Olivier Guitta articles published since July 2013

OG articles published since July 2013
Europe’s half-way ban on Hezbollah won’t please anybody
By Olivier Guitta
Published by The National Post and the Asia Times 26/07/2013
After more than a decade of intense debate, the European Union has finally agreed to include
Hezbollah on its list of terrorist organizations. This came about after the Bulgarian authorities
revealed that Hezbollah was behind the Burgas bus bombing in July 2012, which killed six and
injured 32. The fact that Hezbollah soldiers have been active in the Syrian conflict alongside Bashar
al Assad’s Syrian army put additional pressure on the EU to act.
While the decision constitutes a significant diplomatic achievement — having 28 countries agree
unanimously on applying the t-word to Hezbollah — the move may turn out to be merely symbolic:
The EU has banned only the military wing of Hezbollah rather than the whole organization.
While some terror groups differentiate their military wing from their political activities, by operating
under two different names, Hezbollah does not even bother with that. Its political and military
aspects are really two sides of the same coin. Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s supreme leader, is as
much the “commander in chief” of Hezbollah as its “president.”
In fact, it is foreigners, not Hezbollah, who often insist on making the distinction. In May 2004, for
example, the French ambassador to the United States, Jean-David Levitte, declared that Hezbollah
served mostly as a “social” organization. France insisted that since Hezbollah is a political party,
declaring it a terrorist organization could destabilize Lebanon.
Hezbollah fundraising in Europe likely will go on unabated because the group can always hide behind
its political wing. For instance, in Berlin’s Neukoeln district, where one sometimes sees the green
Hezbollah flag flying outside homes, people within the Shia community could still give money to
Hezbollah with little fear of consequences. They can simply claim the donations are made in regard
to Hezbollah’s political and social activities.
With this half-baked decision, the EU won’t really please anyone: It did not truly clamp down on
Hezbollah, and at the same time it may have angered the Shia terror group and some within the
Lebanese political class. Hezbollah might even retaliate by attacking UNIFIL soldiers in Southern
Lebanon or target European interests around the world.
Gerard Araud, the current French Ambassador to the United Nations, once said that putting
Hezbollah on Europe’s terrorism list would be seen by some in the Arab world as “an American-
Zionist plot” — and France “does not want to give them that pleasure.” Yet the European Union may
actually have done just that, with little benefit in return.

European Union should try actually banning Hezbollah
By Olivier Guitta
Published by the Washington Examiner 29/07/2013
After over 10 years of intense debate, the Europe Union has finally agreed to include Hezbollah in its
list of terrorist organizations. This came about after the Bulgarian authorities revealed that
Hezbollah was behind the Burgas bus bombing in July 2012 that killed six and injured 32.
Also the fact that Hezbollah has been very active in the Syrian conflict alongside Bashar al Assad’s
army put additional pressure on the EU to act.
While this is a very impressive achievement – indeed having 28 countries agree unanimously on
associating the “Tword” (Terrorism) with Hezbollah – it may turn out to be just a symbolical action.
U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, congratulating the EU for the ban, actually knows that this will
not change anything for Hezbollah. In fact, the EU has only banned the military wing of Hezbollah
rather than the whole organization.
While some terror groups differentiate their military wing from their political one by having two
different names, Hezbollah does not even bother. They are really two sides of the same coin. And
that is why Hezbollah itself does not make this distinction. Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s supreme
leader, is as much the “commander in Chief” as the “President.”
It is telling that the distinction is made by some European countries: so for example back in May
2004, the French ambassador to the United States, Jean-David Levitte declared that Hezbollah
served mostly as a “social” organization. France insisted that Hezbollah is a political party and that
declaring it a terrorist organization could destabilize Lebanon.
In practical terms, what will this ban change for Hezbollah in Europe? Virtually nothing.
Thefundraising will go on unabated because Hezbollah could always hide behind its political wing. So
for instance in Berlin’s Neukoeln district where sometimes the green Hezbollah flag is flying outside
homes, people within the Shia community could still give money to Hezbollah with no fear of
consequences.
In the end, they could always say: “But I gave money to Hezbollah’s political wing, not to the military
one”. How can anyone counter that?
With this half-baked decision, the EU may have followed the wrong path and got itself in a lose-lose
situation. It did not really clamp down on Hezbollah and at the same time it may have angered the
Shia terror group and some within the Lebanese political class. It is not far-fetched to think that, at
this point, Hezbollah could retaliate by attacking UNIFIL soldiers in Southern Lebanon or target
European interests around the world.
So in the end, Hezbollah may have the last laugh because nothing will really change for them in
Europe and it could make the point that the EU is against the Shia community as a whole. Also when
France was against the ban, Gerard Araud, current French Ambassador to the United Nations, said
that putting Hezbollah on the terrorism list would be seen by some in the Arab world as “an
American-Zionist plot”. And France “does not want to give them that pleasure.”

The European Union may actually just have done that for naught.
Rising stakes for the US in Mali
By Olivier Guitta
The Washington Examiner 6/08/2013
By early 2013, the continuing expansion of jihadist and Salafist groups in the northern part of the
country transformed Mali into "Malistan."
In such a context, in January 2013, the West and in particular France had no choice but to intervene
military to face off with the jihadists. Holding elections the last week of July was a huge successful
bet that unfortunately will not alleviate the country's problems.
On July 28, successful elections took place in Mali with an unusually high turnout of about 50
percent. Democracy has been brought back to life in a chaotic time, not a small achievement indeed.
In a way, the fact that Ibrahim Boubacar Keita got to first place in the race is less important than the
symbolism of it all.
Also, no terror attacks occurred despite the fact one of the main terror outfits in the region, the
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), had threatened to carry out attacks during
Election Day.
The French intervention has been very successful in retaking ground and killing jihadists such as Abu
Zeid, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)'s leader in the region. Most jihadists have taken
refuge in either Libya or Tunisia.
But it is just a matter of time before the jihadists start their usual asymmetrical war tactics. They will
also wait until foreign troops start leaving the country to reclaim territory. Therefore, the terrorism
issue is still very much alive.
But that is not all. Troubling signs are emerging that could dramatically affect Mali's future. Indeed,
Mali is still a very much divided country between Islamists and secularists, and the war has left
indelible scars. Also another factor at play is that the population holds a grudge against the Tuaregs
for their alliance with the Jihadists.
The Tuaregs, a 200,000-strong Berber group, whose main military group, The Alliance, had been
fighting the Malian regime for decades, decided to join forces with the Jihadists -- something that
could not be easily forgiven by a population that suffered tremendously at their hands. Interestingly,
the Tuaregs have threatened to restart their insurrection if autonomy in the North was not granted
to them.
Another worrisome fact is that Mali has also undergone a major seismic shift towards radicalization.
In fact, starting in the 1950's, Saudi Arabia began investing in the country, from madrasas to cultural
centers to clinics and pharmacies.

Still today, Saudi funding helps build prayer halls, orphanages, bridges and roads in northern Mali.
For instance, clinics are a hit because of their reduced fees. In a poor country where this kind of
infrastructure was lacking, the Wahhabi investment had and still has a lasting effect.
Just in Bamako there are over 3,000 madrasas and between 25 percent and 40 percent of Malian
children attend them where the teaching is done in Arabic rather than in the usual French. The
concerning aspect of this phenomenon is that madrasas are out of reach of the government's
control, are free to teach whatever they deem advisable and, little by little, are creating generations
of Wahhabis.
At the same time, Wahhabis went on a building spree of mosques up to the point where Mali, a
country with 13 million people, 90 percent of whom are Muslims, counts now 17,500 registered
mosques. Also in the past decade, the number of Islamic organizations has soared from just a few to
over 150 now, including the very powerful international Dawa al-Islamiyya.
Hundreds of Malians have been invited to get their religious education in the Gulf and come back
home radicalized and ready to convert their fellow Muslims to their Wahhabi views. Since 2001,
worrying signs are emerging and fundamentalism is making inroads like never before in a moderate
country such as Mali.
Photos of Osama Bin Laden are flourishing in stalls at the Bamako market and the number of radio
stations preaching radical Islam is exploding. At this point, secularists are complaining that this
phenomenon is pushing religious conservatism within Malian society.
Mali is far from out of the woods yet. Numerous issues need to be tackled quickly in order to
reestablish the pre-2012 situation. It also may be high time for the West to realize that Mali is still
very much a powder keg and that getting it right should be a priority.
Algeria and Its Islamists
By Olivier Guitta
The Weekly Standard
19/08/2013
Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika returned to Algiers on July 16 after three months in a hospital
in Paris. His health will prevent him from running for reelection in April, and it’s unclear whether he
can run the country until then. As a result, the contest over his succession is already gearing up, and
the Islamists are first out of the starting blocks. The United States and the European Union—along
with China, a major presence in energy-rich Algeria—are closely monitoring this latest round in the
continuing struggle over the Islamists’ role in government and society.
Bouteflika is widely seen as the counter to the Islamists. In office since 1999 and reelected in 2009
with a Soviet-style 90 percent of the vote, he presided over the end of the bloody civil war unleashed
by a military coup after the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won parliamentary elections in December
1991. The war killed as many as 200,000 people. Though the Islamists suffered a military defeat, the
creeping Islamization of Algerian society has proceeded apace.

