                               11
                                                             3.57%
                                                                                        6
                                                       10                            26.04%
                                                     9.06%


                                                     9
                                                  12.11%

                                                                                       7
                                                                 8                  19.29%
                                                              19.98%




     2. Recommendation: It should contain a mix of four different types of characters – upper case letters, lower case
        letters, numbers, and special characters such as !@#$%^&*,;" If there is only one letter or special character, it
        should not be either the first or last character in the password.
        The ADC analysis showed that almost 60% of users chose their passwords from within a limited set of characters.
        About 40% of the users use only lowercase characters for their passwords and about another 16% use only digits.
        Less than 4% of the users use special characters.
        Password Length Distribution

                                                  3.81% 1.62%




                                         36.94%                            41.69%




                                                     15.94%




        In fact, after evaluating the passwords against two of NASA's recommendations only 0.2% of Rockyou.com users
        have a password that could be considered as strong password:
        » Eight characters or longer
        » Contain a mixture of special characters, numbers and both lower and upper case letters.




10
     http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/ospp/securityguide/V1comput/Password.htm

Imperva White Paper                                                                                                   <     3   >
Consumer Password Worst Practices



  3. Recommendation: It should not be a name, a slang word, or any word in the dictionary. It should not include
     any part of your name or your e-mail address.
    Almost all of the 5000 most popular passwords, that are used by a share of 20% of the users, were just that –
    names, slang words, dictionary words or trivial passwords (consecutive digits, adjacent keyboard keys, and so
    on). The most common password among Rockyou.com account owners is “123456”. The runner up is “12345”. The
    following table depicts the top 20 common passwords in the database list:
    Password Popularity – Top 20

                                Number of Users with                                       Number of Users with
      Rank       Password                                        Rank           Password
                                Password (absolute)                                        Password (absolute)
       1          123456                290731                    11             Nicole           17168
       2           12345                79078                     12             Daniel           16409
       3        123456789               76790                     13            babygirl          16094
       4         Password               61958                     14            monkey            15294
       5         iloveyou               51622                     15             Jessica          15162
       6          princess              35231                     16             Lovely           14950
       7          rockyou               22588                     17            michael           14898
       8         1234567                21726                     18             Ashley           14329
       9         12345678               20553                     19             654321           13984
       10         abc123                17542                     20             Qwerty           13856


    If a hacker would have used the list of the top 5000 passwords as a dictionary for brute force attack on Rockyou.
    com users, it would take only one attempt (per account) to guess 0.9% of the users passwords or a rate of one
    success per 111 attempts. Assuming an attacker with a DSL connection of 55KBPS upload rate and that each
    attempt is 0.5KB in size, it means that the attacker can have 110 attempts per second. At this rate, a hacker will
    gain access to one new account every second or just less than 17 minutes to compromise 1000 accounts. And the
    problem is exponential. After the first wave of attacks, it would only take 116 attempts per account to compromise
    5% of the accounts, 683 attempts to compromise 10% of accounts and about 5000 attempts to compromise 20%
    of accounts. The following diagram depicts the expected effectiveness of attacks using a small, carefully chosen,
    attack dictionary:
    Accumulated Percent of Dictionary Attack Success

                                 20%




                                 15%




                                 10%




                                   5%




                                    0
                                              1
                                            359
                                            717
                                           1075
                                           1433
                                           1791
                                           2149
                                           2507
                                           2865
                                           3223
                                           3581
                                           3939
                                           4297
                                           4655




                                                     Number of password tries



Imperva White Paper                                                                                               <   4   >
Recommendations
Users:
     1. Choose a strong password for sites you care for the privacy of the information you
        store. Bruce Schneir’s advice is useful: “take a sentence and turn it into a password.
        Something like “This little piggy went to market” might become "tlpWENT2m".
        That nine-character password won't be in anyone's dictionary.”11
     2. Use a different password for all sites – even for the ones where privacy isn’t an
        issue. To help remember the passwords, again, following Bruce Schneier’s advice is
        recommended: “If you can't remember your passwords, write them down and put
        the paper in your wallet. But just write the sentence – or better yet – a hint that
        will help you remember your sentence.”12
     3. Never trust a 3rd party with your important passwords (webmail, banking,
        medical etc.)

