Military Robots and Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy

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Military Robots and Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy
By Oleg Nekrassovski
This paper is about the connection between military robotics and Canadian defence and foreign
policy. More specifically, it aims to answer the question of whether a greater employment of
battlefield robots by the CF, in place or in addition to human combatants, can have any
significant effect on Canadian defence and foreign policy.
More than just conventional wisdom, it has become almost a cliché to say that the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq have proved “how technology doesn’t have a big place in any doctrine of future war,” ... The
American military efforts in those countries (or so the thinking goes) have dispelled the understanding of
technology dominated warfare that was prevalent just a few years ago... Insurgents armed with crude
conventional weapons have proven frequently able to flummox their well-equipped American foes. Many
observers increasingly seem to believe that if irregular warfare is likely to be the future of armed conflict,
advanced technologies have no great role. These “all or nothing” attitudes are each incorrect. High
technology is not a silver bullet solution to insurgencies, but that doesn’t mean that technology doesn’t
matter in these fights. In fact, far from proving the uselessness of advanced technology in modern warfare,
Afghanistan and Iraq have for the first time proved the value of a technology that will truly revolutionize
warfare—robotics. (Singer, 2009)
According to several authors, replacing human soldiers with battlefield robots can dramatically
reduce collateral damage, and by extension its negative political consequences. According to
Singer (2009) the usage of robots instead of human soldiers will lead to far more precise
attacks, unaffected by emotions, even if humans are in control of these robots. While according
to Guetlein (2005) robots can also reduce collateral damage by increasing accountability for
attacks, and by performing, in real time, hundreds of calculations regarding blast effects,
population densities, and the like, to reduce the number of unnecessary casualties. Finally,
according to Lin, Beckey, and Abney (2009), fully autonomous battlefield robots are far more
likely than humans to carry out warfare more ethically and effectively, while objectively
monitoring and reporting any unethical conduct of any remaining human combatants.
A similar view exists on the closely related issue of “just” or legal warfare. According to Guetlein
(2005), battlefield robots, if appropriately preprogrammed, will be able to comply with the Law
of Armed Conflict (LOAC), much better than humans. Moreover, even if not enabled to make
their own decisions to attack, military robots allow lawyers and other experts to get involved in
calling off illegal or controversial attacks (The Economist, 2012). In a similar manner, the
development of ‘smart’ artillery shells, allows humans to decide exactly where a particular
artillery shell will strike, and even to order the shell from striking anything after it has been
launched (The Economist, 2012).
A greater usage of battlefield robots can also reduce soldier casualties, as well as reducing the
problem of chronic understaffing and underfunding of the CF (Cowan, 2007). Moreover, a
robotic army will be far more efficient than a human army and will not require commanders
with any motivational skills (Cowan, 2007). On the other hand, the employment of robots
instead of human soldiers will make military conflicts cheaper, and hence may lead to more of

them taking place, by increasing the willingness of a country to go to war (Cowan, 2007).
Finally, a greater usage of battlefield robots can greatly increase CF’s success in peacekeeping,
peace enforcement, and military conflicts in failed and failing states (Guetlein, 2005); and will
lead to earlier changes in the roles occupied by humans in the CF (Adams, 2001).
Thus, a greater employment of battlefield robots by the CF, in place or in addition to human
combatants, can have many significant effects on Canadian defence and foreign policy.
This paper will first give a brief definition of military robots. This will be followed by a brief
overview of the current employment of robots by the CF. Next, a short overview of collateral
damage and how it relates to the CF’s operations, will be presented. This will be followed by a
detailed analysis of how replacing human soldiers with battlefield robots can reduce collateral
damage. After that, several arguments, regarding how the greater usage of robots on the
battlefield can lead to a more “just”, more legal, and more humane warfare, will be presented.
Next, it will be argued that a greater usage of battlefield robots can reduce soldier casualties; as
well as how it can reduce the problem of chronic understaffing and underfunding of the CF.
After that it will be shown that a robotic army should be far more efficient than a human army
and should not require commanders with any motivational skills; even though it may increase
our willingness to go to war. Next, an illustration of the various types of operations in failed and
failing states, that the CF often engage in, will be provided; which will be followed by a
demonstration of the difficulties and difference of such operations from conventional military
operations. This will be followed by a detailed illustration of the strategies and tactics employed
against the CF by its enemies in Afghanistan (a failed or failing state); and how various
battlefield robots that are already in existence can be used to counter such strategies and
tactics. The paper will conclude with a look at the likely future developments and future
consequences for the CF and Canadian defence and foreign policy; stemming from the
inevitable progress in military technology and a possible willingness on the part of the CF to
employ more and more military robots.
