Boost the utilization of your HCL environment by reevaluating use cases and f...
The Economics of PSI: Policy-Oriented Analysis
1. The Economics of PSI:
a Policy-Oriented Analysis
Raimondo Iemma
Nexa Center for Internet & Society | EVPSI
http://nexa.polito.it
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
2. Items discussed
●
Economic nature of PSI
●
Upstream features
●
Downstream features
●
Costs vs benefits
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
3. Items discussed
●
Economic nature of PSI
●
Upstream features
●
Downstream features
●
Costs vs benefits
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
5. Three assumptions
1) PSI holds recurrent features of digital
information goods + further characteristics;
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
6. Three assumptions
1) PSI holds recurrent features of digital
information goods + further characteristics
2) Need to separate the inherent features of a
good from the attributes of its supply
(licensing, pricing, etc.);
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
7. Three assumptions
1) PSI holds recurrent features of digital
information goods + further characteristics;
2) Need to separate the inherent features of a
good from the attributes of its supply
(licensing, pricing, etc.);
3) The decision agent is the Government (or the
PSI holder itself).
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
8. PSI in the digital environment
•
Non-rival in consumption (access + reuse)
•
Hardly excludable (and with ex-ante and ex-
post costs)
•
In some cases, it may be an experience good
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
9. PSI in the digital environment
•
Non-rival in consumption (access + reuse)
•
Hardly excludable (and with ex-ante and ex-
post costs)
•
In some cases, it may be an experience good
--> PSI as (potentially) an impure public good
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
10. PSI in the digital environment
•
Non-rival in consumption (access + reuse)
•
Hardly excludable (and with ex-ante and ex-
post costs)
•
In some cases, it may be an experience good
--> PSI as (potentially) an impure public good
--> What matters is whether and how PSI is
available for reuse
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
11. Currently, PSI is made available as...
•
A public good
--> Open Data platforms
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
12. Currently, PSI is made available as...
•
A public good
--> Open Data platforms
•
A club good
--> Firm registries
(only a few players corresponding a fee can
actually reuse PSI de jure)
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
13. Currently, PSI is made available as...
•
A public good
--> Open Data platforms
•
A club good
--> Firm registries
(only a few players corresponding a fee can
actually reuse PSI de jure)
•
'Something in between' (see e.g. the case of DK
addresses explained afterwards)
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
14. Items discussed
●
Economic nature of PSI
●
Upstream features
●
Downstream features
●
Costs vs benefits
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
15. Peculiar cost structure
•
Not only marginal costs of reproduction tend to
zero...
•
but, more importantly, fixed costs (collection,
management, etc.) have already been covered.
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
16. Peculiar cost structure
•
Not only marginal costs of reproduction tend to
zero...
•
but, more importantly, fixed costs (collection,
management, etc.) have already been covered.
--> we do not have to find an efficient way to fund
the creation of PSI (as ancillary / incidental good);
--> PSI is (almost) available for reuse.
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
17. Usual (first) steps by a PSIH to
make PSI available for reuse
Activity Main cost item
1) Setting the stage Internal coordination
Internal education
Definition of guidelines
2) Opening a few datasets Small technical costs (usually datasets
that do not require any manipulation)
3) Opening more 'critical' datasets Anonymization (where needed)
Meaningful metadatation (where
needed)
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
18. Back to the cost structure
•
Fixed costs are to be taken for granted.
•
To make PSI actually available for reuse:
•
empirically, internal coordination costs represent
the most relevant item (this is the 'fixed part' of the
supply costs);
•
strong economies of scale emerge;
•
efficiency curve effects.
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
19. Items discussed
●
Economic nature of PSI
●
Upstream features
●
Downstream features
●
Costs vs benefits
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
20. Demand-side
•
Strong network effects
●
the value of a dataset increases the more it is linked or
combined with other datasets (think of Linked Open
Data)
•
PSI as 'basic input'
●
centralized knowledge to be combined with local
knowledge
●
e.g. 'Apps4Italy': around 50 of the ideas could not be
implemented without PSI
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
21. PSI as Infrastructure? (cfr. Frischmann)
Basic features:
1) significant role of Government (provider, subsidizer,
coordinator or regulator);
2) traditionally managed as commons (not prioritized);
3) positive externalities.
