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PAGE 1




Netwerk- en
databeveiliging
3 SNBA – Groep 2
xxx




                                        Company Proprietary and Confidential

 Company Proprietary and Confidential
          PHL - Limburg
Inhoudsopgave                                                      PAGE 2




• WEP Hack + Theorie
• Overzicht wireless beveiligingen
• Windows 7 Hack
• Slow Loris Hack
• SSL Stripping Hack
• Webcam Hack
• Keylogger
• WPA/WPA2 Hack




                                         Company Proprietary and Confidential

  Company Proprietary and Confidential
           PHL - Limburg
WEP Hack Theorie                                                                     PAGE 3




  Werking WEP
  • CRC32-checksum te verzenden data.
     • Checksum achter data geplakt

  • Plaintext = (Data + CRC32(Data)) wordt de 'plaintext' genoemd
     • Nog niet leesbaar

  • Keystream = RC4(IV, sleutel).
     • IV = initiële vector ( willekeurig getallen die mogen)
        • Veranderen bij elk nieuw verzonden pakket
     • Sleutel = wachtwoord

  • Volledig pakket
     • Keystream + plaintext ge-XOR'd + IV voor data.


                                                           Company Proprietary and Confidential

 Company Proprietary and Confidential
          PHL - Limburg
WEP Hack Theorie                                                               PAGE 4




  Samenvatting
  • pakket = IV + XOR(data + crc32(data), RC4(IV, sleutel))




                                                     Company Proprietary and Confidential

 Company Proprietary and Confidential
          PHL - Limburg
WEP Hack Theorie                                                              PAGE 5




  Waarom kunnen we WEP kraken?
  • IV te klein en in cleartext
     • SSID, Mac, kanaalnummer, netwerksleutel

  • IV statisch
     • Herhaling in sleutel

  • IV maakt key stream kwetsbaar
     • De 802.11-standaard geeft niet aan hoe de IV’s worden
        ingesteld of gewijzigd

  • IV deel van RC4 encryptie sleutel

  • Geen crypto grafische integriteitsbescherming


                                                    Company Proprietary and Confidential

 Company Proprietary and Confidential
          PHL - Limburg
Overzicht wireless beveiligingen                                                                                          PAGE 6




           Item                                  Wep                      WPA                         WPA2

                                        “shared key” (zwak en
     Authenticatie                                                802.1X met EAP (sterk)     802.1X met EAP (sterk)
                                        gevaarlijk)


      Sleutellengte                             64 bits                  128 bits                    128 bits


                                                                 Regelmatige automatisch    Regelmatige automatisch
  Levensduur sleutel                    Handmatige aanpassing
                                                                 aanpassing (TKIP)          aanpassing (TKIP)

                                                                 RC4 (op verschillende
                                         RC4 (op verschillende   manieren gebroken, maar      RC4 of AES (nog niet
        Encryptie
                                         manieren gekraakt)      langere sleutels veel        gebroken)
                                                                 moeilijker)

                                         CRC (gemakkelijk te
 Boodschap integriteit                                            Mic (niet te vervalsen)     Mic (niet vervalsen)
                                         vervalsen)


     Compatibiliteit                               /                Software-upgrade           Hardware-upgrade


         Peroide                             1997 - 2003               2003 - 2004                 Vanaf 2004




                                                                                                Company Proprietary and Confidential

 Company Proprietary and Confidential
          PHL - Limburg
Windows7 Hack + Logging                                           PAGE 7




  Gebruikte Windows tools?
  • Utility manager + cmd

  Hoe binnen breken?
  • Admin aanmaken via cmd

  Hoe anoniem blijven?
  • Kopiëren Utilman.exe
  • Kopiëren Logs

  Speciaal kopieer commando logs:
  • Cp –r –p … …




                                        Company Proprietary and Confidential

 Company Proprietary and Confidential
          PHL - Limburg
Slow Loris Hack                                                                            PAGE 8




Open-source Perl script
      •      PyLoris (Python), PHP variant, EXE variant (Iran)

Geen SYN-flood / ICMP (Ping of Death)
• Lage bandbreedte  Lage serverload
• Stuurt onvolledige HTTP GET requests
   • Vult cue op met GET requests
   • Houdt sockets open + hergebruikt deze

Alleen effectief tegen bepaalde webservers (vooral Apache)
• Werkt niet tegen load balancers (bv. Visa, Youtube, …)

Kan anoniem met ToR/Proxy




                                                                 Company Proprietary and Confidential

  Company Proprietary and Confidential
           PHL - Limburg
Slow Loris Hack                                                                                            PAGE 9




DoS in het OSI model


                OSI Model                             Dos Attack

               7 Application             Slowloris – Onvolledige HTTP requests

              6 Presentation

                 5 Session


                4 Transport             SYN Flood – Onvolledige TCP handshakes


                3 Network

                2 Data Link

                 1 Physical                      Kabel doorknippen 



                                                                                 Company Proprietary and Confidential

 Company Proprietary and Confidential
          PHL - Limburg
SSL Stripping Hack                                                         PAGE 10




SSL zit tussen de Applicatie en Transport laag




                                                 Company Proprietary and Confidential

  Company Proprietary and Confidential
           PHL - Limburg
SSL Stripping Hack                                                                              PAGE 11




 Hijacking HTTPS communicatie en man-in-the-middle attack




 •        Traffic between the client and web server is intercepted.
 •        When an HTTPS URL is encountered sslstrip replaces it with an HTTP link
          and keeps a mapping of the changes.
 •        The attacking machine supplies certificates to the web server and
          impersonates the client.
 •        Traffic is received back from the secure website and provided back to the
          client.

