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Potential Failure Mode &
Effects Analysis FMEA
PROCESS FMEA
ISO TS 16949:2002 Lead Auditor Course
2
Course Objectives
• By the end of the course the
participant should be able to;
– Understand how to audit FMEA’s
process
identify the two types of FMEA’s
complete a Process FMEA for a project
understand how to determine the RPN
and its implication
3
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• ISO TS requires FMEA’s to be generated and
revised during the following stages;
– Advanced Product Quality Planning - before or at
design concept finalisation/prior to tooling for
production
– Design reviews
– As a result of customer complaints
– As as result of customer/field returns
• FMEA’s are LIVING DOCUMENTS
4
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• What is an FMEA?
– An FMEA is a structured process used to
analyse design and/or process activities and
to assure that potential failure modes have
been addressed and effects analysed.
5
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• An FMEA is a
team process not a
single person
process
6
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• Benefits of FMEA’s
– 1. Utilises previous history and
associated failure modes to
assist in developing quality
products during design - better
understanding of the product
7
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• Benefits of FMEA’s
–2. An objective evaluation of the
design or process - not subjective.
It forces an organisation to
quantify
8
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• Benefits of FMEA’s
–3. Cost & time savings - The
process identifies potential
causes/mechanisms of failure
before they occur
9
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• Benefits of FMEA’s
– 4. Provides a system for
establishing design and
process improvements and
for identifying Special
Characteristics
10
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• Benefits of FMEA’s
• 5. A structured proactive system that
aims to provide for Customer
Satisfaction
11
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• There are two types of FMEA’s
• 1. Design FMEA
– Cooling system for vehicle, spoiler assembly,
wiring harness etc..
• 2. Process FMEA
– Injection moulding, welding, assembling etc...
12
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• Definition of a Design FMEA
– A design FMEA is a structured process
used by Design Responsible companies to
ensure, to the extent possible, that possible
failure modes and their associated causes
and mechanisms have been considered
during the design process.
13
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• Examples of when Design FMEA’s may be used;
– A company may be responsible for the complete
design of the cooling system of a vehicle.
– A company may be responsible for designing a
complete trimmed seat assembly
– A company may be responsible for developing and
designing a material to reduce Noise and Vibration in a
vehicle
14
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• Definition of a Process FMEA
– A process FMEA is a structured process
used by a manufacturing company to
identify potential failure modes and their
associated causes and mechanisms for the
manufacture and assembly of product.
15
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
• Examples of when Process FMEA’s
may be used;
– A company has been provided with all of
the technical information to manufacture;
• An injection moulded interior door handle
• A metal pressed bracket
• A family of fasteners
How to Complete a
Process FMEA
17
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
• How to complete a Process FMEA
1. FMEA number
• A number used for tracking and identifying the
Process FMEA
– GM -001A
18
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
2. Item
• Enter the name and number of the system, sub-system
or component for which the process is being analysed
– Rear Decklid Spoiler 92078645
19
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
3. Process Responsibility
• Indicate the OEM, department and/or group
which is responsible for the Process
– Spoiler Design Team
20
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
4. Prepared by:
• Enter the contact details of the person
responsible for preparing the Process FMEA.
This is typically the Process/Product Engineer
– Max Smart
21
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
5. Model Year(s)/Vehicle(s)
• Enter the intended model year(s) and vehicle
lines that will utilise and/or be affected by the
Process being analysed, if known
– WH 1999
22
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
6. Key Date
• The key date is defined as the due date for the
Process FMEA. This date should not exceed
the scheduled start of production.
– July 1999
23
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
7. FMEA Date
• This date is defined as the original date the
Process FMEA was compiled and the latest
revision date.
– June 5, 1998, August 10, 1999 Rev 8
24
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
8. Core Team
• List the names of the responsible individuals
and departments who have participated in the
generation of the Process FMEA.
– AW, PS, JA, RK, MH
25
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
9. Process/Function Requirements
• Enter the name of the process being analysed.
It is important to be as concise as possible. Use
the same terminology as per any reference
documents.