Oddly enough, the regime has regarded this trend with complacency. It has even courted
conservative Muslim Brothers and named a prime minister sympathetic to the Islamists, Abdelaziz
Belkhadem, who served from 2006 to 2008. Belkhadem closed down outlets selling alcoholic
beverages, condemned those who broke the fast during Ramadan, hunted illicit couples, and
supported restaurants that refused to serve unescorted females. He even called the Koran “the only
constitution of Algerian society,” echoing the motto of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Now, in the hope of a political comeback, the three main Islamist parties have united in a “Green
Alliance” around a single presidential candidate. While some regard these groups as “Islamist in
name only” because they are participating in the political process and are somewhat close to the elite,
the powers that be are not ready to allow their candidate to become president.
The more dangerous Islamists are sitting out the election. They include the FIS and Salafist groups
that do not control a large number of mosques around the country. Abassi Madani, a founder of the
FIS who was imprisoned, then under house arrest, from 1991 to 2003, is stirring the pot from Qatar,
where the emir gives him a monthly stipend of $15,000. Madani is calling for the legalization of the
FIS. This probably won’t happen, but agitating for it allows him to present himself as a victim of an
anti-Muslim dictatorship.
Most likely, the army and the old guard will choose the next president. In an attempt to quell the anger
of the street, the regime dispenses largesse. In 2011, for example, it provided some $23 billion in
public grants and retroactive salary and benefit increases for public workers.
After the In Amenas terrorist attack in January—when al Qaeda-linked militants took some 800
workers and others hostage at a remote gas facility near the Tunisian border and some 70 people
were killed before Algerian security forces had retaken the plant—Western governments realized that
they needed to act to protect their interests in Algeria. This was even truer for China, which has a
huge stake in Algeria’s future.
In recent years, China has reaped the benefits of ties to Africa dating back to Mao’s support for anti-
colonial revolutionary movements in the middle of the last century. And Algeria hosts what may be the
largest Chinese community on the continent, estimated at up to 100,000 people. According to the
daily El Khabar, 567 Chinese-owned companies now operate in Algeria. While Chinese have invested
in many sectors of the economy, construction surpasses them all: Close to $15 billion in construction
contracts has been awarded to Chinese firms since 2000. Under a single contract for the construction
of a huge mosque in Algiers, the China State Construction Engineering Corporation required that at
least 10,000 workers be flown in from China.
The relationship also entails military cooperation. Algeria has commissioned the China Shipbuilding
Trading Company to supply three light frigates, and in April for the first time, the Chinese fleet docked
at an Algerian port and the two countries’ navies took part in joint exercises.
The Chinese “invasion” has come at a cost. Anti-Chinese sentiment is common, and riots
have targeted Chinese nationals; in 2009, dozens were injured and Chinese shops were
looted in Algiers. In addition, some Algerians see China as anti-Muslim because of its harsh
treatment of its Muslim Uighur community; Islamist parties have lodged protests with the
Chinese embassy. Even Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the main terror outfit in
the region, has warned China about potential attacks on its interests and citizens. Already in
2009, AQIM ambushed a convoy of Chinese workers being escorted to a job site 100 miles
southeast of Algiers, and at least 24 police officers and one civilian were killed.
For the time being, Beijing has asked Algerian authorities to protect its nationals from both
terrorism and rioting. But especially if Islamist influence continues to grow, it would be

surprising if China did not also increase its own ability to project force in the region in the
interests of its citizens and investments. That too is a development the West should be
watching.
Egypt’s key player: Saudi Arabia
By Olivier Guitta
Daily Caller 16/08/2013
The international reaction to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s violent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood
has been more or less the same, at least publicly. Condemning the regime for the violence, while
asking for a diplomatic solution, has been the U.S. and the EU’s approach. But one country has
remained silent so far and it is the key actor in the crisis: Saudi Arabia.
As long as Riyadh continues to bankroll the new regime throughout the interim period, General al-
Sisi will not take American diplomatic efforts seriously, simply because he does not need to. The
cancellation of military exercises by the US is just a symbolic gesture. Even withdrawing the yearly
$1.3 billion in aid from Washington may be met by a shrug from al-Sisi.In fact, Saudi Arabia has
pledged to cover that shortfall, if the US decided to go ahead with this threat.
At this point, it is an understatement to say that President Obama has no leverage over al-Sisi. The
proof is the fact that his administration — from Defense Secretary Hagel to Secretary of State Kerry
– have made no headway whatsoever in their attempts to find a diplomatic exit to this crisis.
Despite recent reports of Saudi Arabia offering asylum to Mohamed Morsi, its support for the
Egyptian military, even after the violent crackdown, is not going anywhere any time soon.
Saudi Arabia is thought to have been heavily involved in President Morsi’s ouster, partly due to
its rivalry with the Muslim Brotherhood’s key financier, Qatar, for regional influence in the Gulf. Just
days after Morsi was overthrown, Egypt’s new leaders received a $12 billion aid package from Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, and gas shortages that had been plaguing Morsi’s Egypt for months
suddenly stopped. Saudi Arabia, with whom General al-Sisi has longstanding connections having
been the military attaché in Riyadh, offered its continued support throughout the interim period.
There is no love lost between Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners, in particular the UAE, on one side
and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other. And one can suspect that Saudi Arabia is quite keen on
having the Egyptian army do the “dirty work” of eradicating the Muslim Brotherhood.
While the Muslim Brotherhood could have certainly profited from a major gain of sympathy from
both the Egyptian street and the international community, the fact that they engaged in violence –
attacking three Coptic churches — killed their credibility.
Also placing women and children at the front of the protests, as potential human shields, was not
really a major public relations coup.
Being involved, one way or another, in terrorism in Northern Sinai — through Ansar al Jihad — is the
cherry on the cake. In fact, since Morsi’s ouster on July 3rd, terrorism in the Sinai has skyrocketed,
including the killing of seven Egyptian soldiers on August 15.

As if to prove its involvement, Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Beltagy recently stated that
terrorist attacks in Sinai will stop as soon as Morsi is reinstated as president.
Editorial: Where Spring Was Sprung
By Olivier Guitta
First Published by the Weekly Standard 23/08/2013
It is less than three years since the fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in the small
Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, sparking the events that toppled dictator Ben Ali and launched the
“Arab Spring.” Now, the high hopes of those days have faded, and Tunisia is in disarray, its society
deeply divided and violence flaring.
On July 25, leading opposition member of parliament Mohamed Brahmi was shot 14 times in front
of his house. The assassins used the same weapon that had been used to kill another opposition
figure, Chokri Belaid, in February. The families of both victims put the blame squarely on Ennahda—
the Muslim Brotherhood party in power since elections in October 2011—and its founder and
leader, Rachid Ghannouchi. Outrage over the killings led to violence in several towns. Increasingly,
the demonstrators’ calls for Ennahda to step down are being echoed among the political elite.
Demonstrations are drawing larger and younger crowds—some 50,000 people filled the streets of
Tunis on August 6, the most since the revolution—and the protesters’ signs and chants are
increasingly violent and personal: “Ghannouchi is a murderer!” The police respond with brutal
repression. As longtime opposition journalist Taoufik ben Brik put it, “The post-Ennahda period has
already begun. Not without Ennahda, but rather under Ennahda.”
At present, 82 of the 217 members of parliament are boycotting the assembly to protest Ennahda’s
rule. One of them, Karima Sould, said, “The assassination of one of ours has come as an electric
shock. It’s now or never. [Ennahda] got us with Belaid. We won’t be had twice.” Two camps—
Islamist and anti-Islamist—are facing off, and the climate of hatred is such that at any moment a
spark could ignite the country. Whether Ghannouchi will learn anything from the ouster of his
“Brothers” in Egypt remains to be seen, but his hardline statements suggest he hasn’t so far.
Also unclear at this writing is what action will be taken by the UGTT, a 750,000-strong trade union (in
a country of 10 million) known as “El Makina” (the machine), which plays a role in Tunisian affairs
sometimes likened to that of the army in Egypt. The UGTT was the driving force behind Ben Ali’s fall
and could very well take the lead in turning Ennahda out. Polls suggest that public support for
Ennahda is collapsing (Gallup put approval for the party at 32 percent in May, down from 56 percent
in March 2012). And the economy is in a disastrous state. On August 16, Standard & Poor’s
downgraded Tunisia’s credit rating (for the second time this year) to B.
As for national security, a Tunisie Sondage poll conducted in early August found that 65 percent of
Tunisians considered the terrorist threat high, and 74 percent blamed it on Ennahda’s lenience
towards jihadists. Until a recent falling out, Ennahda maintained close relations with Salafist groups,
notably Ansar al Sharia. It is a member of that group, convicted terrorist Boubakeur el-Hakim, who is
suspected of both high-profile assassinations this year. A French citizen who grew up in the suburbs

of Paris, Hakim was convicted by a French court in 2008 of recruiting French jihadists to fight in Iraq,
but he was released from prison in 2011. In addition, the Ennahda government has ceded control of
dozens of mosques to jihadists, who have used them to recruit extensively.
Alaya Allani, a leading historian of Islamism and professor at Manouba University near Tunis,
estimates that the number of jihadists in the country has rocketed from 800 a year ago to some
3,000-4,000 today. The Salafist wing of Ennahda has steadily reached out to jihadists for both
ideological and opportunistic reasons. And the leading terrorist organization in the region, Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as long ago as October 2012 embraced Ennahda’s goal of
implementing sharia in Tunisia.
Now AQIM is making its presence felt. On July 30, AQIM militants savagely murdered nine Tunisian
soldiers on the Algerian-Tunisian border. Some AQIM operatives, veterans of the fight in Mali, are
joining forces with Tunisian Salafists kicked out of Syria. Even though the Algeria-Tunisia border is
formally closed, it is far from sealed, and Algerian extremists are helping their Tunisian counterparts
manufacture IEDs. Furthermore, Algeria has refused to cooperate with the Islamist regime in Tunisia
because of its Salafist elements. It took no one by surprise when a terrorist blew himself up on
August 2 while building a bomb in a suburb of Tunis.
Between domestic unrest and the deliberate meddling of jihadists from abroad, Tunisia is poised for
continuing and possibly explosive instability.
Editorial: The case for the West to intervene in Syria
By Olivier Guitta
First Published in The Washington Examiner 30/08/2013
After the now-confirmed chemical attack in Syria by the Assad regime on its own people on Aug. 21
that killed upwards of 355 people, the West had to at least debate on how to react. Indeed, after
ignoring the terrible civil war that killed about 100,000 people for the past two-and-a-half years, the
absolutely horrific images of children dying warranted a reaction of some kind.
The issue, whether to intervene militarily or not, is a valid one in the context of Western public
opinions being wildly divided. In any event, just for humanitarian reasons and to send a message to
Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime, the military intervention should take place.
But these are far from the only reasons that should come into play when weighing a strike. In fact,
larger geopolitical interests should very much come into the equation.
For instance, there is the fact that all major international players are one way or another involved in
the Syrian conflict, except the West. So a long list of countries, from Lebanon to Turkey to Jordan to
Iraq to Qatar to Saudi Arabia to Iran to Russia to China, are playing their pawns to advance their own
ultimate goal.
But even more worrisome in a way is the fact that viciously dangerous non-state actors such as al
Qaeda, Al Nusrah and Hezbollah are active factors on the Syrian battlefield. Western nations cannot
afford the luxury of not being present on the chess board.

