Public transport in Singapore has undergone significant improvements since the 1970s through strategic planning and policies. Key developments include:
1) Implementing a transit-oriented Concept Plan in 1971 to concentrate development along transport corridors and integrate land use with public transportation.
2) Consolidating bus services under two regulated franchises and introducing professional management, bus lanes, and common ticketing to improve integration between the 1970s-1990s.
3) Opening the initial MRT system in 1987 and expanding it, while continuing bus network upgrades and stronger integration efforts through the 1990s and 2000s such as removing transfer penalties.
B.COM Unit – 4 ( CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ( CSR ).pptx
Public Transport Policy in Singapore (a long view)
1. Public Transport Policy in Singapore
Paul Barter
Director, Reinventing Transport
and Adjunct Professor, LKY School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore
paulbarter@nus.edu.sg
www.reinventingparking.org
www.reinventingtransport.org
4. Forty years of transit-oriented strategic planning
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
5. The transit-oriented plan predated mass transit
A 1969-71 planning process
resulted in the highly transitoriented 1971 Concept Plan
1971
Dense New Towns along major
corridors and a strong city centre
But final decision on MRT only in
the early 1980s after a debate
1991
Arguably, MRT became essential
because of the Concept Plan
2001
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
6. POLICY CONTEXT: TDM AND
CONSTRAINT OF CARS
6
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
7. Singapore has had a tough TDM ‘bargain’
that faced up to the spatial constraints
Since 1974, strict • to keep the arteries moving for
commerce
policies to slow
car ownership
• cars remain out of reach of ~60% of
households
and traffic growth
In return for this
‘sacrifice’ (either
expensive car or no car)
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
• speed and convenience for motorists
• improving public transport
8. Usage-based
tools played a
role:
ALS then ERP
Parking restraint
(for a time)
But ownership
restraint has
been more
significant
ARF, excise duty
and road tax
Parking
unbundled in HDB
Archives and Oral History Department Singapore
ALS = Area Licence Scheme (manual
cordon pricing system)
Fuel tax
Vehicle Quota
System (VQS)
ERP = Electronic Road Pricing
(congestion charging with variable prices)
ARF = additional Registration Fee
(currently 100% of cost of car)
HDB = public housing
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
9. Strict constraint of car ownership and pricing of usage
predate mass transit by 12 years
Late 1960s: congestion; unreliable buses; pirate
taxis; rapidly rising car ownership
1972:
vehicle purchase & ownership taxes raised
motorisation drastically slowed
major bus improvements (govt. intervention)
1974:
Manual cordon pricing + bus lane network
debate over MRT versus bus
1980s:
Further tax hikes;
Expressway network very small until mid 1980s
Very high bus ridership;
MRT opens 1987
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
10. Slowed traffic growth had many benefits
Revenue
Road space to allocate
to alternatives
Time to gradually improve
infrastructure without traffic crisis
Less urgency on road capacity (just one short
section of expressway in Singapore until 1980s)
Retain and grow the market for
buses and metro
Political power of motorists
limited and delayed
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
11. But troubling side-effects of car constraint too
Sunk cost effect for motorists
Some tendency to take public
transport customers for
granted
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
13. Bus Regulation in Singapore
Singapore’s bus system has always been privately owned and has been
shifting slowly (step-by-step) to the left on this diagram
Bus regulatory options (diagram by Paul Barter)
Government
takes little
responsibility for
outcomes
Government takes
much responsibility
for outcomes
Public
monopolies
Proactive
planning
with service
contracts
Wellregulated
Franchises
Passive
Deregulation
franchises
Compatible with
ambitious integration
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Competition for the market possible
Incompatible
with integration
Competition in
the market
14. Singapore’s buses pre 1935
Singapore Traction Company (STC)
– private but initially with monopoly in urban
core (trams until 1926 then trolley buses and
diesel buses until bankruptcy in 1971)
‘Mosquito buses’ (1910 or so to 1935)
- 7-passenger vehicles
