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Cyber Security Management
In a Highly Innovative World
David Etue, VP Corporate Development Strategy, SafeNet
June 2013
© SafeNet - All Rights Reserved
Agenda
About Me and SafeNet
Context
Evolving Adversaries, Evolving Threats
Evolving Technology, Evolving Dependence
Solutions and Ideas
About David Etue @djetue
• VP, Corporate Development Strategy at SafeNet
• Former Cyber Security Practice Lead [PRTM Management Consultants] (now
PwC)
• Former VP Products and Markets [Fidelis Security Systems]
• Former Manager, Information Security [General Electric Company]
• Industry
• Faculty: The Institute for Applied Network Security (IANS)
• Certified Information Privacy Professional (CIPP/G)
• Certified CISO (C|CISO)
• Cyber things that interest me
• Adversary innovation
• Applying intelligence cycle / OODA loop in cyber
• Supply chain security
• Cloud and virtualization security
Who We Are
Trusted to protect the world’s most sensitive data for
the world’s most trusted brands.
We protect the most
money that moves in
the world, $1 trillion
daily.
We protect the most digital
identities in the world.
We protect the most
sensitive information
in the world.
FOUNDED
1983
REVENUE
~330m
EMPLOYEES
+1,400
In 25 countries
OWENERSHIP
Private
GLOBAL FOOTPRINT
+25,000
Customers in
100 countries
ACCREDITED
Products certified
to the highest
security standard
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Context
We Have Finite Resources…
We Can Not Protect Everything!
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fdr_sidefront.jpgLufthansa Airbus A380 D-AIMC with the name "Peking" at Stuttgart
Lasse Fuss
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lufthansa_A380_D-AIMC.jpg
“Black Box”
Consequences: Value & Replaceability
http://blog.cognitivedissidents.com/2011/10/24/a-replaceability-continuum/
Misplaced Focus
“With the breach-a-week over the last
two years, the key determinate was
nothing YOU did… but rather was WHO
was after you.”
The Control Continuum
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Evolving Adversaries…
…Evolving Threats
10
What is a “Threat”?
A Threat is an Actor
with a Capability
and a Motive
Threats Are A “Who”, Not a “What”
A Modern Pantheon of
Adversary Classes
Methods
“MetaSploit” DoS Phishing Rootkit SQLi Auth Exfiltration Malware Physical
Impacts
Reputational Personal Confidentiality Integrity Availability
Target Assets
Credit Card #s
Web
Properties
Intellectual
Property
PII / Identity
Cyber
Infrastructure
Core Business
Processes
Motivations
Financial Industrial Military Ideological Political Prestige
Actor Classes
States Competitors
Organized
Crime
Script
Kiddies
Terrorists “Hactivists” Insiders Auditors
Methods
“MetaSploit” DoS Phishing Rootkit SQLi Auth Exfiltratio
n Malware Physical
Impacts
Reputational Personal Confidentiality Integrity Availability
Target Assets
Credit Card #s
Web
Properties
Intellectual
Property
PII / Identity
Cyber
Infrastructure
Core Business
Processes
Motivations
Financial Industrial Military Ideological Political Prestige
Actor Classes
States Competitors
Organized
Crime
Script
Kiddies
Terrorists “Hactivists” Insiders Auditors
Profiling a Particular Actor
Script Kiddies (aka Casual Adversary)
14
“MetaSploit”, SQLi,
Phishing
Confidentially,
Reputation
CCN/Fungible
Profit, Prestige
Skiddie
Organized Crime
Malware, Botnets,
Rootkits
Confidentially
Fungible, Banking
Profit
Organized Crime
Custom
Malware, SpearPhishing, Physi
cal, ++
Intellectual Property Trade
Secrets Infrastructure
Confidentially,
Reputation
Industrial/Military
State/Espionage
Adaptive Persistent Adversaries
Hactivists Chaotic Actors
DoS, SQLi, Phishing
Availability, Confidentiality,
Reputation, Personal
Web
Properties, Individuals, Po
licy
Ideological and/or
LULZ
Chaotic Actor
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Evolving Technology…
…Evolving Dependence
18
The Value An Organization Delivers
Is Driven By Its Differentiation
Suppliers &
Partners
Your
Organization Customers
Differentiation
Intellectual
Property
Strategy
Core
Processes
Competitive Differentiation is Dependent
on Information and the IT Infrastructure
Intellectual
Property
Strategy
Core
Processes
Information Security’s Mission Is To Protect
These Key Digital Assets
Optimizing Security Management
Is a Multi-Faceted Challenge
Customer
Needs
Business
Needs
Regulators
(Compliance)
Threats
Branch Office
Cloud, Virtualization, Mobile, and
Consumerization! Oh My!
