1. From ontological structure to semantic lexical
structure: the case of institutional entities
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST)
PHILOWEB 2010
16/10/2010
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 1

2. Outline
1 Systematic polysemy and names of institutions : a challenge for
lexical resources
2 A (philosophical) incursion into institutional ontology
3 Handling systematic polysemy by interfacing ontologies and
lexical resources
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 2

3. Outline
1 Systematic polysemy and names of institutions : a challenge for
lexical resources
2 A (philosophical) incursion into institutional ontology
3 Handling systematic polysemy by interfacing ontologies and
lexical resources
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 3

4. The polysemic character of institution denoting terms
Rephrasing test for polysemy : some semantic data
1. (a) The bank was very nice and understanding [individuals]
(b) The bank is right around the corner [building]
(c) The bank merged with the American Security Bank
[abstract institution]
2. (a) He’s on a trip with his school [individuals]
(b) The roof of the school is leaking [building]
(c) School was founded by Charles the Great [abstract
institution]
3. (a) The church was present at the manifestation [individuals]
(b) We go to church every Sunday [building]
(c) The Orthodox and Catholic church divided in 1054
[abstract institution]
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 4

5. Standard vs. systematic (regular or logical) polysemy
Coordination test
- Standard polysemy
“Ambiguity tests [. . .] utilise the fact that independent senses
of a lexical form are antagonistic to one another ; that is to
say, they cannot be brought into play simultaneously without
oddness. Contexts which do activate more than one sense at a
time give rise to [. . .] zeugma” ([Cruse86] : 61)
- Systematic polysemy
Though the intersection of the entities denoted by each
contextual meaning of the word is empty (physical/individual/
abstract) coordination tests are felicitous
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 5

6. Institution denoting terms and coordination
Compare
4. The bank went on strike [employees] in view of its upcoming merger
with the American Security Bank [institution]
5. The school called me this morning [employees] to inform me that it
will be closed tomorrow [building]
6. The Catholic church, founded in 1054 [institution], is the worlds
largest Christian church [members]
Vs.
7. ? ? John found the key to the mystery, but it doesn’t fit the lock
8. ? ? The key to success is very heavy
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 6

7. Systematic polysemy in WordNet
WordNet’s structure : quick reminder
- Structured in synsets (classes of synonyms), commonly taken
as equivalent to concepts
- Synsets are in turn organized in hierarchies, defined by
hypernym or IS-A relationships
- At the top level, these hierarchies are organized into base
types, 25 primitive groups for nouns, and 15 for verbs
Representation of polysemy in WordNet
- Polysemy as multiple inheritance or multiple hypernym
relations
- Contrastive (homonymy) and complementary ambiguity
(polysemy) are handled in the same way
IS-A overloading problem
([Gangemi et al. 02, 03] [Guarino07]) multiple hypernymy generates
- logical incoherences
- conceptual confusions
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 7

8. From the lexicon to ontology
Requirements for an adequate account of systematic
polysemy
- Introduction of complex categories of objects ([Pustejovsky95]
[Asher10] “dot-types”) : ’semantic facets’ linked through
non-hierarchical relations
- Definition of orthogonal connections between categories and
mechanisms of inheritance through such orthogonal relations
Working hypothesis
- Institutional as stratified entities (grounded in the material
realm and on intentional agents involved in social interaction)
- The systematic polysemy as semantic upraisal of the complex
ontological structure of denoted entities
→ Understanding the patterns of systematic polysemy involving
names of institutions requires understanding the patterns of
ontological constitution of institutional entities
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 8

9. Outline
1 Systematic polysemy and names of institutions : a challenge for
lexical resources
2 A (philosophical) incursion into institutional ontology
3 Handling systematic polysemy by interfacing ontologies and
lexical resources
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 9

