Exxon Valdez Crisis Communication Analysis Project finL

Exxon Valdez Crisis Communication Analysis Project 1
Exxon Valdez Crisis Communication Analysis Project
By
James Nichols
Candidate Master of Science of Nursing Emergency Management Department of Homeland
Security
In Partial Completion of EMHS 6203 Crisis Communication
4/2/2015

I. Introduction
The Exxon Valdez disaster is classified as the biggest man made environmental disaster until the
BP New Horizon’s spill of 2012. The long term impact of an estimated thirty eight million
gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound Alaska, one of the most ecologically sensitive
ecosystems in the world, is still being assessed almost twenty seven years later. Exxon’s
response to the disaster, intentions and philosophy are still being argued today also.
This Communications Analysis uses Finks four stage crisis model to analyze Exxon’s
communication response to the Valdez disaster of 1989 and suggests alternative courses of
action that may have improved the short term and long term outcomes.
II. Aleksey Pipeline, Exxon Transportation, Valdez Terminal Organizational Structure.
Aleksey Pipeline was a consortium of Atlanta Richfield, British Petroleum and Exxon who had
only acquired and interest in the project after purchasing another oil company Humboldt Oil; this
fact lead to no major oil company having responsibility for the terminal or pipelines
shortcomings (Ott, 2014)(Day,2014)(New York Times, 2014). Another issue was the fact that
while Atlantic Richfield and British Petroleum depended substantially on the North Slope for
production and were relying heavily on the opening of the Arctic Wildlife Refuge for future
reserves, Exxon relied mainly on production from the Middle East which could be produced and
transported at a far lower cost than the reserves in Alaska (Yergen, 2010). Still another harbinger
was the end of the cold war which had brought the vast oil reserves of the former Soviet Union
onto the world market; this alone lowered the critical nature and thus the funding of the Aleksey
Pipeline whose construction was as much an issue of national security as economics (Yergen,
2010). The final Prodromal was the fact that an individual, hired by a company whose business

intelligence operations were so effective that Herbert Hoover based FBI surveillance in the
western hemisphere on Standard Oils operations, allowed an individual with a suspended
driver’s license to captain an asset worth one hundred twenty million dollars (Yergen, 1996). The
simple facts of the matter are that Exxon viewed the Aleksey Pipeline and the North Slope fields
as only profitable in the short term and history proved them correct. As a result Exxon reduced
the operating cost as much as possible and did everything possible to increase profits, possibly
including using chemical laden waste water from California refineries as ballast which now can
never be verified after the Valdez spill (Ott, 2008)(Day, 2015). The loss of the Arctic Refuge
drilling put Atlantic Richfield and British Petroleum in a far worse position than Exxon. Atlantic
Richfield and British Petroleum merged in 2000 and all Alaska operations where spun off to
Phillips Petroleum which merged in 2002 with Conoco the combined company Conoco-Phillips
moved its headquarters to Houston the same city Exxon operates out of (Yergen, 2008). Exxon
Transportation owned 19 supertankers. The Exxon Valdez was the newest and only one that was
single hulled, and eighteen ocean going tugs. Exxon Transportation President Frank Iarossi had
worked for the company for twenty years and helped with the original oil spill response plans.
Iarossi was a graduate of the Coast Guard Academy the last true school of seamanship in
America, a ten year coast guard veteran, a mechanical engineer with a BSME from the Coast
Guard Academy and a MBA Master of Business Administration who had ran his own consulting
firm.
Prior Crisis - In this case signals detection should have given the Exxon Corporation all the
information needed to prevent this event. Frank Iarossi, President of Exxon Transportation,
graduate of the Coast Guard Academy and ten year veteran of the Coast Guard, had just returned
to Houston from a Exxon tanker spill cleanup in Hawaii the week of the Valdez disaster (Day,

