Please contact me at lee.hannah@psu.edu for original files.

1. DAY 9 – WHO VOTES?
July 10, 2013

2. Fundraising
 “I’d rather wrestle a gorilla than ask anybody for fifty cents.”
Senator John Glenn (D - Ohio)
 Sources of Congressional candidate funds:
 1) Individual contributors
 $2,400 per candidate
 $45,600 per election
 2) PACS
 3) Party Committees
 4) Personal Funds
 Incumbents always do better. Why?
 House incumbents outspent challengers six times over in 2010.
 Senate incumbents outspent 11 times over in 2010.
 2012 Spending in PA Races
 http://www.opensecrets.org/states/cands.php?state=PA&cycle=20
12

3. Can you buy votes?
 Not exactly.
 Challengers
 Spending is positively correlated with electoral
success.
 Incumbents
 Spending negatively correlated with electoral
success.
 Why?
 Spending matters less later in campaign
races.
 http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/0
9/how-much-does-a-house-seat-cost/

4. Campaign Techniques
 Air Wars
 Positive vs. Negative ads – what are the tradeoffs?
 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002
 Requires candidates personally appear with their advertisements.
 Evolving mass media
 “Word of mouth on steroids.”
 The Ground War
 “Pressing the flesh.”
 Get out the vote (GOTV) drives
 Parallel Campaigns
 Outside players – Freedom Watch – “Dina Titus must be from TaxUs”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5O7rwAj6G4
 Citizens United v. FEC - Corporate spending
 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_08_205
 Super PACs

5. Sources of Donations in 2012
Presidential Election

6. Source:
http://www.brookings.edu/resear
ch/interactives/2013/non-party-
spending-house-and-senate

7. Source:
http://www.brookings.edu/resear
ch/interactives/2013/non-party-
spending-house-and-senate

8. Data Mining
 Using voter information from the internet to more
efficiently target voters.
 The Obama Campaign’s use of data to target
voters
 “Inside the Secret World of the Data Crunchers Who
Helped Obama Win”
 http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-the-secret-
world-of-quants-and-data-crunchers-who-helped-obama-
win/print/
 Translating Obama’s success on a smaller level.
 “Honey I Shrunk the Obama Data Machine”
 http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/obama-database-
smaller-campaigns-93860_Page3.html

9. DOL (pp.87-100)
Who Votes?

10. Reasons for Not Voting
 Demographic reasons
 Legal barriers
 National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (Motor Voter law)
 Electoral arrangements
 Absentee ballots, several elections, etc.
 Biased or careless election administration
 “Congestion at the Polls: A Study of Florida Precincts in the 2012
General Election” Michael C. Herron and Daniel A. Smith
 http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/f5d1203189ce2aabfc_14m6vzttt.pdf?_
_hstc=223762052.9503e16f848624f372ca14cf597a8ea4.137285887
5812.1372858875812.1372858875812.1&__hssc=223762052.1.1372
858875813
 Voter ID Requirements
 Citizen Disaffection
 Ineligible Voters

11. Biases of Voting
 The 1% of the 1%
 http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pc
t_of_the_1pct/

12. Source:
http://sunlightfoundation.co
m/blog/2013/06/26/1pct_of
_the_1pct_polarization/

13. Source:
http://sunlightfo
undation.com/
blog/2013/06/2
6/1pct_of_the_
1pct_polarizati
on/

14. How Voters Decide
 Low-information rationality
 Party loyalties
 Explains 90% of vote choice among registered
Democrats and Republicans
 Independents
 True independents versus closet partisans
 Partisan resurgence
 Examples of strong versus weak party ties
 Split-ticket voting
 Driven largely by partisan shifts in the South (p.91)

15. Changing Voter Distributions by
Election
 Figure 4-2 in
DOL
 Why do less
people vote
in
midterms?
 Does the
electorate
look
different?
 Affluent
 More
Educated

16. Changing Makeup of Voters
Source:
McDonald
(2010) “Voter
Turnout in the
2010 Midterm
Election”, The
Forum 8(4)
Source:
Hannah (2013)
“Ballot
Initiatives and
Electoral
Timing”
How might an older group of voters during Midterms
affect election results?

