Work in progres ;).

1. Succes and Failure on the (Populist) Right: The Case of Wilders and Verdonk<br />Matthijs van Tuijl<br />0850845<br />Master Thesis Political Behaviour and Communication<br />Leiden University<br />6-6-2011<br />Prof. Dr. Galen Irwin<br />‘I want to be Prime-Minister’ was Rita Verdonk’s claim on October 18 2007, when she founded her movement Trots op Nederland (TrotsNL, Proud of the Netherlands). At that point in time not an unrealistic claim, with the polls having her at 25 seats in parliament shortly after. Geert Wilders with his Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Freedom Party), lost half of his supporters to Verdonk when she announced her party. However, on June 9 2010, the day of the Dutch General election, Wilders managed to secure 24 seats and Verdonk was voted out completely by the people. How is it possible that Rita Verdonk could not win any seats in the end and that Geert Wilders showed a significant growth? That there was a potential for Verdonk to be successful was clear from the last general election in 2006, when she was involved in a fierce battle for the leadership of the liberal party (VVD) with now Prime-Minister Mark Rutte. She just lost, but did manage to get more votes during that election than Rutte. With 620,555 votes, she got almost 100,000 votes more than her party leader. Verdonk was forced to leave the VVD after an internal dispute with him, with the leadership contest, in practice, still going on after the elections. When she left, as the polls show, she remained popular and was therefore for a while seen as a serious force within Dutch politics. Geert Wilders, himself also a former VVD MP, having left the party a few years earlier, enjoyed growing support after the elections until Verdonk founded her new movement. At that point in time there were two right wing populist parties looking for the favour of the Dutch voter, only one was capable of claiming victory in the end. <br />Populism as a force in politics has received a lot of attention by scholars. An important question has always been what the exact definition of the word is. Even though it is not the focus of this study to define populism, it is important to know what we are actually dealing with. Related to the concept of populism is the impact it has on modern politics. Especially in Europe there is a growing number of (mostly) right wing parties entering the arena and successfully claiming a position in parliament. According to some, the de-alignment process that took place across Europe, led to the rise of these new parties, focusing more on party leaders and less on a fixed ideology (Dalton et al., 2002: 22, 31-32). The FPO in Austria and the Danish People’s Party are just a few examples of parties that even managed to participate, in some form, in their countries’ government. Since 2010, Wilders and his Freedom Party now also lend support to the government and therefore has a major influence on Dutch policy. While the reasons behind the political success of populist parties have been studied in detail, focusing on elements as political leadership (or charisma), protest voting and issue preferences, there is still no definite answer on how they managed to do it and what elements are most important. While there are many examples in Western Europe of populist parties effectively claiming an influential position within their countries’ politics, the parties that do not make it have not received that much attention. What is interesting about the movement of Rita Verdonk is that there was initial success, with over half a million voters preferring her over the party leader, an exceptional situation in Dutch politics. Why she did not make it and Wilders did, will be the puzzle of this thesis. The findings of this study could contribute to a better understanding of the development of populist parties in general. What defines the faith of these intriguing phenomenon? It leads to the research question of this study.<br />What explains the success of the PVV and the failure of Trots op Nederland in the period 2006-2010?<br />Theory<br />Populism<br />Populism is a concept that is not that easy to define in terms of when a party can be called a populist party. It is a concept that has many features and is has developed over time. In his study on Populism, Paul Taggart (2000) describes this process and defines modern populism as the New Populism, which has its roots in Western Europe. He sees it as a movement of multiple parties across countries with some defining characteristics. First of all, it is reaction to bureaucratised welfare states and corruption within the existing political parties. Secondly they reconstructed politics around a key issue, either taxation, immigration and nationalism or regionalism. Thirdly, they organise themselves differently from existing parties, as a result from distrust of political institutions. Party membership is only active and direct and personalised leadership is prevalent. Fourth, they like the establish a link between the people and them and place themselves outside of the centre of the political spectrum (Taggart, 2000: 75). Canovan explains this link to the people more clearly by distinguishing between three different types: the united people (as in a nation), our people (in an ethnic sense) and the ordinary people (against the privileged) (Canovan, 1999: 5). These separate