2014)(Ott, 2008)(New York Times, 2014). The Amoco Cardiz had spilled sixty eight million
gallons of petroleum off the coast of Brittany France in 1979, the Ixtoc I spilled one hundred
forty million in the Gulf of Mexico in 1979 and Exxon itself had a major spill of the
Massachusetts coast in the early eighties (Ott, 2008) (New York Times, 2014).
Key Missionand Values- The key mission of the pipeline was to safely move North Slope oil
from Northern Alaska to the closest port that was clear of ice year round, Valdez in the south. Oil
companies had tried to send tankers to the northern coast of Alaska but the ice was just too
problematic. Also, the concept of sending the oil by a longer pipeline across Canada proved
impossible for political reasons. To a large extent the pipeline was about American independence
from Middle Eastern oil and having the pipeline running across or through a Canada seemed to
be counter to the argument of energy independence. In order to accommodate the environmental
and fishing industry concerns promises about the safety of the pipeline and the operations of the
Valdez Terminal had to be made to congress. These promises were not honored years later (Day,
2014)(Ott, 2008)(New York Times, 2014). ). The Aleksey Pipeline could only be constructed by
an act of congress that effectively bypassed the years of legal lawsuits that would have
hamstringed construction in the same way that the lawsuits have stopped construction on the
Keystone Pipeline today. To achieve congressional approval the Aleksey Pipeline Company
promised safeguards and contingency plans to insure that not “one drop” of oil would enter the
sound (Ott, 2014).
Key Publics
Oversight Agencies- The Exxon Transportation Corporation was overseen by the Coast Guard,
represented by Coast Guard Commander McCall at Valdez, which controlled the shipping in and
out of the Valdez port. The operations of the Valdez terminal and the ships operating out of it

were monitored by the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) represented at Valdez by Dan Lawn.
Consumers- Exxon has been the largest refiner and distributer of oil products in the United
States during the last century. Exxon’s customers directly or indirectly are every American driver
(Yergen, 2008).
Partner Organizations- the Aleksey Pipeline was a partnership of several oil companies
including Atlanta Richfield, Exxon and British Petroleum.
Communities- The Valdez terminal operated in the most productive fishing region in the United
States. The local fishing interest was represented by the fishing unions at Cordova a small fishing
village on Prince William Sound that is the highest producing fishing port in North America
(Day, 2014)(Ott, 2008).
Stockholders- Exxon is a major public corporation listed on the New York Stock Exchange and
owned by millions of Americans. Including one Supreme Court Justice (Day, 2014)(Ott,
2008)(New York Times, 2014).
Media- The nature of this disaster made the event an international press event. Press
representatives from all over the world converged on Valdez.
Employees- the Oil industry is the biggest employer in Alaska. Followed by Fishing. The impact
of the spill effected the fisherman more than the oil workers as the port reopened within days of
the spill but the fishing season was postponed or canceled in affected areas placing fisherman out
of work.

Organizational Preparedness for the Crisis
While The Exxon Transportation emergency response plan was written to a large extent by the
company President Frank Ioarossi himself and was over twenty volumes in length . The initial
response to an oil spill at the Valdez terminal was to be handled by Alayeska Pipeline with
Exxon taking over responsibility and logistics when able (Day, 2014)(Ott, 2008)(New York
Times, 2014). The state of Alaska never required Exxon to even have a response plan for the
Valdez terminal as long as Exxon only transported oil out of the Valdez terminal (Davidson,
1990). The Emergency Response plans that were required under the agreement with congress to
provide the authorization for the construction of the pipeline were largely ignored by Alyeska
after the terminal facility site was transferred from federal ownership to state ownership in the
late 70’s (Davidson, 2014). But the federal government had created a national contingency plan
under the Clean Water Act of 72 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 which would allow for a takeover of the clean up by the
federal government. The plan provided for an oil pollution fund, equipment, and regional
response teams and on scene coordinators but while the federal government had received over 25
billion in royalties from North Slope oil the contingency fund in case of a spill or environmental
problem was only five million. This was a primary reason that the Coast Guard did not want to
nationalize the clean up as this was the amount spent by Exxon on day one of the spill
(Davdison, 2014). While elaborate plans had been made the reality of the plans feasibility had
long been in question by individuals such as Dan Lawn with the Alaska Department of
Economic Conservation who had a long history of run ins with Alyeska Pipeline over the
emergency plans at the Valdez terminal (Davidson, 2014) (Day, 2014)(Ott, 2008)(New York
Times, 2014).. The Alyeska Pipeline did have one of the best proactive public reactions