Administrators:
     1. Enforce strong password policy – if you give the users a choice, it is very likely that
        they would choose weak passwords.
     2. Make sure passwords are not transmitted in clear text. Always use HTTPS on login.
     3. Make sure passwords are not kept in clear text. Always digest password before
        storing to DB.
     4. Employ aggressive anti-brute force mechanisms to detect and mitigate brute
        force attacks on login credentials. Make these attacks too slowly for any practical
        purposes even for shorter passwords. You should actively put obstacles in the way
        of a brute-force attacker – such as CAPTCHAs, computational challenges, etc.
     5. Employ a password change policy. Trigger the policy either by time or when
        suspicion for a compromise arises.
     6. Allow and encourage passphrases instead of passwords. Although sentences may
        be longer, they may be easier to remember. With added characters, they become
        more difficult to break.


11
     http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/nov/13/internet-passwords
12
     ibid




Imperva
Headquarters
3400 Bridge Parkway
Suite 101
Redwood Shores, CA 94065
Tel: +1-650-345-9000
Fax: +1-650-345-9004

Toll Free (U.S. only): +1-866-926-4678
www.imperva.com

© Copyright 2010, Imperva
All rights reserved. Imperva and SecureSphere are registered trademarks of Imperva.
All other brand or product names are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective holders.
#WP-WORSTPRACTICES_PASSWORDS-0110rev1

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Wp consumer password_worst_practices