types make the faces of populism more clear. It can focus on a certain ethnic group and be an excluding factor or it can rebel against the elite and be the voice of the common man. The elite is seen as corrupt and going against the general will. Cas Mudde considers that to be the centre piece of populism, the restoration of the will of the people in a country. In that way, populism is a very moralistic ‘ideology’ (Mudde, 2004: 543-544). In this view, the common man is no longer in power, the elite is and that is de facto a bad thing. Populist parties are there to restore popular control over a nation. The important thing to realise from the New Populism of Taggart is that these parties are effectively trying to find a niche in politics based on dissatisfaction with modern politics. They see politics as no longer representing the people and try to re-establish that link with them by focusing on issues that appeal to certain groups in society. As Taggart explains, the people are here portrait as an unity within a heartland. That heartland can best be seen as an imaginary place that emphasises all the good and virtues aspects of life. It is however not all inclusive. It is for a large extent based on nationalism of an ‘organic community’, excluding certain groups in society (Taggart, 2000: 95, 97). Related to this is the creation of conspiracy theories. The elite conspires together, no longer protects the heartland and there should be something done about that. This is argued to be a major factor to mobilise support (Ibid.: 105) Leadership is also a defining feature of populist parties. With populist parties you can have two types of leadership. Most common is the type based on charisma, centred around leaders with a large popular appeal. When this is however not present, it is argued that in that case it tends to be authoritarian (Ibid.: 103). The result of this leadership is the creation of a populist mood. The idea that something needs to fundamentally change and the country needs to be reshaped. This mood has the power to encourage otherwise non active citizens to participate in politics and to get out and vote (Canovan, 1999: 6). Interesting points are raised by Mudde in clarifying some basic elements of populism, related to democracy and leadership. As he argues, when it comes to democracy, populist parties want responsive government not necessarily direct democracy. They want the outcome to be representing the will of the people, but those people do not have to participate directly, as long as they are heard. On the point of leadership, he says that the people want their leaders to be in touch, but not be one of them (Mudde, 2004: 558-559). This marks some interesting aspects of populist parties and can explain for the apparent paradox of authoritarian leadership and listening to the will of the people. That will needs to be represented by the political leaders, but the people should not take over from them. Although some other scholars present a somewhat more different picture and argue that populist parties will demand more direct democracy. Democracy should in that view be seen as an ideal that includes ‘referenda, popular consultation and direct elections of office- holders (Keman and Krouwel, 2007: 25). What we see is that the concept of populism is not unambiguous. However, as seen above, there are still some defining features of these parties. <br />Wilders and Verdonk as Populists<br />In order to analyse the success and failure of populist parties in the case of Wilders and Verdonk, it is important to establish what kind of characteristics they share with this populist image as sketched above. Koen Vossen, comparing Wilders and Verdonk in terms of populist tendencies, distinguished seven features of populism comparable to the points mentioned above. Some of them, the ‘folksy style’ and ‘voluntarist approach’, are somewhat similar to other points. The folksy style more or less relates to how politicians act, being one of the people, speaking with the same language. The voluntarist approach relates to politics not having to be as complex, the peoples’ qualities are enough to govern (Vossen, 2010: 25). These two points clearly focus on the incompetent elite in comparison to the people. It again stresses the fact that the political organisation has become filled with an unnecessary bureaucracy which needs to be fixed. The voluntarist approach also moves away from a politician as a professional. The common man should be represented and therefore there is no need for professionals. <br />(Vossen, 2010: 34)<br />Wilders<br />As shown in table 1, there are some doubts with Vossen about the basic idea of Geert Wilders as a populist in the traditional way. He calls Wilders a half-hearted populist, mainly because he is a professional politician and he is not glorifying the people to the extent that an ideal populist would do. Instead he also criticizes them on occasions (Vossen, 2010: 30). The interesting thing about this is that Wilders is a former MP for the VVD, as is Rita Verdonk, but in contrast to her, he has a large history for the party. He had been active for the parliamentary party since 1990, working as a policy advisor. Known as a hard worker, Wilders was living politics. This is illustrated by the fact that when he was forced to leave parliament after the 2002 elections, he was devastated, having no alternative for