The document discusses Bayesian networks and causal inference. It provides an outline that covers probabilistic inference in graphical models, causality, causal graphical models, and concepts related to causal analysis such as randomization, confounding, and selection bias. The document then discusses several controversies and debates that graphical models can help resolve, including Berkson's paradox, Simpson's paradox, the relationship between smoking and lung cancer, and the reverse regression controversy in social sciences. It introduces key concepts in causal analysis using graphical models such as the do() operator, adjustment for direct causes, and the back-door criterion.

1. Bayesian networks & Causal Inference
LIRIS UMR 5205 CNRS
Data Mining & Machine Learning (DM2L) Group
Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1
perso.univ-lyon1.fr/alexandre.aussem
Journées IXXI/Persyvact sur les approches bayésiennes
17 octobre 2013

2. Outline
•
•
•
•
Probabilistic inference in graphical models
From probability to causality
Causal graphical models
Nonstatistical concepts such as randomization, confounding, spurious
correlation, adjustment, selection bias
• Elucidation of some well-known controversies :
• The selection bias or Berkson’s paradox (1946),
• The Simpson's paradox (1899),
• The old debate on the relation between smoking and lung cancer,
• The « reverse regression controversy » which occupied the social
science in the 1970s,
• Rules of causal calculus.

3. Introduction
• The central aim of many studies in the physical, behavioral, social, and
biological sciences is the elucidation of cause-effect relationships among
variables or events.
• However, the appropriate methodology for extracting such relationships
from data has been fiercely debated.
• The two fundamental questions of causality are:
 What empirical evidence is required for legitimate inference of cause-effect
relationships?
 Given that we are willing to accept causal information about a phenomenon,
what inferences can we draw from such information, and how?
• Graphical models provide clear semantics for causal claims, practical
problems relying on causal information that long were regarded as either
metaphysical can now be solved using elementary mathematic.
• Paradoxes and controversies are now easily resolved.

4. Probabilities…
• Probabilities play a central role in modern pattern recognition. Probability
theory can be expressed in terms of two simple equations corresponding to
the sum rule and the product rule.
• All of the probabilistic inference and learning manipulations amount to
repeated application of these two equations.

5. Introduction to Graphical Models
• However, we shall find it highly advantageous to augment the analysis using
diagrammatic representations of probability distributions, called
probabilistic graphical models. These offer several useful properties:
• They provide a simple way to visualize the structure of a probabilistic
model
• Insights into the properties of the model, including conditional
independence properties, can be obtained by inspection of the graph.
• Complex computations, required to perform inference and learning in
sophisticated models, can be expressed in terms of graphical
manipulations.
• Bayesian networks, also known as directed graphical models are a major
class of graphical models in which the links have directional significance.

6. Bayesian Networks
Factorization induced by the DAG:

7. Conditional Independence
a is independent of b given c
Equivalently
Notation

8. Conditional Independence: Example 1

9. Conditional Independence: Example 1

10. Conditional Independence: Example 2

11. Conditional Independence: Example 2

12. Conditional Independence: Example 3
Note: this is the opposite of Example 1, with c unobserved.

13. Conditional Independence: Example 3
Note: this is the opposite of Example 1, with c observed.

14. “Am I out of fuel?”
and hence
B = Battery (0=flat, 1=fully charged)
F = Fuel Tank (0=empty, 1=full)
G = Fuel Gauge Reading
(0=empty, 1=full)

15. “Am I out of fuel?”
Probability of an empty tank increased by observing G = 0.

16. “Am I out of fuel?”
• The probability of an empty tank is reduced by observing B = 0. This referred
to as “explaining away”.
• B and F are negatively correlated conditioned on G despite being independent.