                                                                      Company Proprietary and Confidential

     Company Proprietary and Confidential
              PHL - Limburg
Webcam Hack                                                          PAGE 12




Metasploit
   • Exploits
   • Penetratie
   • Patched

•     NetAPI32.dll  netapi

•     Payload

•     Zwakheid

•     Live stream




                                           Company Proprietary and Confidential

    Company Proprietary and Confidential
             PHL - Limburg
Keylogger                                                          PAGE 13




• Metasploit

• ps => migrate

• Dump




                                         Company Proprietary and Confidential

  Company Proprietary and Confidential
           PHL - Limburg
WPA/WPA2 Hack                                                     PAGE 14




• Monitor mode
   • Airmon-ng

• Netwerk scan

• Station
   • Wpa hand shake
   • Deauthentication
   • Reauthentication

• Wordlist




                                        Company Proprietary and Confidential

 Company Proprietary and Confidential
          PHL - Limburg

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Backtrack ppt

  • 1. PAGE 1 Netwerk- en databeveiliging 3 SNBA – Groep 2 xxx Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 2. Inhoudsopgave PAGE 2 • WEP Hack + Theorie • Overzicht wireless beveiligingen • Windows 7 Hack • Slow Loris Hack • SSL Stripping Hack • Webcam Hack • Keylogger • WPA/WPA2 Hack Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 3. WEP Hack Theorie PAGE 3 Werking WEP • CRC32-checksum te verzenden data. • Checksum achter data geplakt • Plaintext = (Data + CRC32(Data)) wordt de 'plaintext' genoemd • Nog niet leesbaar • Keystream = RC4(IV, sleutel). • IV = initiële vector ( willekeurig getallen die mogen) • Veranderen bij elk nieuw verzonden pakket • Sleutel = wachtwoord • Volledig pakket • Keystream + plaintext ge-XOR'd + IV voor data. Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 4. WEP Hack Theorie PAGE 4 Samenvatting • pakket = IV + XOR(data + crc32(data), RC4(IV, sleutel)) Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 5. WEP Hack Theorie PAGE 5 Waarom kunnen we WEP kraken? • IV te klein en in cleartext • SSID, Mac, kanaalnummer, netwerksleutel • IV statisch • Herhaling in sleutel • IV maakt key stream kwetsbaar • De 802.11-standaard geeft niet aan hoe de IV’s worden ingesteld of gewijzigd • IV deel van RC4 encryptie sleutel • Geen crypto grafische integriteitsbescherming Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 6. Overzicht wireless beveiligingen PAGE 6 Item Wep WPA WPA2 “shared key” (zwak en Authenticatie 802.1X met EAP (sterk) 802.1X met EAP (sterk) gevaarlijk) Sleutellengte 64 bits 128 bits 128 bits Regelmatige automatisch Regelmatige automatisch Levensduur sleutel Handmatige aanpassing aanpassing (TKIP) aanpassing (TKIP) RC4 (op verschillende RC4 (op verschillende manieren gebroken, maar RC4 of AES (nog niet Encryptie manieren gekraakt) langere sleutels veel gebroken) moeilijker) CRC (gemakkelijk te Boodschap integriteit Mic (niet te vervalsen) Mic (niet vervalsen) vervalsen) Compatibiliteit / Software-upgrade Hardware-upgrade Peroide 1997 - 2003 2003 - 2004 Vanaf 2004 Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 7. Windows7 Hack + Logging PAGE 7 Gebruikte Windows tools? • Utility manager + cmd Hoe binnen breken? • Admin aanmaken via cmd Hoe anoniem blijven? • Kopiëren Utilman.exe • Kopiëren Logs Speciaal kopieer commando logs: • Cp –r –p … … Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 8. Slow Loris Hack PAGE 8 Open-source Perl script • PyLoris (Python), PHP variant, EXE variant (Iran) Geen SYN-flood / ICMP (Ping of Death) • Lage bandbreedte  Lage serverload • Stuurt onvolledige HTTP GET requests • Vult cue op met GET requests • Houdt sockets open + hergebruikt deze Alleen effectief tegen bepaalde webservers (vooral Apache) • Werkt niet tegen load balancers (bv. Visa, Youtube, …) Kan anoniem met ToR/Proxy Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 9. Slow Loris Hack PAGE 9 DoS in het OSI model OSI Model Dos Attack 7 Application Slowloris – Onvolledige HTTP requests 6 Presentation 5 Session 4 Transport SYN Flood – Onvolledige TCP handshakes 3 Network 2 Data Link 1 Physical Kabel doorknippen  Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 10. SSL Stripping Hack PAGE 10 SSL zit tussen de Applicatie en Transport laag Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 11. SSL Stripping Hack PAGE 11 Hijacking HTTPS communicatie en man-in-the-middle attack • Traffic between the client and web server is intercepted. • When an HTTPS URL is encountered sslstrip replaces it with an HTTP link and keeps a mapping of the changes. • The attacking machine supplies certificates to the web server and impersonates the client. • Traffic is received back from the secure website and provided back to the client. Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 12. Webcam Hack PAGE 12 Metasploit • Exploits • Penetratie • Patched • NetAPI32.dll  netapi • Payload • Zwakheid • Live stream Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 13. Keylogger PAGE 13 • Metasploit • ps => migrate • Dump Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg
  • 14. WPA/WPA2 Hack PAGE 14 • Monitor mode • Airmon-ng • Netwerk scan • Station • Wpa hand shake • Deauthentication • Reauthentication • Wordlist Company Proprietary and Confidential Company Proprietary and Confidential PHL - Limburg