2. Puzzle
Deng Xiaoping’s school of economic reformism has
modernized the Chinese economy.
However unforeseen and/or poorly managed social
consequences of economic reformism have augmented
social unrest in China.
Will the Communist Party respond sufficiently? Or will the
echoes of Tiananmen reverberate once again?
3. Outline
1. Effects of Economic Reform
A. Radical Reform
B. Sector Investment
C. Foreign Investment
2. Causes of Chinese Social Unrest
A. Rising Living Standards
1. The Wealth Gap
B. Discourse Censorship
C. Foreign Relations
1. Sino-Japanese Trade
3. The Government Response
A. The Balance Beam
4. Speculations and Conclusion
A. Reform From Within
B. Closing Thoughts
C. Suggested Reading
5. Works Cited
4. Radical Reform
• Pre 1978
• Command economy
• Industry first
• Stability
• Post 1978
• “Whether a cat is black or white makes no difference. As long as it
catches mice, it is a good cat.”
• Market economy
• Balanced investment
• Efficiency
• Foreign Investment
7. Rising Living Standards
y = 4E-64e0.076x
R² = 0.933
$0.00
$1,000.00
$2,000.00
$3,000.00
$4,000.00
$5,000.00
$6,000.00
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
GDP per Capita ($US/person)
GDP per capita (current US$)
Expon. (GDP per capita (current US$))
8. The Wealth Gap
y = 0.522x - 998.2
R² = 0.930
y = -0.183x + 372.4
R² = 0.960
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Income Share (%GDP per Income Group)
Income share held by highest 20% Income share held by lowest 20%
Linear (Income share held by highest 20%) Linear (Income share held by lowest 20%)
Wealth Gap
9. Discourse Censorship
2008 2009 2009-2010 2011
Co-designs Bird’s
Nest Olympic
stadium
Publishes a list of
5,835 students
killed Sichuan
earthquake.
Blog shut down
and placed under
house arrest.
Ordered to pay
$2.5m in fines.
12. The Balance Beam
• Reduce the wealth gap while growing wealth at around 7-
8% GDP per year.
• Grow social welfare programs.
• Retain from heavy-handed tactics while addressing
political discourse.
• Develop closer ties to neighbors.
• Temper public nationalism.
13. Reform from Within
Gradual Democratization: Public Nomination, Direct
Election (PNDE) introduced in 1987
14. Closing Thoughts
• China has thrived due to economic reform.
• China still has many social problems that threaten
stability.
• The government must take a balanced approach to
reform.
• The CCP is highly resilient and has not stayed in power
for over 60 years without reason.
15. Suggested Reading for Visitors
Elliott, Michael. "Thirty Years After Deng: The Man Who Changed China." Time
World. Time Magazine, 8 Dec. 2008. Web. 27 Jan. 2013.
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1865539,00.html>.
Wang, Helen H. "The Chinese Middle Class View of the Leadership
Transition." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 09 Nov. 2012. Web. 28 Jan. 2013.
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/helenwang/2012/11/09/the-chinese-middle-class-
view-of-the-leadership-transition/>.
Hillie, Kathrin. "Japan and China Island Tensions Mount." Financial Times, 11
Jan. 2013. Web. 28 Jan. 2013. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/79f1321c-5be8-
11e2-bf31-00144feab49a.html>.
16. Works Cited
Journal Sources
Chan, Anita, and Robert A. Senser. "China's Troubled Workers." Foreign Affairs 76.2 (1997): 104-17. JSTOR. Web. 27 Jan. 2013.
Chen, Sheying. "Economic Reform and Social Change in China: Past, Present, and Future of the Economic State." International
Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 15.4 (2002): 569-89. JSTOR. Web. 27 Jan. 2013.
Dreyer, June Teufel. "Sino-Japanese Rivalry and Its Implications for Developing Nations."Asian Survey 46.4 (2006): 538-
57. JSTOR. Web. 27 Jan. 2013.
Lin, Gang. "Leadership Transition, Intra-Party Democracy, And Institution Building In China."Asian Survey 44.2 (2004): 255-
75. JSTOR. Web. 27 Jan. 2013.
MacKinnon, Rebecca. "Flatter World and Thicker Walls? Blogs, Censorship, and Civic Discourse in China." Public Choice 2nd ser.
134.1 (2008): 31-46. JSTOR. Web. 27 Jan. 2013.
Tsai, Wen-Hsuan, and Peng-Hsiang Kao. "Public Nomination and Direct Election in China: An Adaptive Mechanism for Party
Recruitment and Regime Perpetuation." Asian Survey 52.3 (2012): 484-503. JSTOR. Web. 27 Jan. 2013.
Zheng, Yongnian. "China in 2011: Anger, Political Consciousness, Anxiety, and Uncertainty."Asian Survey 52.1 (2012): 28-
41. JSTOR. Web. 27 Jan. 2013.
Data Sources
"China: GDP per Capita and Income Shares." World Databank. Word Bank, n.d. Web. 27 Jan. 2013.
<http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3>.
"Data on Japan's Trade with ASEAN and China." ASEAN-Japan Centre. Web. 27 Jan. 2013.
<http://www.asean.or.jp/en/asean/know/statistics/4.html>.
Notes de l'éditeur
“Particularly, politics, regarded as the ‘concentrated representation’ of an economic system, was put in command of everything (Chen 571).”Note: the inherent problem with command economies is their inability to exactingly account for supply demand. Furthermore, the Chinese government had a habit of overinvesting in heavy industry and underinvesting in agriculture, causing mass starvations that destroyed any gains generated by investment (Naughton).
