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Fuel for pwnage: Exploit kits




Jorge Mieres, Senior Malware Analyst
Vicente Diaz, Senior Malware Analyst

April 21, 2011, Source Conference
Introduction
Something about us


                Vicente Díaz                                  Jorge Mieres

             @trompi                                          @jorgemieres




PAGE 2 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Exploit Packs




PAGE 3 | Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
What we are talking about




                                           Exploit Kits
                                             inside!




PAGE 4 |   Source Conference Boston 2011    | April 21, 2011
What we are talking about



                                                                        Redirections
                                                                         iFrames,
                                                                         Badness

                                              Surfing




                                                   Exploiting Attack!


           Victim

                                                                              Malicious server




PAGE 5 |      Source Conference Boston 2011       | April 21, 2011
A simple plan




PAGE 6 |   Source Conference Boston 2011     | April 21, 2011
Attack process of a conventional Exploit Kit
Server side




                                      What browser is it?
                                           What OS is it?
   Index.php
                                                                 CVE-XXXX-XXXX




                                              Statistics




                                                                    Malicious Code


PAGE 7 |   Source Conference Boston 2011      | April 21, 2011
Detecting the browser
Get the browser




                                             FirePack




PAGE 8 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Detecting the OS
Get the OS




PAGE 9 |     Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Choose the exploit kit
And launch it




PAGE 10 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
You might have not noticed but … They are everywhere




                                            imagen




PAGE 11 |   Source Conference Boston 2011     | April 21, 2011
Exploit Kits in the media




PAGE 12 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Exploit Kits in the media




PAGE 13 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Back to the old times

Mpack – mid 2006


Developed by DreamCoders (russian gang)
Discovered in DreamDownloader campaign
First version by 700 USD


5 exploits:


MDAC (CVE-2006-0003)
WinZip ActiveX (CVE-2006-6884)
Microsoft WebViewFolderIcon ActiveX (CVE-2006-3730)
Microsoft Management Console (CVE-2006-3643)
Windows Media Player Plug-In Firefox & Opera (CVE-2006-0005)

PAGE 14 |     Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Evolution

                                                        Arabella (private)
                                                        Liberty

    MPack                                               Eleonore
                                                                                                Modern
                                                        Napoleon
                                                                                                Phoenix (2.5)
                                                        Unique
                                                                                                Eleonore (1.6)
                                                        JustExploit
                                                        Fragus

     2006
                          2008                    2009                       2010                 2011
    2007
    Mpack                           ElFiesta                            BlackHole
    AdPack                          LuckySploit                         NeoSploit (Reload)
    IcePack                         CRiMEPACK                           Impact (Ex SEO)
    Armitage                        BOMBA (private)                     Siberia (Ex Napoleon)
    FirePack                                                            BleedinLife
    NeoSploit                                                           iPack

PAGE 15 |      Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Let´s see some numbers




PAGE 16 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Exploit Kits by numbers




                  7 out of 10 botnets
                  use Exploit Packs



PAGE 17 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Exploit Kits by numbers
Play time



How many Exploit Kits do you think there are around?




PAGE 18 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Exploit Kits by numbers
Play time



How many servers serving these kits during 2010?




                              35000 +
PAGE 19 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Exploit Kits by numbers
Play time



How many Exploits are necessary for this?




However … just in case

PAGE 20 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Exploit Kits by numbers
 Play time



 How many 0 day exploits used in exploit kits?




They are just incorporated later

 PAGE 21 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Let´s check if there are vulnerabilities around




PAGE 22 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
How many vulnerable systems?


In a given period of time, it could be 100% (0-day vulns)




During 2010, exposition window was                             21 days in average for
Adobe Vulnerabilities.

PAGE 23 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Most common targets (1)


                          Different targeted vulnerabilities among kits


                         3% 3% 1%
                 5%                                                IE
            6%
                                                         30%       Adobe Reader
            8%                                                     Java
                                                                   Firefox
             16%                                                   Browser complement
                                                 28%               Adobe Flash
                                                                   Quicktime
                                                                   Windows
                                                                   Other




PAGE 24 |    Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Most common targets (2)


                            New unique exploits added during 2010




             8%
                                     8%
                                                                39%   Java
            15%                                                       Adobe Reader
                                                                      Windows
                                                                      IE
                15%
                                             15%                      Adobe Flash
                                                                      Quicktime




PAGE 25 |    Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Typical attacking vector


                                             Attacking vector 2010


                 3% 3% 3% 1%
            7%                                                       Adobe Reader
                                                        28%          IE
            9%                                                       Java
                                                                     Adobe Flash
            19%                                                      Firefox
                                                     27%             Quicktime
                                                                     Windows
                                                                     Browser complement
                                                                     Other




PAGE 26 |    Source Conference Boston 2011     | April 21, 2011
How effective are the attacks? Attacking perspective




                           36.16%
PAGE 27 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
How effective are the attacks? Attacking perspective




PAGE 28 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Do they need 0-days?