17. Illustration – Epidemiology

18. Illustration – Genetics

19. Limites of Bayesian Networks
• Two given DAGs are observationally equivalent if every probability
distribution that is compatible with one of the DAGs is also compatible
with the other.
• Theorem: Two DAGs are observationally equivalent if and only if they
have the same skeletons and the same sets of v-structures, that is, two
converging arrows whose tails are not connected by an arrow.
• Observational equivalence places a limit on our ability to infer
directionality from probabilities alone. Two networks that are
observationally equivalent cannot be distinguished without resorting to
manipulative experimentation or temporal information

20. Graphs as Models of Interventions
• Causal models, unlike probabilistic models, can serve to predict the
effect of interventions. This added feature requires that the joint
distribution P be supplemented with a causal diagram - that is, a directed
acyclic graph G that identifies the causal connections among the variables
of interest.
• In other words, each child-parent family in a DAG G represents a
deterministic function
where pai are the parents of variable xi in G; the
(i=1,…,n) are
mutually independent, arbitrarily distributed random disturbances.
• The equality signs in structural equations convey the asymmetrical
relation of "is determined by“.

21. Causal Bayesian Networks
General Factorization
Now supplemented with causal
assumptions

22. Manipulation theorem
• The manipulation theorem (Spirtes et al. 1993) states that
given an external intervention on a variable X in a causal
graph, we can derive the posterior probability distribution
over the entire graph by simply modifying the conditional
probability distribution of X.
• Intervention amounts to removing all edges that are
coming into X. Nothing else in the graph needs to be
modified, as the causal structure of the system remains
unchanged.
• Thus, intervention can be expressed in a simple truncated
factorization formula.

23. The do(.) operator
• Interventions are defined through a mathematical operator
called do(x), which simulates physical interventions by
deleting equations corresponding to variable X from the
model, replacing them with a constant X = x, while keeping
the rest of the model unchanged.
• The causal effect of X on Y, is denoted as
𝑃 𝑦 𝒅𝒐(𝑥) or 𝑃 𝑦 𝑥 ′ . It is a function from X to the space
of probability distributions on Y.
• Intervention can be expressed in a simple truncated
factorization formula,

24. The do(.) operator
Can be rewritten as:
Can be rewritten as:
Summing over all variables expect xi and y leads to the result called
adjustement for direct causes:

25. The do(.) operator: another view
Graphically,
is equivalent to
removing the ling between Z0 and X
while keeping the rest of the network
intact.

26. Randomisation
• With the insight from causal graphs and especially the manipulation
theorem, we can easily see that randomization serves the purpose of
breaking all alternative paths from the independent variable to the
dependent variable.
• A flip of a coin determines whether a subject will be in the treatment
group (smokers) or the control group (non-smokers). The coin is now
the only cause of smoking. All other causes of smoking, are made
inactive. The edges coming into smoking are, according to the
manipulation theorem, broken.

27. Placebo effects
• The concept of placebo effects in experimental design has a similarly
intuitive explanation.
• Obtaining a medicine causes healing in itself and that impacts the
dependent variable without a direct link between them.
• Administration of placebo to the control group makes the causal
structure for the placebo path the same for both groups and the
placebo effect can be easily isolated from the effect of medicine.

28. Subject-experimenter effects
• The concept of subject-experimenter effects in experimental design has
a similarly intuitive explanation.
• The experimenter knows whether the subject is in the treatment group
or the control group. This knowledge modifies the experimenter’s
behavior so that it impacts the dependent variable.
• Blinding removes the link from treatment to experimenter effect and
assures that possible dependence is the result of a direct link.

29. Controlling confounding biais
• Whenever we undertake to evaluate the effect of one factor, X, on
another, Y, the question arises as to whether we should adjust our
measurements for possible variations in some other factors (Z), otherwise
known as “covariates” or « confounders ».
• Adjustment amounts to partitioning the population into groups that
are homogeneous relative to Z, assessing the effect of X on Y in each
homogeneous group, and then averaging the results.
• The practical question that it poses - whether an adjustment for a given
covariate is appropriate - has resisted mathematical treatment.
• Epidemiologists often adjust for wrong sets of covariates…
• What criterion should one use to decide which variables are
appropriate for adjustment?