Data from <Databank.Worldbank.Org>Bai Mao, Hei Mao: “Economic reform was implemented in 1980, and the first three years were devoted to reform in the countryside. The remarkable economic turnout and desirable sociopolitical effect of the rural reform greatly encouraged the post-Mao leadership under Deng (Chen 573).”Tie Fanwan: “The Chinese labor system had been in the main a system of permanent workers since 1949. Permanent employees constituted over 90 percent of the total number of urban workers and staff in 1966, and over 84 percent in 1978. The problem was that this system spoiled some staff and workers, including business leaders, to revel in a leisurely position and indulge in comfort. Such a system had stifled economic productivity. (Chen 574-575).”This data series does not support the idea that political reform boosted the Chinese economy. The values of agriculture and industry are similar even after the reforms of 1978. It is not until 1995 that gains appear.
Data from <Databank.Worldbank.org>But this one does! The 1978 Reforms allowed foreign companies to invest in China. Furthermore, by freeing up workers from permanent state employment, foreign companies found a wealth of low-cost labor.
"China: GDP per Capita and Income Shares." World Databank. Word Bank, n.d. Web. 27 Jan. 2013. <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3>.
Note: Exponentially multiplying wealth is not equally shared among citizens. The rich receive a disproportionate share of wealth. While middle class citizens want more government incentives, the poor strive for social-welfare. China has a limited budget that cannot support both agendas.“After a decided improvement in living standards during the first half of the 1980’s, income inequality has widened, with workers’ social status declining apace (Chan and Senser, 104).”“Although the government continued to make great efforts to improve the living standards of the grass roots under the established policy of ‘building a harmonious society,’ other factors such as high rates of inflation and widening income disparities have worsened people’s living conditions, real of perceived. China’s middle class are also angry. With the continuous rapid expansion of the state owned enterprise (SOE) sector since the 2008 global financial crisis, private entrepreneurs have been squeezed out by powerful SOEs. Many Chinese entrepreneurs have chosen to migrate to other countries (Zheng 28-29).”
Photograph and Timeline: "Ai Weiwei: Timeline." Telegraph. N.p., 1 Nov. 2011. Web. 27 Jan. 2013. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8861612/Ai-Weiwei-timeline.html>.“They are determined to prevent the Internet from serving as a tool for ‘color revolution’ in the way that online media and communication tools empowered activists in Ukraine and Lebanon (MacKinnon 32).”HOWEVER, native Chinese realize that gains are made incrementally.“Despite a situation that looks rather dire and oppressive from the perspective of people who live in Western democracies, outsiders are surprised to discover that many Chinese bloggers rankle at the Western media’s focus on censorship and blogs to the exclusion of many other-often much more subtle-positive accomplishments of the Chinese blogosphere. (They are), tenacious optimists, slowly and patiently pushing back the boundaries, believing that in the end, history is on their side (MacKinnon 46).”
“Over the past decade, incidents of unrest have seen a sharp rise in China. According to official figures, 80000 were recorded for the year 2006 and 127,000 for the year 2007 (Zheng 30).”“Although the government has tightened political control and media censorship, social networking sites have helped social groups to organize collective protests. Social networking sites have taken off in China since 2009 (Zheng 31).”
Chart From: "Data on Japan's Trade with ASEAN and China." ASEAN-Japan Centre. Web. 27 Jan. 2013. <http://www.asean.or.jp/en/asean/know/statistics/4.html>.China and Japan are shooting themselves by promoting nationalistic propaganda. “China’s rise is good for Japan. Trade with the PRC is a major factor in Japan’s recent, albeit modest, economic recovery. Optimists view China and Japan as economically complementary (Dreyer 555).”“Though frequently obscured by nosier rhetoric, voices of reason do exist. Suggestions have been made that the two sides mutually examine their treatment of history and reach some agreement to coordinate descriptions of each other (Dreyer 556).”“For the moment however, competitive impulses seem more prevalent than cooperative ones. Chinese hatred of Japan still runs deep, and given that Japanese nationalism is also emerging, things do not bode well for 21st century Sino-Japanese Relations (Dreyer 557).”Note: Susan Shirk believes that Chinese and Japanese leaders inflame nationalism during transitions of power to build an image of strength. Both Japan and China appointed new leaders in the previous year. Unfortunately, inflaming nationalism for short-term political gains detracts from both nations’ long-term goals of economic prosperity.
“Handling unrest will require maintaining and perhaps even strengthening a system of coercion that includes breaking up workers’ meetings, suppressing free speech, and enforcing extrajudicial punishment in forced labor camps for those who do not march in lockstep with the party. Such practices could work for a while, but they are awkward at a time where the regime is seeking international legitimacy and facing increasing international scrutiny (Chan and Senser 116).”“When the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao leadership put forward their new policy initiatives of ‘harmonious society’ and ‘scientific development’ upon coming to power, they were warmly received by intellectuals. The leadership was expected to change the country’s development paradigm to cope with serious emerging problems such as widening income disparities, increasing social injustice, and worsening corruption. Now, almost ten years later, not only are these problems unresolved but the overall situation is deteriorating. The rise of social ideologies in recent years reflects the deep concerns of the intellectuals for the future of their country (Zheng 33).”
PNDE“The purpose behind the creation of the PNDE method is to sustain the perpetuity of the CCP’s governing system; it is an adaptive mechanism designed to safeguard the CCP regime (Tsai and Kao 487).”“The emerging system of PNDE was derived by the CCP regime to meet the needs of national development. Many academics believe that the regime is a resilient political system (Tsai and Kao 503).”Picture taken from Tsai and Kao 490.
Then again, if Chinese leaders fail miserably on all social issues, the people will likely rise up, inspired by their Arab compatriots.
Most of this is fairly difficult reading, but don’t be discouraged if you don’t understand every passage. China is a vast and complex country that cannot be explained through three articles.