22
Web 2.0 Application
Remote Replication
• Sensitive Data on the Rise
• More IT Dependency
• Compliance
• Variety of Threat Actors
Growing Risk
• Traditional Perimeter GONE!
• SaaS, Cloud & Web 2.0 Apps
• Collaboration Partners
• Growing Mobile Devices
No Physical Controls
Internet
SaaS Cloud
Extranet
WAN
Docs
Offline
Folders
Shared
Folders
DatabaseGroupware
E-Mail
Media Flash-
drive
Data Center
Laptop
Mobile
Virtualization and Cloud Computing
Are Economically Compelling and Here to Stay
23
What Has Changed?
Perimeter Layers Collaboration Integrated
Amount of
Information
and
Infrastructure
Attack
Surface
Cost of
Failure
Time
As Organizations Have Embraced Technology, the Amount of
Information, Attack Surface, and Cost of Failure Have All
Skyrocketed!
Another Change:
The New Definition of Privilege
25
Privileged Users Even More Powerful
In Cloud/VIrt
26
Virtual Machine Virtual Machine Virtual Machine
Compute Storage Network
Virtual
Compute
CPU
Virtual Storage
NAS / SAN
Management
Database As-
A-Service
Application
Guest OS
Application Application
Guest OSGuest OS
Virtual
Network
Physical
Network
Hypervisor
Server
Application
OS
CPU Disk
Network
BEFORE AFTER
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Solutions and Ideas
27
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Adversary ROI
Why Adversary ROI
 Adversaries want assets -
vulnerabilities are a means
 Our attack surface is
approaching infinity
 Adversaries have scarce
resources too
Adversaries care if *they* can get a return on
investment from an attack, not you…
Adversary ROI Came About By
Looking at Risk
A risk requires a threat and a vulnerability
that results in a negative consequence
We have finite resources, and must optimize the entire
risk equation for our success!
Current State
Threat
Vulnerability
Consequence
Proposed State?
Understanding the Risk Equation
Risk = Threat + Vulnerability
Most Cyber Security programs focused solely on vulnerability
management, which necessary but insufficient:
• Technology changes at high rate of speed making vulnerability a moving
target
• Adversary community changes faster than defenders
• Attacks quickly move to the most porous layer
• End users likely to remain a significant vulnerability
Focus of most cyber
security programs
The Cyber Security “arms race” today focuses
Vulnerabilities—Its time to address other variables!
Value Favors the Attacker
Public Sensitive
Highly Replicable
Sensitive
Irreplaceable
Information Classification
AttackerGains
Typical IT
Security
Budget
(1-12% of
IT Budget)
Are you prepared to address a
funded nation state targeting
your highest value intellectual
property?