17. Surge and Decline Theory
From Bafumi, Erikson, Wlezien
(2010) “Balancing, Generic Polls,
and Midterm Congressional
Elections” Journal of Politics 72(3)

18. Ballot Initiatives and Electoral
Timing
 “Tell your friends: We lost because of timing,
not lack of public support.”
 Scott Morgan – CA Proposition 19 Advocate
(Legalization of Marijuana)
 Conventional wisdom states that more
conservative voters participate in midterm
elections.
 This should have an even greater effect on
direct initiatives – where voters decide on
policy.
 What policies might be particularly affected byFollowing slides are from Hannah, Lee. 2013 “Ballot Initiatives and Electoral
Timing”, Unpublished. Parts of paper presented at 2011 and 2012 State
Politics and Policy Conference.

19. Morality Policy and Direct
Democracy
Abortio
n, 10%
Civil
Rights,
4%
Crime
Policy, 8
%
Drugs, 5
%
English
Languag
e, 4%
Gaming,
34%
Guns, 2
%
Gay
Rights,
10%
Assisted
Suicide;
2%
Other, 2
1%
Morality Policy by Category (N=254)

20. Research Question
 Does the timing of an election systematically
affect the results of ballot initiative campaigns?
 Do the demographic differences in the electorate
between midterm and presidential elections affect
results?
 Why yes? Why no?
 Do certain candidates provide favorable conditions, or
surges, for initiative campaigns?
 Do popular liberal candidates affect the chances of a liberal
outcome on an initiative?
 Do popular conservative candidates affect the chances of a
conservative outcome on an initiative.
 In short, do popular presidential candidates provide a coat-

21. Defining Surge Elections
Type of Election Election
Year
Margin of Victory Notes
Republican Surge
Election
1980 9.7 – Reagan (50.7); Carter (41.0)
1984 18.2 – Reagan (58.8); Mondale
(40.6)
1988 8.5 – Bush (53.4); Dukakis (45.6)
Democratic Surge
Election
1996 8.5 – Clinton (49.2); Dole (40.7)
2008 7.2 – Obama (52.9); McCain (45.7)
Non-Surge Election
1968-1976 --- *Candidates do not take unique stances on
morality policy.
1992 5.6 – Clinton (43.0); Bush (37.4) *Candidacy of Ross Perot complicates
Democratic surge arguments.
2000 -.6 – Bush (47.9-); Gore (48.5) *This margin is too close to be considered a
surge election.
2004 2.4 – Bush (50.7); Kerry (48.3) *This margin is too close to be considered a
surge election.

22. Model & Analysis
 Dependent Variable - % Conservative Vote on
an Initiatives
 Example:
Initiative Category Conservative
?
%
Yes
D.V.: Conservative
Vote
MI – Proposal 08-02 (2008) – Removes some
restrictions from embryonic stem cell research
Morality No (0) 52.6 100-52.6 = 47.4
AZ – Prop 202 (1998) – Allow federal office
candidates to declare position on abolition of
income tax and IRS, and have that appear on
ballot.
Tax Yes (1) 45 45

23. Model – Logistic Regression
Covariate
Expected
Direction
Education -
Fundamentalist +
Catholic +
Black +/-
Hispanic +/-
Ideology -
Midterm Election +
Special Election +
Gubernatorial Election -
Democratic Surge Election -
Republican Surge Election +
StateDemographic
Factors
ElectoralContext
Factors
Dependent Variable: Conservative Outcome (1)
Three Models:
1- Full Model (254)
2- Model Excluding
Gaming (169)
3 - Model only Gaming
(85)

24. Liberal Effects Conservative Effects
-1.05
-1.47
-2.22
1.57
-0.59

25. Results
 State-level demographics have little effect on the odds of a
conservative outcome
 Timing matters (Model 2):
 Odds of a conservative outcome is 1 to 4 in Democratic surge
elections.
 Nearly 5 to 1 in Republican surge elections.
 Interestingly, odds of a conservative outcome in gaming policy
decreases to nearly 1 to 10 in Republican surge elections.
 Results are robust for:
 Region
 Political culture (Elazar 1972).
 Fixed-effects model controlling for states.
 OLS Models.
 Close Elections.

26. Discussion
 It is unlikely that the initiative process could be
manipulated in regards to timing.
 Conservative outcomes are no more likely in midterm
elections and might even be less likely.
 Model 1 may reflect a Republican backlash in midterms.
 Results possibly due to increased initiative awareness in
midterms (Smith 2001), the ability of morality policy
initiatives to increase turnout and interest (Nicholson
2003), or the increased mobilization potential of initiative
campaigns during midterms (Donovan et al. 2009).
 Results suggest that initiative campaigns benefit from the
coattails of popular presidential candidates.