1. Canada, and the US Ballistic Missile Defence Program
By Oleg Nekrassovski
The two key factors that drive Canadian decision making on Canada-US defence-related
issues, are Canadian desire to take part in US-led continental defence programs, on the one
hand, and a desire to preserve the military stability of the world and prevent arms races, on the
other (Lagassé, 2008). Since both of these policy objectives are clearly contradictory, recent
Canadian decision not to participate in the US ballistic missile defence plan, while
simultaneously renewing NORAD, was a politically smart, well executed decision, which, given
the circumstances, served the Canadian national interest better than any other possible
decision (Lagassé, 2008). However, “NORAD, which was once Canada’s window into the global,
strategic world and American thinking and planning, will probably become a marginal, ‘North
American only’ institution, substantively only dealing with the air environment,
notwithstanding expansion elsewhere” (Fergusson, 2005). Thus, if Canada is to retain the
benefits accruing to a participant of US-led continental defence programs, it must actively seek
to participate in such programs as much as possible.
According to the
Former Canadian diplomat John Noble … Close collaboration on continental defence
was essential for Canada … so leaders had a responsibility to try to push it through, even
in the face of substantial public opposition. Even Pierre Trudeau, not known for backing
down from confrontation with the United States, apparently understood this, as seen in
his 1983 decision to authorize the testing of US cruise missiles over northern Alberta.
(Bow, 2009)
Hence, Canada should seek to participate in the current ballistic missile defense (BMD)
program of the United States. This would give Canada “a window on global developments and a
‘seat at the table’ of this vitally important US initiative.” This would also guarantee for Canada a
“continued access to American space assets and an even further strengthened NORAD
arrangement.” Moreover, Canadian companies could potentially receive industrial benefits
from BMD contracts (McDonough, 2006/07).
According to Crosby (2010), USA’s current BMD program is actually three integrated
programs of a global scale.
The Global Warning Program consists of a layering of land, sea, air, and space-based
radars, sensors, and communication technologies designed to provide the US military
with global surveillance, warning, communication, and battle management tools. These
technologies support the work of the second program, Theatre Missile Defense, which
allows the US military to address the use of short- and medium-range missiles in regional
conflicts. ... [And lastly] the National Missile Defense program [is] designed ... to address
an accidental, or hostile launch of a limited number of long-range missiles aimed at the
US by intercepting and destroying the missiles in mid-course either in space or at high
altitudes. (Crosby, 2010)

2. Hence, “It is not possible to separate continental defence from the larger global defence
system in which it is embedded” (Crosby, 2010); which is, in many ways, a desirable thing for
Canada, because “Promoting the twin forces of neo-liberal politics and capitalist markets on a
global basis is a primary goal of both Canadian and US national security documents, and
underwriting the promotion of both with the exercise of military power is one of the
foundational assumptions of the Bi-National Report” (Crosby, 2010). Thus, the global exercise of
military power is aimed “to ‘stabilize’ recalcitrant regions of the world so that Western
economic and political forces can bring all peoples, as expressed in Canada’s penultimate
foreign policy statement, into ‘the virtuous circle of rising prosperity’” (Crosby, 2010).
Canada, however, is already at risk of losing the above mentioned benefits of
participation in USA’s BMD program, which can only be acquired by a close US ally; in part
because of its own periodic failures to take part in US defense programs, and in part because of
USA’s increasing post 9/11 tendency to act alone.
Crosby (2010) describes a curious series of events in 2005-2006, where almost all House
of Commons MPs were against Canadian participation in the US National Missile Defense
(NMD) program, but voted in favour of renewing the NORAD agreement. This “gave the
appearance that NORAD activities and missile defence are two separate issues. The US global
missile defence system, however, depends significantly on NORAD technologies and functions,
and the NORAD agreement was rewritten in 1996 to allow for Canada’s formal participation in
missile defence in the future” (Crosby, 2010).
In the wake of 9/11 attacks, the US created its own continental air defence force, the
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), which is tasked specifically with the air defence of
continental United States. While not independent from NORAD, already “USNORTHCOM is
unhappy with the division of responsibilities between it and NORAD;” in no small part because
“North American air defence still falls operationally to NORAD” (Jockel & Sokolsky, 2006).
At the same time, NORAD’s position … is weakening as the value of the command’s
longstanding core function, warning of and assessing a ballistic missile attack on North
America, or in NORAD parlance, “ITW/AA” (integrated tactical warning and attack
assessment), diminishes. … [This is because] as part of its BMD system, the United
States is developing ballistic missile warning and assessment capabilities that may
surpass and are separate from those providing NORAD ITW/AA. … [Meanwhile] the
Martin government’s 2005 decision not to participate directly in North American missile
defence threatens ITW/AA, and with it, NORAD. (Jockel & Sokolsky, 2006)
Hence, if Canada is to retain a privileged position in USA’s military and political power
structure (with all of its attendant benefits), from the continental to the global level, it must
take an active part in the current US BMD program.
The political tensions within Canada, however, always made it difficult for the
government to fully engage with USA’s continental defence programs. The problem was that

3. “As part of its contribution to the strategic defence of the continent, Canada has tacitly
endorsed and facilitated the United States' offensively oriented nuclear strategies. Canada's
support of strategic stability, however, has aimed to discourage offensive nuclear doctrines and
the arms races they have tended to fuel” (Lagassé, 2008). Despite their obvious contradiction,
both policies were (and still are) seen as being valuable to Canada, and both had (and still have)
large groups of supporters. Consequently, government after government never tried to
eliminate this contradiction, and instead always tried to pursue both policies at once (Lagassé,
2008). Thus, if a party in power is to maintain support within the House and from the general
public, and to continue bringing Canada the benefits of participation in USA’s continental
defence programs, while simultaneously contributing to global military stability; it must put
maximum effort into accommodating both policies.
Thus, Canada should seek to participate in the US National Missile Defense program.
This will give Canada a variety of strategic and technological advantages, as well as help to
promote its national interests around the world. This is especially important in the coming
years, because the United States is increasingly developing independent continental defence
systems while the position of NORAD is weakening. However, Canadian participation in USA’s
continental defence programs should never lose sight of Canadian desire to maintain global
strategic stability and prevent arms races.

4. References
Brian Bow, “Defence Dilemmas: Continental Defence Cooperation, From Bomarc to BMD,”
Canadian Foreign Policy 15,1 (Spring 2009): 40-62.
Ann Denholm Crosby, “Canada-US Defence Relations: Weapons of Mass Control and a Praxis of
Mass Resistance,” in J. Marshall Beier and Lana Wylie, eds., Canada Foreign Policy in
Critical Perspective (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2010), 29-43.
James Fergusson, “Shall we Dance? The Missile Defence Decision, NORAD Renewal, and the
Future of Canada-US Relations,” Canadian Military Journal 6,2 (Summer 2005): 13-22.
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no2/inter-01-eng.asp
Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, “Renewing NORAD – Now if not forever,” Policy Options (July-
August 2006): 53-58. Retrieved 23 July 2010 from
http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/jul06/jockel.pdf
Philippe Lagassé, “Canada, Strategic Defence, and Strategic Stability: A Retrospective and Look
Ahead,” International Journal 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 917-937.
David McDonough, “BMD and US Strategic Doctrine: Canadian Strategic Interests in the Debate
on Missile Defence,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 9, 3 (Spring 2006-2007): 1-
41.