politics whatsoever (Fennema, 2010: 66). Wilders can therefore with reason be called a professional politician and not so much a ‘common man’. It might be this background that prevents him from actively calling on the people as a source of wisdom and more relying on his own mind. In contrast to not glorifying the people, Wilders does denounce the elite and rises up against them. He has managed to create a link between progressive politics and the anti-establishment idea of populism. He has created an image of the Dutch elite as a leftish elite with an inclination for cultural and moral relativism (Vossen, 2010: 27 ). It might be this explicit definition of the elite that explains for him being a professional politician at the one hand but mixing that with some form of populism. It is just a certain part of the political spectrum that is completely on the wrong path. Wilders wrote a ‘declaration of independence, his starting point for his movement. In this he explicitly mentions that elite let ‘this’ happen and now hold their hand in the air and say there is nothing they can do about it anymore (Fennema, 2010: 103). With this he focused on the cultural aspects. This also shows his focus on the progressive elite, conspiring against society. He made a distinction between the Labour party of Wouter Bos, which he thought to be pampering, and the VVD. Who did not want it to go completely wrong should vote VVD (Ibid., 105). The exponent of this focus on the cultural and moral relativism of the Dutch elite, is his own conspiracy theory about Islam taking over Europe (Eurabia). As Vossen shows, Wilders actively spreads this image of islamification, referring to many experts in the field. With this he is trying to give weight to his claims and focus his campaign on the issue of immigration of Moslim immigrants (Vossen, 2010: 27). Vossen gives no definite answer on whether Wilders is a charismatic leader, calling it difficult to measure in his case because of the closed nature of the party. However according to him the style of leadership is more important in his case. Wilders is the only member of his party, trying to control the internal decision making (Ibid.:28). This relates to the points made by Taggart on authoritarian leadership. Wilders, whether charismatic or not, should then more be seen as an authoritarian leader. Paul Lucardie (2007), also shows the special position Wilders has put himself in. He qualifies Wilders as a right-wing, semi- hearted liberal nationalist and populist (181). As well as Vossen, he acknowledges that Wilders his behaviour is not one of standard populism. Wilders focuses on freedom, but it is limited and very inconsistent with respect to (Islamic) religion. The populism, although by some seen as limited is according to Lucardie clearly noticeable in his reference to the people and the corrupt elite (2007: 179-180). Geert Wilders, although not being the ideal type can therefore be characterised as a populist politician. Especially his anti-elite politics and the focus on Islam as the key issue around immigration are clear indicators. The leadership elements can also be found. What is however clear is that Wilders has some points that distinguish him from an average populist.<br />Verdonk<br />Where Wilders is a somewhat more complicated story in terms of populism, Verdonk seems all the more fulfilling the standard definition of a populist. As can be seen in table 1, she scores on all the criteria that are outlined. Research on her speeches and interviews show a clear distinction between the corrupt elite and the people as the virtuous element in society. There is a distrust of the people caused by the elite (Vossen, 2010: 30). Note here that Verdonk does not care for the elite being left or right wing, it is just the elite. Unlike Wilders she tries to take on the entire establishment and does not even leave out her own former party. She mentioned Mark Rutte as being too left wing and therefore also being out of touch with the people. When founding her movement she did not want to take sides either and think in the old way of how the political spectrum was divided. She did not want to be mentioned left or right, but wanted to think in old and new (Lucardie, 2007: 181). With this she cannot be seen as more distinguishing herself from the establishment or elite and taking the side of the people. From her history it does make sense for her not just to criticise the left, since she was ousted by the VVD party leaders, but favoured by the people during the elections. In general we can see Verdonk trying to frame that image of her party taking on politics in general. The other important point to qualify Verdonk as a populist is that she emphasises vigorously on voluntarism and direct democracy. In her view the people should govern and we do not need politicians to sort out the best solutions. This is best illustrated by the fact that she wanted citizens to discuss with each other what the best solutions to certain problems are. The real knowledge of ordinary people would improve this country (Vossen, 2010: 31). What we see here is Verdonk going away from the politican as a professional in politics. Politicians should listen to the people and she goes to extremes to establish that link. She also did not present a real party manifest until very late. Only in april 2010, people really got a chance to know what Verdonk