30. Back-Door adjustment
Z
We seek 𝑃 𝑦 𝒅𝒐(𝑥) , we show easily that
𝑃 𝑦 𝑑𝑜(𝑥) = 𝑃 𝑦 𝐹 𝑥 = 𝑧 𝑃( 𝑦, 𝑧|𝐹 𝑥 )
= 𝑧 𝑃( 𝑦 𝑧, 𝐹𝑥 𝑃(𝑧 𝐹 𝑥 = 𝑧 𝑃( 𝑦 𝑧, 𝐹𝑥, 𝑥 𝑃(𝑧 𝐹 𝑥
= 𝒛 𝑷( 𝒚 𝒙, 𝒛 𝑷(𝒛)
X
More generally, a set of variables Z satisfies the back-door criterion relative to
an ordered pair of variables (X, Y) in a DAG G iff
• no node in Z is a descendant of X ; and
• Z blocks every path between X and Y that contains an arrow into X.
Theorem - If a set of variables Z satisfies the back-door criterion relative to (X,Y),
then the causal effect of X on Y is identifiable and is given by the formula,
𝑷 𝒚 𝒅𝒐(𝒙) =
𝒛
𝑷( 𝒚 𝒙, 𝒛 𝑷(𝒛)
Y

31. Back-Door adjustment
𝑷 𝒚 𝒅𝒐(𝒙) =
𝒛
𝑷( 𝒚 𝒙, 𝒛 𝑷(𝒛)
Relative to the ordered pair of variables
(Xi,Xj) in the DAG G,
• the sets Z1 = {X3, X4} and Z2 = {X4, X5}
meet the back-door criterion,
• but Z3 = {X4} does not because X4 does
not block the path (Xi, X3, X1, X4, X2, X5, Xj).

32. Berkson’s paradox
• Berkson's paradox is a result in conditional probability (not related de
causality) which is counterintuitive for some people: given two
independent events, if you only consider outcomes where at least
one occurs, then they become negatively dependent.
• Exemple: If the admission criteria to a certain graduate school call for
either high grades as an undergraduate or special musical talents,
then these two attributes will be found to be negatively correlated in
the student population of that school, even if these attributes are
uncorrelated in the population at large.

33. Berkson’s paradox

34. Simpson's paradox
if we associate
• C (connoting cause) with
taking a certain drug,
• E (connoting effect) with
recovery, and
• F connoting gender,
then - under a causal
interpretation - the drug seems
to be harmful to both males
and females yet beneficial to
the population as a whole.

35. Simpson's paradox
Such order reversal might not surprise when given
probabilistic interpretation, it is paradoxical when
given causal interpretation.

36. Simpson's paradox
• We shall take great care in distinguishing seeing from doing. The
conditioning operator in probability calculus stands for the evidential
conditional "given that we see," whereas the do(.) operator was devised
to represent the causal conditional "given that we do.“
• Accordingly, the inequality
• is not a statement about C being a positive causal factor for E, properly
written

37. Simpson's paradox
Three causal models capable of generating the data Model (a)
dictates use of the gender-specific tables, whereas (b) and
(c) dictate use of the combined table.

38. Simpson's paradox
As F connotes gender, the correct answer is the gender specific table, i.e.
𝑷 𝒚 𝒅𝒐(𝒙) =
𝒛
𝑷( 𝒚 𝒙, 𝒛 𝑷(𝒛)
• Conclusion: every question related to the effect of actions must be
decided by causal considerations; statistical information alone is
insufficient.
• The question of choosing the correct table on which to base our
decision is a special case of the covariate selection problem.

39. Front-Door adjustment
A set of variables Z is said to satisfy the frontdoor criterion relative to (X, Y) if
• Z intercepts all directed paths from X to Y;
• there is no back-door path from X to Z;
• all back-door paths from Z to Y are blocked
by X.
Theorem : If Z satisfies the front-door criterion relative to ( X , Y) and if P(x, z )
> 0, then the causal effect of X on Y is identifiable and is given by the formula:
𝑷 𝒚 𝒅𝒐(𝒙) =
𝑷 𝒚 𝒛, 𝒙′ 𝑷 𝒙′
𝑷 𝒛 𝒙
𝒛
𝒙′

