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Cyber Security 2016 Law & Regulatory
Environmental Trends
A) Presidential Executive Orders 13636 and 13691 Critical
Infrastructure Cyber Security
B) Legal Authority: Key Federal Laws, DOD Guidance (161
Directives), FAR/DFARS
C) System Cyber Defense Resilience Architecture
Alex Dely, Contracts Manager, Innovation & Cyber
Directorates, Raytheon Missile Systems
ASIS Phoenix Chapter 18 May 2016
Alex_Dely@Raytheon.com
1
Cyber Tidbits
• Typical Dwell Time in Public Infrastructure Networks before
Penetration Detection: 128 Days.
• Every minute 1,080 hacks occur, 27 Days to Resolve, $
7.4M/Incident.
• Software Code: 4.9 Flaws/1000 Lines of Code, of which 1 to 5%
represent serious vulnerabilities
• Typical Penetration Detector: External Vulnerability Assessment Part
• 1.5 Million Cyber Security Jobs Unfilled (Unfillable?)
• Attacker only needs 0.0001 Success Rate
• Most Asset Owners do not know about their Outbound Traffic: #
Connections, Length of Connection, Amount of Data, % Encrypted,
Destination IP
2
SECTION A
PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBER
SECURITY
3
POTUS Executive Order 13636
EO 13636 Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (March 2013)
* technology-neutral cybersecurity framework and practices
* increase volume, timeliness and quality of threat information sharing
* incorporate strong privacy and civil liberties protections
* evaluate regulatory adequacy
POTUS Policy Directive-21 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience directs the
Executive Branch, led by DHS, in coordination with NIST, NSA and sector Agencies to:
* develop near-real time physical and cyber situational awareness capability
* understand cascading consequences of infrastructure failures
* mature public-private partnerships
* update the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
* develop comprehensive research and development plan
NIPP 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors
1) Defense Industrial Base 9) Energy
2) Critical Manufacturing 10) Communications
3) Emergency Services 11) Chemical
4) Government Facilities 12) Dams
5) Financial Services 13) Water & Wastewater
6) Information Technology 14) Food & Agriculture
7) Transportation 15) Public Health Facilities
8) Nuclear Reactors & Materials 16) Commercial Facilities
COMPLEX INTERLINKAGES WITH LIMITED CORRESPONDING
GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY EXPERTISE & ACCOUNTABILITY
5
POTUS EXECUTIVE ORDER 13691
EO Order 13691 Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing (Feb 2015)
- establishes Information Sharing & Analysis Organizations (ISAO)
standards and protocols to coordinate with US Government Information
Sharing & Analysis Centers (ISAC)
- strengthens DHS National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration
Center (NCCIC) ability to approve access to classified information
Categories: 1) Cyber-Physical (nano-scale to large-scale wide-area systems
of systems; dependably, safely, securely, efficiently and in
real-time; convergence of computation, communication, and
control)
2) Cyber-Cyber (Network Cyber)
3) Physical-Cyber
4) Physical-Physical
Source: NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards
Integrated SCADA/ICS
Graphic courtesy of DHS Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies
Control System is NOT IT Network !!
Industrial Control Systems (ICS):
* Distributed Control Systems (IoT)
* Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA)
* Process Control Systems
* Manufacturing Execution Systems
Vulnerability Categories:
* Millions of Remote Access Points, many in Legacy systems with limited
Access Control, open Communications Protocols, Default Passwords,
Limited/No Firewalls
* Complex Systems Dynamically Reconfiguring in Space/Time
* Reliance on mostly Offshore Suppliers
* Technical Documentation freely available on Internet
* Hierarchical Wireless Sensor network allow attacker to determine where
the root node is placed;
9
DOE FERC NERC CIP Requirements & Penalties
• FERC NERC CIP 6/7 Requirements
Penalty: up to $ 1M per event/day based on Violation Risk
Factor/Severity Level (16 USC 825o)
• CIP 001 Sabotage Reporting & Compliance
• CIP 002 Critical Cyber Assets Risk Based Management
• CIP 003 Senior Management Controls
• CIP 004 Personnel & Training
• CIP 005 Electronic Security Perimeters & Vulnerability
Assessment
• CIP 006 Physical Security Perimeters
• CIP 007 Security System Management (malware, etc.)