would fight for and which issues were relevant to her party. She then focused on taxation, subsidies and other public spending. The personality of Verdonk was therefore very important. As Vossen stresses, she mainly relied on her own popularity and her image she had built during the years before. Trots op Nederland is very apolitical, in that way and more a feeling. A feeling of distrust to politics in general (Vossen, 2010: 32-33). Because of that lack of content of what the party is really about, it is difficult to clearly explain what kind of party or movement it is. It could only somewhat be qualified as a nationalist party. She does emphasize Dutch culture and the relevance of putting that up front, but not as extreme as Wilders does it. She could therefore best be seen as a populist liberal-conservative (Lucardie 2007: 182). The clear difference here is that Wilders actually wants to tackle the influence of Islam in society, whereas Verdonk does not see that danger. She sees it more in terms of not letting the Dutch society fade away in general. By focusing on taxation and more power to the people, she fits very clearly in the classic image as depicted by Taggart. <br />Success and Failure<br />In general there are three reasons that can be defined why people vote for populist parties. The protest vote, in reaction to other parties; voting for the charisma or leadership or voting for substance of policy preferences. <br />Immerfall sees a neo-populist agenda. He focuses on what the emphasize is of a populist party and sees its appeal accordingly. He argues it to be important for such a party to hold together what he calls, a neo-populist coalition. This is aimed at exploiting country specific issues, mainly focused on the economic situation of the nation, in order to attract voters (Immerfall, 1998: 250). Populism here is seen as a reaction to what is happening in a country and the reason of existence is an appeal to the people. Populist parties, by showing what is wrong, have a reason to exist. Voters then react to this by seeing the establishment as incompetent who fail to take care of the nation and vote for the party that raised those questions (Ibid., 258). This explanation of the populist vote has nothing to do with the appeal of leadership or what plan are presented to the people. It is the basic idea of framing the image of the corrupt elite that let the people down and is not representing the general will anymore. As Taggart explains, there are a problems with the way populist parties behave or are organised, especially in this way. One of those things is their critique on established parties. They want to distance themselves from them, but are forced, by the way politics is organised, to behave in a similar way. As a consequence, they have a large risk of internal conflicts or collapsing (Taggart, 2000: 100). In practice it comes down to a very simple logic. At first a populist party successfully explains why the old parties are not the right choice for the voter. With this they create momentum for them to grow support. However, since this is not based on concrete plans or policy they fall in the trap they have created for themselves. Once the people notice that they are not capable of fulfilling their needs either, the image of a strong counter party disappears and the party collapses. <br />Roger Eatwell sees the importance of charisma in leaders for explaining the success of populist parties. Whereas it is a concept that cannot be defined very easy and can take on many forms, he focuses on the personal presence of the leader. It is about being able to create the right image on television and to catch the right sound bite and not so much about the physical attraction of the party leader. The focuses of the publicity tends to be on the personality of the leader and this creates electoral appeal (Eatwell, 2005: 108). This approach takes away the idea of charisma just being about the leader and puts the emphasis on the actions of him or her. It still remains a personalised attraction, but of a different nature. Taggart sees the problems with charismatic leadership in the long run. He argues it to be unstable and not very reliable. Politicians can never be certain how to effectively sustain their charisma and it is therefore very unstable (Taggart, 2000: 102). As long as politicians are seen to be charismatic and are capable to catch the eye of the people, they will continue to be popular. However relying on charisma alone seems to form a problem in the long run. A new contender can come along and take away the support or people will start to see through the charismatic mask. Van der Burg and Mughan (2007) conclude from their study on Dutch populist leaders, that they do not have a greater effect on the voting behaviour than their counterparts of the established parties. Even for Pim Fortuyn, arguably a very charismatic man, there was not to be found any significant difference (Van der Burg and Mughan, 2007: 44). This further puts pressure on the effectiveness, if any, of just the leader as a token to attract votes. Even though in a best case scenario it helps to improve voting for the party, it seems to be the case that a populist party cannot rely on the leader alone. There is more to it and Mughan and Paxton (2006) try to explain this with a case study of anti-immigrant feelings in Australia. What they find is that