The Adversary ROI Equation
Adversary ROI =
Attack Value
Cost of the Attack
Probability
of Success
Deterrence
Measures
(% Chance of Getting Caught x Cost of Getting Caught)
Value of Assets Compromised +
Adversary Value of Operational Impact
X
-
[ ] Cost of
the Attack
-
( )
Ability to
respond and
recover key
Impacting Adversary ROI
It is typically not desirable
to make your assets less
valuable
Impact of getting caught is
typically a government issue
Increase
adversary “Work
Effort”
Ability to
respond and
recover key
Increase
adversary “Work
Effort”
Adversary ROI =
Attack Value
Cost of the Attack
Probability
of Success
Deterrence
Measures
(% Chance of Getting Caught x Cost of Getting Caught)
Value of Assets Compromised +
Adversary Value of Operational Impact
X
-
( ) Cost of
the Attack
-
( )
Every Organization Should Know The Key
Components to This Model
Methods
Impacts
Target Assets
Motivations
Actor Classes
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The Control Quotient
36
The Control Quotient Definition
 Quotient: (from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quotient )
• the number resulting from the division of one number by another
• the numerical ratio usually multiplied by 100 between a test score
and a standard value
• quota, share
• the magnitude of a specified characteristic or quality
 Control Quotient: optimization of a security control based
on the maximum efficacy within sphere of control (or
influence or trust) of the underlying infrastructure*
 *unless there is an independent variable…
Amazon EC2 - IaaS
The lower down the stack the Cloud
provider stops, the more security you are
tactically responsible for implementing &
managing yourself.
Salesforce - SaaS
Google AppEngine - PaaS
The Control Quotient and the SPI Stack
Stack by Chris Hoff -> CSA
Security Management & GRC
Identity/Entity Security
Data Security
Host
Network
Infrastructure Security
Application
Security
CSA Cloud Model
The Control Quotient and the SPI Stack
CSA Cloud Model
Security Management & GRC
Identity/Entity Security
Data Security
Host
Network
Infrastructure Security
Application
Security
Virtualization, Software Defined
Networks, and Public/Hybrid/Community
Cloud Forces a Change in How Security
Controls Are Evaluated and Deployed
The Control Quotient and the SPI Stack
To Be Successful, We Must Focus on the Control
Kept (or Gained!), NOT the Control Lost…
Half Full or Half Empty?
http://www.flickr.com/photos/markhillary/6342705495 http://www.flickr.com/photos/tallentshow/2399373550
More Than Just Technology…
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The Secure Breach
43
Crunchy on the Outside…
44
http://www.flickr.com/photos/theilr/2240742119/
Time to Secure the Breach
45
Breach Prevention Era
Secure Breach Era
Key Enablers to the Secure Breach
Encryption (and Key Management)
Identity and Access Management with Strong Authentication
Segmentation
Privilege User Management
Detection and Response Capabilities
Asset, Configuration, and Change Management
46
4 Step Program For Ushering In the
“Secure Breach” Era
• Its time to try something new…
Introspection
• You can’t prevent a perimeter breach…
Acceptance
• Know your enemies and what they are after…
Understanding
• Decrease adversary ROI…
Action
47
Insert Your Name
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Thank You!