40. Front-Door adjustment
We seek 𝑷 𝒚 𝒅𝒐(𝒙)
=
=
=
We have
𝑃(𝑢) =
According to the DAG
This yields 𝑃 𝑦 𝑥 ′ =
Summing over u gives
𝑃( 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑢|𝑑𝑜(𝑥))
𝑧,𝑢 𝑃( 𝑦 𝑧, 𝑢 𝑃 𝑧 𝑥 𝑃(𝑢)
𝑧 𝑃 𝑧 𝑥
𝑢 𝑃(𝑦|𝑧, 𝑢)𝑃(𝑢)
𝑧,𝑢
𝑃( 𝑢 𝑥′ 𝑃 𝑥 ′
𝑥′
𝑃 𝑢 𝑥′ = 𝑃 𝑢 𝑥 ′ , 𝑧
𝑃 𝑦 𝑧, 𝑢 = 𝑃 𝑦 𝑧, 𝑢, 𝑥 ′
𝑧
𝑃 𝑧 𝑥
𝑥′
𝑷 𝒚 𝒅𝒐(𝒙) =
𝑢
𝑃 𝑦 𝑧, 𝑢, 𝑥 ′ 𝑃( 𝑢 𝑧, 𝑥 ′ 𝑃 𝑥 ′
𝒛
𝑷 𝒛 𝒙
𝒙′
𝑷 𝒚 𝒛, 𝒙′ 𝑷 𝒙′

41. Smoking and Cancer
Old debate on the relation between smoking, X, and lung cancer, Y: If we
ban smoking, will the rate of cancer cases be roughly the same as the one
we find today among non smokers in the population ?
Controlled experiments could decide between the two models, but these
are illegal to conduct.

42. Smoking and Cancer
According to many, the tobacco industry has managed to forestall
antismoking legislation by arguing that the observed correlation between
smoking and lung cancer could be explained by some sort of carcinogenic
genotype , U (unknown), , that involves inborn craving for nicotine.

43. Smoking and Cancer
𝑷 𝒚 𝒅𝒐(𝒙) =
𝑷 𝒚 𝒛, 𝒙′ 𝑷 𝒙′
𝑷 𝒛 𝒙
𝒛
𝒙′

44. Numerical application
Contrary to expectation, the data prove smoking to be
somewhat beneficial to one's health !!

45. Discrimination controversy
•
Another example involves a contoversy called « reverse
regression », which occupied the social science literature in
the 1970s. Should we, in salary discrimination cases, compare
salaries of equally qualified men and women or instead
compare qualifications of equally paid men and women?
•
Remarkably, the two choices may lead to opposite
conclusions. It turns out that men earns a higher salary than
equally qualified women and, simultaneously, men are more
qualified than equally paid women.
•
The moral is that all conclusions are extremely sensitive to
which variables we choose to hold constant when we are
comparing,

46. Discrimination controversy
•
Men earns a higher salary than equally qualified women
reads:
𝑄
•
•
𝑃 𝑆 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒, 𝑄 𝑃 𝑄 >
𝑄
𝑃 𝑆 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒, 𝑄 𝑃 𝑄
Men are more qualified than equally paid women reads:
𝑆 𝑃 𝑄 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒, 𝑆 𝑃 𝑆 >
𝑆 𝑃 𝑄 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒, 𝑆 𝑃 𝑆
The question we seek to answer: does sex directly influence
salary ? Which is the court definition of discrimination, and reads:
𝑃 𝑆 𝐝𝐨(𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒) > 𝑃 𝑆 𝐝𝐨(𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒)

47. Discrimination controversy
Suppose all direct effects are positive (hence sex discrimination on
salary). Conditionned on S, G and Q become negatively correlated via
the open path in dotted lines.
+
G
+
G
Q
+
+
+
Q
+
S
S
-

48. Confounding & Selection bias
•
Selection bias, caused by preferential exclusion of
samples from the data, is a major obstacle to valid causal
and statistical inferences; it can hardly be detected in either
experimental or observational studies.
• To illuminate the nature of this bias, consider a variable S
affected by both X (treatment) and Y (outcome), indicating
entry into the data pool. Such preferential selection to the
pool amounts to conditioning on S, which creates spurious
association between X and Y.
• Conditioning on instrumental variables may introduce
new bias where none existed before.

49. Confounding & Selection bias
Instrumental variable with confounding and selection bias
Adjustment on Z would amplify the bias created by U….