• Examples are;
trimming, vacuum forming, welding etc..
26
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
10. Potential Failure Mode
• Enter the potential failure mode(s) for that
process. Examples of failure modes might be,
but are not limited to;
– Stressing, Burrs, Cracking, Burning, Flash,
Fails to open, Part leaking, bent, brittle,
worn, tool mark etc...
27
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
11. Potential Effects of Failure
• What if the failure occurs, what are the potential
effects? These need to be written from the customers
perspective. This can mean the next operation or
machine, not just end customer.
• Examples
• inoperable, unsatisfactory appearance, noisy because
of vibration, uncomfortable, erratic operation, unable
to fit or locate etc...
28
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
12. Severity
• Enter the severity rating as described in
Appendix 1. The severity is an assessment of
the seriousness of the problem
29
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
13. Classification
• Enter the special characteristic symbol as per
customer requirements for any critical,
significant, major, safety or Key characteristic.
ISO TS Section II should define the type of
symbol required.
ISO TS requires that all special characteristics
are addressed during the FMEA stage.
30
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
14. Potential Cause(s)/Mechanism(s) of
Failure
• Enter any potential reasons for these failures
– Examples are:
– Improper weld
– Part not mounted correctly before drilling
– Incorrect cycle time
– Inadequate gauging
– Human error, Fatigue, interaction..
– Tool worn
31
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
15. Occurrence
– Enter the Occurrence as per Appendix 2.
The Occurrence is defined is the
probability or the likelihood that the
specific cause or mechanism will occur.
This may be based on previous field
history, similar products and experience
32
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
16. Current Process Controls
• Enter the current Process verification/validation
activities that will assure the adequacy of the
Process
• Typical examples may be, SPC, gauging
error proofing etc...
33
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
17. Detection
• Enter the detection probability as per Appendix
3. Detection is defined as the ability of the
proposed Process controls to detect any Process
weakness or potential failure.
34
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
18. Risk Priority Number (RPN)
• The Risk Priority Number is defined as the
Severity multiplied by the Occurrence
multiplied by the Detection. The RPN is a
measure of the Process risk. The RPN will be
between 1 and 1000. It is the responsibility of
the group to define what a high RPN is and
take the appropriate actions.
35
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
19. Recommended Action(s)
• When high RPN’s are established corrective
action should be incorporated with a focus on
reducing the Process risk
36
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
20. Responsibility
• Enter the name of the person(s) or organisation
who has the responsibility for implementing the
corrective action(s). This should also include a
target date for completion.
37
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
21. Actions taken
• Enter the effectiveness and the results of the
actions taken
38
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
22. Severity
• Re-enter the severity rating as described in
Appendix 1. The severity is an assessment of
the seriousness of the problem.
39
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
23. Occurrence
• Re-enter the Occurrence as per Appendix 2.
The Occurrence is defined as the probability or
the likelihood that the specific cause or
mechanism of failure will occur. This may be
based on previous field history, similar
products and/or experience.
40
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
24. Detection
• Re-enter the Detection probability as per
Appendix 3. Detection is defined as the ability
of the proposed Process controls to detect any
Process weakness or potential failure.
41
Process Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis
– How to complete a Process FMEA
25. Resulting RPN
• Based on the corrective action, calculate the
RPN and record this result. If further action is
required repeat the corrective action steps in
order to reduce the RPN.
42
Appendix 1 Severity rating for Process FMEA
Effect Customer Effect Manufacturing/Assembly Effect Ranking
Hazardous-
without
warning
Very high severity ranking when a potential
failure mode affects safe vehicle operation
and/or involves nonconpliance with
government regulation without warning.
Or may endanger machine or assembly
operator, without warning.
10
Hazardous
with
warning
Very high severity ranking when a potential
failure mode affects safe vehicle operation
and/or involves nonconpliance with
government regulation without warning
Or may endanger machine or assembly
operator, with warning
9
Very High Vehicle/item is inoperable, loss of primary
function
Or 100% of product may have to be
scrapped, or vehicle/item repaired in
repair dept with a repair time greater
then 1 hr
8
High Vehicle/item is operable, but at a reduced
level of performance. Customer very
dissatisfied.