programs in that every Alaskan receive around a thousand dollars a year from the state Royalties
from the pipeline. This along with the number of people employed with the oil industry in
Alaska created a great deal of good will; It also made individuals who were to enforce the
environmental regulations such as Dan Lawn at Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation very unpopular when it came to enforcement (Davidson, 1990) (Day, 2014)(Ott,
2008)(New York Times, 2014). Exxon maintained press relations professionals in Alaska and
one of these individuals Don Cornett took charge of the press briefings. Cornett was reported to
have said that he felt like Patton before battle when going into the press conference (Ott, 2008).
Iarossi President of Exxon transportation was on the ground within 24 hours (Day, 2014). One of
the major mistakes was the concept that the Valdez terminal would handle “initial response”
which Aleksey Pipeline took to mean that their responsibility ended when the Exxon
management team arrived and not when Exxon had the resources on the ground to effectively
contain the situation (Day, 2014)(Ott, 2008)(Davidson, 1990). Also, Exxon was hampered by the
logistics of the remoteness and distance to Alaska. Most of the equipment had to be flown in
from the continental United States over two thousand miles away and this took time (Day, 2014)
(Ott, 2008) (Davidson, 1990).
III.Theory
Fink’s prodromal phase of crisis which is defined in Mitroff’s stages as signal detection, probing
and prevention includes all events before the actual event or series of events directly leading up
to the defining event (Coombs, 2014 p. 10). In this case signals detection should have given the
Exxon Corporation all the information needed to prevent this event. Frank Iarossi, President of
Exxon Transportation, graduate of the Coast Guard Academy and ten year veteran of the Coast
Guard, had just returned to Houston from a Exxon tanker spill cleanup in Hawaii the week of the

Valdez disaster (Day, 2014)(Ott, 2008)(New York Times, 2014). Fink’s stages state crisis
breakout as the event that brings about the crisis or the series of events that brings about the
crisis; Mitroff calls this stage Damage Containment (Coombs, 2014). Chronic in Fink’s stages or
Recovery in Mitroff’s stages involves trying to place the individual, community or environment
in the position that it was before the crisis. In order to do this the Exxon Transportation Company
did several things. Chronic in Fink’s stages or Recovery in Mitroff’s stages involves trying to
place the individual, community or environment in the position that it was before the crisis. In
order to do this the Exxon Transportation Company did several things. The marketing expertise
of Exxon realized that most people would assume that in a state as vast as Alaska that the oil
spill interfered with a larger tourist region. Exxon began a tourism program to reinforce that with
the exception of the immediate area around Valdez that the vast majority of Alaska was
untouched. The “Alaska is Beautiful” campaign actually increased the tourism for the 1990 year
by five percent (Coombs, 2015).
I used Decision Theory to analyze this case as it was the theory most applicable to a case that
involved such a logistical undertaking. The crisis communications in this case were an important
component of a much larger and important endeavor involving the use of over a billion dollars in
resources. Decision theory is concerned with providing management with the resources to make
the most effective decisions (Coombs, 2014). The goal of the theory is to optimize the outcome
for the corporation and limit the cost or loss of resources to the company (Coombs, 2014).
Because the decisions are made in situations were perfect information is not available the
decision makers should measure the probability of the event and the benefit or negative outcome
of a positive occurrence and the negative occurrence. Creating largely a mathematical equation
to optimize the outcome. Decision theory is one of the most widely studied and applied theories