Indeed, at this point, the West is missing an opportunity to play an important role in the most
destabilizing conflict in the region. There is a real domino effect in the making.
Not only is the huge humanitarian crisis having disastrous consequences for the neighbouring
countries, but also the actual fighting is having spill-over effects. The conflict has spread to Iraq,
Turkey — the Kurdish issue has sprung again — and especially to Lebanon, where in the past few
weeks the deadliest terror attacks since the civil war in 1975 took place.
In light of this, the argument that by intervening the West is going to fuel the fire is moot because
the whole region is already burning up and the West’s action could actually help quell it.
By de facto not doing anything, the West is leaving the field wide open to its enemies to win and
hurt it in the medium to long run. Indeed, a proxy war is being waged in Syria that has all the
hallmarks of a war of religion, if you will, between Sunnis and Shias.
Also, the argument of not picking sides between two evils, i.e. al Qaeda and Assad, is no longer valid.
In fact, this war is not a zero-sum game. Both the West’s enemies are winning: al Nusrah is making
great strides within the opposition and setting up mini-Islamist states and Assad’s army has been
steadily gaining ground. The West cannot let the Assad/Iran axis win and cannot afford to have al
Qaeda rule territories within Syria.
The argument that the chemical weapons stockpile could end up in the hands of al Qaeda is not
standing its ground because Assad could also decide on a whim to provide some of its weapons to
Hezbollah. Both are terrible scenarios indeed.
Furthermore, limited military intervention could also deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The Iranian
regime will consider the international community’s response to the use of chemical weapons by the
Syrian regime as evidence of its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.
Last but not least, al Qaeda is already capitalizing on the Syrian conflict, de facto using it as a tool to
radicalise generations of Western Muslims, as it did in Bosnia.
Not surprisingly, European security services have warned about the risks of potential domestic terror
attacks from elements fighting in Syria and returning to their home country well-trained and
radicalised.
If that is not enough to intervene, then what will be?
Editorial: Congress should authorize Obama’s Syrian intervention
By Olivier Guitta
First Published by the Daily Caller 06/09/2013
After U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed undeniably that the Assad regime gassed its own
people with sarin, killing close to 1,500 people on August 21, Congress has to decide next week
whether or not this atrocity will have consequences. On a basic level, purely for humanitarian
reasons and to uphold international law on chemical weapons, the military intervention should take

place. But following on the heels of the disgraceful vote in the British Parliament, the stakes now
have to be framed in terms of credibility and national interests.
When weighing a strike, geopolitical interests should very much come into play.
First and foremost, the Syrian conflict is no longer a civil war but rather an international one. Indeed,
this is a very large proxy war being waged by the Iran-Russia-China axis against Turkey-Saudi Arabia-
Qatar, even though Saudi Arabia and Qatar are not really seeing eye to eye.
The point is that all major international players — and in particular our enemies – are, in one way or
another, involved in the Syrian conflict, and advancing their pawns while the West is watching idly
on the side lines. But even more worrisome is the fact that viciously dangerous non-state actors such
as al Qaeda, al Nusrah, and Hezbollah are very active on the Syrian battlefield. The U.S. cannot afford
the luxury of not being present on the chess board when so many of our enemies are seeing this war
as the major battlefield.
Iran is spending $500 million a month to prop up Assad, and Russia is providing weapons left and
right to the regime while the U.S. is missing an opportunity to play an important role in the most
destabilizing conflict in the region. There is a real domino effect in the making.
Not only is the huge humanitarian crisis having disastrous consequences for the neighboring
countries, but the violence is spilling over also. The conflict has spread to Iraq, Turkey — the Kurdish
issue has sprung up again — and especially to Lebanon where in the past few weeks the deadliest
terror attacks since the civil war in 1975 took place.
In light of this, the argument that by intervening the West is going to fuel the fire is moot. The whole
region is already burning up, and the West’s action could help quell it.
By not doing anything, the West is leaving the field wide open to its enemies to win and hurt it in the
medium to long term. A proxy war is being waged in Syria that has all the hallmarks of a religious
war between Sunnis and Shias.
Also, the argument of not picking sides between two evils, i.e. al Qaeda and Assad, is not valid any
longer. In fact this war is not a zero-sum game. Both the West’s enemies are winning: al Nusrah is
making great strides within the opposition and setting mini-Islamist states and Assad’s army has
been steadily gaining ground.
The argument that the chemical weapons stockpile could end up in the hands of al Qaeda does not
hold water because Assad could also decide on a whim to provide some of its weapons to Hezbollah:
both are terrible scenarios indeed.
Furthermore, limited military intervention could deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The Iranian regime
will consider the international community’s response to the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian
regime as evidence of its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.
Also the U.S. will regain a little credibility since Assad’s decision to cross Obama’s “red line” will be
met with actions.

The last time America was seen as a paper tiger by Osama bin Laden, the consequences were
disastrous.
The status quo is not an option any longer. Iran winning, with the help of Russia and China, is the
worst possible outcome. And if al Qaeda were to control Syrian territory then the West would be
faced with the most threatening perfect storm in ages. If that is not enough to intervene then what
is?
Editorial: Syria’s forgotten WMD program
By Olivier Guitta
First Published by Le Monde in French 17/09/2013
US Secretary of State John Kerry has made the fierce debate on intervention in Syria irrelevant with
his apparent gaffe suggesting that in order to avoid a strike Syrian president Bashar al Assad must
simply turn over his chemical weapons within a week. Russia, Syria and the United Nations all
jumped on this diplomatic godsend when they saw an easy way out of the crisis, despite Kerry’s
caveat that Assad “isn’t about to do it and it can’t be done”.
Ignoring the vast practical issues around regarding the decommissioning of the largest chemical
weapons stockpile in the Middle East – including the challenges of accessing sites in a warzone, the
fact the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has neither the manpower
nor the wherewithal to conduct such an operation, and the huge doubts over whether Assad could
even be trusted to hand over his entire arsenal – even if these obstacles were to be overcome, Assad
will still be left with his biological weapons collection, and most worryingly his likely access to the
smallpox virus.
In July 2012, Syrian Foreign Minister Jihad Makdissi stated that Syria would never use chemical or
biological weapons and that the Syrian military was guarding all stockpiles and sites, confirming the
existence of a Syrian biological weapons program and putting to rest years of speculation by the
international community. As a result James Clapper, the US Director of National Intelligence,
confirmed in March 2013 Syria’s longstanding biological warfare program, and it’s noteworthy that
the French have addressed this in their draft UN Resolution.
And while chemical weapons have both a treaty (Chemical Weapons Convention) and an inspection
regime (the OPCW), biological weapons do not. Syria is a signatory to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, but has not ratified it.
Depending on which pathogenic agent, virus or toxin was used and how it was deployed, the
argument that Assad would not use biological weapons as they could endanger his government or
military forces may not even be an issue for the regime. In a retaliatory strike in particular, biological
weapons could be effectively released on an unsuspecting population in a geographic region which
would not pose a direct health threat to Assad’s government or military.
Assad’s primary biological weapon programs are run out of the SSRC (Scientific Studies and Research
Centre) in Damascus with government laboratories in Aleppo and Homs. The SSRC is a huge complex
with wings and units designated for specific pathogen research. The labs are state of the art and

unlike chemical weapons, stockpiling biological weapons is obsolete. The infrastructure to support
both clandestine and legitimate research is identical, making identification of the development of
biological weapons exceptionally difficult. As with vaccine development, it is only at the very end
that the process becomes offensive.
Chemical weapons are calculated, while biological weapons are living organisms and do not
distinguish national boundaries. Monitoring Assad’s chemical weapons stockpiles is far more
transparent than locating biological programs, which are run out of both military and civilian
facilities, in Syria’s veterinary labs, its pharmaceutical industry, agro-industries and public health
institutes.
Smallpox is by far the most concerning program Syria likely possesses. Syria has long been suspected
of retaining strains of smallpox from its last natural outbreak in 1972, as well as possibly receiving
genetically modified versions from North Korea in 2006. Unlike chemical weapons, many biological
warfare agents are highly infective, transmissible, have lengthy incubation periods and are
genetically modified to circumvent current medical counter-measures.
To put this threat into context, in 1972 Yugoslavia experienced one of the last outbreaks of smallpox
in Europe. For each person infected, another thirteen contracted variola. Generally a 1:3 ratio is
considered the norm. Yugoslavia instituted martial law, vaccinating their entire population in three
weeks. Today, with modern air travel, the pace not the space is critical, and this could quickly
become an international health emergency.
In light of this, it is indeed Assad’s biological weapon complex which poses a far greater threat than
his chemical weapons complex. By ignoring this and letting itself become fixated on just the use of
chemical weapons, the West is allowing Syria to have its (yellow) cake and eat it too.
Kenya’s terrorism problem is the world’s terrorism problem
By Olivier Guitta
First Published in The National Post 27/09/2013
Eleven years after the 2002 attacks against Israeli targets in Mombassa, and 15 years after
the 1998 United States embassy bombings in Nairobi (and Dar es Salaam), Kenya is once
again suffering at the hands of an Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group. Al-Shabaab’s
murderous rampage at the Westgate mall is just one more in a string of Islamist terrorist
attacks that have targeted the region.
The mall, partially Israeli-owned, is a popular location where many Westerners and wealthy
Kenyans do their shopping. Security was poor. And the enclosed mall presented the
terrorists with an easy opportunity to trap and kill many victims because, unlike open-air
African malls, it has only two entrances. This explains how Al-Shabaab was able to keep the
mall under siege for four days with only a small group of terrorists. In deciding who would be
killed and who would be spared at the Westgate mall, al-Shabaab appears to have followed
guidelines recently issued by al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri, who has instructed his
terrorist followers to spare Muslims while killing infidels.