Or product may have to be sorted and a
portion (less than 100%) scrapped, oer
vehicle/item repaired in the repair
department with a repair time between a
half hour to one hour.
7
Moderate Vehicle/item is operable, but
comfort/convenience items inoperbale.
Customer dissatisfied
Or a portion (less than 100%) of the
product may have to be scrapped with no
sorting, or vehicle/item repaired in repair
department with a repair time of less then
1 hour
6
Low Vehicle/item is operable, but
comfort/convenience items operbale at a
reduced level of performance
Or 100% of product may have to be
reworked, or vehicle item repaired off line
but does not fo to repair dept
5
Very low Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item does
not conform. Defect noticed by most
customers (greater then 75%)
Or the product may have to be sorted,
with no scrap, and a portion(less then
100%) scrapped.
4
Minor Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item does
not conform. Defect noticed by 50%
customers.
Or a portion (less then 100%) of the
product may have to be reworked with no
scrap, on line but out of station.
3
Very Minor Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item does
not conform. Defect noticed
bydiscriminating customers (less then 25%)
Or a portion (less then 100%) of the
product may have to be reworked with no
scrap, on line but in station.
2
None No discernable effect. Or slight inconvenience to operation or
operator, or no effect
1
43
Appendix 2
Occurrence rating for Process FMEA
Probability of failure Possible failure rates Ppk Ranking
Very High - Persistent failures ≥ 100 per thousand pieces < 0.55 10
50 per thousand pieces ≥ 0.55 9
High - Frequent failures 20 per thousand pieces ≥ 0.78 8
10 per thousand pieces ≥ 0.86 7
Moderate - Occasional Failures 5 per thousand pieces ≥ 0.94 6
2 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.00 5
1 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.10 4
Low - Isolated failures associated with
similar processes
0.5 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.20 3
Low - Relatively few failures 0.1 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.30 2
Remote - Failure is unlikely. ≤ 0.01 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.67 1
44
Appendix 3
Detection
rating for
Process
FMEA
Detection Criteria Suggested Range of
Detection Methods
Ranking
A B C
Almost
impossible
Absolute
certainty of non-
detection
X Cannot detect or is not checked 10
Very remote Controls will
probably not
detect
X Control is achieved with indirect
or random checks only
9
Remote Controls have
poor chance of
detection
X Control is achieved with visual
inspection only
8
Very Low Controls have
poor chance of
detection
X Control is achieved with double
visual inspection only
7
Low Controls may
detect
X X Control is achieved with SPC
charting methods
6
Moderate Controls may
detect
X Control is based on variable
gauging after parts have left the
station, or GO/NO GO gauging
performed on 100% of the parts
after the parts have left the
station
5
Moderately
High
Controls have a
good chance to
detect
X X Error detection in subsequent
operations, OR gauging
performed on setup and first
piece check
4
High Controls have a
good chance to
detect
X X Error detection in station, or
detection in subsequent
operations by multiple layers of
acceptance: supply, inspect,
install and verify. Cannot accept
discrepant part.
3
Very High Controls
almost certain
to detect
X X Error detection in-station
(automatic gauging with
automatic stop feature). Cannot
pass discrepant part.
2
Very High Controls
certain to
detect
X Discrepant parts cannot be made
because item has been error-
proofed by process/product
design
1
Inspection
Types
Inspection types
A = Error proofed
B = Gauging
C = Manual Inspection
45
Auditing PFMEA’s
1. Is the PFMEA conducted by a cross functional
team?
2. Has the Key date been defined
3. Is it consistent with the customer’s PPAP date?
4. Does the organisation consider all of the elements
within the process flow chart?
5. Has the organisation defined what constitutes a high
RPN
6. Does the organisation follow the definition of a
high RPN
46
Auditing PFMEA’s
7. Are recommended actions completed prior to the
Key date
8. Do the sequence of dates make sense?
9. How are revisions recorded?
10. Does the organisation ensure the PFMEA is a living
document?