in crisis management; its focus on optimizing the outcome for the corporation is extremely well
received in the business world (Coombs, 2014).
Decision theory has been used in economics, psychology, mathematics, computer science and
statistics. The various subdivisions of decision theory have been broadly used, studied and
applied in every field of endeavor since the 1940’s. Neuman’s theory of expected utility theory
demonstrated that by using systematic logical steps in the decision process outcomes could be
optimized. Allais and Ellsberg showed that human behavior demonstrated patterns of behavior
and sometimes departed from the expected utility theory (Anand, 1993).
IV. Prodromal
Fink’s prodromal phase of crisis which is defined in Mitroff’s stages as signal detection, probing
and prevention includes all events before the actual event or series of events directly leading up
to the defining event (Coombs, 2014 p. 10). In this case signals detection should have given the
Exxon Corporation all the information needed to prevent this event. Frank Iarossi, President of
Exxon Transportation, graduate of the Coast Guard Academy and ten year veteran of the Coast
Guard, had just returned to Houston from a Exxon tanker spill cleanup in Hawaii the week of the
Valdez disaster (Day, 2014)(Ott, 2008)(New York Times, 2014). The Amoco Cardiz had spilled
sixty eight million gallons of petroleum off the coast of Brittany France in 1979, the Ixtoc I
spilled one hundred forty million in the Gulf of Mexico in 1979 and Exxon itself had a major
spill of the Massachusetts coast in the early eighties (Ott, 2008) (New York Times, 2014).
The sensitivity of the wildlife and fishing industry in the area was evident from the start. The
Prince William Sound area is dependent on fishing of migratory species for its existence. The
Ecology of the area is equally dependent on the Salmon and other species who return from the

sea yearly to reproduce in the pristine glacier fed streams of the ford (Ott, 2008)(Day,2014). The
fishing industry from the beginning of the Aleksey Pipeline argued against construction of the
port in Valdez because of the probability of a spill and the ecological, social and economic
disaster it would cause (Day, 2014). The Aleksey Pipeline could only be constructed by an act of
congress that effectively bypassed the years of legal lawsuits that would have hamstringed
construction in the same way that the lawsuits have stopped construction on the Keystone
Pipeline today. To achieve congressional approval the Aleksey Pipeline Company promised
safeguards and contingency plans to insure that not “one drop” of oil would enter the sound (Ott,
2014). The fishing industry, represented by trade unions, was concerned about lax safety
precautions at the Valdez Terminal before the spill (Day, 2014) (Ott, 2008). The bilge water
treatment plants that were supposed to treat the water used as ballast in the giant tankers before
it’s discharge into the sound during the unloading process for the oil reportedly dumped not only
the oil residue into the bottom of the sound but also reports were circulating of other toxic
substances and by products being pumped in as ballast in refining operations in California and
Washington where strict environmental codes had been enacted and dumped into the bottom of
Prince William sound (Ott, 2014). Also, the air pollution level in the Valdez level was equal to a
major metropolitan area (Ott, 2014). The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
represented by Dan Lawn a former engineer on the Valdez Terminal was in constant conflict
with Aleksey Pipeline over spill response shortcomings (Ott, 2014)(HBO, 2001)(Day, 2014).
The Valdez was the newest of the Exxon fleet but was the only one of the eight supertankers
operated by Exxon Transportation with a single hull construction (Ott, 2014)(New York Times,
2014). Coast Guard Naval Architect concluded that in the thirty tanker groundings from 1969
through 1973 double hull construction would have prevented 97% of the oil loss to the