  What is the all-time most common exploit among all kits?



                       CVE 2006-003
               IE 6 MDAC Remote Code Execution




             Phoenix 2.5, 2011 brand new release

PAGE 29 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
What makes an exploit kit successful?




PAGE 30 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
What makes an exploit kit successful?


•  First
            Price
•  Then
            Exploits
•  Today
            Additional services:
                           VirTest
                           Domain reputation
                           Special offers: Get a bullet proof domain


                          Also: Piracy/easy customization!
PAGE 31 |   Kaspersky Lab PowerPoint Template   | April 21, 2011
New trends (1)
Phoenix 2.5 (2011)


  15 exploits

                                                  Target distribution

                   7%
            6%                               7%
                                                                     40%   Adobe Reader
                                                                           Adobe Flash
            20%                                                            Java
                                                                           IE
                                             20%                           Windows
                                                                           Quicktime




PAGE 32 |    Source Conference Boston 2011        | April 21, 2011
New trends (2)
Phoenix 2.5 (2011)


  15 exploits
                                              Vulnerabilities age



                                            7%
                              13%
                7%                                                        Y2010
                                                                    53%   Y2009
                                                                          Y2008
                     20%
                                                                          Y2007
                                                                          Y2006




PAGE 33 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
New trends (3)
Phoenix 2.5 (2011)




                               IN                                        OUT

            JAVA (Skyline) 2010                                 Java (JRE Calendar) 2008

              Java (MIDI) 2010                                       Java JRE 2009

            Java (javagetval) 2010                                PDF newPlayer 2009


                     New fresh Java exploits replace old ones


PAGE 34 |    Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Java as new attacking vector
There is a good reason for that




                                    87.91 %
PAGE 35 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
The business behind




PAGE 36 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
The business behind




PAGE 37 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Evolution of business

Marketing
" Underground forums
" Dedicated websites
" Social networks: Facebook / Twitter
" Pastebin


Protection and antipiracy
" Malware as a service model
" Zend / IonCube
" Randomization
" Packing/polymorphism




PAGE 38 |    Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Evolution of business




PAGE 39 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Copycats




PAGE 40 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Copycats
Find the 7 differences




PAGE 41 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
The future? Let me see




PAGE 42 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Some conclusions

•  Exploiting is the business, and the business is good


•  However something is changing: increased demand on security


•  New services make the difference, added value


•  Exploits for new platforms will be common


•  Resurrection of old kits, rearmed with new stuff




PAGE 43 |   Source Conference Boston 2011   | April 21, 2011
Thank You
       Vicente Díaz               Jorge Mieres
 vicente.diaz@kaspersky.com   jorge.mieres@kaspersky.com


      @trompi                           @jorgemieres

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Vicente Diaz - Jorge Mieres - Fuel For Pwnage