10. Descriptive common sense (social) ontology
A common semantic assumption in NLP
- Lexical semantic as the reflection of common sense
categorization of the world
Metaphysics of the “common sense world”
- Objects surrounding us in our everyday environment and
activities
- E.g. trees, rocks, rivers, but also chairs, tables, houses, banks,
universities, etc.
General ontological assumptions
- Non-relativistic approach : there is an objective core structure
of the common sense world as it is delivered trough different
cultures
- Non-reductionist approach : “ordinary objects” have proper
identity and persistence conditions, viz. do not reduce to the
ontological building blocks studied in foundational ontology
(material, intentional, abstract)
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 10

11. Philosophical background
The phenomenological tradition
- Husserl : study of the “lifeworld” or “personal world” as a
proper ontological layer structured by multiple dependence
relations on “lower” layers
- G¨otingen circle (Ingarden, Reinach) : ontological foundations
of the literary work, positive law, etc.
Recent advances at the joint between phenomenological and
analytic tradition
- Common sense metaphysics, developments and integration in
contemporary analytical debates : B. Smith, A.L. Thomasson
- Development of a formal theory of dependence, taken as the
fundamental ontological relation structuring reality : K. Fine,
J. Lowe, P. Simons
The analytic tradition
- Searle’s social ontology grounded in his theory of intentionality
(with divergences but also overlaps with the phenomenological
approach)
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 11

12. Institutions as “stratified” intentional products
Products of social acts (or collective intentionality) [Reinach,
Searle]
- A social act (e.g. promises, commands, etc.) is such that it
necessarily involves : being produced in the direction of others,
thus being externalized, and being grasped as such by others
→ Collective intentionality
- Social acts are productive, viz. something new comes into
being : very roughly, new connections between agents hence
bound into social-institutional groups
“Stratified” or “many-layered” entities [Ingarden]
- “Organic structures” or “formations” depend upon
“heterogeneous” ontological strata for their existence and
identity (material, ideal, intentional)
- As such, these entities cannot be classified in either of the
major categories of objects accepted by traditional
metaphysics, though they are grounded on them
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 12

13. The (quasi) abstract component of institutions
Deontic powers
- Drawing on the example of promises : paradigmatic pre-legal
social acts
- Social acts produce claims and obligations regulating actions
Institutional roles
- Deontic powers are tied to institutional roles (e.g. president,
employee), viz. place-holders for patterns of actions
- RLs are defined by (i) constitutive norms, determining the
conditions under which an entity can qualify for role ; (ii)
deontic norms, regulating the actions of players of a given role
Abstract artifacts
- Roles and deontic powers are not irreducible to intentional
states nor material entities.
- (i) They are abstract in that they lack spatial location ; (ii)
they are artifactual in being man-created, temporally located
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 13

14. The agentive component of institutions
Constant dependence on agents
- Deontic powers, like claims and obligations, can only exist
insofar as there are people tied by them
- The dependence of such powers on agents consists in the fact
that they cannot endure unless relevant bearers exist
Generic dependence on agents
- Institutional deontic powers do not tie specific individuals :
they can be passed on from a bearer to another (e.g.
replacement of the members of an organization)
- The perdurance of an institution only requires the existence of
some individuals qualifying of the relevant institutional roles,
viz. the existence of some bearer of the relevant deontic powers
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 14

15. The material component of institutions
Material objects invested with institutional status (role)
The institutional status of material objects is derivative upon the
actions of agents within the institution
(i) Institutions determine patterns of actions for the agents
playing different institutional roles
(ii) These patterns (correlatively roles) include actions in relation
to a material object
Two cases :
1. Determining the conditions under which a person is tied to
“temporary institutional roles” may involve relational
conditions to a material entity
A building housing an institutional activity (bank, university).
Determines patterns of actions associated for people while
present in the building.
2. Institutional roles may involve regulated actions bearing on a
material entity
French national territory. The rights and duties of French
citizens regulate ex. there movement on the French territory.
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 15

16. Outline
1 Systematic polysemy and names of institutions : a challenge for
lexical resources
2 A (philosophical) incursion into institutional ontology
3 Handling systematic polysemy by interfacing ontologies and
lexical resources
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 16