policy preference is highly significant as an explanation for the populist vote. Only if there is correspondence between what voters want and what parties offer them, they will vote for them (Mughan and Paxton, 2006: 354, 357). It seems that voters have an idea on what they want to happen in a country and need parties to defend this or to bring this forward. It can effectively boost the claim made by many populists that the old parties are not representing the will of the people. It could be the case that it is then more than a protest vote and basic rhetoric and gives a chance for parties that can actually find a niche in politics to grow and become important. Ivarsflaten, shows the volatility of populist parties when it comes to issues and thereby also acknowledges the importance. She shows that the saliency of (especially the economic) issue is important (Ivarsflaten, 2005: 489). The populist voter does look at issues and does take in account the state of the nation and is not simply affected by rhetoric or leadership appeal. Van der Burg and Fennema (2003) firmly support this conclusion and state that conclude from their analyse on the development of anti-immigrant parties, that voters vote according to their issue preferences. They argue that voters for those parties vote for the same reasons on a party as any other voter does. Some evidence even hints that they are even more ideological voters. (Van der Burg and Fennema, 2003: 66. 70-71). It seems that we should not underestimate the voters for populist parties. There is evidence that they are not the simplistic voters as some people hold them to be. The strength of a party does not just rely on the leadership or on a protest vote. It heavily depends on which issues are salient and whether a party manages to bring them forward in a right way. There are therefore many ways for a populist party to go wrong and it depends on the context whether such a party is successful or not. <br />Hypotheses<br />Based on the literature and the characterisation of both Wilders and Verdonk, it is possible to formulate some hypotheses to explain the success and failure of their parties. <br />H1 (Policy matters hypothesis): Wilders found a niche in politics to continue to attract voters whereas it was never clear what Verdonk her party was about. <br />H2 <br />H3. <br />Methodology<br />This study will focus on the period between 2006 and 2010. By looking at the relevant events and moments in time, based on weekly opinion polls, it is possible to reconstruct the story of these two political leaders and their movements. A newspaper analysis of De Telegraaf will be carried out of this period. The searchterm ‘Rita Verdonk’ for the period 21-09-2007 (Day before the 2006 general election) to 10-06-2010 (day after the 2010 general election) resulted in 649 Telegraaf hits. A similar search for ‘Wilders OR PVV’ resulted in 2378 hits. These results will be grouped and linked to specific moments in time to analyse them and see what accounts for the changes. (INSERT GRAPH MEDIA ATTENTION TELEGRAF OVER THE YEARS)<br />The advantage of doing this qualitative research over a more quantitative approach is that a better understanding can be acquired about the circumstances under which the shifts in popularity took place. This can then be linked to the theory on populist support, hypotheses can be tested on the basis of the relevant narrative. This in-depth approach can shed more light on what factors are different for these two parties and should therefore not be limited to raw data.<br />Nieuwsmonitor?<br />2010 NKO, wat voor analyse<br />……….<br />A short analysis<br />De Hond/Peil.nl<br />The results of the polls (2006-2010) of the PVV (Wilders) and TrotsNL (Verdonk) are presented above. The source for these polls is the research done by Peil.nl (Maurice de Hond). The reason to use these polls are first of all that they are very accessible for the general public. More importantly however, de Hond includes all kinds of extra research done on a week to week basis of the most striking issues developing that week or the most important changes that happened. On several occasions he includes trust in politicians or the ‘rapport cijfers’, he also measures the faith people have in a certain politicians as PM (note that these figures are not presented on a weekly basis). He also presents extra research when certain issues are more salient in a particular week, examples of this are the discussions about the AOW, the purchase of the JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) and the military mission to Uruzgan. When Rita Verdonk was forced to leave the VVD, he measured the potential of her party and compared that to the PVV voters. On some other occasions he also includes the potential of a certain party in general and the potential of TON when the other party would not be there as a second choice. This was important for certain local elections where the PVV did not participate. He also looked at the question which newspaper the populist voters read most. Here we can see a large number favouring de Telegraaf. <br />The Polls<br />What this figure above shows is that there are clear movements of the two parties. We can clearly define some momentum with each of the parties at certain points in time. What we can also see is the difference between success and failure. Wilders had success, growing from 9 seats after the 2006 general election to 24 seats in 2010. Verdonk failed, by being the first member of parliament elected with more votes than the party leader and initially growing in (virtual) seats but ending up with nothing at the actual elections.