• CIP 008 Incident Reporting & Response Planning
• CIP 009 Recovery Plans
DHS Cross Sector Roadmap of Cyber
Security Control Systems
Homeland security Presidential Directive-7: Robustness,
Survivability & Resilience Systems-of-Systems Principles:
1) Operational Independence of Elements
2) Managerial Independence of Elements
3) Geographical Distribution of Elements
4) Evolutionary Development
5) Emergent behavior
6) Heterogeneous Network of Systems
7) Automated Intrusion Audit Trails
8) Real Time Incident Response
9) Acquisition Strategy & Contracting
10) Training
11
Where We Want to Go
“Defense-in-Depth Architecture”
Graphic courtesy of DHS Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies October 2009
SECTION B
KEY FEDERAL LAWS, DOD
GUIDANCE, FAR/DFARS
13
Key Federal Laws
1) Title 44 Federal Information Security
Management Act (3541 et seq)
2) Title 18 Computer Fraud & Abuse Act (1030)
3) Title 18 Stored Communications Act (2701 et
seq)
4) Title 18 Federal Wiretap Act (2510 et seq)
5) Title 18 Pen Registers and Trap and Trace
Devices (3121 et seq)
6) Many Presidential Executive Orders
14
DOD Guidance Documents (161!)
Build & Operate a Trusted DoDIN handut (CIO Cyber)
1) Lead & Govern (18)
2) Design for the Fight (26)
3) Develop the Workforce (12)
4) Partner for Strength (9)
5) Secure Data in Transit (22)
6) Manage Access (16)
7) Assure Information Sharing (7)
8) Understand the Battlespace (7)
9) Prevent & Delay Attackers/Prevent Attackers from Staying (15)
10) Develop and maintain Trust (9)
11) Strengthen Cyber Readiness (8)
12) Sustain Missions(12)
15
DoDI 5000.02 & 5200.39 Program Protection Planning
PPP is iterative System Security risk management process:
1) Critical Program Information Identification/Criticality
2) Mission Critical Functions & Components Trusted Systems &
Networks Analysis
3) Identification of Horizontal Protection Requirements
4) Identification of Foreign Involvement (Trusted Supply Chain)
5) Threat Analysis
6) Vulnerability Assessment
7) Risk Assessment
8) Trade-off Analyses
9) Countermeasures Implementation (Defensive Cyber Resilience,
Anti Tamper, OpSec, InfoSec/Information Assurance, Software
Assurance)
10) Verification & Validation and Residual Risk
16
DFARS 252.204-7012 (Sept 2015)
“Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber
Incident Reporting”: INTERIM RULE:
1) 72 Hr Network Penetration Reporting
2) Contracting for Cloud Services
Four Recommended Contractor Actions:
1) Register with DOD to obtain a mandatory Medium
Assurance certificate
2) Identify & Mark all Attributional/Proprietary Information
3) SCM Flowdown to Subcontractors (including Commercial
Item and Small Business Subcontracts, Teaming
Agreements etc). Sub must report to Prime and DOD within
72 hrs (no Tier limitation).
4) Monitor Existing Contract Mods
17
DFARS 252.204-7012 Cont 2
“Covered Defense Information”:
- unclassified information provided to contractor by or on behalf of DOD in
connection with performance of a contract
- Information collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored by or
on behalf of the contractor in support of contract performance
CDI includes:
- Controlled Technical Information - Critical Information
- ITAR Export Control Information - Other Restricted Information
Covered Contractor Information Systems: any systems
owned, or operated by or for, that processes, stores or transmits CDI.
NIST SP 800-171 Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in
Nonfederal Information Systems and organizations. REPLACES NIST SP
800-53
18
DFARS 252.204-7012 Cont 3
72 HR CYBER INCIDENT REPORTING:
- Any action that results in a compromise or an actual or
potentially adverse effect on an information system and/or
the information residing therein
- Required “Review for Compromise”:
* disclosure of information to unauthorized persons
* violation of the security policy of a system in which
unauthorized intentional or unintentional disclosure,
modification, destruction or loss of an object, or copying to
unauthorized media may have occurred
90 DAY IMAGE PROTECTION OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR
FORENSIC ANALYSIS AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
19
DFARS 252.204-7012 Cont 4
COMPANION DFARS 252.204-7009 Limitations on the
Use and Disclosure of Third Party Contractor Reported
Incident Information
Cyber Incident Info may be shared with:
1) US and other entities affected
2) Entities that may assist in diagnosis, detection, or mitigation
(need additional PIA/NDA!)