Any questions
David Etue
@djetue
Watch the full webcast on demand:
https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/6319/75109
48
Follow SafeNet on Social Media
[Blog] http://data-protection.safenet-inc.com
@safenetinc
http://www.linkedin.com/company/safenet
http://youtube.com/safenetinc
http://facebook.com/safenetinc
https://plus.google.com/+safenet
http://pinterest.com/safenetinc/
http://www.safenet-inc.com/rss.aspx
http://www.slideshare.net/SafeNet
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http://www.brighttalk.com/channel/2037
http://community.spiceworks.com/pages/safenetinc
49

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Cyber Security Management in a Highly Innovative World

  • 1. Insert Your Name Insert Your Title Insert Date Cyber Security Management In a Highly Innovative World David Etue, VP Corporate Development Strategy, SafeNet June 2013 © SafeNet - All Rights Reserved
  • 2. Agenda About Me and SafeNet Context Evolving Adversaries, Evolving Threats Evolving Technology, Evolving Dependence Solutions and Ideas
  • 3. About David Etue @djetue • VP, Corporate Development Strategy at SafeNet • Former Cyber Security Practice Lead [PRTM Management Consultants] (now PwC) • Former VP Products and Markets [Fidelis Security Systems] • Former Manager, Information Security [General Electric Company] • Industry • Faculty: The Institute for Applied Network Security (IANS) • Certified Information Privacy Professional (CIPP/G) • Certified CISO (C|CISO) • Cyber things that interest me • Adversary innovation • Applying intelligence cycle / OODA loop in cyber • Supply chain security • Cloud and virtualization security
  • 4. Who We Are Trusted to protect the world’s most sensitive data for the world’s most trusted brands. We protect the most money that moves in the world, $1 trillion daily. We protect the most digital identities in the world. We protect the most sensitive information in the world. FOUNDED 1983 REVENUE ~330m EMPLOYEES +1,400 In 25 countries OWENERSHIP Private GLOBAL FOOTPRINT +25,000 Customers in 100 countries ACCREDITED Products certified to the highest security standard
  • 5. Insert Your Name Insert Your Title Insert Date Context
  • 6. We Have Finite Resources… We Can Not Protect Everything! http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fdr_sidefront.jpgLufthansa Airbus A380 D-AIMC with the name "Peking" at Stuttgart Lasse Fuss http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lufthansa_A380_D-AIMC.jpg “Black Box”
  • 7. Consequences: Value & Replaceability http://blog.cognitivedissidents.com/2011/10/24/a-replaceability-continuum/
  • 8. Misplaced Focus “With the breach-a-week over the last two years, the key determinate was nothing YOU did… but rather was WHO was after you.”
  • 10. Insert Your Name Insert Your Title Insert Date Evolving Adversaries… …Evolving Threats 10
  • 11. What is a “Threat”? A Threat is an Actor with a Capability and a Motive Threats Are A “Who”, Not a “What”
  • 12. A Modern Pantheon of Adversary Classes Methods “MetaSploit” DoS Phishing Rootkit SQLi Auth Exfiltration Malware Physical Impacts Reputational Personal Confidentiality Integrity Availability Target Assets Credit Card #s Web Properties Intellectual Property PII / Identity Cyber Infrastructure Core Business Processes Motivations Financial Industrial Military Ideological Political Prestige Actor Classes States Competitors Organized Crime Script Kiddies Terrorists “Hactivists” Insiders Auditors
  • 13. Methods “MetaSploit” DoS Phishing Rootkit SQLi Auth Exfiltratio n Malware Physical Impacts Reputational Personal Confidentiality Integrity Availability Target Assets Credit Card #s Web Properties Intellectual Property PII / Identity Cyber Infrastructure Core Business Processes Motivations Financial Industrial Military Ideological Political Prestige Actor Classes States Competitors Organized Crime Script Kiddies Terrorists “Hactivists” Insiders Auditors Profiling a Particular Actor