11. Verify the occurrence rankings are based on
objective evidence
12. Ensure the organisation is using the correct
rankings for Severity, Occurrence and Detection

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Fmea process la

  • 1. Potential Failure Mode & Effects Analysis FMEA PROCESS FMEA ISO TS 16949:2002 Lead Auditor Course
  • 2. 2 Course Objectives • By the end of the course the participant should be able to; – Understand how to audit FMEA’s process identify the two types of FMEA’s complete a Process FMEA for a project understand how to determine the RPN and its implication
  • 3. 3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • ISO TS requires FMEA’s to be generated and revised during the following stages; – Advanced Product Quality Planning - before or at design concept finalisation/prior to tooling for production – Design reviews – As a result of customer complaints – As as result of customer/field returns • FMEA’s are LIVING DOCUMENTS
  • 4. 4 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • What is an FMEA? – An FMEA is a structured process used to analyse design and/or process activities and to assure that potential failure modes have been addressed and effects analysed.
  • 5. 5 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • An FMEA is a team process not a single person process
  • 6. 6 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • Benefits of FMEA’s – 1. Utilises previous history and associated failure modes to assist in developing quality products during design - better understanding of the product
  • 7. 7 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • Benefits of FMEA’s –2. An objective evaluation of the design or process - not subjective. It forces an organisation to quantify
  • 8. 8 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • Benefits of FMEA’s –3. Cost & time savings - The process identifies potential causes/mechanisms of failure before they occur
  • 9. 9 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • Benefits of FMEA’s – 4. Provides a system for establishing design and process improvements and for identifying Special Characteristics
  • 10. 10 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • Benefits of FMEA’s • 5. A structured proactive system that aims to provide for Customer Satisfaction
  • 11. 11 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • There are two types of FMEA’s • 1. Design FMEA – Cooling system for vehicle, spoiler assembly, wiring harness etc.. • 2. Process FMEA – Injection moulding, welding, assembling etc...
  • 12. 12 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • Definition of a Design FMEA – A design FMEA is a structured process used by Design Responsible companies to ensure, to the extent possible, that possible failure modes and their associated causes and mechanisms have been considered during the design process.
  • 13. 13 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • Examples of when Design FMEA’s may be used; – A company may be responsible for the complete design of the cooling system of a vehicle. – A company may be responsible for designing a complete trimmed seat assembly – A company may be responsible for developing and designing a material to reduce Noise and Vibration in a vehicle
  • 14. 14 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • Definition of a Process FMEA – A process FMEA is a structured process used by a manufacturing company to identify potential failure modes and their associated causes and mechanisms for the manufacture and assembly of product.
  • 15. 15 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • Examples of when Process FMEA’s may be used; – A company has been provided with all of the technical information to manufacture; • An injection moulded interior door handle • A metal pressed bracket • A family of fasteners
  • 16. How to Complete a Process FMEA
  • 17. 17 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis • How to complete a Process FMEA 1. FMEA number • A number used for tracking and identifying the Process FMEA – GM -001A
  • 18. 18 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 2. Item • Enter the name and number of the system, sub-system or component for which the process is being analysed – Rear Decklid Spoiler 92078645
  • 19. 19 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 3. Process Responsibility • Indicate the OEM, department and/or group which is responsible for the Process – Spoiler Design Team
  • 20. 20 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 4. Prepared by: • Enter the contact details of the person responsible for preparing the Process FMEA. This is typically the Process/Product Engineer – Max Smart
  • 21. 21 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 5. Model Year(s)/Vehicle(s) • Enter the intended model year(s) and vehicle lines that will utilise and/or be affected by the Process being analysed, if known – WH 1999
  • 22. 22 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 6. Key Date • The key date is defined as the due date for the Process FMEA. This date should not exceed the scheduled start of production. – July 1999
  • 23. 23 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 7. FMEA Date • This date is defined as the original date the Process FMEA was compiled and the latest revision date. – June 5, 1998, August 10, 1999 Rev 8
  • 24. 24 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 8. Core Team • List the names of the responsible individuals and departments who have participated in the generation of the Process FMEA. – AW, PS, JA, RK, MH
  • 25. 25 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 9. Process/Function Requirements • Enter the name of the process being analysed. It is important to be as concise as possible. Use the same terminology as per any reference documents. • Examples are; trimming, vacuum forming, welding etc..