3) Law enforcement and counterintelligence
4) Defense Industrial Base participants
5) Support services contractors
20
SECTION C
LIFECYCLE SYSTEMS CYBER
RESILIENCY ARCHITECTING
21
Cyber Resiliency Defined (MITRE)
1) The ability of a nation, organization, mission,
process or weapon system to anticipate,
withstand, recover from, and evolve to improve
capabilities in face of adverse conditions,
stresses, or attacks on the supporting cyber
resources it needs to function
2) The sub-discipline of Mission Assurance
Engineering which considers: a) the ways an
evolving set of resilience practises can be applied,
and b) the tradeoffs associated with the different
strategies for applying those practises
22
Cyber Resilience Key “Terms of Art” Defined (Cont)
END STATE:
1) Anticipate: Understand, Prepare, Predict, Prevent
2) Withstand: Constrain, Maintain Essential Functionality
3) Recover: Determine Damages, Restore Capabilities,
Reconstitute, Determine Reliability
4) Evolve: Re-architect
TECHNIQUES: Adaptive Response, Privilege Restriction,
Deception, Diversity, Substantiated Integrity, Coordinated
Defense, Analytic Monitoring, Non-Persistence, Dynamic
Positioning, Redundancy, Segmentation, Unpredictability,
Dynamic Representation, Realignment
23
Cyber Resiliency 3 Pillars
1) NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STANDARDS & TECHNOLOGY
(NIST):
A) Cybersecurity Framework
B) Risk Management Framework
C) Trustworthy Resilient Systems
D) Supply Chain Risk Management
SP 800 Series of Documents: SP 800-160 System Security Engineering,
SP 800-115 Information Security Testing, SP 800-161 Supply Chain Risk
Management
2) DOD ENGINEERED RESILIENT SYSTEMS INITITATIVE (ERS
TOGAF)
3) DOD PROGRAM PROTECTION PLANNING (PPP)
24
18 Cyber Resiliency Architecture Principles
1) Separate 2) Manual Operation
3) “Stateless” Services (no record of previous interaction)
4) Common vs Redundant Services 5) Any Function/Console
6) Location Independent services 7) Degraded Modes
8) Saturation Alleviation 9) Disconnected Modes
10) Least Privilege 11) Provenance
12) Reconfigurability 13) Layers
14) Vulnerability Containment 15) Isolation
16) Boundaries 17) Audit
18) Recovery
25
13 Cyber Resilience Engineering Techniques
1) Adaptive Response 2) Analytic Monitoring
3) Coordinated Command & Control Defense
4) Deception 5) Diversity
6) Dynamic Positioning & Representation
7) Non-Persistence 8) Privilege Restriction
9) Realignment 10) Redundancy
11) Segmentation 12) Unpredictability
13) Substantiated Integrity
26
14 Cyber Attack Mechanisms
1) Gather Information
2) Deplete Resources
3) Injection
4) Deceptive Interactions
5) Abuse of Functionality
6) Probabilistic Techniques
7) Exploitation of Authentication
8) Exploitation of Authorization
9) Manipulate Data Structures
10) Analyze Target
11) Gain Physical Access
12) Malicious Code Execution
13) Alter System Components
14) Manipulate System Users
27
Measuring Cyber Resilience
• DOD Universal Joint task List Enclosure B
• MITRE Cyber Resiliency Metrics (272)
28
SUMMARY:
1) Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security goes
WELL beyond IT networks
2) Cyber Security Law & Regulation is infancy
and DOD Guidance will likely drive significant
expansion in scope & quantity of new laws
and FAR/DFARS regulations
3) Most of the 16 Critical Infrastructure Industry Sectors have
BARELY begun Cyber Resilience Architecting & Engineering
of Critical Systems
29
BACKUP
30
SCADA Cyber Security Needs
Operational Needs
• Certifiable, attribute-based access control (only authenticated AND authorized users)
• Low cost, small form factor information assurance appliances—SW and HW
• Tailorable levels of assurance to changing operational requirements
• Real-time data delivery between stations
• Interfaces with multiple communications protocols
• Rapid reconfiguration of security policies to meet dynamic needs of smart grids
• Scalable for all levels of service (e.g. generating stations, substations, primary & secondary
customers)
Operational Benefits
 Enhanced operational effectiveness and efficiency
(e.g. lower cost per kwh)
 Streamlined certification & accreditation to meet
emerging policy mandates
DHS Cyber Cryptography
• Aging Cryptographic Algorithms
– Legacy 80-bit algorithms (DES, MD5, SHA-1, RSA-1024, two-key 3DES,
