High Level Nuclear Waste presentation The Magic of Spent Fuel by David Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety, Union of Concerned Scientists at the KNOW NUKES Y'ALL SUMMIT on June 30, 2012.
4. When in the reactor core,
irradiated fuel is so
hazardous as to require
highly reliable cooling and
containment systems with
highly reliable backups.
When in a
repository, irradiated
fuel is so hazardous
as to require
In-between, irradiated fuel is so benign it isolation for the next
can be crowded in a pool cooled by a 10,000 years.
single non-safety system without backups.
17. Spent Fuel in BWR SFPs:
Doesn’t need water
Doesn’t need containment
Doesn’t need AC power
Doesn’t need DC power
(except when being moved about)
19. Spent Fuel in BWR SFPs:
Doesn’t need water
Doesn’t need containment
Doesn’t need AC power
Doesn’t need DC power
Doesn’t need control room AC
(except when being moved about)
20.
21. General Design Criterion 44 (GDC 44) in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50
Criterion 44—Cooling water. A system to transfer heat
from structures, systems, and components important to
safety, to an ultimate heat sink shall be provided. The
system safety function shall be to transfer the combined
heat load of these structures, systems, and components
under normal operating and accident conditions.
Suitable redundancy in components and features, and
suitable interconnections, leak detection, and isolation
capabilities shall be provided to assure that for onsite
electric power system operation (assuming offsite power
is not available) and for offsite electric power system
operation (assuming onsite power is not available) the
system safety function can be accomplished, assuming a
single failure.
22. 10 CFR Part 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment
(i) This equipment is that relied upon to remain functional during and
following design basis events to ensure--
(A) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;
(B) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe
shutdown condition; or
(C) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that
could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guidelines in §
50.34(a)(1), § 50.67(b)(2), or § 100.11 of this chapter, as applicable.
(ii) Design basis events are defined as conditions of normal operation,
including anticipated operational occurrences, design basis accidents,
external events, and natural phenomena for which the plant must be
designed to ensure functions (b)(1)(i) (A) through (C) of this section.
(2) Nonsafety-related electric equipment whose failure under postulated
environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of
safety functions specified in subparagraphs (b)(1) (i) (A) through (C) of
paragraph (b)(1) of this section by the safety-related equipment.
23. During a reactor accident,
irradiated fuel in BWR
spent fuel pools becomes
invisible – one can still see
the pool, but it magically
empties of irradiated fuel as
far as safety studies of
reactor building cooling
loads for GDC 44 and
environmental
qualifications for 10 CFR
50.49 go. Amazing!
24. Spent Fuel in BWR SFPs:
Doesn’t need water
Doesn’t need containment
Doesn’t need AC power
Doesn’t need DC power
Doesn’t need control room AC
Doesn’t need to affect GDC 44
or 10 CFR 50.49
(except when being moved about)
25. BWR Spent Fuel Science Fiction
Irradiated fuel in spent fuel pools, even
when not being moved, needs:
to be covered by water
to be within reliable containment
to have ac power for its cooling system
to have dc power for its I&C systems
to enable control room habitability
to enable GDC 44 to be met
to enable 10 CFR 50.49 to be met
26. Far, Far Better Place
to Store Spent Fuel
Five years after discharge from reactor cores, spent fuel
can and should be transferred into dry storage. Slide 26
27. Lessons from Fukushima Dai-Ichi
Hydrogen explosions removed Nearly 400 BWR spent fuel
walls and roofs, allowing water assemblies were in this building,
cannons and helicopters to inundated by the tsunami, but not
provide feed & bleed cooling of requiring explosions and Rube
these BWR spent fuel pools. Goldberg water cooling.
Could the irradiated fuel in the Unit 4 SFP have been cooled w/o the explosions?
30. Conclusions
Irradiated fuel in BWR spent fuel pools poses
undue hazards.
Safety studies and tech specs must consider
spent fuel pool events other than dropping an
assembly or banging it into something.
The decay heat from BWR spent fuel pools
must be considered in GDC 44 and 10 CFR
50.49 calculations.
As soon as possible after 5 years’ decay,
irradiated fuel must be moved to dry storage.
Slide 30
Editor's Notes
The solution has been available in the U.S. since 1986. Five years after it has been removed from the reactor core, spent fuel has cooled down to the point where it can be transferred into dry storage. Spent fuel in dry storage is cooled by the chimney effect of air flowing into the bottom of the container and exiting at the top. The spent fuel is within a sealed canister so that the heat escapes, but not the radioactivity.U.S. reactors began using dry storage in 1986. But plant owners use dry storage only after filling their spent fuel pools to near capacity. Consequently, the spent fuel pool risk is maximized. If the spent fuel pool inventory were reduced to only the fuel removed from reactors within the past five years, the spent fuel pool risk would be minimized. Much is known about the Fukushima disaster. Something often overlooked is the fact that there were nearly 400 spent fuel assemblies in dry storage at Fukushima. They came through the earthquake and tsunami undamaged. It is the right way to manage the spent fuel hazard.
There are known spent fuel storage, fire protection, and seismic hazards at Duane Arnold with known and readily available solutions. But until those solutions are implemented, the people of Iowa face greater risk than is necessary.In addition to the safety risk, nuclear power has significant financial risks. Billions of dollars were wasted on nuclear reactors ordered, partially built, and then canceled.More billions of dollars were wasted on nuclear reactors placed in service but mis-managed to the point where year-plus outages were required to restore their safety levels to acceptable ranges.