- little or no regulation until mergers
in 1935 into 10 ‘Chinese’ bus companies
- initially served rural areas beyond
STC domain
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Source: Archives and Oral History Department Singapore
15. Singapore’s buses 1935 - 1973
Ten ‘Chinese’ companies (1935-1970)
– route monopolies with fare regulation but
weak and little-enforced service obligations
(“passive franchises”)
Pirate taxis (especially in 1960s and 70s)
- illegal, unregulated;
- cherry-picking opportunity due to poor bus
service, which further undermined it
Three consortia (1970-1973)
- merged Chinese bus companies, still under
“passive franchise” arrangements
(and STC went bust)
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
A Changi Bus Company Limited bus. Image credit: Yeo Hong Eng
(via http://wwwyeohongeng.blogspot.sg/2012/11/buses-of-singapore-in-50s-60s-and-70s.html)
16. Singapore’s buses 1973 - 2008
1973 - : SBS regulated bus monopoly
1982 - : SBS and TIBS (now SMRT)
– monopolies serving distinct regions
– regulated by Government (by quasiindependent Public Transport Council since 1987)
• Fare regulation (balanced)
• Quality of Service Standards
• PTC approved route change requests
Successful approach for almost 4 decades
but now reaching its limits?
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
17. Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
On-road priority efforts
Singapore has both all-day (as here)
and peak-only bus lanes
Kerb-side bus lanes since 1974
All-day bus lanes (7.30am-8pm) since 2005
Now 23km of full-day bus lanes and
155km of normal bus lanes
Image credit: Flickr user Merlijn Hoek
Since 2008: Give way to buses
exiting bus bays (extending
gradually to more and more bus bays)
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Image credit: http://www.oneshift.com/articles/news.php?artid=4839
18. Image source: Wikimedia Commons user Vsion
URBAN RAIL: MRT SINCE 1987
18
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
19. Singapore urban rail
The initial MRT system opened in 1987. This is the 1989-1996 system.
Image credit: Wikimedia Commons user Calvin Teo
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
20. Singapore urban rail
MRT system (and “LRT”) today and near future
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Originally from http://www.lta.gov.sg/projects/proj_maps_rail_l.htm
21. Singapore’s funding of public transport
(oversimplifying a little)
MRT investment from taxation general revenue
(but large % of land is state-owned so significant land value increment
captured presumably)
MRT operations from fares (This is also a criterion for
construction decisions. But there has been a recent shift: now achieving
operating cost-recovery for the whole network is the test.)
Bus investment AND operations from fares
(so arguably bus system is underfunded relative to rail. However, recent
overcrowding in both rail and bus has prompted a “one off” injection of
S$1.1billion)
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
24. ‘Connective’ versus ‘Direct’
Public Transport Networks
• More frequent with
SAME resources (in this
example, 3 high-frequency lines versus
9 low-frequency lines)
The
Connective
Network
achieves
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
• Connections are a
feature not a bug
• Lower total travel
time, despite
connections!
• Simpler network:
easily understood
and remembered
Based on a diagram in the excellent book,
“Human Transit” by Jarrett Walker
25. Strong Integration Efforts
Bus interchanges co-located with
MRT stations (gradually improved)
Tampines: a significant
walk between bus
interchange and MRT
Ticketing (stored value) and
information integration (from 1989 via
TransitLink joint venture)
Transfer rebate (initially S$0.25 then
transfer penalty eliminated in 2010)
Covered walkways from bus stops
to MRT stations and such like
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Woodlands: bus interchange directly below MRT station
(Image credit: Flickr user xcode)
26. Remaining integration shortcomings
Operators’ reluctant to offer
information on rival’s services (now
partially rectified by LTA)
TransitLink progress stalled
No system-wide season passes
until recently (and still limited)
Long bus headways and poor busstop locations make bus-bus
transfers unattractive
Lack of readable bus maps
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Singapore’s bus network is complex
Difficult to convey connections on a map
But difficult to
improve further with
this regulatory
approach
27. Bus headways
need to be
shorter
Simpler
network
enables
shorter
headways!