SKIPJACK, KEA, and DSA) are threatened. NIST SP 800-78 requires
Government users to replace RSA-1024/SHA-1 with higher security
algorithms
• Suite B Algorithms for the Next Generation
– NSA-endorsed algorithms that are approved for classified use and deliver
the information assurance required for the next 30-50 years
– ECC in GF(p) (P-256, P-384, P-521*)
– Equivalent to 3,072, 7,680, and 15,360-bit RSA
– ECMQV and EC Diffie-Hellman key establishment
– ECDSA digital signatures
– AES-128/192*/256, SHA-224*/256/384/512*
DHS Control System AMI Security Requirements
2.8 System Communication Protection
* Policy/Management
* Port Partitioning/Security Function Isolation/Information
Remnants/Denial of Service Protection/
* Communication Integrity/Trusted Path/
* Validated Cryptographic Key Establishment/Public Key
Infrastructure Certificates
* Message Authenticity/Secure Name–Address Resolution
2.9 Information System Management
2.10 System Development & Maintenance (Legacy)
2.12 Incident Response (Continuity of Operations/Alternate
Control Centers)
2.14 System & Information Integrity (Malicious
Code/Accuracy/Completeness/Validity/Authenticity)
2.15 Access Control (Authenticator Management, Remote
Access, Wireless Access)
2.16 Audit & Accountability (Time Stamps)
DHS Control System AMI Sec Cont
NIST Control System Security Cont
15 Categories of Logical Interfaces
1) SCADA Control Systems 2) WAN Control Systems
3) DMS/LMS Control Systems 4-5) Back Office Systems
6) B2B Connections 7) Control to NC Systems
8) Sensor Networks 9) Sensor to Control Sys
10) AMI Network Interfaces 11) HAN/BAN Customer
12) Interface to Customer 13) Mobile Field Crews
14) Metering Interfaces 15) Decision WAMS/ISO

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Ncma saguaro cyber security 2016 law & regulations asis phoenix dely final 05182016

  • 1. Cyber Security 2016 Law & Regulatory Environmental Trends A) Presidential Executive Orders 13636 and 13691 Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security B) Legal Authority: Key Federal Laws, DOD Guidance (161 Directives), FAR/DFARS C) System Cyber Defense Resilience Architecture Alex Dely, Contracts Manager, Innovation & Cyber Directorates, Raytheon Missile Systems ASIS Phoenix Chapter 18 May 2016 Alex_Dely@Raytheon.com 1
  • 2. Cyber Tidbits • Typical Dwell Time in Public Infrastructure Networks before Penetration Detection: 128 Days. • Every minute 1,080 hacks occur, 27 Days to Resolve, $ 7.4M/Incident. • Software Code: 4.9 Flaws/1000 Lines of Code, of which 1 to 5% represent serious vulnerabilities • Typical Penetration Detector: External Vulnerability Assessment Part • 1.5 Million Cyber Security Jobs Unfilled (Unfillable?) • Attacker only needs 0.0001 Success Rate • Most Asset Owners do not know about their Outbound Traffic: # Connections, Length of Connection, Amount of Data, % Encrypted, Destination IP 2
  • 3. SECTION A PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDERS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBER SECURITY 3
  • 4. POTUS Executive Order 13636 EO 13636 Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (March 2013) * technology-neutral cybersecurity framework and practices * increase volume, timeliness and quality of threat information sharing * incorporate strong privacy and civil liberties protections * evaluate regulatory adequacy POTUS Policy Directive-21 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience directs the Executive Branch, led by DHS, in coordination with NIST, NSA and sector Agencies to: * develop near-real time physical and cyber situational awareness capability * understand cascading consequences of infrastructure failures * mature public-private partnerships * update the National Infrastructure Protection Plan * develop comprehensive research and development plan
  • 5. NIPP 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors 1) Defense Industrial Base 9) Energy 2) Critical Manufacturing 10) Communications 3) Emergency Services 11) Chemical 4) Government Facilities 12) Dams 5) Financial Services 13) Water & Wastewater 6) Information Technology 14) Food & Agriculture 7) Transportation 15) Public Health Facilities 8) Nuclear Reactors & Materials 16) Commercial Facilities COMPLEX INTERLINKAGES WITH LIMITED CORRESPONDING GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY EXPERTISE & ACCOUNTABILITY 5
