Presentation by Mr Cees Fossen, Customs Administration of the Netherlands, at the WCO and OECD Regional Policy Dialogue, 7-8 November 2016, Brussels. For more information see ww.oecd.org/gov/risk/oecdtaskforceoncounteringillicittrade.htm

1. Customs
Administration of
the Netherlands

2. 5 december 2016
Dutch customs
and Free Trade
Zones
Mr Cees Fossen
Dutch customs

3. 5 december 2016
Content
1. Dutch customs and
volumes
2. FTZ approach
3. Case Peru (Colon)
4. Case Turkye (Mersin)
5. Problem or challenge

4. Sea port of
Rotterdam
Customs Administration of the Netherlands: Pushing boundaries
4

5. Containers (x 1.000)
Customs Administration of the Netherlands: Pushing boundaries
5

6. Declarations
6
Customs Administration of the Netherlands: Pushing boundaries
Declaration 2015
Import 129,626,022
Export 10,094,779
Entry ICS sea 4,823,821
Exit ICS sea
8,918,326

7. Our Enforcement is a mix of
knowledge/intelligence/technology/cooperation :
•Risk assessed approach
•Services and communication
•Fysical and administrative inspections
Strategic goal is: 100% supervision,
the flow of goods is monitored
7

8. Our (maritime) perspective
In total over 1800 profiles in our entry system,
incl ad-random, CRC EU, other authorities
and
In total 1030 profiles in importing system:
Incl. ad-random, on request other authorities
and national law (e.g. excise)
But: based on the declaration and/or
manifest

9. 9
Bascap study in 2013: Controlling the zone
The study of Bascap focussed on IPR and mentioned also the FTZ:
balancing facilitation vs control to combat illicit trade.
Identified the worldwide lack of controls concerning IPR in the FTZ’s.
A lot of case studies concerning the control on IPR, transhipment and
production.
Production of IPR is also determined inside the FTZ’s, assembling of
legitimate goods with brandlabels turning those goods into illegal
trade.

10. The paradox of free trade zones
study of Florida International University 2014
10
Economy vs transnational crime (IPR, Narcotics, Arms etc)
ftz volume regulations Ipr routes
nearby
Drug routes
nearby
Arms routes
nearby
Colon 4 mln teu Security
Camera’s
Yes Yes Yes
Jebel Ali 14/15 mln
teu
Goods
regulated
and
documents
Yes Yes No
Shanghai 29 mln teu Public sec
Vehicle
inspection
Yes Yes

11. 11
Situation in Mersin (2014)
Custom officers control at the gate not the
incoming goods from sea.
Thousands of workers in all kind of factories
in FTZ but mostly clothing.
No control in the FTZ unless investigation or
specific information.
No “export”control by transport to other
countries.
What happens inside the FTZ, stays in the FTZ???

12. Example Panama
12
Containers from USA (eg San Francisco) with generators in FTZ Colon
in a warehouse.
Containers from Peru/Panama with bananas in FTZ Colon in a
coldstore with cocaine.
Cocaine is replaced, within a few days inside the generators, no
officials are controlling in the warehouses.
Containers with generators are transported to Rotterdam.
(Pre) Arrival in Rotterdam: any control on narcotics?

13. Rotterdam
Pre-arrival selection: based on the
manifest/declaration and the FTZ is not
in the manifest mentioned.
Containers with generators from USA:
Low risk
13
Containers are loaded in Colon:
• Profile on rip-on/ rip off, possibility for a control:
• Control rip-off load by physical check or scan (backscatter)
• Control by opening container and look for bags/boxes etc
• Control in generators: only by ad-random or
investigation/information

14. Recommendations of the Florida University
-cooperation with neighboring countries (influence organised crime is
mostly regional)
-sharing intelligence on ongoing investigations (regional)
-transparency with the FTZ policy
-transparency with documentation
-training and education of the harbour workers/employees
-tackle networks
-One big remark: the university underlined the effect of corruption in
many FTZ’s
14

15. 15
Bascap study in 2013: Recommendations
The study of Bascap focussed on IPR.
Recommendations to:
•WCO
•WTO
Specific recommendations
•National governments (role customs)
•FTZ operators (responsibility and information sharing)

16. Recent article: The economist/intelligence unit
The illicit trade environment index, (limited 2016) :
Conclusion and a Quote pag 12:
“Shipments that enter FTZs are stored in a warehouse, where they
can be re-packaged, re-labelled, processed, or assembled before being
imported into the national territory, re-exported to the country of
destination, or re-exported to another FTZ.
In FTZs that are not monitored by customs or law enforcement,
smugglers are free take a variety of actions to hide or disguise illicit
shipments, including mislabelling the country of origin and
the packages themselves, as well as consolidating and mixing
cargoes.”
5 december 201616

17. Conclusions
17
1. FTZ’s are important for the economy but the paradox
remains.
2. Control of and in the FTZ’s is necessary but, in general, still
very limited
3. The chances for the OCG’s are still huge and wellknown
4. There is no enough knowledge/awareness in the harbour
of destination that the goods have been in a FTZ’s
5. The risks are still unknown or still underestimated.

18. specific policies to remedy the situation ??
5 december 201618
In the FTZ’s:
-Implementation of recommandations of Bascap and studies
Achievable in Europe:
-Awareness of the FTZ’s situation in Europe
- Specific EU actions to underline the risks

19. We can catch the sharks if …..we want
19
Thank you!!!