environment (Davidson, 2014). The Exxon Transportation corporation had halved the crew of
the super tankers between 1979 and 1989 leading to accusations of safety concerns (Day, 2014)
(Ott, 2014). The new radar that was supposed to be placed in the Valdez coast guard station was
replaced with a cheaper version that could be maintained by Coast Guard personnel to save
money (Ott, 2014). The staff at the Coast Guard station was halved also to save money (Ott,
2014). Also, a general level of complacency had developed after ten years of operation without a
major incident; the night before the disaster the Aleksey Pipeline had its annual awards dinner in
spite of the fact that the terminal had ten percent of the tanker traffic in the United States and
fifty percent of Tanker incidents (Day, 2014). Exxon Corporation had all the necessary
information to predict that an incident in the sound was probable.
Crisis Breakout
Fink’s stages state crisis breakout as the event that brings about the crisis or the series of events
that brings about the crisis; Mitroff calls this stage Damage Containment (Coombs, 2014).
The Event that directly lead to the Valdez disaster was when Captain Hazelwood and two other
crew members returned to the Exxon Valdez on the evening of March 24, 1989 after Captain
Hazelwood a recovering alcoholic had visited one of the local bars and drank three double
vodkas (Ott, 2008). After this the ship left the Valdez terminal as usual with the harbor pilot at
the helm. The harbor pilot left the Valdez after it had exited the narrows; indicated in the map
below as a small light blue square. Because of calving icebergs entering the sea-lane from the
glacier, indicated by the small triangle in the upper left of the map, which moved down the ford
and into the sea lane Captain Hazelwood contacted coast guard for permission to steer away
from the bergs steering right five degrees into the inbound lane, permission was granted by the
coast guard. At this time it is conjectured that the captain steered the ship five degrees and set the

autopilot, which locked out all manual steering (Ott, 2008). Captain Hazelwood then went below
to his quarters leaving the third mate a Mr. Cousins in charge (Day, 2008) (Ott, 2008). A few
minutes later the lookout reported to Mr. Cousins that the channel marker light was to the right
instead of the left, Cousins ordered a ten degree turn to the right to reenter the outbound lane
because the ship was locked into autopilot the manual steering did not respond (Ott,2008). A
minute or two later the lookout returned and stated that the marker lights were even further to the
right and Mr. Cousins determined that the sea depth was rapidly coming shallow and ordered a
hard turn to the right which again did nothing as the autopilot had manual steering locked out.
This meant that the ship continued on the five degree adjusted course the captain set it upon
earlier before leaving the bridge. Mr. Cousins alerted the captain to the dangerous situation
moments before impact. All this occurred at shift change at the Coast Guard Radar center and
report and greetings were being exchanged at that time between the ongoing and off going shift
(Ott, 2008). The ship came up hard aground on Bligh Reef and was seen to be leaking copious
amounts of oil that appeared to be a foot higher than surrounding seas (Ott, 2008) (Day, 2008)
(New York Times, 2008). Captain Hazelwood then contacted the Coast Guard at Valdez stating
the Valdez was hard aground on Bligh Reef and was leaking some oil.
The first failure of communications was between the Coast Guard Commander and Captain
Hazelwood on the amount of oil being lost, the scale of the leak was not known fully until the
Coast Guard and Alaska Environmental officials accessed the ship in person approximately two
hours after the incident (Ott, 2008)(Day, 2008)(HBO, 1992)(New York Times, 2014).

Bligh Reef the grounding site of the Valdez is indicated by a small light blue egg, Columbia
Glacier is indicated by a small light blue triangle, the point where the harbor pilot left the Valdez
is indicated by a small light blue square, and the sea lane is in purple.
The Situation, Background, Assessment and Recommendation (SBAR) reporting system should
have been used to report an immediate estimate of the situation to the Coast Guard Commander,
Aleksey Pipeline Company and the call desk at Exxon Transportation in Houston (Coombs,
2014). This should have initiated an accurate Crisis Response Plan where the containment
equipment, skimmers, boom, boats and the containment team all onboard the emergency
response barge were put to sea within minutes from the port. In reality the Crisis Response Plan
Aleksey had written for the Valdez terminal had not been properly implemented; the
containment boom was substandard and useless, the emergency response barge was unloaded
and under repairs, the dispersant was not on hand in sufficient volumes (Ott, 2008) (Day, 2008)