  • 14. Script Kiddies (aka Casual Adversary) 14 “MetaSploit”, SQLi, Phishing Confidentially, Reputation CCN/Fungible Profit, Prestige Skiddie
  • 16. Custom Malware, SpearPhishing, Physi cal, ++ Intellectual Property Trade Secrets Infrastructure Confidentially, Reputation Industrial/Military State/Espionage Adaptive Persistent Adversaries
  • 17. Hactivists Chaotic Actors DoS, SQLi, Phishing Availability, Confidentiality, Reputation, Personal Web Properties, Individuals, Po licy Ideological and/or LULZ Chaotic Actor
  • 18. Insert Your Name Insert Your Title Insert Date Evolving Technology… …Evolving Dependence 18
  • 19. The Value An Organization Delivers Is Driven By Its Differentiation Suppliers & Partners Your Organization Customers Differentiation Intellectual Property Strategy Core Processes
  • 20. Competitive Differentiation is Dependent on Information and the IT Infrastructure Intellectual Property Strategy Core Processes Information Security’s Mission Is To Protect These Key Digital Assets
  • 21. Optimizing Security Management Is a Multi-Faceted Challenge Customer Needs Business Needs Regulators (Compliance) Threats
  • 22. Branch Office Cloud, Virtualization, Mobile, and Consumerization! Oh My! 22 Web 2.0 Application Remote Replication • Sensitive Data on the Rise • More IT Dependency • Compliance • Variety of Threat Actors Growing Risk • Traditional Perimeter GONE! • SaaS, Cloud & Web 2.0 Apps • Collaboration Partners • Growing Mobile Devices No Physical Controls Internet SaaS Cloud Extranet WAN Docs Offline Folders Shared Folders DatabaseGroupware E-Mail Media Flash- drive Data Center Laptop Mobile
  • 23. Virtualization and Cloud Computing Are Economically Compelling and Here to Stay 23
  • 24. What Has Changed? Perimeter Layers Collaboration Integrated Amount of Information and Infrastructure Attack Surface Cost of Failure Time As Organizations Have Embraced Technology, the Amount of Information, Attack Surface, and Cost of Failure Have All Skyrocketed!
  • 25. Another Change: The New Definition of Privilege 25
  • 26. Privileged Users Even More Powerful In Cloud/VIrt 26 Virtual Machine Virtual Machine Virtual Machine Compute Storage Network Virtual Compute CPU Virtual Storage NAS / SAN Management Database As- A-Service Application Guest OS Application Application Guest OSGuest OS Virtual Network Physical Network Hypervisor Server Application OS CPU Disk Network BEFORE AFTER
  • 27. Insert Your Name Insert Your Title Insert Date Solutions and Ideas 27
  • 28. Insert Your Name Insert Your Title Insert Date Adversary ROI
  • 29. Why Adversary ROI  Adversaries want assets - vulnerabilities are a means  Our attack surface is approaching infinity  Adversaries have scarce resources too Adversaries care if *they* can get a return on investment from an attack, not you…
  • 30. Adversary ROI Came About By Looking at Risk A risk requires a threat and a vulnerability that results in a negative consequence We have finite resources, and must optimize the entire risk equation for our success! Current State Threat Vulnerability Consequence Proposed State?
  • 31. Understanding the Risk Equation Risk = Threat + Vulnerability Most Cyber Security programs focused solely on vulnerability management, which necessary but insufficient: • Technology changes at high rate of speed making vulnerability a moving target • Adversary community changes faster than defenders • Attacks quickly move to the most porous layer • End users likely to remain a significant vulnerability Focus of most cyber security programs The Cyber Security “arms race” today focuses Vulnerabilities—Its time to address other variables!
  • 32. Value Favors the Attacker Public Sensitive Highly Replicable Sensitive Irreplaceable Information Classification AttackerGains Typical IT Security Budget (1-12% of IT Budget) Are you prepared to address a funded nation state targeting your highest value intellectual property?