In the FY 2005 Joint Robotics Master Plan, DoD defines a robot as “a machine or device that works
automatically or operates by remote control.” There are fundamentally three modes of operating robotic
systems. They can be fully autonomous, which means they completely execute their mission without
human interface. They can be semi-autonomous or supervised autonomous, which means they need human
control during critical portions of the operation. Finally, they can be operated teleoptically or remotely
controlled by humans throughout the length of the mission. (Cowan, 2007)
Defence Research and Development Canada has been developing various military robots,
ranging from purely remote controlled to fully autonomous types, since the 1970s (Giesbrecht
et al, 2008); suggesting that DND started spending some of its funds on the development of
military robots while the Cold War was in full swing.
At present, the Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit of the CF is operating robotic vehicles
(created by Defence R & D Canada) designed to improve CF’s response to Chemical, Biological,

Radiological and Nuclear events. While Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan are using “Improved
Landmine Detection System, a newer version of the mine-detection robot the DRDC developed
in the mid-1990s”; as well as “unmanned air vehicles (UAV) for surveillance and
reconnaissance” (Military robots, 2007).
Publicized instances of collateral damage caused by CF members during combat, especially
where deliberate wrongdoing was involved, nearly always lead to outcries from the Canadian
public, damage to the morale of the CF, and undermine the international reputation of
Canadian soldiers. A good example, of such an instance and its consequences, is the Somalia
Affair.
On the evening of 16 March 1993, 16-year-old Shidane Arone was spotted sneaking into the Canadian
compound near Belet Huen in south-central Somalia. The Canadian force stationed there ... was organized
around the Canadian Airborne Regiment. It was in Belet Huen ... to keep the peace in Somalia in order to
allow food and other relief to be distributed. Shidane Arone’s apparent purpose in sneaking into the
compound was to steal something ... He was caught and incarcerated. By the next morning, he was dead –
slowly and methodically beaten to death by two paratroopers. During the course of the night, about a dozen
other paratroopers became aware of the beating, but no one intervened. ... Shocking evidence was also
uncovered of brutality toward Somali civilians by members of the Regiment at Belet Huen prior to Arone’s
death. The most egregious episode involved an apparent execution-style killing of a civilian during a night
patrol that was little more than a hunting expedition. The Canadian public was shocked by the “Somalia
Affair”; and the Canadian Forces was traumatized. (Bercuson, 2009)
According to several authors the usage of battlefield robots in place of human soldiers can go a
long way in reducing instances of collateral damage. In fact, unmanned systems are capable of
far greater precision than unaided humans. Remote controlled or semi-autonomous robots
remove the operator from the risks of fighting, allowing him/her to approach the target much
closer than a human fighter would be allowed, or even let the enemy reveal himself by
attacking first (Singer, 2009). Also, the operator of a remote controlled or a semi-autonomous
battlefield robot is unlikely to attack recklessly out of fear or anger (Singer, 2009).
Battlefield robots can also reduce collateral damage by increasing accountability. In fact,
battlefield robots “offer the capability for post mortem analysis by keeping a detailed record of
the decision logic that led to an engagement, a detailed transcript of the engagement, and a
detailed battle damage assessment after the engagement. A major tenet of warfare is
accountability. AW [robots] offer a clear record of accountability” (Guetlein, 2005).
In addition, target planners spend countless hours performing “elaborate evaluations of the blast effects on
the kind of buildings found near the weapon’s estimated impact point. The results are interpolated with
known population distributions to make casualty projections.” These calculations are far too complex for
the warfighter to make in real time. AW [robots] could perform hundreds of these same calculations in real
time, increasing the lethality of the engagement while simultaneously reducing the probability of collateral
damage. (Guetlein, 2005)
When it comes to fully autonomous battlefield robots, “Without emotions and other liabilities
on the battlefield, they could conduct warfare more ethically and effectively than human

soldiers who are susceptible to overreactions, anger, vengeance, fatigue, low morale, and so
on” (Lin, Beckey, and Abney, 2009). “Robots may act as objective, unblinking observers on the
battlefield, reporting any unethical behavior back to command; their mere presence as such
would discourage all-too-human atrocities in the first place” (Lin, Beckey, and Abney, 2009).