(HBO, 1992). To add to this situation Aleksey was trying to as rapidly as possible hand off
responsibility to Exxon; the operating agreement for the Aleksey Pipeline’s Valdez terminal said
that Aleksey would handle the containment clean up only as until the responsible party could
respond (Ott, 2008) (Day, 2014) (HBO, 1992). This placed Aleksey in a position where it tried to
spend as little money as possible. Don Cornett was Alaska coordinator for Exxon and was the
on-seen information manager; Cornett tried to deflect the public from the issue to the clean up as
quickly as possible. Frank Iarossi the President of Exxon Transportation whose division owned
the ship flew in on a corporate jet as quickly as possible and established a headquarters in the
local hotel (Coombs, 2014). The CEO of Exxon Rawl stayed away from the event as much as
possible. Iarossi had just completed a tanker spill cleanup in Hawaii; Iarossi felt that the Exxon
Emergency Response plan which had twenty eight volumes could handle the current situation
(Day, 2014). In the first of what would become twice daily news conferences Iarossi was not
properly briefed and seemed to be ill informed, on the issue of the use of dispersants he ran into
conflict with Ricki Ott a local fisherman and marine toxicologist who corrected him several
times and established more credibility than Iarossi and his experts from Fairbanks (Day, 2014)
(Ott, 2008) (HBO, 1992). Iarossi later gained some support with the local fisherman’s union by
agreeing to back them up to a million dollars in coming up with the equipment to protect the
local salmon hatcheries from the oil; he simply placed a note on the back of his business card
that he would back them up to one million (Ott, 2008). Iarossi also ran into problems with the
governor who after seeing the way the meeting was going said he would not allow massive use
of dispersants until it was properly tested. This delay in use caused the slick to spread even
further. This lack of communication and cooperation between the State of Alaska and Exxon was
a critical issue in the failure of the cleanup (Ott, 2008) (Day, 2014) (HBO, 1992) (New York

Times, 2014). The lack of cooperation between the Coast Guard, the State of Alaska and Exxon
made the relief effort almost impossible. To a large degree this lack of cooperation was a result
of a great deal of animosity that had developed over the years between the Aleksey Pipeline
Company and the enforcement divisions of the state Environmental protection units. The
Aleksey Pipeline provided eighty percent of the state’s budget and provided every Alaskan a
check for a thousand dollars making anything that interfered with the oil industry in Alaska
unpopular and unpatriotic (Ott, 2008) (Day, 2014) (HBO, 1992) (New York Times, 2014). The
only exception was the fishing industry which operated to a large degree with autonomy. The
Coast Guard tried to avoid responsibility because in previous cleanup efforts they had been left
paying for most of the efforts out of their own meager budget (Ott, 2008) (HBO, 1992). The state
of Alaska had no right to interfere unless Exxon failed in the cleanup efforts (HBO, 1992).
Leaving a power vacuum and a lack of direction in leadership. Another issue was that Exxon
established the press headquarters in Valdez instead of somewhere like Houston or Seattle
allowing for many photo ops of animals and birds soaked in oil and interviews with non-expert
experts who conveyed as much emotion as facts (Coombs, 2014). The state of Alaska’s delay in
the use of dispersants allowed weather patterns to disperse the oil to the point that the dispersants
would no longer be effective. The use of explosions to burn off the oil was effective but a report
that it had caused head aches and a miscarriage, both unsubstantiated caused the state to block
further burns which would have been the most effective way to dispose of the oil (Ott, 2008)
(Day, 2014) (HBO, 1992) (New York Times, 2014). The Skimmers had no place to put the
nearly solid oil after filling up their tanks in minutes (HBO, 1992) (Day, 2014). Leaving Exxon
with little choice but to hire as many local people in the futile effort to use mops, pressure