  • 26. 26 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 10. Potential Failure Mode • Enter the potential failure mode(s) for that process. Examples of failure modes might be, but are not limited to; – Stressing, Burrs, Cracking, Burning, Flash, Fails to open, Part leaking, bent, brittle, worn, tool mark etc...
  • 27. 27 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 11. Potential Effects of Failure • What if the failure occurs, what are the potential effects? These need to be written from the customers perspective. This can mean the next operation or machine, not just end customer. • Examples • inoperable, unsatisfactory appearance, noisy because of vibration, uncomfortable, erratic operation, unable to fit or locate etc...
  • 28. 28 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 12. Severity • Enter the severity rating as described in Appendix 1. The severity is an assessment of the seriousness of the problem
  • 29. 29 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 13. Classification • Enter the special characteristic symbol as per customer requirements for any critical, significant, major, safety or Key characteristic. ISO TS Section II should define the type of symbol required. ISO TS requires that all special characteristics are addressed during the FMEA stage.
  • 30. 30 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 14. Potential Cause(s)/Mechanism(s) of Failure • Enter any potential reasons for these failures – Examples are: – Improper weld – Part not mounted correctly before drilling – Incorrect cycle time – Inadequate gauging – Human error, Fatigue, interaction.. – Tool worn
  • 31. 31 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 15. Occurrence – Enter the Occurrence as per Appendix 2. The Occurrence is defined is the probability or the likelihood that the specific cause or mechanism will occur. This may be based on previous field history, similar products and experience
  • 32. 32 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 16. Current Process Controls • Enter the current Process verification/validation activities that will assure the adequacy of the Process • Typical examples may be, SPC, gauging error proofing etc...
  • 33. 33 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 17. Detection • Enter the detection probability as per Appendix 3. Detection is defined as the ability of the proposed Process controls to detect any Process weakness or potential failure.
  • 34. 34 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 18. Risk Priority Number (RPN) • The Risk Priority Number is defined as the Severity multiplied by the Occurrence multiplied by the Detection. The RPN is a measure of the Process risk. The RPN will be between 1 and 1000. It is the responsibility of the group to define what a high RPN is and take the appropriate actions.
  • 35. 35 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 19. Recommended Action(s) • When high RPN’s are established corrective action should be incorporated with a focus on reducing the Process risk
  • 36. 36 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 20. Responsibility • Enter the name of the person(s) or organisation who has the responsibility for implementing the corrective action(s). This should also include a target date for completion.
  • 37. 37 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 21. Actions taken • Enter the effectiveness and the results of the actions taken
  • 38. 38 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 22. Severity • Re-enter the severity rating as described in Appendix 1. The severity is an assessment of the seriousness of the problem.
  • 39. 39 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 23. Occurrence • Re-enter the Occurrence as per Appendix 2. The Occurrence is defined as the probability or the likelihood that the specific cause or mechanism of failure will occur. This may be based on previous field history, similar products and/or experience.
  • 40. 40 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 24. Detection • Re-enter the Detection probability as per Appendix 3. Detection is defined as the ability of the proposed Process controls to detect any Process weakness or potential failure.
  • 41. 41 Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – How to complete a Process FMEA 25. Resulting RPN • Based on the corrective action, calculate the RPN and record this result. If further action is required repeat the corrective action steps in order to reduce the RPN.