Thus, if the above authors are correct, the usage of robots on the battlefield, in place of human
combatants, will go a long way in reducing collateral damage, and the resultant Canadian public
outcries, international condemnation of CF’s conduct on the battlefield, and a weakening of
CF’s morale.
A closely related issue is the ability of the armed forces to conduct the war “justly” or
humanely. “The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is that subset of international law addressing
generally accepted practices for waging a “Just” or humane war. The foundation of LOAC is a
set of moral standards generally accepted by the international community” (Guetlein, 2005).
There are
... three main principles of LOAC: military necessity, proportionality, and discrimination. ... Military
necessity prevents the use of weapons which cause excessive damage or suffering in excess of the benefits
being gained. ... The law of proportionality requires the military advantage be weighed against the potential
for collateral damage. The military benefits gained must exceed the probability of collateral damage. ... The
principle of discrimination or distinction requires the attack to be focused on the military objective and
prohibits indiscriminate attacks against non-military objectives. ... [Battlefield robots] can preserve the
legitimacy of the cause because the use of force is constrained by a rigid set of heuristics preprogrammed to
comply with ... the LOAC. ... [Battlefield robots] can better discriminate targets and calculate the impacts
of an engagement in real time to insure the impact is proportional to the military advantage gained. ... If the
probability of success is low, or the probability of excessive collateral damage is high, then the weapon
system will not engage. Instead, the system can be preprogrammed to ask “mother-may-I” prior to
engaging the objective. The thresholds for these probabilities will be predetermined by the operational
commander based on the operating environment. (Guetlein, 2005)
Battlefield robots, however, can make the war more “just” and legal even before reaching this
level of sophistication. As recently as 1997, some of the most advanced jet fighters in usage had
... no video links between cockpits and command centres, and even radio contact was patchy at times. As a
result, pilots often made their own calls on whether or not to strike. Today's drones, blimps, unmanned
boats and reconnaissance robots collect and transmit so much data ... that Western countries now practise
“warfare by committee”. Government lawyers and others in operation rooms monitor video feeds from
robots to call off strikes that are illegal or would “look bad on CNN,” (The Economist, 2012)
Along the same lines, is the development of robotic artillery shells, which do not follow a fixed
trajectory before hitting some object on the ground and exploding. Instead, “The Fire Shadow is
a “loitering munition” capable of travelling 100km, more than twice the maximum range of a
traditional artillery shell. It can circle in the sky for hours, using sensors to track even a moving
target. A human operator, viewing a video feed, then issues an instruction to attack, fly
elsewhere to find a better target, or abort the mission by destroying itself” (The Economist,
2012). Needless to say, when it comes to reducing “unjust” and illegal strikes stemming from
our inability to predict the exact landing site of a launched artillery shell, these new robotic
shells provide a superior advantage.

The usage of robots on the battlefield “removes the human operator from the conflict, thereby
lowering the possibility of injury, death or capture” (Cowan, 2007). This is also very important
as the Canadian public has low tolerance for battlefield casualties among Canadian soldiers. In
fact,
When Hillier [Canada’s chief of defence staff] urged and convinced the Martin government to take on the
provincial reconstruction team in Kandahar, he emphasized … that the team needed to be reinforced by a
strong combat deployment. But he did not foresee that the conventional force component would demand so
many resources and cost so many lives. … Most troubling for the population of Canada, which had not
seen its soldiers in such combat since the Korean War, was the high rate of fatality in this "reconstruction"
mission. In 2006 and 2007, the annual Canadian fatality rate was 1.5 percent of troops deployed, more than
double the rate of US and UK forces in Afghanistan. (Dorn & Varey, 2008)
According to Cowan (2007), the utilization of battlefield robots can solve the problem of
“shrinking populations of military aged men.” While “for robots which must be teleoptically
controlled, it does not take an operator of soldier capability. Any one who can work the
controls can operate the robot … making the pool of people able to conduct warfare far larger.”