washers and buckets to clean the shores by hand. Many of the local people felt that these efforts
were merely for the cameras and were basically useless (Day, 2014) (HBO, 1992) (Ott, 2008).
Chronic/Recovery
Chronic in Fink’s stages or Recovery in Mitroff’s stages involves trying to place the individual,
community or environment in the position that it was before the crisis. In order to do this the
Exxon Transportation Company did several things. The marketing expertise of Exxon realized
that most people would assume that in a state as vast as Alaska that the oil spill interfered with a
larger tourist region. Exxon began a tourism program to reinforce that with the exception of the
immediate area around Valdez that the vast majority of Alaska was untouched. The “Alaska is
Beautiful” campaign actually increased the tourism for the 1990 year by five percent (Coombs,
2015).
Exxon decided to compensate those affective by paying them for lost wages. The company
intended to reduce future judgments paid out by these amounts (Day, 2014) (New York Times,
2014). In the beginning there were issues as the formula originally used to prevent false claims
often was found to be unfair and unrealistic but the company did adjust the formula to a low end
estimate of probable losses (Ott, 2008). The company also eventually in two weeks had the CEO
Rawls fly to Alaska to apologize (Day, 2014).
Another bright spot was the saving of the hatcheries that kept the salmon coming back another
year (Ott, 2008) (Day, 2014) (New York Times, 2014).
Many fisherman went broke as the price of salmon in the Asian market because of the health
risks attributed to oil dropped drastically. Pink Salmon was sold at a very high premium before

the spill (Ott, 2008). The price of the permits to fish dropped by up to 50% shortly after the
Valdez disaster (Ott, 2008).
Exxon established and funded animal rescue centers to try to save animals by cleaning, feeding,
treating and releasing them back into the wild. This also worked as a good public relations
sentiment (Coombs, 2008).
The communities suffered polarization between the fishing workers and the oil workers. The
economic hardships caused by the spill caused many to go through a form of post-traumatic
stress disorder (Ott, 2008).
Resolution/Learning
The resolution phase came as Exxon finally paid out the court settlement. The case which began
locally with a five billion dollar judgement had been appealed all the way to the supreme court
and after Exxon argued the case that the company had spent over two billion in cleaning up the
spill and a billion in fines the judgement was reduced to 500 million by the US Supreme Court.
The judgement amounted to 15,000 per person affected twenty years later (New York Times,
2014).
Bald Eagle and Sea Otter populations have regained pre- spill numbers other species have not
achieved this level of return (Ott, 2008).
Today double hulled tankers are required at the Valdez terminal, no tanker involved in a spill can
reenter Alaskan waters, a tugboat / emergency response ship accompanies each ship to sea, the
harbor pilot is on board until completely outside the sound and the treatment plant issue has been
addressed (Ott, 2008).

Oil had still been found at depths of ten inches under many beaches in the area (Ott, 2008).
Evaluation Impact
The communications plan if the goal was to prevent a spill, limit the impact of a spill or
minimize the area affected by the spill was a complete failure. The one success or exception was
the protection of the hatcheries which was an idea from the local fisherman.
If the communications plan was designed to protect Exxon’s reputation it regained the number
one ranking of all US companies again at the end of the 2000’s. Also, the public relations part of
the plan the payouts, the tourism and the actual clean up were inexpensive and served as
advertisement for Exxon. The damage to Exxon’s production capability was minimal and
actually reduced the oil glut of the 90’s and 00’s while damaging two competitors BP and
Atlanta Richfield that later were forced to merge with other companies to continue profitability
and also both companies had to leave the Alaska production market entirely. The Arctic Refuge
was delayed in development once again reducing the glut of the 90’s and the 00’s. So Exxon did
quite well and profited despite causing the greatest ecological disaster in US history.
V. Lessons Learned
In this situation elaborate plans were made by the state, by Aleksey Pipeline, by Exxon and by
the Coast Guard but because of lack of communication, cooperation and interagency training
none of the groups or individuals understood each other’s goals and everyone questioned the
other’s motives. The same can be said for the relationship between the oil terminal and its
fisherman neighbors. Without the ill will of the fisherman community Exxon could have had far
more time to work on the cleanup.