  • 6. POTUS EXECUTIVE ORDER 13691 EO Order 13691 Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing (Feb 2015) - establishes Information Sharing & Analysis Organizations (ISAO) standards and protocols to coordinate with US Government Information Sharing & Analysis Centers (ISAC) - strengthens DHS National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) ability to approve access to classified information Categories: 1) Cyber-Physical (nano-scale to large-scale wide-area systems of systems; dependably, safely, securely, efficiently and in real-time; convergence of computation, communication, and control) 2) Cyber-Cyber (Network Cyber) 3) Physical-Cyber 4) Physical-Physical
  • 7. Source: NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards
  • 8. Integrated SCADA/ICS Graphic courtesy of DHS Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies
  • 9. Control System is NOT IT Network !! Industrial Control Systems (ICS): * Distributed Control Systems (IoT) * Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) * Process Control Systems * Manufacturing Execution Systems Vulnerability Categories: * Millions of Remote Access Points, many in Legacy systems with limited Access Control, open Communications Protocols, Default Passwords, Limited/No Firewalls * Complex Systems Dynamically Reconfiguring in Space/Time * Reliance on mostly Offshore Suppliers * Technical Documentation freely available on Internet * Hierarchical Wireless Sensor network allow attacker to determine where the root node is placed; 9
  • 10. DOE FERC NERC CIP Requirements & Penalties • FERC NERC CIP 6/7 Requirements Penalty: up to $ 1M per event/day based on Violation Risk Factor/Severity Level (16 USC 825o) • CIP 001 Sabotage Reporting & Compliance • CIP 002 Critical Cyber Assets Risk Based Management • CIP 003 Senior Management Controls • CIP 004 Personnel & Training • CIP 005 Electronic Security Perimeters & Vulnerability Assessment • CIP 006 Physical Security Perimeters • CIP 007 Security System Management (malware, etc.) • CIP 008 Incident Reporting & Response Planning • CIP 009 Recovery Plans
  • 11. DHS Cross Sector Roadmap of Cyber Security Control Systems Homeland security Presidential Directive-7: Robustness, Survivability & Resilience Systems-of-Systems Principles: 1) Operational Independence of Elements 2) Managerial Independence of Elements 3) Geographical Distribution of Elements 4) Evolutionary Development 5) Emergent behavior 6) Heterogeneous Network of Systems 7) Automated Intrusion Audit Trails 8) Real Time Incident Response 9) Acquisition Strategy & Contracting 10) Training 11
  • 12. Where We Want to Go “Defense-in-Depth Architecture” Graphic courtesy of DHS Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies October 2009
  • 13. SECTION B KEY FEDERAL LAWS, DOD GUIDANCE, FAR/DFARS 13
  • 14. Key Federal Laws 1) Title 44 Federal Information Security Management Act (3541 et seq) 2) Title 18 Computer Fraud & Abuse Act (1030) 3) Title 18 Stored Communications Act (2701 et seq) 4) Title 18 Federal Wiretap Act (2510 et seq) 5) Title 18 Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices (3121 et seq) 6) Many Presidential Executive Orders 14
  • 15. DOD Guidance Documents (161!) Build & Operate a Trusted DoDIN handut (CIO Cyber) 1) Lead & Govern (18) 2) Design for the Fight (26) 3) Develop the Workforce (12) 4) Partner for Strength (9) 5) Secure Data in Transit (22) 6) Manage Access (16) 7) Assure Information Sharing (7) 8) Understand the Battlespace (7) 9) Prevent & Delay Attackers/Prevent Attackers from Staying (15) 10) Develop and maintain Trust (9) 11) Strengthen Cyber Readiness (8) 12) Sustain Missions(12) 15
  • 16. DoDI 5000.02 & 5200.39 Program Protection Planning PPP is iterative System Security risk management process: 1) Critical Program Information Identification/Criticality 2) Mission Critical Functions & Components Trusted Systems & Networks Analysis 3) Identification of Horizontal Protection Requirements 4) Identification of Foreign Involvement (Trusted Supply Chain) 5) Threat Analysis 6) Vulnerability Assessment 7) Risk Assessment 8) Trade-off Analyses 9) Countermeasures Implementation (Defensive Cyber Resilience, Anti Tamper, OpSec, InfoSec/Information Assurance, Software Assurance) 10) Verification & Validation and Residual Risk 16