Before Saturday’s attack, Al-Shabaab — the Somali-based wing of al-Qaeda — was thought
to have been weakened and close to extinction. But Western experts have made the same
mistake with al-Qaeda itself, whose extinction also is often predicted. While it is true that al-
Shabaab lost a lot of its stature in the region of late, and has been pushed out of much of the
territory it once controlled in Somalia, it can still mount terrorist attacks. Since March, Al-
Shabaab has attacked a United Nations compound, and made an assassination attempt
against Somali President Hassan Cheikh Mohamoud.
Al-Shabaab’s desire to regionalize the conflict is rooted in an effort to punish Kenya for its
military intervention in Somalia in late 2011. Indeed, Kenyan forces had dislodged Al-
Shabaab from Kismayo, their stronghold in Somalia, in September 2012. This had disastrous
consequences for al-Shabaab as half of its earnings came from “taxes” collected from
businesses based in the area.
Organizing the attack in Nairobi likely required extensive preparations. And Al-Shabaab may
have received logistic support from a terrorist group based in Kenya, Al Hijra. The presence
of Westerners among the terrorists, notably Americans and a British woman, also reinforces
Al-Shabaab’s worrying ability to recruit in the Western world.
After the Bombay attacks in 2008, which also involved a team of terrorists causing death and
mayhem over a period of several days, it became clear that terrorist groups would be using
this new modus operandi more often. Attacking poorly protected places with a high media
value is clearly advantageous for groups such as Al-Shabaab. Moreover, having the world’s
eyes turned to their actions for several days is preferable, from their point of view, to a
classic terrorist attack such as a car bomb, which is over in an instant.
This attack will have a psychological effect on the Kenyan population, as the thought that
terrorists can attack anywhere, anytime will destroy their sense of security. By targeting
foreigners, the terrorists wanted to instill fear in the Kenya-based Western community, too. In
so doing, Al-Shabaab hopes to destabilize the Kenyan economy and dry out foreign
investments.
A legitimate question now arises: When will African affiliates of al-Qaeda attack Europe or
the United States? Kenya may seem a world away. But then again, Kenyans once thought
the same thing about Somalia.
Could al-Qaeda have access to biological weapons?
By Olivier Guitta and Jill Bellamy Van Aalst 15/10/2013
While the removal of chemical weapons in Syria is currently the focus of the world’s attention,
experts from the Henry Jackson Society (HJS) have warned of the dangers of overlooking the
potential development of biological weapons, and the threat that could be posed if al-Qaeda gains
access to biological WMDs.In a new briefing, available to download here, the HJS has outlined key
points that suggest terrorist factions in Syria could access biological pathogens, while giving a
detailed background on AQ’s biological warfare ambitions.Dr Jill Bellamy van Aalst, a former EU and
NATO bio-defence consultant who has joined the HJS as an Associate Fellow, and HJS Director of
Research Olivier Guitta, have prepared the briefing and warned that Assad’s biological program

could pose a greater risk than the chemical stockpiles currently being handed over to
authorities.They find:
Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, Al Nusrah, may have acquired access to biological pathogens or
weaponized agents, either of which would pose a threat to the international community.
The Syrian civil war has left sections of the bio-pharmaceutical infrastructure destroyed, and looting
of labs has been observed, which could indicate that Assad is losing command and control over one
of the most dangerous classes of weapons remaining in his weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
arsenal.
Should al Qaeda acquire sections of Assad’s BW program, it has the competence and expertise to
weaponize and deploy agents.
Documents found in Afghanistan, in 2001, ostensibly revealed that al-Qaeda was doing research on
using botulinum toxin to kill 2,000 people.
On January 6, 2009 a number of terrorists died of plague in one of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) training camps in Tizi Ouzou. Reportedly, 50 terrorists had been diagnosed with the plague,
40 of whom already died.
Intelligence sources suggest that in several countries, notably Morocco, Algeria, Sudan and
Mauritania, AQ is training operatives in biological and chemical weapons and has successfully
inserted terrorists into Europe through application processes for refugee status.
Dr Bellamy van Aalst said: “Establishing the extent to which Assad may have developed biological
WMDs is extremely difficult, given that their production is indistinguishable from benign biological
lab processes.
“But this is certainly a risk to which we should not turn a blind eye. If Assad has been developing
biological weapons, as the evidence suggests, and if those weapons fall into the hands of extremists,
global health security could be in grave danger.”
HJS Director of Research Olivier Guitta added: “Syria has just this week joined the Chemical
Weapons Convention, which is clearly a welcome step in the right direction, and there is no
underestimating the importance of removing chemical weapons so they can never again be used
against the Syrian population.
“However in making this progress, we must not lose sight of the potential risk that Assad’s biological
weapons program could still pose, not least because of the risk of biological WMDs falling into the
control of extremists in Syria.”
Dr Bellamy van Aalst’s appointment makes the Henry Jackson Society one of the only think tanks in
the world with an in-house bio-warfare expert. Her work for the HJS will include wide-ranging
research on the risks of biological WMDs around the world.

Security Affairs Fall/Winter 2013
Tunisia’s Turnaround
Tunisia is like no other country in the Arab world. Its GDP per capita, at $9,400, is one of the
highest on the African continent, which is all the more remarkable considering that it has almost no
natural resources to exploit. The IMF and the World Bank, among others, regularly praise Tunisia for
its successful economic model. Indeed, no Arab state has been able to do better on the economic and
social fronts with so little means.
But all that was before the 2011 Jasmine Revolution that unseated dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali.
The subsequent assumption of power by the Muslim Brother- hood, through the Ennahda party, in
October of that year, put Tunisia on a totally different trajectory.
Before Ben Ali’s fall
In order to truly grasp the changes that have been wrought since Ennahda’s acces- sion to power, it is
necessary to understand how things stood in Tunisia pre-2011.
With regard to education, Tunisia ranked at the head of the class. As of 2008, the country’s adult
literacy rate stood at 96 percent, and the schooling of children aged 6 to 12 exceeded 99 percent.1 This
impressive achievement was the product of a free education policy for children aged 6 to 14 that had
been put in place by the Tunisian government following the country’s independence in 1956.2 The
investment was made early on, and as much as 30 percent of the nation’s budget was historically
directed to the Education Ministry.3 In turn, one of the major steps taken by the ministry was to alter
textbooks by removing the rigid view of Islam that had previously permeated school manuals—and
which was very much the norm elsewhere in the region.4
olivier GuiTTa is the Director of Research at the Henry Jackson Society, a foreign affairs think tank in London. Kati
Richardson assisted in the research for this paper.
Olivier Guitta
In turn, Tunisia’s Educational Reform Law, passed in 1991, decreed education to be compulsory for
both sexes up until the age of 16.5 Mohamed Charfi, who served as Minister of Educa- tion from 1989
to 1994, sought to estab- lish a clear distinction between the study of religion on the one hand and the
study of the rights and duties of citizenship— civics—on the other. The Institute for Monitoring Peace
and Cultural Tolerance in School Education described Charfi as “the great hero,”6 who inculcated the
concept of tolerance within the younger generation of Tunisians. Charfi’s educational reforms were
groundbreaking. For example, article 65 of the 1991 Education Reform Law stated: “The primary
goal of the education system is to prepare students for a life that leaves no room for any
discrimination or segregation based on sex, social class, race or religion.”7
Throughout Tunisian history, there has been the desire on the part of
conservative Islamist groups to restructure family law according to
sharia—a desire which, post-2011, is fast resurfacing.
Passages and authors preaching intolerance were removed from school curricula (and in some cases,
from circu- lation in general). Charfi revised numerous schoolbooks as well. For example, a 9th-
grade textbook called upon students to “break the cycle of hostility and reck- less tendency to plunge
into violence... try to hear the other voice, even if it comes from a minority, because this is the voice
of dialogue that will one day allow us to replace conflict with mutual understanding and respect.”8 The
study of science was also introduced—including the theories of Darwin and the Big Bang concept of
the universe’s creation. Both are considered to be heretical elsewhere in the Muslim world.
Tunisia’s liberalism extended to women’s rights. The status of women in Tunisian society has been
protected since 1956 pursuant to Bourguiba’s Code of Personal Status, which abolished polyg- amy,

articulated the legal right of women to ask for divorce, and established a mini- mum age for marriage
and the required consent of both spouses. Women were granted the right to vote in 1957, and were
empowered by the 1959 constitution to seek elected office. Article 6 articulates the equal rights of
male and female citizens, and requires them to “remain faith- ful to human values which constitute
the common heritage of peoples attached to human dignity, justice and liberty.”9 A fund was created
for divorced women and their children, supplemented by a system of family allowances and legal aid.
This empowerment of women shows in the fact that girls now represent the majority (59.5 percent10)
of university students and women now account for 51 percent of the teaching staff.11 Women’s
employment had been consistently on the rise as well.
In this context, liberal Tunisians fear Ennahda’s “doublespeak” on matters of gender equality.12 They
are concerned that the status of women will slowly, if indirectly, be eroded through “inaction”
regarding the conservative elements of Tunisian society.13
Absence of trust in Ennahda is widespread among secular women as well, and for good reason.
Though the state retains a veneer of relative liberalism regarding gender equality, the formal stance
on the status of women is now somewhat ambiguous under the Ennahda-led government.
Furthermore, throughout Tunisian history, there has been the desire on the part of conservative
Islamist groups to restructure family law according to sharia—a desire which, post-2011, is fast
resurfacing.
The results have not been long in coming. For instance, in April 2013,
76 The Journal of InTernaTIonal SecurITy affaIrS
Olivier Guitta
the headmaster of the Manzel Bouzelfa secondary school, near Hamamet, was brutally attacked by a
dozen Salafists because of the dismissal of a veiled stu- dent. Authorities did not investigate the
crime, and have adopted a lenient atti- tude towards Salafist violence writ large. The veil has emerged
as a major point of contention between Islamists and secular Tunisians. Historically, women had
been banned from wearing the veil in state offices and educational institutions pursuant to a 1981
edict. The general ban was lifted in January 2011, but after extended debate the prohibition of the face
veil (niqab) in classrooms was pre- served. This did not sit well with Salaf- ists, prompting violence
on campuses, in particular at Manouba University, Tunis; at Sousse University, at Ibn Charaf Uni-
versity and at the Preparatory School for Literary Studies.
Manouba University suffered the highest number of incidents, which prompted classes to be
suspended. Fol- lowing the refusal of two female students to remove their niqab during examina- tions
in November 2011, a Salafist sit-in occupied Manouba University from late November 2011 to late
January 2012, pre- venting all other students from attending class. At one point, the black al-Qaeda
flag was even seen flying over the Manouba campus.
The faculty board refused to permit the wearing of the niqab on the grounds it would interfere with
matters of security and pedagogy, subsequently requesting the intervention of the Ministry of Higher
Education to evacuate the Salafists from the building. The request was refused by the Minister of
Higher Education, Moncef Ben Salem, who regarded the sit-in as an “internal affair.” Only after
accusations of inaction were leveled did the Ministry of Interior intervene.14
But that was not all. In April 2012, the Dean of the Arts Faculty, Habib Kaz- daghli, was charged with
assault. He was
accused of slapping two veiled women who wore niqabs to class in defiance of the ban. He was
acquitted in May 2013, and the two students were given two- and four-month suspended jail sentences
for violating the niqab ban. Of the six students wearing the niqab, two recently returned to the
university unveiled. But Kazdaghli fast became a hate-figure for conservative Islamists.
Evidence of Wahhabi penetration in the wake of Ennahda’s rise to power
is growing.
Ansar al-Shariah, the main jihadist outfit in the country, slandered Kaz- daghli over Facebook,
describing him as “an agent for the Mossad”15—a label that is tantamount to “a death sentence” in
Tunisia.16 A Salafist “blacklist” posted on Facebook displayed a photo of Kazdaghli under one of
Chokri Belaid—a promi- nent secular political opponent who was assassinated in February 2013.17