  • 33. The Adversary ROI Equation Adversary ROI = Attack Value Cost of the Attack Probability of Success Deterrence Measures (% Chance of Getting Caught x Cost of Getting Caught) Value of Assets Compromised + Adversary Value of Operational Impact X - [ ] Cost of the Attack - ( )
  • 34. Ability to respond and recover key Impacting Adversary ROI It is typically not desirable to make your assets less valuable Impact of getting caught is typically a government issue Increase adversary “Work Effort” Ability to respond and recover key Increase adversary “Work Effort” Adversary ROI = Attack Value Cost of the Attack Probability of Success Deterrence Measures (% Chance of Getting Caught x Cost of Getting Caught) Value of Assets Compromised + Adversary Value of Operational Impact X - ( ) Cost of the Attack - ( )
  • 35. Every Organization Should Know The Key Components to This Model Methods Impacts Target Assets Motivations Actor Classes
  • 36. Insert Your Name Insert Your Title Insert Date The Control Quotient 36
  • 37. The Control Quotient Definition  Quotient: (from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/quotient ) • the number resulting from the division of one number by another • the numerical ratio usually multiplied by 100 between a test score and a standard value • quota, share • the magnitude of a specified characteristic or quality  Control Quotient: optimization of a security control based on the maximum efficacy within sphere of control (or influence or trust) of the underlying infrastructure*  *unless there is an independent variable…
  • 38. Amazon EC2 - IaaS The lower down the stack the Cloud provider stops, the more security you are tactically responsible for implementing & managing yourself. Salesforce - SaaS Google AppEngine - PaaS The Control Quotient and the SPI Stack Stack by Chris Hoff -> CSA
  • 39. Security Management & GRC Identity/Entity Security Data Security Host Network Infrastructure Security Application Security CSA Cloud Model The Control Quotient and the SPI Stack
  • 40. CSA Cloud Model Security Management & GRC Identity/Entity Security Data Security Host Network Infrastructure Security Application Security Virtualization, Software Defined Networks, and Public/Hybrid/Community Cloud Forces a Change in How Security Controls Are Evaluated and Deployed The Control Quotient and the SPI Stack
  • 41. To Be Successful, We Must Focus on the Control Kept (or Gained!), NOT the Control Lost… Half Full or Half Empty?
  • 43. Insert Your Name Insert Your Title Insert Date The Secure Breach 43
  • 44. Crunchy on the Outside… 44 http://www.flickr.com/photos/theilr/2240742119/
  • 45. Time to Secure the Breach 45 Breach Prevention Era Secure Breach Era
  • 46. Key Enablers to the Secure Breach Encryption (and Key Management) Identity and Access Management with Strong Authentication Segmentation Privilege User Management Detection and Response Capabilities Asset, Configuration, and Change Management 46
  • 47. 4 Step Program For Ushering In the “Secure Breach” Era • Its time to try something new… Introspection • You can’t prevent a perimeter breach… Acceptance • Know your enemies and what they are after… Understanding • Decrease adversary ROI… Action 47
  • 48. Insert Your Name Insert Your Title Insert Date Thank You! Any questions David Etue @djetue Watch the full webcast on demand: https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/6319/75109 48
  • 49. Follow SafeNet on Social Media [Blog] http://data-protection.safenet-inc.com @safenetinc http://www.linkedin.com/company/safenet http://youtube.com/safenetinc http://facebook.com/safenetinc https://plus.google.com/+safenet http://pinterest.com/safenetinc/ http://www.safenet-inc.com/rss.aspx http://www.slideshare.net/SafeNet http://www.govloop.com/group/safenetgov http://www.brighttalk.com/channel/2037 http://community.spiceworks.com/pages/safenetinc 49

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. Economics is the study of how society allocates scarce resources and goods. A well managed Info/Cyber/Security/Assurance program requires intelligent allocation of scarce resources–we can not protect everythingWe can’t build the entire airplane out of the “black box”
  2. Classes of actors can be identified (and even particular actors in some cases)Capabilities can be estimated (and potentially managed by working Governments and Law Enforcement)Motive can be analyzed via “Adversary ROI”
  3. Rorschach Test: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rorschach_testWe see in Anonymous what we WANT to see.. We project. Our perceptions say more about us than they do about the multitude of subgroups/causes in Anonymous.
  4. http://www.vmware.com/files/pdf/solutions/Business-Value-Virtualization.pdfhttp://aws.amazon.com/free/
  5. When our attack surfaces approach infinity, its easier to manage threatsCONTROL QUOTIENTMost security programs focused solely on vulnerability management, which necessary but insufficientTechnology changes at high rate of speed making vulnerability a moving targetAdversary community changes faster than defendersAttacks quickly move to the most porous layerEnd users likely to remain a significant vulnerability
  6. Serenity prayer