Such advantages of battlefield robots will clearly be of great value to the CF. After all, in its
strategic self-assessment for 2008, “the Canadian army noted that in spite of the military’s
vigorous three-year recruitment campaign, the CF’s land force is short 250 officers and 1000
non-commissioned members. “The Army,” the assessment continued, “is now stretched almost
to the breaking point”” (Lagasse and Robinson, 2008). Around the same time, and in large
measure due to Canadian military operations in Kandahar, the CF were experiencing an
administrative and operational overstretch which was “slowing the training of new recruits and
hurting the CF’s ability to retain experienced personnel” (Lagasse and Robinson, 2008).
Robots require no training; while the operators of remotely controlled and semi-autonomous
robots that are already in service with the US military require minimal training compared to
“live” human warriors. This is suggested by the last quote from Cowan (2007), above; as well as
by the following quote from Singer (2009), regarding an unmanned aerial vehicle called Global
Hawk: “Using a computer mouse, the operator just clicks to tell it to taxi and take off, and the
drone flies off on its own. The plane then carries out its mission, getting directions on where to
fly from GPS coordinates downloaded off a satellite. Upon its return, “you basically hit the land
button,” describes one retired Air Force officer.” Also, just like human soldiers, modern robots
can also acquire experience (learn) from each mission (e.g. Atkeson et al., 2000), but unlike
human soldiers, they have a 0% attrition rate. Thus, the replacement of human combatants
with robots can allow the CF to engage in real military conflicts with fewer personnel problems.
This is in line with the fact that the utilization of battlefield robots can also solve the problem of
“increasing personnel costs.” Moreover, unlike various common military vehicles “robotic
devices are smaller, lighter and less expensive because they do not carry or protect human
occupants” (Cowan, 2007). More specifically, “Depending on the level of artificial intelligence,
unmanned systems are one-third the cost of manned platforms and cost two-thirds as much to

operate. Designs are not constrained by the incorporation of life support systems, which frees
up critical space and weight allowing for smaller and stealthier systems” (Guetlein, 2005).
These advantages of battlefield robots will also clearly be of great value to the CF. Since, as
recently as 2008, all three divisions of the CF suffered from considerable underfunding (Lagasse
and Robinson, 2008). And according to Bland (2000), in Canada, defence funding is always
limited, because for various geopolitical reasons there is a tendency to minimize it as far as
possible.
The usage of
... robots ... removes many of the human frailties which cause “friction” within the military. As Gordon
Johnson from the Joint Forces Command said, "They don't get hungry. They're not afraid. They don't forget
their orders. They don't care if the guy next to them has just been shot. Will they do a better job than
humans? Yes." Clausewitz points out that it is “friction” which makes war difficult. “Countless minor
incidents - the kind you can never really foresee - combine to lower the general level of performance.” This
friction is caused by all of the individuals involved in the action. The combined effect of all individual
shortcomings creates a “tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points…”
Using robots can substantially reduce friction. One example is that robots don’t miss when shooting. ...
Clausewitz states that a good general is necessary to overcome friction. The need to motivate soldiers to
overcome adversity and pay attention to detail will be gone. The need to ensure that the robots do as they
are told will be gone. Therefore, the introduction of robots ... will have a significant impact on ... the
commanders [who] will not have to be as good at motivating their soldiers. They will only have to focus on
operations, not on the human element of conflict. (Cowan, 2007)
On a less brighter side,
... the use of robots will have a significant impact on whether a nation determines to go to war. ... the
reduction of casualties makes warfare ‘cheaper’. The political motive for going to war determines “both the
political objective and amount of effort it requires.” If the government does not see a huge amount of cost
in human lives to secure a political objective, then war becomes ‘cheap’. Clausewitz goes on to say that
“the value …must determine the sacrifices to be made for it, in magnitude and also in duration.” The less a
political objective is believed to cost, the more likely a government will be willing to risk going to war.
This will lead to more conflicts as governments will be able to use their ‘cheap’ army to get more involved
in other pursuits. (Cowan, 2007)
“In addition, we may lose our ability to influence other nations if they perceive” that our
country “is unwilling to commit human lives and intends to fight ... battles with technology
alone” (Guetlein, 2005).
Semi-autonomous and fully autonomous battlefield robots “can be deployed in support of
regional conflicts, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or other military-operations-other-than-
war (MOOTW)” (Guetlein, 2005). Hence, additional battlefield robots will be of great value to
the Canadian Forces who have a long history of engaging in MOOTW. In fact, in recent times
the concept of the “three-block war” enjoyed temporary popularity in the Canadian Forces.