Interestingly enough, Kazdaghli blames the oil-rich Gulf States for the current situation, in particular
their support for the Salafists that have been tasked with spreading Wahhabism. The royal rulers of
Saudi Arabia and Qatar regard Tunisian secularism as a serious threat to their Wahhabi ideals.18
Evidence of Wahhabi penetration in the wake of Ennahda’s rise to power is growing. Salafists, for
example, have attempted to take over the largest mosque in Tunis, the Zituna, and turn it into a
Wahhabi powerhouse. Also, Sufi shrines and other holy places along with tombs have been destroyed,
and there have been efforts to stop the flow of non- Muslim tourists in Tunisia and replace them with
Muslim visitors.
The relationship of Ennahda to the Salafists is worryingly ambiguous, vacillating between “laissez-
faire” and “open disapproval.”19 Ennahda’s hidden
The Journal of InTernaTIonal SecurITy affaIrS 77
agenda is, by all accounts, the Islam- ization of the state. Ahmed Ibrahim, former secretary of the
Ettajdid party, has explained that Ennahda engages in a “double-discourse,” speaking of propa- gating
democracy and gender equality to placate Western onlookers, while espous- ing more fundamentalist
Islamist ideals to its internal audience.20
When it happened, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the main
terrorist organization in the region, framed the Tunisian uprising against
Ben Ali as part of a wider battle “against the Jews and Christians” and
encouraged Tunisians to seize the opportunity to spread “jihad.”
A worrying turnaround
The debate over the constitution reveals much about the fracture in Tunisian society and how
Islamists are trying to impose sharia law. If they suc- ceed in getting any aspects of sharia onto the
books, then their leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, will be able to advance his extreme agenda more easily.
Ghannouchi is on record as saying that he wants to set up an Islamic republic in Tunisia where the law
would be inspired by sharia and secularism would be wiped out.21 The larger Ennahda Party,
meanwhile, appears primarily driven by the desire to maximize electoral appeal and satisfy its base. In
fact, it is estimated that among the group’s militants, 50 percent sympa- thize with the Salafists.22
Foreign observers have taken notice. Human Rights Watch, for example, has been very critical of
the situation in Tunisia since Ennahda took over.23 In particular, the human rights watchdog has made
note of the violence propagated by the party’s militias against political opponents and its disruption of
opposition political rallies.24 Secular forces
are fighting back and, in the ensuing struggle, Ennahda’s true face has been revealed. On July 13,
2013, its leader in Parliament, Sahbi Atig, threatened opponents with death. That threat was made
real when, twelve days later, political opponent Mohamed Brahmi was murdered by Islamists.
Also, in the central Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid, where Salafists more or less control the streets,
hotels and bars have been ransacked because they sell alcohol. Many businesses have been forced to
close as a result. Physical violence against professors, journalists, intellectuals, artists, political
leaders has multiplied. Female teachers have been threatened with rape. Even more worrisome than
the Salafist violence and threats is the fact that the government refuses to take action against them.
A terrorist beacon
Before Ben Ali’s fall, Tunisia had witnessed a few notable acts of terrorism. For example, in 1995,
Islamists from Algeria had attacked a Tunisian border post, killing six. In 2002, al-Qaeda deto- nated
a suicide truck bomb outside the synagogue in the town of Djerba, killing 21 persons, mostly German
tourists. In December 2006 and January 2007, fighting erupted between security forces and a group
of armed jihadists in the country’s south, resulting in two deaths. Fighting resumed a few days later,
this time 20 miles away from Tunis, leading to some 25 deaths. In response, the regime instituted a
harsh clampdown on Islamist sympathizers, and approximately 1,000 individuals were arrested.
But in the main, this unrest was far less than that evident in other countries in the region. Ben Ali
knew better than anyone that the prosperity of Tunisia rested on the security issue. In fact, more than
anything else, security is paramount to maintaining foreign investment and the tourism industry. At

that time, the popula-
Olivier Guitta
tion did not feel threats related to terrorism because of a strong security state and swift responses to
any terror acts.
All of this changed in early 2011, however. When it happened, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), the main terrorist organization in the region, framed the Tunisian uprising against Ben Ali as
part of a wider battle “against the Jews and Christians” and encouraged Tunisians to seize the
opportunity to spread “jihad.”25 With the fall of Ben Ali, AQIM’s presence in Tunisia became more
visible. This, in turn, has led to an increased flow of arms through, and within, Tunisia, particularly in
the prov- inces that border Algeria.
In December 2012, the AQIM-affiliated Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade was set up in Tunisia to provide
initial jihadi training before sending fighters on to “real” AQIM camps in Algeria and Libya. That
month, two Tunisian soldiers were killed and at least 20 wounded by IEDs planted by the Brigade in
the Jebal Chambi region, as the army conducted an operation to clear the area of terrorists. Violence
even spread to the border areas with Algeria, and the February 20, 2013, assault against an Algerian
army base at Khenchela was suspected of being the work of the Brigade. This has strengthened
speculation that AQIM is predominantly using Tunisia for recruiting and training, while focusing on
combat operations elsewhere, such as Algeria and Mali.
Nonetheless, the main jihadist outfit in the country remains Ansar al-Sharia (AST), a loose offshoot of
AQIM. Abu Iyadh, its leader, was previously the co- leader of the Tunisian Combating Group in
Afghanistan, which was behind the murder of Afghan Northern Alliance commander Ahmad Shah
Massoud on September 9, 2001. AST was also behind the demonstrations against an anti- Muslim
movie that escalated to the attack on the U.S. embassy in Tunis in Septem- ber 2012, an assault that
killed four.
According to the International Crisis Group, there are about 50,000 Salafists now in Tunisia, and
2,000 of them went to Syria to fight alongside al- Qaeda’s affiliate there, Jabhat al-Nusra.26 But Abu
Iyadh has called for his followers to stay in Tunisia and fight the jihad at home. He has also stated:
“Our youth who have won in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria will not hesitate to sacrifice themselves to
defend their religion.” A call relayed by AQIM highlighted that the group does not want to “leave
Tunisia in the hands of the seculars.”27
In light of this, the findings of a poll conducted in August 2013 by Tunisie Sondage are not
surprising.28 It revealed that 65 percent of Tunisians consider the terrorist threat to be high, and 74
percent blame it on Ennahda’s lenient policy toward jihadists. And indeed, for a long time, Ennahda
had a very close relationship with the Salafists, at least until recently.
Recent demonstrations have had the salutary effect of pushing the
Islamists to step down and embrace a “national dialogue” with members
of the opposition.
The results have been striking. According to Alaya Allani, professor of contemporary history at the
University of Manouba in Tunis and a specialist in political Islam, the number of jihadists in Tunisia
has surged from just 800 a year ago, and now stands anywhere between 3,000 and 4,000.29 This
increase is due mostly to the fact that Ennahda has will- ingly left control of dozens of mosques to the
jihadists, who were then able to recruit extensively.
A change for the better?
From any angle, Tunisia has been worse off since the Ennahda party came to power. The economic
situa-
The Journal of InTernaTIonal SecurITy affaIrS 79
tion has clearly deteriorated, women’s rights and democracy have eroded, violence is spreading, and
Tunisian society is polarized as never before. Adding to that volatile mix is an acute political crisis