  • 42. 42 Appendix 1 Severity rating for Process FMEA Effect Customer Effect Manufacturing/Assembly Effect Ranking Hazardous- without warning Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves nonconpliance with government regulation without warning. Or may endanger machine or assembly operator, without warning. 10 Hazardous with warning Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves nonconpliance with government regulation without warning Or may endanger machine or assembly operator, with warning 9 Very High Vehicle/item is inoperable, loss of primary function Or 100% of product may have to be scrapped, or vehicle/item repaired in repair dept with a repair time greater then 1 hr 8 High Vehicle/item is operable, but at a reduced level of performance. Customer very dissatisfied. Or product may have to be sorted and a portion (less than 100%) scrapped, oer vehicle/item repaired in the repair department with a repair time between a half hour to one hour. 7 Moderate Vehicle/item is operable, but comfort/convenience items inoperbale. Customer dissatisfied Or a portion (less than 100%) of the product may have to be scrapped with no sorting, or vehicle/item repaired in repair department with a repair time of less then 1 hour 6 Low Vehicle/item is operable, but comfort/convenience items operbale at a reduced level of performance Or 100% of product may have to be reworked, or vehicle item repaired off line but does not fo to repair dept 5 Very low Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers (greater then 75%) Or the product may have to be sorted, with no scrap, and a portion(less then 100%) scrapped. 4 Minor Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% customers. Or a portion (less then 100%) of the product may have to be reworked with no scrap, on line but out of station. 3 Very Minor Fit and finish/squeak and rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed bydiscriminating customers (less then 25%) Or a portion (less then 100%) of the product may have to be reworked with no scrap, on line but in station. 2 None No discernable effect. Or slight inconvenience to operation or operator, or no effect 1
  • 43. 43 Appendix 2 Occurrence rating for Process FMEA Probability of failure Possible failure rates Ppk Ranking Very High - Persistent failures ≥ 100 per thousand pieces < 0.55 10 50 per thousand pieces ≥ 0.55 9 High - Frequent failures 20 per thousand pieces ≥ 0.78 8 10 per thousand pieces ≥ 0.86 7 Moderate - Occasional Failures 5 per thousand pieces ≥ 0.94 6 2 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.00 5 1 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.10 4 Low - Isolated failures associated with similar processes 0.5 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.20 3 Low - Relatively few failures 0.1 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.30 2 Remote - Failure is unlikely. ≤ 0.01 per thousand pieces ≥ 1.67 1
  • 44. 44 Appendix 3 Detection rating for Process FMEA Detection Criteria Suggested Range of Detection Methods Ranking A B C Almost impossible Absolute certainty of non- detection X Cannot detect or is not checked 10 Very remote Controls will probably not detect X Control is achieved with indirect or random checks only 9 Remote Controls have poor chance of detection X Control is achieved with visual inspection only 8 Very Low Controls have poor chance of detection X Control is achieved with double visual inspection only 7 Low Controls may detect X X Control is achieved with SPC charting methods 6 Moderate Controls may detect X Control is based on variable gauging after parts have left the station, or GO/NO GO gauging performed on 100% of the parts after the parts have left the station 5 Moderately High Controls have a good chance to detect X X Error detection in subsequent operations, OR gauging performed on setup and first piece check 4 High Controls have a good chance to detect X X Error detection in station, or detection in subsequent operations by multiple layers of acceptance: supply, inspect, install and verify. Cannot accept discrepant part. 3 Very High Controls almost certain to detect X X Error detection in-station (automatic gauging with automatic stop feature). Cannot pass discrepant part. 2 Very High Controls certain to detect X Discrepant parts cannot be made because item has been error- proofed by process/product design 1 Inspection Types Inspection types A = Error proofed B = Gauging C = Manual Inspection
  • 45. 45 Auditing PFMEA’s 1. Is the PFMEA conducted by a cross functional team? 2. Has the Key date been defined 3. Is it consistent with the customer’s PPAP date? 4. Does the organisation consider all of the elements within the process flow chart? 5. Has the organisation defined what constitutes a high RPN 6. Does the organisation follow the definition of a high RPN
  • 46. 46 Auditing PFMEA’s 7. Are recommended actions completed prior to the Key date 8. Do the sequence of dates make sense? 9. How are revisions recorded? 10. Does the organisation ensure the PFMEA is a living document? 11. Verify the occurrence rankings are based on objective evidence 12. Ensure the organisation is using the correct rankings for Severity, Occurrence and Detection