“The core idea is that military forces would conduct humanitarian, peacekeeping/stabilization,
and combat operations simultaneously on three separate city blocks or more widely” (Dorn &
Varey, 2008). The “three-block war” concept was actively promoted by Canada’s then chief of
defence staff, General Rick Hillier. Hillier was not completely satisfied with the nature and
division of activities outlined in the “three-block war” concept, however. Consequently, “In

2005, Hillier modified the activities: he put "fighting" in block one, "helping secure, stabilize and
nation build" in block two and, most ambitiously, "helping people through disaster relief,
humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping" in block three” (Dorn & Varey, 2008). This clearly
illustrates the myriad MOOTW activities the CF tend to engage in.
Thus, the Canadian Forces frequently engage in military conflicts and related operations in
failed and failing states. Such conflicts are radically different from ““state–on–state” conflicts
characterized by clashes between similarly organized military forces” (Capstick, 2007). In fact,
modern armies that enter hostilities in failed and failing states, face “weaker adversaries
(usually, but not always, non-state actors) … [who] use tactics and weapons intended to
minimize the advantages that a high-tech industrial age army brings to the battle. These
adversaries avoid confrontations that could result in a decisive defeat, they adopt guerilla and
terror tactics and achieve their force protection by blending into the population. In short, they
fight “among the people”” (Capstick, 2007). However, unlike most of the “structures, munitions
and equipment optimized for a clash of armies,” which are traditionally employed by modern,
industrial-age military forces (Capstick, 2007), a number of battlefield robots are particularly
well suited for such unconventional conflicts in failed and failing states.
A good example of adversaries, in a failed state, that use such strategy and tactics and were
recently heavily fought by the Canadian Forces, are the Taliban. After the attack by the NATO
coalition, the Taliban lost their power over Afghanistan, and fled into Pakistan, where they
regrouped to plan an insurgency in Afghanistan.
Due to the Neo-Taliban’s initial poor organizational state, in 2002 their military activities were limited to
cross-border raids and the harassment of US garrisons, mainly through launching long-distance rockets.
However, small teams of ten to twenty insurgents were already infiltrating the Afghan countryside with the
purpose of identifying villages that could provide hospitality and support. ... These groups were able to
cross the Pakistani border undetected throughout 2002-6 ... The strategic task of these ‘vanguard’ teams
was to prepare the ground for a later escalation of the insurgency. ... Suitable locations for ammunition and
weaponry stockpiles would also be identified, so as to allow the insurgents to infiltrate the region later
without carrying weapons and using the main roads. (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 99-101)
Insurgents that are crossing the border, attempting to find supporters in local villages, or
looking for good locations for stockpiling ammunition and weapons, can be spotted with
inconspicuous surveillance robots. And a plenty of such things are already in existence.
DelFly, a dragonfly-shaped surveillance drone built at the Delft University of Technology in the
Netherlands, weighs less than a gold wedding ring, camera included. ... On the ground, robots range from
truck-sized to tiny. ... And smaller robotic beasties are hopping, crawling and running into action, as three
models built by Boston Dynamics ... illustrate. By jabbing the ground with a gas-powered piston, the Sand
Flea can leap through a window, or onto a roof nine metres up. Gyro-stabilisers provide smooth in-air
filming and landings. The 5kg robot then rolls along on wheels until another hop is needed—to jump up
some stairs, perhaps, or to a rooftop across the street. Another robot, RiSE, resembles a giant cockroach
and uses six legs, tipped with short, Velcro-like spikes, to climb coarse walls. ... Researchers at Italy's
Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, in Pisa, have designed a snakelike aquatic robot. And a small
helicopter drone called the Pelican, designed by German and American companies, could remain aloft for
weeks, powered by energy from a ground-based laser. (The Economist, 2012)

Such robots can also be used to spot “motorcycle-mounted reconnaissance units”; such as
those that were created by the Taliban and “tasked with following NATO/US patrols and other
potential targets, as well as with field reconnaissance” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 153).