17. Ontology-driven revision of lexical resources
General strategy
- Formalizing the fundamental categories and relations
structuring institutional entities in a top-level ontology
- Formulating principles of orthogonal quality-inheritance, in
particular quality-inheritance through dependence
- Aligning the top level of lexical resource with top-level ontology
Framework : DOLCE foundational ontology [Masolo et al.03]
- Alignment of WordNet’s upper level and DOLCE foundational
ontology has been successfully achieved [Oltramary et al. 2002]
[Gangemi et al. 03]
- A preliminary characterization of social roles [Masolo et al. 04]
and organizations [Bottazi&Ferrario 09] has been proposed in
DOLCE
Aim : Show how orthogonal inheritance involved in institutional
entities can be formally characterized by focussing on the case of
organizations and bringing minimal extensions to existing results.
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 17

18. DOLCE basic categories
- ED(x) :“x is an endurant”, i.e. an entity that is wholly present at
any time it is present
- PD(x) : “x is a perdurant”, i.e. an entity that extends through time,
has temporal parts, and is only partially present at any given time
- APO(x) : “x is an agentive physical object”, i.e. an endurant that
has intentionality
- NAPO(x) : “x is an non-agentive physical object”, i.e. an endurant
that has no intentionality
- SOB(x) : “x is a social object”, i.e. an endurant that (i) is not a
physical object ; (ii) depends on a community of intentional agents
- PC(x, y, t) : the endurant x participates in the perdurant y at time
t, i.e. endurants “involved” in an occurrence, typically an event
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 18

19. Extension to social individuals
Social individuals (SI(x)) (e.g. the bank of France, the Peugeot
company) as social objects which can be described and defined
using a number of social concepts.
[Gangemi&Mika03] : Reifying concepts and descriptions to be able
to predicate on them :
CN(x) : “x is a social concept”
DS(x) : “x is a description”
DF(x, y) : “x is defined by the description y”
US(x, y) : “x is (re)used in the description y”
CF(x, y, t) : “at time t, x is classified by the concept y”
[Bottazi&Ferrario09] : Modifying the argument restrictions for DF
and US so that they can apply to social individuals
(A1) US(x, y) → ((CN(x) ∨ SI(x)) ∧ DS(y))
(A2) DF(x, y) → US(x, y)
(A3) (CN(x) ∨ SI(x) → ∃y (DF(x, y))
(T1) DF(x, y) → ((CN(x) ∨ SI(x)) ∧ DS(y))
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 19

20. Some basic relations
Following [Bottazi&Ferrario09] :
Organizations, like any social object, are created by collective
intentionality, viz. involve a social event (SEV(x))
This event links institutions and their defining descriptions through
social commitment, which “turns the description into a prescription
for agents”. This dimension is captured through the primitive
validity relation (VAL(x, y))
(A4) VAL(x, y) → SI(y) ∧ DF(y, x) ∧ ∃z, t (SEV (z) ∧ PC(x, z, t) ∧ PC(y, z, t)
New concepts and roles are created that have a meaning and a
“legal status” inside the organization. These institutionalized
(INST(x, y)) concepts and roles are introduced through valid
descriptions
(D1) INST(x, y) =df CN(x) ∧ SI(y) ∧ ∃z (VAL(z, y) ∧ US(x, z))
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 20

21. Social roles
Based on the notion of social role (RL(x)), we distinguish agentive and
non-agentive roles, depending on the kind of entity classified by a role
(CF(x, y, t) [Masolo et al 04]).
Agentive roles regulate the behavior that agents must observe when
they play definite roles.“x is an agentive role in y” (ARL(x, y)) is
defined by
(D2) ARL(x, y) =df RL(x) ∧ INST(x, y) ∧ ∀z, t (CF(z, x, t) → APO(z))
Non-agentive roles (NARL(x, y)) regulate actions of agents
involving the object invested with the given role. They are
institutionalized insofar as they are ’definitional’ of the agentive
roles.
The requirement relation (RQ(x, y) :“x requires y”) captures this
’definitional’ connection through :
(A5) (RQ(x, y) ∧ DF(x, d)) → US(y, d)
(D3) NARL(x, y) =df RL(x) ∧ ∀z, t (CF(z, x, t) → NAPO(z))∧
∀v (ARL(v, y) → RQ(v, x))
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 21