  • 17. DFARS 252.204-7012 (Sept 2015) “Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting”: INTERIM RULE: 1) 72 Hr Network Penetration Reporting 2) Contracting for Cloud Services Four Recommended Contractor Actions: 1) Register with DOD to obtain a mandatory Medium Assurance certificate 2) Identify & Mark all Attributional/Proprietary Information 3) SCM Flowdown to Subcontractors (including Commercial Item and Small Business Subcontracts, Teaming Agreements etc). Sub must report to Prime and DOD within 72 hrs (no Tier limitation). 4) Monitor Existing Contract Mods 17
  • 18. DFARS 252.204-7012 Cont 2 “Covered Defense Information”: - unclassified information provided to contractor by or on behalf of DOD in connection with performance of a contract - Information collected, developed, received, transmitted, used or stored by or on behalf of the contractor in support of contract performance CDI includes: - Controlled Technical Information - Critical Information - ITAR Export Control Information - Other Restricted Information Covered Contractor Information Systems: any systems owned, or operated by or for, that processes, stores or transmits CDI. NIST SP 800-171 Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and organizations. REPLACES NIST SP 800-53 18
  • 19. DFARS 252.204-7012 Cont 3 72 HR CYBER INCIDENT REPORTING: - Any action that results in a compromise or an actual or potentially adverse effect on an information system and/or the information residing therein - Required “Review for Compromise”: * disclosure of information to unauthorized persons * violation of the security policy of a system in which unauthorized intentional or unintentional disclosure, modification, destruction or loss of an object, or copying to unauthorized media may have occurred 90 DAY IMAGE PROTECTION OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR FORENSIC ANALYSIS AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 19
  • 20. DFARS 252.204-7012 Cont 4 COMPANION DFARS 252.204-7009 Limitations on the Use and Disclosure of Third Party Contractor Reported Incident Information Cyber Incident Info may be shared with: 1) US and other entities affected 2) Entities that may assist in diagnosis, detection, or mitigation (need additional PIA/NDA!) 3) Law enforcement and counterintelligence 4) Defense Industrial Base participants 5) Support services contractors 20
  • 21. SECTION C LIFECYCLE SYSTEMS CYBER RESILIENCY ARCHITECTING 21
  • 22. Cyber Resiliency Defined (MITRE) 1) The ability of a nation, organization, mission, process or weapon system to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and evolve to improve capabilities in face of adverse conditions, stresses, or attacks on the supporting cyber resources it needs to function 2) The sub-discipline of Mission Assurance Engineering which considers: a) the ways an evolving set of resilience practises can be applied, and b) the tradeoffs associated with the different strategies for applying those practises 22
  • 23. Cyber Resilience Key “Terms of Art” Defined (Cont) END STATE: 1) Anticipate: Understand, Prepare, Predict, Prevent 2) Withstand: Constrain, Maintain Essential Functionality 3) Recover: Determine Damages, Restore Capabilities, Reconstitute, Determine Reliability 4) Evolve: Re-architect TECHNIQUES: Adaptive Response, Privilege Restriction, Deception, Diversity, Substantiated Integrity, Coordinated Defense, Analytic Monitoring, Non-Persistence, Dynamic Positioning, Redundancy, Segmentation, Unpredictability, Dynamic Representation, Realignment 23
  • 24. Cyber Resiliency 3 Pillars 1) NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STANDARDS & TECHNOLOGY (NIST): A) Cybersecurity Framework B) Risk Management Framework C) Trustworthy Resilient Systems D) Supply Chain Risk Management SP 800 Series of Documents: SP 800-160 System Security Engineering, SP 800-115 Information Security Testing, SP 800-161 Supply Chain Risk Management 2) DOD ENGINEERED RESILIENT SYSTEMS INITITATIVE (ERS TOGAF) 3) DOD PROGRAM PROTECTION PLANNING (PPP) 24