Be as it may, if the attempt to stop the infiltration of the occupied areas by the insurgents, was
unsuccessful so that “a support structure has been put in place by the ‘vanguard’ teams, the
Taliban would be ready to move in greater numbers and upgrade the level of their military
activities ... to full-fledged ambushes and attacks on government roadblocks and posts”
(Giustozzi, 2008, p. 110). A good example of such ‘upgraded’ activities of the Taliban took place
IN THE early afternoon of August 18th 2008, [when] a reconnaissance unit of about 100 French
paratroopers, accompanied by a small number of Afghan and American soldiers, was ambushed by a
similarly sized Taliban force in the Uzbin Valley, not far from Kabul. Ten French soldiers were killed in
fighting that continued into the night—France's biggest loss since it sent soldiers to Afghanistan in 2002.
But it might have been avoided had the unit had a single aerial-robot scout, says Gérard de Boisboissel, a
specialist on military robots at the French army's Saint-Cyr military academy. That assessment, shared by
many, led to a retooling of France's armed forces. Today drones, also called unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), routinely accompany even small French units. (The Economist, 2012)
“Although the Taliban always lagged behind the sophistication of their Iraqi colleagues in the
manufacturing of IEDs ... In the spring of 2006, the Taliban were already making experiments in
stacking anti-tank mines together, while during 2006 linking together IEDs to improve the
targeting of moving vehicles was also becoming common” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 148). However,
“Remote-controlled ground robots ... proved enormously helpful in the discovery and removal
of makeshift roadside bombs in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere” (The Economist, 2012).
“The biggest tactical problem for the Taliban was how to avoid air strikes.” One of the options
for doing this
... was to seek cover whenever it was available once airpower intervened on their enemy’s side.
Engagements were often refused when aircraft was present on the scene. ... The Taliban developed the
ability to calculate the exact flight time of helicopters from their bases to the target area, preparing
themselves to go into hiding with the arrival of the helicopter. However, the use of UAVs meant that US
forces could survey an area of suspected Taliban concentration virtually indefinitely, often without the
insurgents even realising it. (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 155)
Another method that the Taliban used to avoid air strikes, “adopted when it was deemed
necessary to confront the adversary on the open ground or to attack its bases, was to carry out
human wave attacks in order to close in as rapidly as possible. The tactic was first used as early
as 2005 in the south-east, where the level of training and the skill of Taliban cadres were
higher” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 155-156).
Also, “the Taliban deliberately tried to demoralize their enemies through relentless attacks,
often against the same targets, and regardless of their own casualties. ... Another aspect of the
strategy of demoralization, suicide attacks, was adopted relatively early, apparently in May
2003, but its effective implementation was slowed by the difficulty of finding sufficient recruits”
(Giustozzi, 2008, p. 107-108). Moreover, “In 2004 suicide attacks were still estimated to have a

failure rate of around 60-70 per cent. [However] In 2005 the failure rate was down to 10-15 per
cent, showing a dramatic improvement in the skills of the Taliban’s ‘bomb craftsmen’ and of the
suicide volunteers” (Giustozzi, 2008, p. 149).
Human wave attacks, relentless attacks against the same targets, and suicide attacks can be
effectively tackled by robot sentries, if only because this will save the lives of human soldiers
that they will replace, and because military robots are more resistant to gunfire and explosions.
A good example of this practice is as follows. “The Israel Defence Forces have installed “combat
proven” robot machineguns along the country's borders. When sensors detect an intruder, the
barrel pivots to follow him. A human soldier, watching the scene remotely via a fibre-optic link,
decides whether or not to issue a warning (through a loudspeaker) or press the fire button”
(The Economist, 2012).
“From the late 2006 the Taliban began paying much greater attention to fighting off the
infiltration attempts of the intelligence agencies of the government and of its external allies. As
the insurgents moved closer to the cities and increased recruitment inside Afghanistan, they
became increasingly vulnerable to the information gathering of their enemies” (Giustozzi, 2008,
p. 156-157).
A few robots that can be used to exploit this vulnerability, and help with gathering information
about insurgents in densely populated areas, are also on the market. “Upload a mugshot into
an SUGV, a briefcase-sized robot than runs on caterpillar tracks, and it can identify a man
walking in a crowd and follow him. ... FirstLook, is a smaller device that also runs on tracks.
Equipped with four cameras, it is designed to be thrown through windows or over walls” (The
Economist, 2012).
According to Adams (2001), the development and employment of battlefield robots is part of a
larger trend in the development of modern warfare where warfare moves further and further
away from the realm of human senses and reaction times. This will first make it pointless, and
later, counterproductive and inefficient for humans to direct, at least the details of, military
campaigns.