22. Partial characterization of organizations
Relations connecting agents and non-agentive physical objects to social
individuals (drawing on and extending [Bottazi&Ferrario09]) :
“x is affiliated to y at time t”
(A6) AFF(x, y, t) → ∃z ARL(z, y) ∧ CF(x, z, t)
“x counts as y at time t” (following Searle)
(A7) CNT(x, y, t) → ∃z NARL(z, y) ∧ CF(x, z, t)
Necessary conditions for a social individual to be an organization, using
the relation of being present a time t (PRE(x, t))
“x is an organization”
(A8) ORG(x) → ∃t (PRE(x, t) ∧ ∀t (PRE(x, t ) → ∃y AFF(y, x, t ))
“x is a materially grounded organisation”
(D4) MORG(x) =df ORG(x) ∧ ∀t (PRE(x, t) → ∃y CNT(y, x, t))
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 22

23. Organizations and dependence
The dependences structuring organizations :
One important axiom of the CF relation :
(A9) CF(x, y, t) → PRE(x, t)
From the definition of Generic Constant Dependence (GD(φ, ψ))
(D5) GD(φ, ψ) =df (∀x(φ(x) → ∃t(PRE(x, t))∧
∀x, t((φ(x) ∧ PRE(x, t)) → ∃y(ψ(y) ∧ PRE(x, t)))
and (A9) the following theorems can be prouved :
(T2) GD(ORG, AFF)
(T3) GD(MORG, AFF)
(T4) GD(MORG, CNT)
[(T) SD(ORG, DS)]
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 23

24. Indirect quality-inheritance
Kinds of qualities
- TQ(x) : “x is a temporal quality”
- SQ(x) : “x is a spatial quality ”
- AQ(x) : “x is an abstract quality”
- To which we add AGQ(x) : “x is an agentive quality”
Extending argument restrictions (where qt(x, y) is read “x is a
quality of y” and Kx stands for “the kind of x”)
(A10) qt(x, y) ↔ (TQ(x) → D(Ky , PD))
(A11) qt(x, y) ↔ (SQ(x) → D(Ky , ED))
(A12) qt(x, y) ↔ (AQ(x) → D(Ky , NPED))
(A13) qt(x, y) ↔ (AGQ(x) → D(Ky , APO))
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 24

25. Remarks on indirect inheritance
Note that :
(A10- A12) cover the original argument constraints on qualities
from DOLCE :
(i) a PD(resp. ED, NPED, APO) is constantly dependent on
itself,
(ii) a TQ (resp. SQ, AQ, AGQ) is constantly dependent on PD
(resp. ED, NPED, APO)
Indirect inheritance extends beyond the category of social
individuals to all cases of constant dependence
Axioms stipulating that a PD indirectly inherits SQ from its
participants, and that a PED indirectly inherits TQ from the event
it participates to follow as theorems
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 25

26. Perspectives
Concerning institutional ontology
- Further exploit philosophical literature in the ontology of
institutional entities and in particular its recent developments
(e.g. legal, geographic)
- Pursue the formal characterization of social individuals and
relations
Concerning the ontology/lexical resource interface
- Extending and testing the hypothesis of a correlation between
systematic polysemy and ontological dependence
- Use systematic polysemy detection in WordNet (viz. multiple
hypernym detection) as a tool to reveal underlying ontological
dependences
- Draw general patterns of dependence and integrate them in
foundational ontologies like DOLCE
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 26

27. .
Thank you !
Alexandra Arapinis (Paris 1 - IHPST) PHILOWEB 2010 27