50. The Rules of do-calculus
• The do-calculus was developed by J. Pearl in 1995
to facilitate the identification of causal effects in nonparametric models.
• When a query is given in the form of a doexpression, for example P(y|do(x),z), its identifiability
can be decided systematically using an algebraic
procedure known as the do-calculus .
• It consists of three inference rules that permit us to
map interventional and observational distributions
whenever certain conditions hold in the causal
diagram G.

51. The Rules of do-calculus
Let X, Y, Z, and W be arbitrary
disjoint sets of nodes in a causal
DAG G. We denote by
the graph
obtained by deleting from G all
arrows pointing to nodes in X.
Likewise, we denote by
the
graph obtained by deleting from G
all arrows emerging from nodes in
X. To represent the deletion of both
incoming and outgoing arrows, we
use the notation
The following three rules are valid
for every interventional distribution
compatible with G.

52. Front-Door adjustment

53. Front-Door adjustment

54. Causal graphs: illustration
We wish to assess the total effect of the
fumigants X on yields Y.
The first step in this analysis is to construct a
causal diagram, which represents the
investigator's understanding of the major
causal influences among measurable quantities
in the domain.
Here, the quantities Z1, Z2, Z3 represent the
eelworm population before treatment, after
treatment, and at the end of the season,
respectively. Z0 represents last year's eelworm
population. B is the population of birds and
other predators.
Unmeasured quantities are designated by dashed lines.

55. Causal graphs: illustration
The purpose is not to validate or repudiate
such domain-specific assumptions.

56. Causal graphs: illustration
Z0 is an unknown quantity. Thus we have a
classical case of confounding bias that
interferes with the assessment of treatment
effects regardless of sample size.
Can we
test whether a given set of
assumptions is sufficient for quantifying
causal effects of fumigants on yields from
non experimental data ?

57. The do(.) operator: illustration
Graphically, 𝑃 𝑦 𝒅𝒐(𝑥) is equivalent
to removing the link between Z0 and X
while keeping the rest of the network
intact.

58. The Rules of do-calculus
Using the do-calculus, one can establish that
the total effect of X on Y can be estimated
consistently from the observed distribution
of X, Z1, Z2, 23, and Y.
It is given by the formula:
These conclusions are obtained by
performing a sequence of symbolic
derivations (the 3 inference rules).

59. Sex discrimination in College Admission
•
Causal relationships relevant to Berkeley's sex discrimination study.
•
Adjusting for department choice X2 or career objective Z (or both) would
be inappropriate in estimating the direct effect of gender on admission. In
contrast, the direct effect of X1 on Y,

60. Hip factor analysis among women
P( Fracture | do(Psycho=no) ) = ?

61. Abstract model of diseases
M. Lappenschaar et al. Artificial Intelligence in Medicine (2013)

62. Conclusions
• Testing for cause and effect is difficult, discovering cause
effect is even more difficult.
• But, once the causal diagram is provided, identification of
causal effects is straightforward using the do-calculus
rules.
• Causality is not metaphysical, it can be understood by
simple processes, and expressed in a friendly
mathematical language.
• The inference of causal relationships from massive data
sets is a challenge but the mathematical language for
causal analysis offers new insight and eventually lead to
new discoveries (e.g. cancer)

63. References
• J. Pearl. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009.
• J. Pearl "Understanding Simpson's Paradox'‘, UCLA Cognitive Systems
Laboratory, Tech. Rep. R-414, 2013.
• J. Pearl "Do-Calculus Revisited" UCLA Cognitive Systems Laboratory,
Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI) 2012.
• S. Lauritzen. Graphical Models. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996.
• J. Pearl “Myth, confusion, and science in causal analysis”, UCLA
Cognitive Systems Laboratory, Tech. Rep. R-348, 2009.
• J.A. Myers et al. « Effects of adjusting for instrumental variables on
bias and precision of effect estimates. Am. J. of Epidemiology 2011.
• A. Goldberger. “Reverse regression and salary discrimination”. The
Journal of Human Resources 1984.
• J. Berkson. “Limitations of the application of fourfold table analysis to
hospital data ». Biometrics Bulletin 1946.
• P. Spirtes, et al. Causation, Prediction and Search, MIT Press, 1993.

64. Thank you for your attention, any question ?