and terrorism; the cocktail is indeed explosive.
In light of these failures, the recent anti-Ennahda demonstrations that have shaken the country should
not have come as a surprise. They have had the salutary effect of pushing the Islamists to step down
and embrace a “national dialogue” with members of the opposition, as first had been proposed by the
Tunisian Gen- eral Labor Union and other leading civil society actors.
The agreement has created pro- visions for the appointment of an independent, technocratic caretaker
government by the end of October. In the meantime, negotiations for a future election date and the
finalization of a new Constitution will carry on, with no certainty of success.
While Tunisia enters another phase in its post-“Arab Spring” reconstruction, it remains to be seen if
an all-out alliance could work in spite of major, and irrecon- cilable, domestic differences.
1. Lilia Ben Salem, “Tunisia,” in S. Kelly and J. Breslin, eds., Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress
Amid Resis- tance (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2010), http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
inline_images/Tunisia.pdf.
2. Ibid. 3. “Tunisia – Administration, Finance and Edu-
cational Research,” StateUniversity.com, n.d., http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1555/ Tunisia-ADMINISTRATION-
FINANCE-EDU- CATIONAL-RESEARCH.html.
4. Ben Salem, “Tunisia.” 5. Susan Watts, The Impact on Women of
Changes in Personal Status Law in Tunisia,
World Health Organization, 2007. 6. IMPACT SE, “Press Release,” February
2011, http://www.impact-se.org/docs/press_ releases/2011-02_Egypt-Tunisia-Iran-Press- Release-En.pdf.
7. Ben Salem, “Tunisia.” 8. IMPACT SE, “Press Release.” 9. Ben Salem, “Tunisia.” 10.Republique Tunisienne,
Ministere de
l’Enseignement Superieur de la Recherche Sci- entifique et de la Technologie, L’enseignement supérieur et la recherche scientifique
en chif- fres: Année universitaire, 2008/2009, 4, http:// www.universites.tn/francais/donnees_de_base/ db08/brochure_fr_08_09.pdf.
11. World Bank, “Secondary Education, Teachers, Female,” n.d., http://data.worldbank.org/indica- tor/SE.SEC.TCHR.FE.
12. Sara O’Rourke, “Women’s Rights in Tunisia,” in P. Terrence Hopmann and I. William Zart- man, eds., Tunisia: Understanding
Conflict 2012 (Johns Hopkins, 2012), http://www.sais- jhu.edu/sites/default/files/areas-of-study/files/ Tunisia%20Report%20-
%20April%2017%20 Final.pdf.
13. Ibid. 14. Roberta Lusardi, “Ennahdha and the Salafis,” in
Hopmann and Zartman, eds., Tunisia. 15. Thomas A. Bass, “How Tunisia is Turning into a Salafist Battleground,” The Atlantic,
June 20, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ archive/2013/06/how-tunisia-is-turning-into-a-
salafist-battleground/277058/. 16. Kazdaghli, as quoted in Bass, “How Tunisia is
Turning into a Salafist Battleground.” 17. Ibid.
18. Ibidem. 19. Lusardi, “Ennahdha and the Salafis.” 20. Ibid. 21. Ibidem. 22. Ibidem. 23. Julie Schneider, “Tunisie, le crime qui
change
tout,” Le Point, February 14, 2013. 24. Ibid.
25. Sarah Diffalah, “La Tunisie est devenue un nou- veau front pour Aqmi,” Le Nouvel Observateur, July 30, 2013.
26. Julie Schneider, “La Stratégie du ‘djihad soft,’” Le Point, May 16, 2013.
27. Ibid. 28. “La Tunisie peut-elle vivre sur fond d’une
économie de guerre terroriste?” L’économiste
maghrébin, August 16, 2013. 29. Alaya Allani, “La Tunisie peut-elle être influ-
encé, voire contaminée, par ce qu’il se passe en Egypte?” Le Figaro, July 4, 2013.
Olivier Guitta
The Muslim Brotherhood has Set Up Home in London - and Britain
Should Beware
By Olivier Guitta, Oren Kessler 17/12/2013
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), kicked out of power in Egypt five months ago, has been undergoing
one of the toughest periods in its 85-year history. The grandfather of all Islamist groups may be
down, but the West counts it out at its own peril.
With its leadership cast out of Egypt, the organisation has regrouped in Qatar, where the state-run
Al Jazeera satellite network has paid for its members' plush hotel suites and provided them ample
broadcast time to air their anti-Western messages. A second new locus of operation is Turkey which

has already played host to two Brotherhood summits, and served as a launch pad for the pan-
Islamist group's political return to Syria.
Also Istanbul will host the MB's new TV channel, Rabaa, which has garnered a $35 million budget
and will broadcast in five languages: Arabic, English, French, German and Italian via Eutelsat, the
French satellite company.
But the Brotherhood's third choice for its new address should also come as no surprise: it is London.
Over the years the city has been dubbed "Londonistan," for its vibrant and vocal Islamist community.
London has played host to sundry Islamists, from Abu Qatada and Rached Ghannouchi (icon of
Tunisia's Brotherhood-linked Ennahda movement) to Egyptian Brotherhood ex-spokesman Kamal
Helbawy and the Al-Qaeda-affiliated preacher Abu Hamza al-Masri.
The centrality of London in terms of the Brotherhood's global network has spiked since the removal
of President Morsi. Indeed, on 30 June four Egyptian MPs fled to the English capital. The
Brotherhood's spiritual leader ,Gomaa Amin, is now in London. So are the recently-arrived Salim Al
Awwa, chief of Morsi's defense committee and now the president of the Brotherhood's parallel
government in London, and Ibrahim Mounir, who is in charge of the Brotherhood's London office
and general secretary of the organisation in Europe.
Last month London hosted a meeting for the who's who of international Brotherhood members to
discuss future strategy. Attendees included Mahmoud Ezzat, the Brotherhood's deputy supreme
guide, who was imprisoned along with Supreme Guide Muhammad Badie from 1965 to 1974 and has
been a member of the Guidance Office since 1981. He is married to the daughter of former supreme
guide Mahdi Akef and is viewed by many as the Brotherhood's "iron man".
As well as moving so many of its key figures to London, the Brotherhood has also relocated its media
headquarters, spearheaded by the main media operations office. Among the staff are Mona al-
Kazzaz, sister of Egyptian MB Foreign Relations Khaled al-Kazzaz (currently jailed in Egypt) and
Abdullah al-Haddad, the brother of Egyptian MB spokesman Gehad al-Haddad (also incarcerated in
his home country). The movement is now launching a London newspaper, al-Jadeed, financed by
Qatar.
Why does this matter? Because the Brotherhood is the world's most influential Islamist group, and
because despite well-intentioned Westerners' illusions that they had found the long-sought
standard-bearer for "moderate Islam," nothing could be further from the truth. Qatar and Turkey
may choose to give the Brotherhood sanctuary, but Britain can find better company than those
Islamist-friendly regimes.
No refuge ought to be given to an illiberal organisation opposed to the values of tolerance and
pluralism that most Britons and Westerners hold dear. It's crucial to remember that the Brotherhood
is a dangerous organisation with limitless ambitions, and that while the Brothers may be bowed,
they are far from broken.
Security and Terrorism Experts Highlight Global Dangers in 2014
By Olivier Guitta

International Business Times 09/01/2014
A group of analysts from London's Henry Jackson Society discuss the global threat of terrorism in
2014, showing how extremist Islamic violence has fragmented across the Arab world and is
concentrating in parts of Africa, for instance. The forthcoming Sochi Winter Olympics also gets a
mention, as does the UK.
1- The UK
by Hannah Stuart
Islamism-inspired terrorist activity in the UK will continue to diversify in 2014. Among the British
Security Services' primary concerns for the year ahead is the on-going Syrian conflict, which has
already attracted up to 400 individuals from the UK in recent years.
Some of the individuals fighting in Syria will return not only with combat experience and bomb-
making expertise but also renewed jihadist inspiration and connections to al-Qaeda operatives
globally. Their impact on radicalisation in the UK will likely be felt not just in the coming year but
over the next decade and even beyond.
This year will also see the release of influential jihadists, either from prison or from under
government controls for terrorist suspects (known as a terrorism prevention and investigation
measures).
This includes Mohammed Hamid, the self-styled 'Osama bin London', convicted for soliciting murder
in 2008 and up for potential release from prison in March. It also includes a 32 year-old known as
'AY', said to have been a key co-ordinator in the 2006 al-Qaeda plot to detonate liquid bombs on-
board transatlantic airliners.
The Security Services have identified several thousand individuals in the UK who support or engage
in violent extremism and the impact of such charismatic and connected individuals should not be
underestimated. After last year's fatal attack on Fusilier Lee Rigby in Woolwich, for example, it
emerged that one of the killers had previously attended lectures by Hamid.
We have seen – and will continue to see – more smaller scale attacks by lone actors attempted here.
But the threat has not shifted. Large terrorist cells with links to al-Qaeda central or South East Asia
will remain a feature of Britain's counter-terrorism efforts, and another 7/7 style attack should never
be discounted.
2- Africa:
Olivier Guitta
Two African al-Qaeda affiliates were able to pull off spectacular and deadly terror attacks over 2013:
first, the In Amenas attack that killed 39 foreign citizens in January and the Westgate one in
September that killed 71.

2014 will see Africa become even more of a hotspot: from Algeria to Tunisia, to Mali to Libya to
Niger, to Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia, just to name a few. The emergence of additional al-Qaeda
affiliates is going to have terrible implications for the security on the continent.
In fact, there are a number of offshoots of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that could pull
off spectacular and deadly attacks: from Ansar al Dine to Ansar al Sharia to Al Mourabitun (a merger
from Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and al-Mulathameen (Masked Men
Brigade) of Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The latter might be the most dangerous because of Belmokhtar's
experience and sophistication. These groups co-operate and have common objectives including the
ridding of Africa of Western influence; the overthrowing of apostate 'unbeliever' governments and
the installing of fundamentalist regimes based on Sharia Law. Libya has one of the highest terrorist
concentrations in the world; adding to the sheer amount of weapons lying around - MI6 estimates
1m tons of weaponry, more than the entire arsenal of the British Army- and its almost failed state
status, make it the most dangerous place on the continent.
Further south, both Boko Haram and al-Shabaab are also potentially thinking of internationalising
their cause, especially in light of both the "success" of Westgate and AQIM's fundraising
achievements through ransom money. Thus targeting Western interests or citizens might be
something of a priority for these two groups. Overall a very gloomy outlook for Africa.
3- Egypt:
Emily Dyer
While Egypt is pushing forward its political transition into 2014, its deep divisions threaten to
completely derail any remaining appearance of stability. General al-Sisi's interim government is
taking its first step towards holding new parliamentary and presidential elections with a referendum
held on the newly drafted constitution in mid-January. Islamists (namely Muslim Brotherhood
supporters) are likely to reject the political process they feel they have been entirely ousted from
participating in and will instead pursue power and revenge through boycott and violence on the
streets. Both sides – the military rulers and Brotherhood supporters – have not shown any sign of
backing down, both viewing their survival as dependent upon the destruction of the other. Any
violence on the streets will be met with an undoubtedly heavy hand from the police and security
forces.
Terrorist groups based in the Sinai, who will continue to increase and broaden their attacks both
along the peninsula and throughout wider Egypt, are likely to remain the biggest threat to the
prospect of reclaimed stability. Despite bolstered security measures, the Suez Canal (namely military
bases, vital trading routes and cargo ships) and leading political figures (namely al-Sisi) will face the
greatest threat of attack. North Sinai will become a further established front for al-Qaeda and al-
Qaeda affiliated groups, not just as a place to attack but as a base from which to run operations.
The current regime's denial about the limitations of Egypt's economy and financial support from its
Gulf neighbours is likely to fuel civil unrest and violent uprisings throughout 2014 - particularly
during the summer months. Moreover, its attempt to secure status quo through crackdowns on the
Muslim Brotherhood and terrorist groups (including its labelling the Brotherhood as a terrorist
organisation) will only lead to further violence, terrorism and civil unrest.