  • 1. Fuel for pwnage: Exploit kits Jorge Mieres, Senior Malware Analyst Vicente Diaz, Senior Malware Analyst April 21, 2011, Source Conference
  • 2. Introduction Something about us Vicente Díaz Jorge Mieres @trompi @jorgemieres PAGE 2 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 3. Exploit Packs PAGE 3 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 4. What we are talking about Exploit Kits inside! PAGE 4 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 5. What we are talking about Redirections iFrames, Badness Surfing Exploiting Attack! Victim Malicious server PAGE 5 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 6. A simple plan PAGE 6 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 7. Attack process of a conventional Exploit Kit Server side What browser is it? What OS is it? Index.php CVE-XXXX-XXXX Statistics Malicious Code PAGE 7 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 8. Detecting the browser Get the browser FirePack PAGE 8 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 9. Detecting the OS Get the OS PAGE 9 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 10. Choose the exploit kit And launch it PAGE 10 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 11. You might have not noticed but … They are everywhere imagen PAGE 11 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 12. Exploit Kits in the media PAGE 12 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 13. Exploit Kits in the media PAGE 13 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 14. Back to the old times Mpack – mid 2006 Developed by DreamCoders (russian gang) Discovered in DreamDownloader campaign First version by 700 USD 5 exploits: MDAC (CVE-2006-0003) WinZip ActiveX (CVE-2006-6884) Microsoft WebViewFolderIcon ActiveX (CVE-2006-3730) Microsoft Management Console (CVE-2006-3643) Windows Media Player Plug-In Firefox & Opera (CVE-2006-0005) PAGE 14 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 15. Evolution Arabella (private) Liberty MPack Eleonore Modern Napoleon Phoenix (2.5) Unique Eleonore (1.6) JustExploit Fragus 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2007 Mpack ElFiesta BlackHole AdPack LuckySploit NeoSploit (Reload) IcePack CRiMEPACK Impact (Ex SEO) Armitage BOMBA (private) Siberia (Ex Napoleon) FirePack BleedinLife NeoSploit iPack PAGE 15 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 16. Let´s see some numbers PAGE 16 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 17. Exploit Kits by numbers 7 out of 10 botnets use Exploit Packs PAGE 17 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 18. Exploit Kits by numbers Play time How many Exploit Kits do you think there are around? PAGE 18 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 19. Exploit Kits by numbers Play time How many servers serving these kits during 2010? 35000 + PAGE 19 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 20. Exploit Kits by numbers Play time How many Exploits are necessary for this? However … just in case PAGE 20 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 21. Exploit Kits by numbers Play time How many 0 day exploits used in exploit kits? They are just incorporated later PAGE 21 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 22. Let´s check if there are vulnerabilities around PAGE 22 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 23. How many vulnerable systems? In a given period of time, it could be 100% (0-day vulns) During 2010, exposition window was 21 days in average for Adobe Vulnerabilities. PAGE 23 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 24. Most common targets (1) Different targeted vulnerabilities among kits 3% 3% 1% 5% IE 6% 30% Adobe Reader 8% Java Firefox 16% Browser complement 28% Adobe Flash Quicktime Windows Other PAGE 24 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 25. Most common targets (2) New unique exploits added during 2010 8% 8% 39% Java 15% Adobe Reader Windows IE 15% 15% Adobe Flash Quicktime PAGE 25 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 26. Typical attacking vector Attacking vector 2010 3% 3% 3% 1% 7% Adobe Reader 28% IE 9% Java Adobe Flash 19% Firefox 27% Quicktime Windows Browser complement Other PAGE 26 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 27. How effective are the attacks? Attacking perspective 36.16% PAGE 27 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 28. How effective are the attacks? Attacking perspective PAGE 28 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 29. Do they need 0-days? What is the all-time most common exploit among all kits? CVE 2006-003 IE 6 MDAC Remote Code Execution Phoenix 2.5, 2011 brand new release PAGE 29 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 30. What makes an exploit kit successful? PAGE 30 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 31. What makes an exploit kit successful? •  First Price •  Then Exploits •  Today Additional services: VirTest Domain reputation Special offers: Get a bullet proof domain Also: Piracy/easy customization! PAGE 31 | Kaspersky Lab PowerPoint Template | April 21, 2011
  • 32. New trends (1) Phoenix 2.5 (2011) 15 exploits Target distribution 7% 6% 7% 40% Adobe Reader Adobe Flash 20% Java IE 20% Windows Quicktime PAGE 32 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 33. New trends (2) Phoenix 2.5 (2011) 15 exploits Vulnerabilities age 7% 13% 7% Y2010 53% Y2009 Y2008 20% Y2007 Y2006 PAGE 33 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 34. New trends (3) Phoenix 2.5 (2011) IN OUT JAVA (Skyline) 2010 Java (JRE Calendar) 2008 Java (MIDI) 2010 Java JRE 2009 Java (javagetval) 2010 PDF newPlayer 2009 New fresh Java exploits replace old ones PAGE 34 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 35. Java as new attacking vector There is a good reason for that 87.91 % PAGE 35 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 36. The business behind PAGE 36 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 37. The business behind PAGE 37 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 38. Evolution of business Marketing " Underground forums " Dedicated websites " Social networks: Facebook / Twitter " Pastebin Protection and antipiracy " Malware as a service model " Zend / IonCube " Randomization " Packing/polymorphism PAGE 38 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 39. Evolution of business PAGE 39 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 40. Copycats PAGE 40 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 41. Copycats Find the 7 differences PAGE 41 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 42. The future? Let me see PAGE 42 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 43. Some conclusions •  Exploiting is the business, and the business is good •  However something is changing: increased demand on security •  New services make the difference, added value •  Exploits for new platforms will be common •  Resurrection of old kits, rearmed with new stuff PAGE 43 | Source Conference Boston 2011 | April 21, 2011
  • 44. Thank You Vicente Díaz Jorge Mieres vicente.diaz@kaspersky.com jorge.mieres@kaspersky.com @trompi @jorgemieres