  • 1. Consumer Password Worst Practices The Imperva Application Defense Center (ADC) Summary In December 2009, a major password breach occurred that led to the release of 32 million passwords1. Further, the hacker posted White Paper to the Internet2 the full list of the 32 million passwords (with no other identifiable information). Passwords were stored in clear- text in the database and were extracted through a SQL Injection vulnerability3. The data provides a unique glimpse into the way that users select passwords and an opportunity to evaluate the true strength of these as a security mechanism. In the past, password studies have focused mostly on surveys4. Never before has there been such a high volume of real-world passwords to examine. The Imperva Application Defense Center (ADC) analyzed the strength of the passwords. ADC 1 http://www.rockyou.com/help/securityMessage.php 2 http://igigi.baywords.com/rockyou-com-passwords-list/ 3 http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/12/14/rockyou-hacked/ 4 http://blog.absolute.com/passwords-are-not-enough/
  • 2. Consumer Password Worst Practices The shortness and simplicity of passwords means many users select credentials that will make them susceptible to basic, brute force password attacks. Furthermore, studies show5,6,7 that about one half of the users use the same (or very similar) password to all websites that require logging in. Ironically, the problem has changed very little over the past twenty years. In 1990, a study of Unix password security revealed that password selection is strikingly similar to the 32 million breached passwords8. Just ten years ago, hacked Hotmail passwords showed little change9. This means that the users, if allowed to, will choose very weak passwords even for sites that hold their most private data. Worse, as hackers continue to rapidly adopt smarter brute force password cracking software, consumers and companies will be at greater risk. To quantify the issue, the combination of poor passwords and automated attacks means that in just 110 attempts, a hacker will typically gain access to one new account on every second or a mere 17 minutes to break into 1000 accounts. Key findings: » About 30% of users chose passwords whose length is equal or below six characters. » Moreover, almost 60% of users chose their passwords from a limited set of alpha-numeric characters. » Nearly 50% of users used names, slang words, dictionary words or trivial passwords (consecutive digits, adjacent keyboard keys, and so on). The most common password among Rockyou.com account owners is “123456”. 5 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/6125081/Security-risk-as-people-use-same-password-on-all-websites.html 6 http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/majority_use_same_password.php 7 http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/200911/3184/Internet-users-still-using-same-password-for-all-Web-sites 8 http://www.klein.com/dvk/publications/passwd.pdf 9 http://www.switched.com/2009/10/07/hotmail-scam-reveals-most-common-password-123456/ Imperva White Paper < 2 >
  • 3. Consumer Password Worst Practices Analysis NASA provides the following Recommendations10 for strong password selection. The ADC used NASA’s standards to help benchmark consumers’ password selection: 1. Recommendation: It should contain at least eight characters. The ADC analysis revealed that just one half of the passwords contained seven or less characters. (Rockyou.com current minimal password length requirement is five). A staggering 30% of users chose passwords whose length was equal to or below six characters. Password Length Distribution 13 12 1.32% 2.11% 5 4.07% 11 3.57% 6 10 26.04% 9.06% 9 12.11% 7 8 19.29% 19.98% 2. Recommendation: It should contain a mix of four different types of characters – upper case letters, lower case letters, numbers, and special characters such as !@#$%^&*,;" If there is only one letter or special character, it should not be either the first or last character in the password. The ADC analysis showed that almost 60% of users chose their passwords from within a limited set of characters. About 40% of the users use only lowercase characters for their passwords and about another 16% use only digits. Less than 4% of the users use special characters. Password Length Distribution 3.81% 1.62% 36.94% 41.69% 15.94% In fact, after evaluating the passwords against two of NASA's recommendations only 0.2% of Rockyou.com users have a password that could be considered as strong password: » Eight characters or longer » Contain a mixture of special characters, numbers and both lower and upper case letters. 10 http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/ospp/securityguide/V1comput/Password.htm Imperva White Paper < 3 >
  • 4. Consumer Password Worst Practices 3. Recommendation: It should not be a name, a slang word, or any word in the dictionary. It should not include any part of your name or your e-mail address. Almost all of the 5000 most popular passwords, that are used by a share of 20% of the users, were just that – names, slang words, dictionary words or trivial passwords (consecutive digits, adjacent keyboard keys, and so on). The most common password among Rockyou.com account owners is “123456”. The runner up is “12345”. The following table depicts the top 20 common passwords in the database list: Password Popularity – Top 20 Number of Users with Number of Users with Rank Password Rank Password Password (absolute) Password (absolute) 1 123456 290731 11 Nicole 17168 2 12345 79078 12 Daniel 16409 3 123456789 76790 13 babygirl 16094 4 Password 61958 14 monkey 15294 5 iloveyou 51622 15 Jessica 15162 6 princess 35231 16 Lovely 14950 7 rockyou 22588 17 michael 14898 8 1234567 21726 18 Ashley 14329 9 12345678 20553 19 654321 13984 10 abc123 17542 20 Qwerty 13856 If a hacker would have used the list of the top 5000 passwords as a dictionary for brute force attack on Rockyou. com users, it would take only one attempt (per account) to guess 0.9% of the users passwords or a rate of one success per 111 attempts. Assuming an attacker with a DSL connection of 55KBPS upload rate and that each attempt is 0.5KB in size, it means that the attacker can have 110 attempts per second. At this rate, a hacker will gain access to one new account every second or just less than 17 minutes to compromise 1000 accounts. And the problem is exponential. After the first wave of attacks, it would only take 116 attempts per account to compromise 5% of the accounts, 683 attempts to compromise 10% of accounts and about 5000 attempts to compromise 20% of accounts. The following diagram depicts the expected effectiveness of attacks using a small, carefully chosen, attack dictionary: Accumulated Percent of Dictionary Attack Success 20% 15% 10% 5% 0 1 359 717 1075 1433 1791 2149 2507 2865 3223 3581 3939 4297 4655 Number of password tries Imperva White Paper < 4 >
  • 5. Recommendations Users: 1. Choose a strong password for sites you care for the privacy of the information you store. Bruce Schneir’s advice is useful: “take a sentence and turn it into a password. Something like “This little piggy went to market” might become "tlpWENT2m". That nine-character password won't be in anyone's dictionary.”11 2. Use a different password for all sites – even for the ones where privacy isn’t an issue. To help remember the passwords, again, following Bruce Schneier’s advice is recommended: “If you can't remember your passwords, write them down and put the paper in your wallet. But just write the sentence – or better yet – a hint that will help you remember your sentence.”12 3. Never trust a 3rd party with your important passwords (webmail, banking, medical etc.) Administrators: 1. Enforce strong password policy – if you give the users a choice, it is very likely that they would choose weak passwords. 2. Make sure passwords are not transmitted in clear text. Always use HTTPS on login. 3. Make sure passwords are not kept in clear text. Always digest password before storing to DB. 4. Employ aggressive anti-brute force mechanisms to detect and mitigate brute force attacks on login credentials. Make these attacks too slowly for any practical purposes even for shorter passwords. You should actively put obstacles in the way of a brute-force attacker – such as CAPTCHAs, computational challenges, etc. 5. Employ a password change policy. Trigger the policy either by time or when suspicion for a compromise arises. 6. Allow and encourage passphrases instead of passwords. Although sentences may be longer, they may be easier to remember. With added characters, they become more difficult to break. 11 http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/nov/13/internet-passwords 12 ibid Imperva Headquarters 3400 Bridge Parkway Suite 101 Redwood Shores, CA 94065 Tel: +1-650-345-9000 Fax: +1-650-345-9004 Toll Free (U.S. only): +1-866-926-4678 www.imperva.com © Copyright 2010, Imperva All rights reserved. Imperva and SecureSphere are registered trademarks of Imperva. All other brand or product names are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective holders. #WP-WORSTPRACTICES_PASSWORDS-0110rev1