4- Iraq and Yemen:
Robin Simcox
It will be Syria that dominates the overall jihadi focus, drawing in huge amounts of funds and foreign
fighters. As a result, 2014 could be the year that the world begins to properly focus its attentions on
a key actor in the Syrian war – the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL, aka al-Qaeda in Iraq).
The amount of territory ISIL control – both in Iraq and Syria – will fluctuate throughout the year
depending on its military successes, but its ambition to govern will remain undiminished.
Furthermore, ISIL will become an even more significant regional threat. It could expand its
operations even further into Lebanon, bombing Hizbollah strongholds in retaliation for their
involvement in the Syrian war. However, regardless of ISIL's activities in 2014, they will likely not be
directed by al-Qaeda Central (AQC) in Pakistan, which struggles to influence ISIL's overall strategy
(wanting the group to focus solely on Iraq). Relations between Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's emir,
and ISIL's leadership, are already fractious; yet they will become even more so if Zawahiri attempts
to re-assert strategic control over the group's activities.
AQC itself will remain a direct threat to the West, yet its relevance will diminish further in Western
policymakers' minds if Zawahiri is unable to direct another attack there this year. In all likelihood,
the al-Qaeda threat to the West will emanate mainly from Yemen, where al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) remains a potent force. AQAP will use any suitable recruits – especially those with
European or American passports – to attempt devastating, high-impact attacks, likely on aviation.
Aggressive counterterrorism operations carried out by American and Yemeni forces can only stunt,
rather than eradicate, this Yemeni-based threat.
5- Iran:
Oren Kessler
2014 will be a critical year on the Iran front. Even though an interim deal was struck late last year,
Tehran is currently believed to be two months away from the ability to produce weapons-grade
uranium - that's not the opinion of foreign-policy hawks in Washington but of Olli Heinonen, the
former number-two at the IAEA. That's why US allies in the Persian Gulf are privately bemoaning the
interim agreement: it contains certain measures to slow the Islamic Republic's march to nuclear
weapons, but little to nothing to actually roll it back.
Having pocketed a deal that doesn't ask it to remove a single centrifuge or even suspend
enrichment, Iran is feeling emboldened to promote its radical foreign policy around the region. That
includes its massive support for the Syrian government, whose forces are responsible for most of the
estimated 130,000 killed in their country's three-year civil war. The Iranians also continue to arm and
fund Hezbollah – a Lebanese terror militia that has also been key in quashing the Syrian revolt, while
also running a terror network extending to Europe, Africa and Latin America. And domestically,
Tehran's appalling human rights record will continue to bring it into conflict with the West: it
executed 125 people in just the four months following the inauguration of supposedly moderate
president Hassan Rouhani in August 2013. Despite the regime's charm offensive, and the Obama
administration's desperate desire to avoid another Middle East confrontation, 2014 will be a year of
reckoning on Iran.

6- Lebanon:
Rupert Sutton
With the ongoing conflict in Syria the detrimental effects being felt in Lebanon will persist and
increasing sectarian violence is likely, particularly in Tripoli, where sporadic fighting has continued
since November. The summer months tend to see the most intense fighting, and with both
Presidential and General elections due street fighting at sectarian interfaces could become a feature
of 2014.
The killing of the former Finance Minister Mohammad Chatah, a persistent critic of both the Syrian
regime and Hezbollah, on 27 December has highlighted the readiness of supporters of Bashar Al-
Assad to carry out indiscriminate attacks in Lebanon, and a similar campaign of assassinations to
those which followed the Cedar Revolution in 2005/06 is possible in 2014. Any attacks by Sunni
militants on Shia or Alawite areas will also see retaliation by pro-Assad paramilitaries, with the
double bombing of Sunni mosques in Tripoli in August 2013 a template.
Al-Qaeda-linked groups such as the Abdullah Azzam Brigades will continue to attack Shia
neighbourhoods and pro-Assad targets, with its capability unlikely to be damaged by the death of
leader Majid Al-Majid. The claim of responsibility by the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) for a
car bomb strike on the Shia district Haret Hreik on 02 January also highlights the increasing ability
and aspiration of Syrian jihadists to attack targets inside Lebanon.
Lastly given Hezbollah's failure to respond to several Israeli airstrikes on Syria during 2013, and
increasing security problems in its South Beirut strongholds, it is instead more likely to focus on its
domestic and Syrian enemies in 2014.
7- Russia:
Andrew Foxall
As Vladimir Putin enters his fifteenth year in power, the North Caucasus looms large on the Russian
security agenda. In the first three quarters of 2013, 375 people were killed as a result of armed
conflict in the North Caucasus. The three suicide bombings in Volgograd in October and December
2013 (which killed 41 people in total), together with the car bombing in Pyatigorsk in December
(which killed 3 people), showed beyond doubt the continued threat posed by insurgents from the
region. Given that the Caucasus Emirate – the main source of Russia's domestic insurgency –
declared its aim to use "maximum force" to "prevent" the Winter Olympic Games (to be held in
Sochi, in February) from taking place, in mid-2013, the likelihood of terrorist attacks in Russia in 2014
is high.
What is unclear is whether there will be an increase in the number of terrorist attacks in 2014
relative to 2013. After all, the resources available to the Caucasus Emirate are limited. Rather, what
seems more likely is that there will be a change in the location of attacks. Given that the full extent
of Russia's security architecture will be focussed on Sochi (at least for the duration of the Olympic
Games), an attack elsewhere in Russia seems likely. The geographical spread of insurgency away
from the North Caucasus republics into southern Russia suggests that likely targets might include:
Rostov-on-Don; Krasnodar; and Stavropol (as well as the already-targeted Pyatigorsk and Volgograd).

Whether or not an attack takes place, President Putin may decide to launch a crackdown across the
North Caucasus after the Olympic Games in response to increasing instability in the republics over
recent years. If such action is forthcoming, it is likely to trigger further violence.
Ukraine Crisis: Why Turmoil in Kiev May Start a Nuclear Chain
Reaction
By Olivier Guitta and Andras Simonyi
International Business Times 13/03/2014
While Europe and America focus on how to deescalate the crisis in Ukraine, the long-term
implications of this debacle will need to be examined through the transatlantic prism. We will have
to assess its impact on our global efforts.
The West has for a long time lived in a dream world, one that never actually existed. If Ukraine is
permanently occupied, god forbid secedes under the guardianship of Russia, our credibility will incur
huge damage. Unfortunately the damage is not going to be limited to Ukraine.
In 1994, the United States and the UK, together with the Russian Federation, signed the Budapest
Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine. It was the most important element in the difficult
process leading to the Ukrainians giving up their nuclear weapons.
They did this with the strong belief that if their sovereignty was ever tested, if they ever needed to
invoke the help, there will be guarantees that the West will indeed come to its assistance. They
trusted us.
In the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine we can clearly state that the Budapest Memorandum
was worth nothing in the face of overt aggression. Ukraine gave up its nuclear arms and with this left
the exclusive club of nuclear states. It gave up its ability to deter an aggression by being a nuclear
power. It gave up its international status. And indeed, the world, including us, has not taken Ukraine
as seriously since. Were it still nuclear, we would behave differently.
What does this mean for countries with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programmes? Well
let's look first at Syria, a country which has been embroiled in Maidan-style turmoil for the past
three years.
Why is Assad holding off handing over his chemical weapons? The much-lauded deal inked in
September 2013 by Russia and the US with President Assad of Syria, which called for the destruction
of the country's chemical weapons arsenal, has been a failure so far. Syria has been missing
deadlines and dragging its feet to provide the chemical weapons. Syria is not ready to abandon its
WMD programme, including Assad's covert Biological Weapons programme.
Because of national security implications and a strong will to remain military independent, Assad is
not willing to just give in to external pressure to please the international community. Once his WMD
are gone, he is unlikely to be taken seriously. He is looking into the mirror and seeing Gaddafi's
Lybia.

Gaddafi was a dictator, who gave up his WMDs; he was considerably weakened and then he was
gone. Which is a good thing, except in the process we developed a pattern, which will make it
difficult in the future to get other leaders like him to make deals.
How will the West's inability to make good on its promise to secure Ukraine's territorial integrity
influence the Iran talks? The P5+1 interim six-month agreement with Iran, which came into effect on
20 January 2014, is at best a sham, even though it has been described by the US and the EU at that
time as a victory for peace and a major breakthrough in curbing Iran's nuclear menace.
Let's assume for a moment that Iran agreed, in good faith, to dismantle its nuclear programme –
something very unlikely in light of Tehran's past history of deceit. What kind of guarantees will the
Iranians get that they will still be taken as seriously as a regional power?
The Ukrainian precedent will actually give a boost to countries that are thinking of going nuclear
because they will come to the conclusion that possessing such weapons is the key to their
international status.
Ukraine today surely has second thoughts about having given up its nuclear status. The problem is
that others in the world will draw similar conclusions. This is very bad news indeed.
Ukrainian debacle and its impact
By Olivier Guitta & Andras Simonyi
The Huffington Post 18/03/2014
While Europe and the United States focus on ways to ease the crisis in Ukraine, the implications for
the long-term this debacle should be examined through the prism transatlantic. We will also assess
the impact on our overall efforts. For a long time, the West has lived in a dream world, a world that
never really existed. If Ukraine is found under permanent occupation, and worse, is divided under
the tutelage of Russia, our credibility will be severely damaged. Unfortunately, the damage will not
be limited to the Ukraine.
In 1994, the United States, Britain and the Russian Federation signed the Budapest Memorandum to
ensure safety in Ukraine. This element was the most important in the difficult process leading
Ukrainians to abandon their nuclear weapons. If agreement was reached, thanks to the guarantees
that the West would help if the country's sovereignty would be threatened. They trusted us.
However, due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we can clearly state that the Budapest
Memorandum had no value to deter the attack. Abandoning its nuclear weapons, Ukraine has left
the club of "nuclear state" and thereby lost its international status. Indeed, the country is not taken
as seriously by the world, including the West. The situation would be different if the country still had
nuclear weapons.
Why Syria Assad Does delaying delivery of its chemical weapons? The agreement signed between
Russia, the United States and President Assad in September 2013 to ensure the destruction of the
Syrian chemical arsenal is proving to be hitherto failed. Not only Syria does not respect the time
limits, but it is more reticent when it comes to make chemical weapons. The country is not ready to
abandon its WMD program, including its hidden biological weapons program.