Once this progression of ever more capable machines began, the US armed forces, and those of other
advanced countries, started down a road that will probably remove warfare almost entirely from human
hands. Several trends are contributing to this unsettling development, but the most important one is the rise
of computer-driven information systems coupled with the proliferation of mobile autonomous and semi-
autonomous systems (i.e. "robots"). ... In short, the military systems (including weapons) now on the
horizon will be too fast, too small, too numerous, and will create an environment too complex for humans
to direct. Furthermore, the proliferation of information-based systems will produce a data overload that will
make it difficult or impossible for humans to directly intervene in decision making. (Adams, 2001)
Though these predictions may have seemed too farfetched and scary at the time they were
published, they no longer are.
Handing battlefield decisions to the collective intelligence of robot soldiers sounds risky, but it is the
essence of a research project called ALADDIN. ... In it, the grunts act as agents, collecting and exchanging
information. They then bargain with each other over the best course of action, make a decision and carry it

out. ... [For now] The real prize, though, is processing battlefield information. ... ALADDIN, and systems
like it, should help [with this task] ... by automating some of the data analysis and the management of
robots. Among BAE Systems' plans, for example, is the co-operative control of drones, which would allow
a pilot in a jet to fly with a squadron of the robot aircraft on surveillance or combat missions. … And for
those worried about machines taking over, more research will be carried out into what Dr Jennings calls
flexible autonomy. This involves limiting the agents' new-found freedom by handing some decisions back
to people. In a military setting this could mean passing pictures recognised as a convoy of moving vehicles
to a person for confirmation before, say, calling down an airstrike. Whether that is a good idea is at least
open to question. Given the propensity for human error in such circumstances, mechanised grunts might
make such calls better than flesh-and-blood officers. The day of the people's—or, rather, the robots'—army,
then, may soon be at hand. (The Economist, 2010)
Thus, the more the CF start to employ battlefield robots, instead or in addition to human
combatants, the sooner there will be a shift in the roles occupied by the (shrinking) human
personnel of the CF, from those of ‘live’ battlefield combatants to those of remote battlefield
commanders.
Humans may retain control at the highest levels, making strategic decisions about where and when to strike
and, most important, the overall objectives of a conflict. But even these will increasingly be informed by
automated information systems. Direct human participation in warfare is likely to be rare. Instead, the
human role will take other forms--strategic direction perhaps, or at the very extreme, perhaps no more than
the policy decision whether to enter hostilities or not. (Adams, 2001)
The potential advantages of AW [autonomous weapons, i.e. battlefield robots] are numerous. They will be
“faster, better, and cheaper” than manned systems. They offer increased range, endurance, and persistence
while keeping the warfighter out of harm’s way. They reduce the military’s operational tempo because
fewer troops are required to deploy to the theater of operations. They are versatile and can be adapted to fit
a wide array of missions. (Guetlein, 2005)
Early in the 21st Century, advances in robotics are helping move human participants further and further
away from the conflict. The large scale introduction of robots on the battlefield will change the nature of
combat more than any other technological innovation to date because it will ultimately remove man from
the battlefield. The pursuit of robotics for the battlefield is moving at breakneck speed. (Cowan, 2007)
Imagine the face of warfare with advanced robotics: Instead of our soldiers returning home in flag-draped
caskets to heartbroken parents, autonomous robots - mobile machines that can make decisions, such as to
fire upon a target without human intervention – can replace the human soldier in an increasing range of
dangerous missions: from tunneling through dark caves in search of terrorists, to securing urban streets rife
with sniper fire, to patrolling the skies and waterways where there is little cover from attacks, to clearing
roads and seas of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), to surveying damage from biochemical weapons, to
guarding borders and buildings, to controlling potentially-hostile crowds, and even as the infantry
frontlines. (Lin, Beckey, and Abney, 2009)
References
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Atkeson, C.G. et al. (2000). Using Humanoid Robots to Study Human Behavior. IEEE Intelligent
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Bercuson, D. J. (2009). Up from the ashes: The re-professionalization of the Canadian forces
after the Somalia Affair. Canadian Military Journal, 9(3): 31-39. Available at
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at http://www.economist.com/node/17572232.
The Economist. (2012, June 2nd
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