<br />The first pre-Verdonk period can be characterised as one of a small increase in potential for the PVV, with immediately after the election the reaction on the cabinet formation, discussions on asylum issues an double passports, leading to more trust in Wilders and more potential votes. In the summer of 2007 the Islam date rose again with critique on then Minister Vogelaar. The PVV reached a high of 19 seats in the polls before Verdonk split up with the VVD. <br />The first time Verdonk was taken in account in the polls there is a clear indication in how the vote was initially split between the PVV and Verdonk (later TON or TrotsNL). A poll was conducted with Verdonk and a separate one without her for a couple of weeks. If Verdonk was included, almost half of the PVV seats would go to her party. A study researching the position of the electorate for each party was included in this particular poll, showing how left or right PVV and Verdonk voters were. It seems as though the initial bump for Verdonk up to 25 seats had mainly to do with her establishing the party. The moment she officially announced to start her own party and to participate in the next election, she rose from 18 to 23/25 seats (a small research on the opinion of the foundation of her party is also included). There seem to have been some consolidation back to that starting point of 18 seats (Verdonk) and 11/12 seats (Wilders). That is until the Fitna discussion began (early 2008). Here we an initial small increase for Wilders, but more importantly, the polls show an increase for Verdonk once the movie was released on the internet. The numbers show a lot of trust in Verdonk and a decline of the PVV after Fitna. One of the explanations could be that right wing voters did not think Wilders should have gone that far and found Verdonk a safer alternative. Once that effect had gone away, the problems for Verdonk started. Gradually she declined in the number of seats. A defining moment there was her adviser Ed Sinke showing problems within TON. That led to Verdonk losing 8 seats in September 2008. After that trust in Verdonk declined and Wilders took over these voters. An additional research of October 2008 shows this trend of TON voters no going to the PVV instead. Another adviser, Kay van der Linde left the party in November 2008, resulting in the loss of 2 more seats. From then on Verdonk did not get a chance to recover anymore, although she did get some minor bumps when the cabinet addressed difficult issues (such as the AOW or the Iraq war). It was however Wilders how managed to draw attention. After taking over the Verdonk seats the trial against his person started, with the court ordering the prosecution to start a case against him. That attention and the failed trip to England to show Fitna secured a lot of virtual seats. In January 2009, he gained 6 seats in the polls by this. Leaving parliament in a protest against the government on march 2009 and the Joint Strike Fighter discussion, showed another gain of 3 seats leading to the PVV becoming the largest party in the polls with 33 seats. This major position in the polls had worn off several months later, but the PVV remained the biggest party in the polls. <br /> But this is not the entire story, there is also a point of electability in the period between the municipal elections and the general elections of 2010. Polls and numbers show that there was a question of whether the PVV should have participated in the city executive (college van B&W) in Almere and the Hague and if they did not simply opt out too simple. There is an indication that some PVV sympathisers doubted Wilders and the PVV. Trust in Wilders declined in comparison to the period before and voters shifted to the VVD instead. The PVV still being the largest party in the polls after the municipal elections gave away to the VVD and ended up in third place. The most important conclusion here is, they did not profit from the fall of the cabinet, they lost. The success story of Wilders therefore also has another side. <br />Overall, there seems to be a strong connection between the Verdonk vote and that of the PVV. De Hond also shows, that even though Verdonk in early 2009 had declined to almost nothing, she was still a good second option for PVV voters. Also, the movements in the polls of the parties are almost mirrored. The strongest indication that this link is present is the start of the Group Verdonk, where she took over many PVV votes. At the end, Verdonk seemed to have lost momentum by internal struggles, it being a clear turning point in the popularity of her party. Wilders, gaining from this could not secure an overall victory at the elections, but managed to grow a staggering 15 seats in comparison to the previous general election.<br />List of References <br />Under construction.<br />Dalton et al, 2002<br />Taggart, 2000<br />Canovan, 1999<br />Mudde 2004<br />Vossen 2010<br />Fennema 2010<br />Lucardie 2007<br />Immerfall, 1998<br />Eatwell, 2005<br />Van der Burg and Mughan, 2007<br />Mughan and Paxton, 2006<br />Ivansflatern, 2005<br />Van der Burg and Fennema, 2003<br />Keman and Krouwel, 2007<br />