  • 25. 18 Cyber Resiliency Architecture Principles 1) Separate 2) Manual Operation 3) “Stateless” Services (no record of previous interaction) 4) Common vs Redundant Services 5) Any Function/Console 6) Location Independent services 7) Degraded Modes 8) Saturation Alleviation 9) Disconnected Modes 10) Least Privilege 11) Provenance 12) Reconfigurability 13) Layers 14) Vulnerability Containment 15) Isolation 16) Boundaries 17) Audit 18) Recovery 25
  • 26. 13 Cyber Resilience Engineering Techniques 1) Adaptive Response 2) Analytic Monitoring 3) Coordinated Command & Control Defense 4) Deception 5) Diversity 6) Dynamic Positioning & Representation 7) Non-Persistence 8) Privilege Restriction 9) Realignment 10) Redundancy 11) Segmentation 12) Unpredictability 13) Substantiated Integrity 26
  • 27. 14 Cyber Attack Mechanisms 1) Gather Information 2) Deplete Resources 3) Injection 4) Deceptive Interactions 5) Abuse of Functionality 6) Probabilistic Techniques 7) Exploitation of Authentication 8) Exploitation of Authorization 9) Manipulate Data Structures 10) Analyze Target 11) Gain Physical Access 12) Malicious Code Execution 13) Alter System Components 14) Manipulate System Users 27
  • 28. Measuring Cyber Resilience • DOD Universal Joint task List Enclosure B • MITRE Cyber Resiliency Metrics (272) 28
  • 29. SUMMARY: 1) Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security goes WELL beyond IT networks 2) Cyber Security Law & Regulation is infancy and DOD Guidance will likely drive significant expansion in scope & quantity of new laws and FAR/DFARS regulations 3) Most of the 16 Critical Infrastructure Industry Sectors have BARELY begun Cyber Resilience Architecting & Engineering of Critical Systems 29
  • 31. SCADA Cyber Security Needs Operational Needs • Certifiable, attribute-based access control (only authenticated AND authorized users) • Low cost, small form factor information assurance appliances—SW and HW • Tailorable levels of assurance to changing operational requirements • Real-time data delivery between stations • Interfaces with multiple communications protocols • Rapid reconfiguration of security policies to meet dynamic needs of smart grids • Scalable for all levels of service (e.g. generating stations, substations, primary & secondary customers) Operational Benefits  Enhanced operational effectiveness and efficiency (e.g. lower cost per kwh)  Streamlined certification & accreditation to meet emerging policy mandates
  • 32. DHS Cyber Cryptography • Aging Cryptographic Algorithms – Legacy 80-bit algorithms (DES, MD5, SHA-1, RSA-1024, two-key 3DES, SKIPJACK, KEA, and DSA) are threatened. NIST SP 800-78 requires Government users to replace RSA-1024/SHA-1 with higher security algorithms • Suite B Algorithms for the Next Generation – NSA-endorsed algorithms that are approved for classified use and deliver the information assurance required for the next 30-50 years – ECC in GF(p) (P-256, P-384, P-521*) – Equivalent to 3,072, 7,680, and 15,360-bit RSA – ECMQV and EC Diffie-Hellman key establishment – ECDSA digital signatures – AES-128/192*/256, SHA-224*/256/384/512*
  • 33. DHS Control System AMI Security Requirements 2.8 System Communication Protection * Policy/Management * Port Partitioning/Security Function Isolation/Information Remnants/Denial of Service Protection/ * Communication Integrity/Trusted Path/ * Validated Cryptographic Key Establishment/Public Key Infrastructure Certificates * Message Authenticity/Secure Name–Address Resolution
  • 34. 2.9 Information System Management 2.10 System Development & Maintenance (Legacy) 2.12 Incident Response (Continuity of Operations/Alternate Control Centers) 2.14 System & Information Integrity (Malicious Code/Accuracy/Completeness/Validity/Authenticity) 2.15 Access Control (Authenticator Management, Remote Access, Wireless Access) 2.16 Audit & Accountability (Time Stamps) DHS Control System AMI Sec Cont
  • 35. NIST Control System Security Cont 15 Categories of Logical Interfaces 1) SCADA Control Systems 2) WAN Control Systems 3) DMS/LMS Control Systems 4-5) Back Office Systems 6) B2B Connections 7) Control to NC Systems 8) Sensor Networks 9) Sensor to Control Sys 10) AMI Network Interfaces 11) HAN/BAN Customer 12) Interface to Customer 13) Mobile Field Crews 14) Metering Interfaces 15) Decision WAMS/ISO