Simulations of the plans involving everyone involved would have been the key to successful
implementation of the Crisis Management Plans (Coombs, 2014).
Good relationships between the regulators and Exxon could have been extremely valuable in
preventing the crisis in the beginning and responding to it in the aftermath an example is the
Tylenol Murders case (Coombs, 2014).
Ensuring proper funding for response equipment and proper training for response teams was a
critical issue that should have been addressed throughout the terminal operation.
One responsible party should be appointed in each disaster. In the Department of Homeland
Security Emergency Management Courses they stress one scene commander. If one individual
had authority to make the decisions this issue would have been far more effective. I think that the
most effective way to handle his issue was by burning as much of the oil as possible using
explosive devises and evacuate people in surrounding areas and clean up their town and villages
afterwards. If done correctly this could have prevented some of the contamination. But no one
had the authority to make the decision.
Exxon in the late 2000’s returned to being one of the largest corporations in America (Coombs,
2014). Exxon had reconsolidated control and became one of the two remaining large oil
companies, Texaco being the other. Exxon profited from its refining operations and marketing
operations during the oil gluts of the 90’s and 00’s while competitors that focused on production
had to absorb overhead costs (Yergen, 2008).
IV. Recommendations from the Study
Crisis management begins by anticipating a problem and preventing its occurrence. The potential
damage of an oil spill the size of the Valdez disaster was so catastrophic and so unstoppable after

it occurred that all efforts should have been undertaken to prevent the event. Sun Tzu wrote
every battle is won or lost before it is fought. The Valdez disaster was lost months before the
actual event when Exxon and the Coast Guard sacrificed marginal expense cuts for major safety
risks. The academics should focus on corporate governance, corporate responsibility and
possibly holding individual corporate officers criminally responsible for allowing minor profit
driven issues to cause major safety disasters.

Reference
Anand, P. (1993) Foundations of Rational Choice Under risk. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
U.K.
Coombs, T. (2014) .Ongoing Crisis Communication; Planning, Managing and Responding. Sage
Publishing. Washington. D.C.
Davidson, A. (1990). In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez. Sierra Club Books. San Francisco, CA.
Day, A. (2014). Red Light to Starboard. Recalling the Exxon Valdez Disaster. Washington State
University Press. Pullman. WA.
Fearns-Banks. K. (2006) Crisis Communication A Casebook Approach 4th. Routledge
Publishing. New York.
Kvasniski, K. (2008) The Exxon Valdez 18 years late. Amazon Books. Seattle. WA. Retrieved
From: http://www.Amazon.Com via Kindle
HBO. (1992) Dead Ahead: The Exxon Valdez. Home Box Office. New York. N.Y.
New York Times. (2014). The Exxon Valdez Disaster T Book. New York Times. N.Y. Retrieved
from: http://www.amazon.com. Via Kindle
Ott, Ricki (2008) Not One Drop Betrayal and Courage in the Wake of the Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill. Chelsea Green Publishing Company. White River Junction VT. Retrieved From:
http://www.Amazon.com Via Kindle

Yergen, D. (1994) the Prize-Epic Quest For Oil and Money. Putman Publishing. New York.
N.Y.
Yergen, D. (2008) the Quest-Energy Security and the Modern World. Penguin Press. New York.
N.Y. Retrieved From: http:/www.amazon.com

Exxon Valdez Crisis Communication Analysis Project finL

Recommandé

Recommandé

Contenu connexe

Tendances

Tendances (20)

En vedette

En vedette (8)

Similaire à Exxon Valdez Crisis Communication Analysis Project finL

Similaire à Exxon Valdez Crisis Communication Analysis Project finL (20)

Plus de James Nichols

Plus de James Nichols (9)

Exxon Valdez Crisis Communication Analysis Project finL