The Syrian case demonstrates that the implications for national security and the military will remain
independent encourage Assad not to yield to external pressures to satisfy the international
community. It is unlikely that Assad be taken seriously if he no longer held its WMD. Looking in the
mirror, sees Syrian President Gaddafi's Libya. After disposing of its WMD, the dictator was
considerably weakened and eventually disappears. This is a good thing, but we created a diagram in
the process, making the signing of other agreements difficult in the future.
How Western failure to keep its promises and secure the territorial integrity of Ukraine influence
agreements with Iran? While the preliminary agreement of six months between the P5 +1 and Iran
on Tehran's nuclear program (which entered into force 20 January 2014) was described as a victory
for peace and a major breakthrough by United States and the European Union, it is at best a sham.
Imagine for a moment that Iran accepts, in good faith, to abandon its nuclear program - something
unlikely given previous deceptions Tehran - Iranians what safeguards will continue to be viewed
seriously as a regional power?
Ukrainian previous encourage hesitant countries develop a nuclear program because they conclude
that the possession of these weapons will ensure their international status.
Today, Ukraine regret having sold its nuclear status. Other countries in the world will draw the same
conclusions, which will cause serious problems. These are indeed very bad news.
The end of Londonistan?
By Olivier Guitta
The Huffington Post 11/04/2014
British Prime Minister David Cameron has asked its security review activities, and possible links to
terrorism of the Muslim Brotherhood. While some argue that the British government investigation
comes in response to the pressures imposed by its Gulf allies such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates, do not underestimate the fact that the presence growing Muslim Brothers in
London is worrying. The Muslim Brotherhood is present in Europe since the 60s. Outside the Middle
East, Europe served as a refuge and a rear base for the group. After short period of popularity
following the elections after the Arab Spring, the Muslim Brotherhood is now under attack from all
sides. To compensate for this setback popularity in the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood seem
to exploit the freedoms guaranteed to them by Europe to expand their presence, and exercise their
political and social influence.
London is the nerve center of the Brotherhood in Europe. This is especially true since the removal of
Egyptian President Morsi in July 2013. As shown the Henry Jackson Society in December 2013, many
senior Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaders have taken up residence in London. Among them are
the spiritual leader of the group Gomaa Amin, and the head of the Defence Committee of Morsi,
Salim Al Awwa, who was chosen to be the president of the group in London. In addition, the capital
hosted last November an important meeting between the International Brotherhood members.
Mahmoud Ezzat, the supreme guide of the Brotherhood nicknamed "Iron Man", was present to
discuss the future strategic plans of the group. The organization has also shifted its media
headquarters in London. In addition to the headquarters site in English Ikhwanweb.com , the Muslim

Brotherhood launched a newspaper, al-Arabi al-Jadeed , based in London, funded by the Emir of
Qatar. It is ironic that the Brothers are both located in Europe. Indeed, the continent is the ultimate
incarnation of everything that the group opposes: secularism, multiculturalism, and economic and
political liberalization. Europe illustrates the ideology that Hassan al-Banna sought to fight when he
founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928. Yet it is these values that allow the group to
make Europe their base of operation . Freedoms enjoyed by individuals and organizations in Europe
are such that existing institutions do not allow governments to restrict the activities of the Muslim
Brotherhood. The security threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood is difficult to determine because
the organization encourages not directly, violent attacks in Europe. While the security services
recognize the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood, evolution of these to terrorism will result in
a strong response from the authorities. This would make possible the pursuit of their activities on
the continent. In the public arena, the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe define themselves as enemies
of all forms of extremism. Nevertheless, its executives have continued to be accused of providing
ideological and financial support to violent movements outside Europe. Although the brothers do
not actively encourage violence in Europe, the group encourages the Islamization of European
companies, which illustrates for them the only way to go. It is therefore reasonable to assume that
those who embrace the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to take more direct action.
Olivier Guitta: Iran’s other nuclear timebomb
By Olivier Guitta
The National Post 31/03/2014
While the international community has been focusing on a potential Israeli strike against Iranian
nuclear facilities, another much larger issue looms, and should be tackled very urgently. But
interestingly, except for a few concerned neighbours in the Gulf, nobody is really looking at the
possible implications of a potential earthquake in Bushehr, where Iran’s oldest and main nuclear
plant is located.
Bushehr, a city of over a million people in southeast Iran, sits in one of the most active seismic
regions in the world, at the intersection of three tectonic plates. Building a nuclear plant in this area
should have been a no-no, but construction started in 1975 with the help of Germany. It was
stopped in 1979, right before the Revolution that unseated the Shah. It was resumed in 1996 with
Russian assistance. The project took over 15 years to complete because of the very difficult technical
issues of merging German and Russian technology. After Russia provided necessary nuclear fuel, the
plant went operational in July 2013.
The safety issues concerning the plant are numerous: It is built with a 40-year-old design that has
shown its limitations; the emergency coolant system is also 30 years old; it is running on two
different technologies; according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the staff is not properly
trained to face any kind of accident. In February, 2011, a broken water pump caused small metallic
pieces to infiltrate the reactor cooling system, forcing the unloading of the fuel rods.
When you couple all this with the fact that Iran is the only nuclear-operating country that has not
signed any of the major international safety conventions, one should be very worried about a

possible Fukushima-style accident. Indeed, in May, 2011, Iranian scientists themselves concluded
this, in a report that was subsequently leaked.
The design of the plant, and the competence of its staff, are not the only issues. It is situated in a
zone that has experienced several deadly and very intense earthquakes — including as recently as
April of last year. A 6.3 magnitude earthquake hit Bushehr; luckily the plant was not online at the
time.
The Gulf countries are even more concerned than Iran itself about a potential nuclear accident. By a
quirk of geography, Bushehr is closer — much closer — to major population centres in the Arab
nations of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar than it is to other large Iranian cities.
Additionally, the speed and the direction of the winds, northwesterly, would actually push the
potential radioactive leak right towards the aforementioned neighbouring countries and the Strait of
Hormuz. Iran’s major population centers could be partially sheltered by the Zagros Mountains, a
large mountain range about 550 miles long and 150 miles wide, which could act as a shield.
So any accident at Bushehr would have far more repercussions in the Arab world than Iran itself.
First, the number of direct victims could be in the thousands, with hundreds of thousands more
facing long-term cancer risks. The impacts on international relations and global trade in this
economically vital area of the world cannot be predicted, but would clearly be devastating.
The Gulf Co-operation Council has asked repeatedly for international officials to inspect the plant for
potential radioactive leaks and has loudly expressed its concerns, especially of late. So far, no
success. Maybe that is something that the P5+1 should have demanded to be included in their
much-hailed agreement.
Rumors of Instability
By Olivier Guitta
The Weekly Standard 12/05/2014
Plus ça change. . . . Algeria, ever obedient to the wishes of the army and Security Services, reelected
its ailing and elderly president in a landslide on April 17. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, known as Boutef for
short, garnered 82 percent of the vote in a virtually uncontested race. Ali Benflis, who came second
with 12 percent, decried massive fraud—possibly including an official turnout of 52 percent, high
considering the numerous calls for a boycott.
It remains to be seen whether continuity will mean stability for Algeria. There are reasons to fear the
opposite may be true—notably, rising inter-tribal violence, smoldering discontent among the young,
and the terrorist threat.
Late last year, violence broke out in the northern Sahara city of Ghardaia (400,000 pop.). It pitted
Arabs against Berbers and has already left at least 10 dead and more than 400 injured. At least 700
shops and houses have been torched, and additional police have been called in to restore calm.
The trouble began when the mausoleum of a Berber patriarch was destroyed at the end of
December, sparking riots in Ghardaia, three-quarters of whose inhabitants are Mozabite Berbers.

The situation remains tense, despite the two communities’ 11-century history of living together in
peace. The Mozabites have always been autonomous, going about their business without
involvement from Algiers. The fear at this point is that the violence could spread to the strategic
region near the big oil fields and not far from Algeria’s borders with its Sahel neighbors.
Making matters worse, in a separate incident, the central government responded crudely to
peaceful demonstrations in Tizi Ouzou, in Kabylia, near the Mediterranean coast, to commemorate
the “Berber Spring” of 1980. For the first time, the police banned the annual demonstrations, and
violence ensued. Pictures of policemen beating demonstrators have sparked outrage and are
antagonizing the Berber community.
It looks like Bouteflika is losing control of Algeria’s various communities, and if the situation
deteriorates, it could potentially sink him.
So could pent-up anger among Algerian youth, whose poor prospects stir a sense of humiliation and
cynicism about the country’s fossilized system. The statistics are dreary: Half a million young people
leave school without a diploma every year. One-third of the population is below 30; half of these
young people are unemployed, and the other half make an average of $235 a month.
Many young people respond by emigrating to Europe in search of opportunity. Some commit
suicide. Yet the regime ignores the youth issue; no young person moves in political leadership
circles. There is anger, moreover, among all classes about how the country is being run. So measures
to dampen the discontent of different groups by doling out government benefits have been put in
place: housing subsidies; increases in pensions, teachers’ wages, unemployment benefits, and
farmers’ benefits; subsidies for grain, water, milk, electricity, and gas.
Another, more unusual set of measures has also been adopted: bonuses ranging from $125 to $440
for policemen whose children pass the baccalaureate exam, for instance, and $1,850 bonuses for
newlywed couples. These outlays have cost over $600 billion since Bouteflika came to power in
1999. Try though the authorities might to buy off discontent, it seems likely the powder keg will
explode sooner or later. And the country’s leaders must know it. Algeria’s foreign currency reserves
are rapidly dwindling. Fear of repression by the army may not keep the streets quiet forever.
Indeed, the antiregime propaganda coming from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) does not
fall on deaf ears. In an hour-long video clip, AQIM denounces the corrupt Bouteflika administration
and underlines the country’s political, social, and economic problems. The video stresses the
collusion of the regime with its Western allies, especially France, which it says is killing Muslims in
Mali. Some discontented youths are buying this narrative and falling easy prey to AQIM recruiters.
Also, thanks to its very successful “business model,” AQIM is wealthy: Reuters estimates that it has
garnered at least $150 million through kidnapping for ransom in the past 10 years, and it profits
handsomely from smuggling and trafficking in drugs, arms, and human beings.
Because of Algeria’s porous borders with Mali, Tunisia, and Libya, AQIM and its affiliates transit easily
and pull off attacks around the region. Making matters even easier for terrorists, Algiers refuses to
cooperate with its neighbors and accepts no external involvement in its management of terrorism.
Also, the fact that the Algerian military maintains thousands of troops on the border with Morocco,
with which it is waging a longstanding undercover war, limits its effectiveness in other areas.

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Olivier Guitta articles published since July 2013

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