Strategic Crisis Management, Identifying good practices in the governance of risks. Danish emergency management agency share ideas.

1. Pandora Cell

2. Challenge to
crisis management organisations
 What has happend?
 What are we doing about it?
 What are the consequences?
 What if..?

3. Frequent assumption
Impact
Time
”Things are under control”
Deployed measures will be sufficiently effective in
mitigating the consequences of the incident at hand, and
in preventing further adverse developments.
Now

4. What if..?
Impact
Time
Prolongation
Current situation and
issues persist
Reframing
Something else happens
(or already happend)
Exacerbation
The current situation
intensifies and worsens
Fatiguing
Recovery is (too) slow
Now

5. Crisis
Management
Staff
Chief of Staff
Secretariat
HR & Legal ICT & Logistics Operations
Crisis
communication
Crisis management organisation

6. Crisis
Management
Staff
Chief of Staff
Secretariat
HR & Legal ICT & Logistics Operations
Crisis
communication
Pandora cell
Crisis management organisation

7. Aim
• Strengthen proactivity in the crisis response
• Prevent bad situations from getting worse due to lack of
attention to the immediate future, and failing memory of past
learning points
Task
• Analyse the crisis and identify circumstances that may cause the
current situation to deteriorate in the near future
Output
• A list of 3-5 issues for the staff leadership to consider
• Further input to the decision-making process during crisis
situations, as requested
Pandora Cell

8. CURRENT CASE
• Situation report
• Media
• Social Media
• other
PREVIOUS CASES
• Written evaluation reports
• Risk assessment reports
• Personal experience
• other
COMMON ISSUES
INVENTORY
THE INCIDENT
LOSS OF CONTROL
RESOURCE GAPS
SPREADING
DRIVERS
STRENGTH
MOMENTUM
INDICATORS
PHASE I
Sense-making
PHASE II
Calibration
TIME HORIZON
ORGANISATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
PHASE III
Sense-breaking
OUTPUT
Recommendations
for the crisis staff
PHASE IV
Selection
Methodology

9. The incident
 Increased intensity
 Prolonged duration
 Increased mortality
 Different from what was initially assumed
 The projection or forecast is misleading
 […]
Loss of control
 Breakdown of physical barriers
 Breakdown of procedures
 Breakdown of communication systems
 Inefficient crisis management
 Insufficient overview
 Insufficient situational awareness
 Lack of attention to loss and needs of those affected
 Insufficient focus on recovery
 Loss of credibility or reputation
 Loss of political support (local/national/internat.)
 Rumours/misinformation
 Anxiety/unrest
 Undesirable behavioural changes
 Active resistance towards authorities
 Riots
 […]
Resource shortages
 Staff shortage
 Transport shortage
 Insufficient facilities, systems or equipment
 Insufficient time
 Exhaustion/fatigue
 Limited redundancy
 Fiscal limitations (short/long term)
 Insufficient leadership/prioritisation/delegation
 Insufficient rear area support
 Insufficient training/experience
 Insufficient technical capabilities
 Insufficient recovery capabilities
 […]
Spreading
 Breakdown/failure of critical functions
 Critical functions under pressure
 Knock-on effects btw. sectors
 Geographical (local/national/internat.)
 Socially
 Pollution/contamination
 […]
Common Issues Inventory

10. Exercise lead-out
• Collision btw. the Russian nuclear-
powered vessel ’Sevmorput’ and a
Danish bulk carrier
• Severe damage to and subsequent
grounding of ’Sevmorput’ 70 km
east of Aarhus
• Limited communication with
’Sevmorput’
• Strictly no access to ’Sevmorput’

11. CURRENT CASE
• Situation report
• Media
• Social Media
• Other
PREVIOUS CASES
• Written evaluation reports
• Risk assessment reports
• Personal experience
• Other
COMMON ISSUES
INVENTORY
THE INCIDENT
LOSS OF CONTROL
RESOURCE GAPS
SPREADING
DRIVERS
STRENGTH
MOMENTUM
INDICATORS
PHASE I
Sense-making
PHASE II
Calibration
TIME HORIZON
ORGANISATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
PHASE III
Sense-breaking
OUTPUT
Recommendations
for the crisis staff
PHASE IV
Selection
Chernobyl
Submarine incidents
Russia’s current stance on
national security issues
24 hours
DEMA
Example: CMX 2015
Wednesday , November 11th 2015

12. The incident
 Increased intensity
 Prolonged duration
 Increased mortality
 Different from what was initially assumed
 The projection or forecast is misleading
 […]
Loss of control
 Breakdown of physical barriers
 Breakdown of procedures
 Breakdown of communication systems
 Inefficient crisis management
 Insufficient overview
 Insufficient situational awareness
 Lack of attention to loss and needs of those affected
 Insufficient focus on recovery
 Loss of credibility or reputation
 Loss of political support (local/national/internat.)
 Rumours/misinformation
 Anxiety/unrest
 Undesirable behavioural changes
 Active resistance towards authorities
 Riots
 […]
Resource shortages
 Staff shortage
 Transport shortage
 Insufficient facilities, systems or equipment
 Insufficient time
 Exhaustion/fatigue
 Limited redundancy
 Fiscal limitations (short/long term)
 Insufficient leadership/prioritisation/delegation
 Insufficient rear area support
 Insufficient training/experience
 Insufficient technical capabilities
 Insufficient recovery capabilities
 […]
Spreading
 Breakdown/failure of critical functions
 Critical functions under pressure
 Knock-on effects btw. sectors
 Geographical (local/national/internat.)
 Socially
 Pollution/contamination
 […]
Common Issues Inventory

13. Issues to take into account
Specific issues Indicators
Not just a nuclear incident
It may also be a matter of national security for
Russia
• Continued withholding of information
• Russian threats of intervention by force
• Noncompliance with international law
No experience with nuclear incidents on
Danish territory
Planning focused on incidents in other
European countries
• Exhaustion of experts and DEMA personnel
• Confusion regarding procedures for Host
Nation Support
• Loud concerns regaring health issues and
protective gear
Unknown hazards related to lost
containers
No information on number, content and
position of lost containers
• Matitime accidents caused by malfloating
containers
• Accidents caused by contact with unknown
container content

14. 10 NM
20 NM
Russian frigat
Sea Guardian
Sevmorput
Royal Danish Navy

15. Read all about it
• https://www.oecd.org/governance/toolkit-on-risk-governance/home/
• Contacts at DEMA
– Head of Division Mads Ecklon, me@brs.dk
– Head of Section Morten Thoft Korslund, mtko@brs.dk