Short
headways
make
transfers less
painful
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Simpler,
connective
network
Waiting time
is huge
influence on
passenger
trip speed
Connective
network
forces more
transfers
28. Singapore’s buses since 2008 and looking ahead
2007 review was critical of half-hearted integration
Elimination of transfer penalty
LTA took over bus line planning
Towards competitive tendering?
Moving to the left on the diagram above (in order to more
easily enable ambitious integration and a connective network approach)
… but how far will Singapore go and how fast?
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
29. Connective networks for buses too?
“Competently designed transit networks often
consist of trunk lines with frequent service and
separate feeders, even when both sections are
served by buses…”
Vukan Vuchic, Transportation for Livable Cities, 1999, p. 210
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
30. A major intersection in
Hamburg’s suburbs
Bus stop 1
Bus stop 2
(Kollau Strasse and Vogt Wells Strasse)
Bus stop 3
Bus stops close to
intersection
Easy to make bus-bus
connections here
Bus stop 4
Bus stop 2
Bus stop 1
Bus stop 3
30
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
31. Singapore bus stops far from intersections
Without bus stops close to corners it is difficult to create a grid of bus lines
31
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
32. Towards a London/Scandinavian/Seoul
model for Singapore?
This is my preferred
option but time will tell
Government agency plans
bus lines and schedules
High level of ‘system unity’
(connective network aim)
Government takes revenue
risk (gross-cost contracts with
performance incentives)
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
London.
Photo by David Hawgood and licensed for reuse under this Creative Commons Licence
34. Overview of Singapore public transport improvements
1970s and
since
1980s and
since
1990s and
since
2000s and
since
•
•
•
•
Transit-oriented Concept Plan 1971
Bus consolidation (SBS) 1973
Professional management for SBS 1973
Bus lane network 1974
• MRT opens 1987 then expands
• Efficient bus franchise system is consolidated (two operators for benchmarking)
• Strong integration efforts circa 1995 (eg common ticketing)
• Bus service standards raised
• North East Line MRT
•
•
•
•
New bus priority initiatives
Circle line and further rapid MRT expansion underway
Distance fares (eliminating transfer penalty)
Land Transport Authority (LTA) takes over bus line planning from operators
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Notes de l'éditeur
Still broadlyreflected in the first two of the three key strategies for “a people centred land transport system” which are: Make public transport a choice mode Manage road use Meet diverse needs
Result: low car ownership, high traffic speeds and high car-km per car
Singapore Traction Company (STC) – trams until 1926 then trolley buses and diesel buses (monopoly in core urban area)In Singapore, “mosquito buses”, which were small 7-seater buses operated by individual or very small enterprises became very important by 1921. They became the dominant public transport mode by the 1930s (having amalgamated into eleven “Chinese bus companies” in 1935), along with buses run by the former tram company (Singapore’s tram services ceased in 1926) (Rimmer, 1986c). Rimmer (1986c) describes an almost identical scenario in Singapore in the 1960s with regard to the bus services of the Chinese bus companies and by the larger former tram company. With controlled fares and high taxation, bus services there deteriorated to such an extent that in the 1960s there were an increasing number of “pirate taxis” (private cars illegally offering shared-taxi or hybrid-type services mostly along the bus routes).
We have neglected bus frequencyWaiting time is often more important than vehicle speed A simpler, ‘connective’ bus network could improve frequencies
Interesting point from http://stevemunro.ca/?p=7223A London-style regulatory approach demands that the planner has excellent service and performance measurement. “… requires detailed metrics people can understand and agree to.”
= proactive planning by government with gross-cost contracts (with some performance incentives) so government takes most of the revenue risk