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
22. PSI as Infrastructure? (cfr. Frischmann)
AND:
- non rival consumption of its resources;
- producing input to downstream activity;
- wide range of (private, public, social) goods downstream.
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
23. Items discussed
●
Economic nature of PSI
●
Upstream features
●
Downstream features
●
Costs vs benefits
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
24. Basic situation
A change in the PSI-supply policy of a specific PSIH
holder:
•
from a closed and / or paying reuse;
•
to an open / free reuse.
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
25. A possible (welfare) approach
(cfr. Houghton)
•
PSIH net position
•
Annual foregone revenues (-)
•
Annual savings (+) / e.g. transaction costs
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
26. A possible (welfare) approach
(cfr. Houghton)
•
PSIH net position
•
Annual foregone revenues (-)
•
Annual savings (+) / e.g. transaction costs
•
(Re)users savings
•
No more payment (+)
•
Time saved (finding material) (+)
•
Time saved (license enquiries) (+)
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
27. A possible (welfare) approach
(cfr. Houghton)
•
PSIH net position
•
Annual foregone revenues (-)
•
Annual savings (+) / e.g. transaction costs
•
(Re)users savings
•
No more payment (+)
•
Time saved (finding material) (+)
•
Time saved (license enquiries) (+)
•
Welfare impact / externalities
•
Based on ex-ante vs. ex-post reuse indicators
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
28. A possible (welfare) approach
(cfr. Houghton)
•
PSIH net position
In some cases, a positive
•
Annual foregone revenues (-) balance can be identified
even at this stage
•
Annual savings (+) / e.g. transaction costs
•
(Re)users savings
•
No more payment (+)
•
Time saved (finding material) (+)
•
Time saved (license enquiries) (+)
•
Welfare impact / externalities
•
Based on ex-ante vs. ex-post reuse indicators
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
29. After all...
... benefits are distributed, while costs (and revenues for
PSIH) are localized.
Therefore, when drafting policies we should (also) ask
ourselves:
How do the benefits from PSI have to be allocated / internalized?
At what stage of the PSI supply should competition (if any) be
actually achieved? Ideally --> at the earliest possible stage.
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
30. Some examples OPENNESS
DEGREE
•
'Typical' firm registry: (virtual) competition downstream
'distributors'
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
31. Some examples OPENNESS
DEGREE
•
'Typical' firm registry: (virtual) competition downstream
'distributors'
•
Public transport companies using PSI as 'bargaining chip' with selected
complementary players (e.g. maps producers), releasing as open
only a small subset of their data. No competition
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
32. Some examples OPENNESS
DEGREE
•
'Typical' firm registry: (virtual) competition downstream
'distributors'
•
Public transport companies using PSI as 'bargaining chip' with selected
complementary players (e.g. maps producers), releasing as open
only a small subset of their data. No competition
•
DK address data: once not available as centralized DB, now available to
distributors mainly for 'supply chain' reasons but at very small costs
(so that double marginalization on users has lower effects); actual
competition downstream those distributors
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
33. Some examples OPENNESS
DEGREE
•
'Typical' firm registry: (virtual) competition downstream
'distributors'
•
Public transport companies using PSI as 'bargaining chip' with selected
complementary players (e.g. maps producers), releasing as open
only a small subset of their data. No competition
•
DK address data: once not available as centralized DB, now available to
distributors mainly for 'supply chain' reasons but at very small costs
(so that double marginalization on users has lower effects); actual
competition downstream those distributors
•
Spanish Cadastre: free and open data downloadable in bulk! Actual
competition downstream PSIH
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012
34. Thank you
Raimondo Iemma
Nexa Center for Internet & Society | EVPSI
raimondo.iemma@polito.it
LAPSI 4th Conference, Turin 9th of July 2012