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Measuring and Enabling Resiliency in Distribution
Systems With Multiple Microgrids
Sayonsom Chanda
Major Advisor: Dr. Anurag K. Srivastava
1
Presentation Outline
– Problem Statement
• Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems
– Literature Review
• What has been done so far and what are the research gaps?
– Computation of Resiliency Metrics
• mathematical formulation
– Enabling resiliency
• Using multiple microgrids
– Simulation and Results
• On real and standard test feeders
– Conclusions
2
Presentation Outline
– Problem Statement
• Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems
– Literature Review
• What has been done so far and what are the research gaps?
– Computation of Resiliency Metrics
• mathematical formulation
– Enabling resiliency
• Using multiple microgrids
– Simulation and Results
• On real and standard test feeders
– Conclusions
3
Vulnerabilities of power distribution system
4
High impact,
Low frequency events
Smart Grid has
information flow
as critical to its
operation: increasing
Vulnerability to getting
hacked.
Level of servicing,
OH/UG Construction
Mitigation Schemes
Protective relays Enough resources to
meet demands?
Energy security
issues.
Acts of terrorism.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Focus of the thesis: for any extreme event, analysis of resiliency.
Background: Effect of weather on continuity of power supply
400% increase in number of weather
related power outages over the last 20
years, in US .
In 2012, Superstorm Sandy left more than
8.5 million customers without power
Economic Benefits of Increasing Electric
Grid Resilience to Weather Outages
estimates the average annual cost of
weather-related power outages to be
between $18 and $33 billion over the past
decade
To reduce these losses and avert
discontinuity of power supply during
unfavorable weather events, we must
re-engineer our existing systems to be
resilient to weather changes.
Weather-related outages in US between 1992-2012
Picture: Region-wise most financial losses as a result of
power interruption due to weather-related events.
Source: National Climatic Data Center
PROBLEM STATEMENT 5
Presentation Outline
– Problem Statement
• Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems
– Literature Review
• What has been done so far and what are the research gaps?
– Computation of Resiliency Metrics
• mathematical formulation
– Enabling resiliency
• Using multiple microgrids
– Simulation and Results
• On real and standard test feeders
– Conclusions
6
Concept of resilience applied to power systems
• Resilience of networks [social networks, water networks,
airport networks] is well-studied. However, resilience of power
distribution system is a new topic of interest.
• Multiple definitions of resiliency
– US PPD-21: reducing the risk to critical infrastructure by physical
means or defense cyber measures to intrusions, attacks, or the
effects of natural or man-made disasters.
– NARUC: robustness and recovery characteristics of utility
infrastructure and operations, which avoid or minimize interruptions
of service during an extraordinary and hazardous event.
– Dominion Power Virginia: ability to reduce the magnitude and/or
duration of a disruptive event
– SNL – Resiliency is the ability of system to respond and remain
functional during an event X, given there is a threat Y of it happening.
7LITERATURE REVIEW
• Resiliency has been studied from several perspectives, for both long and short time
scales.
Interest in resiliency power system research has increased over the years.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Summary of literature review
Database: IEEExplore Digital Library
Keyword: Power System Resiliency
Database: Google Scholar
Keyword: Resiliency Metrics
• Metrics can evaluate both Operational and Planning resiliency, or deal with them
separately.
• No formal resiliency metric for power distribution system
8
Power System resilience has been studied from complex network point of
view.
Fig: European Power Grid
• 3,000 Nodes, 150,000 mi of HV network
• Resiliency of this network has been studied by
Pagani (’12), Solé (’08), Rosas-Casals(’07),
Albert(’04), Crucitti(’04)
For the US Power Grid:
• Watts(’99)- studied US Power Grid resiliency in his
book.
• Holmgren(’07)- compared US Grid resiliency to
Nordic Grid Resiliency
• Wei(’10), Chen(’07)- Vulnerability Evaluation
Models
• Wang(’10)- NYISO-2935 bus system, WECC
system
• Bompard(’10), Dwivedi(’10), Pahwa(’10)- complex
network analysis of IEEE Systems
9LITERATURE REVIEW
Differences between Reliability and Resiliency
Resiliency
• Measured in anticipation of some
form of threat
Reliability
• Measure of operational consistency
and good performance of Utility
towards its customers over long time
period.
• Priority of critical loads is
considered
• No classification load is reflected in
measurement of reliability
• Resiliency is an indication of
preparedness of a network to
withstand or avert damage coming
from outside the power system [like
weather]
• Reliability accounts for only power
lost due to operational or equipment
damages, over which Utility has
control. It doesn't consider external
factors
• No formal metrics • SAIDI, SAIFI, MAIFI, etc
10LITERATURE REVIEW
LITERATURE REVIEW
Approaches towards studying Resiliency
System A and System B show different
resiliency based on what reconfiguration
algorithms are there in the DMS [ RAND]
Sandia National Lab Conceptual Framework for deriving Resiliency
Metrics as a PDF. Higher Resiliency is shifting the peak to the left.
Resiliency Metrics Computation and Enabling
Framework proposed by Panteli et al
11
Thus, a resilient distribution system should be able to:
W
R
A
P
Withstand any sudden inclement weather or human attack
on the infrastructure.
Respond quickly, to restore balance in the community as
quickly as possible, after an inevitable attack.
Adapt to abrupt and new operating conditions, while
maintaining smooth functionality, both locally and globally.
Predict or Prevent future attacks based on patterns of past
experiences, or reliable forecasts.
12LITERATURE REVIEW
Presentation Outline
– Problem Statement
• Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems
– Literature Review
• What has been done so far and what are the research gaps?
– Computation of Resiliency Metrics
• mathematical formulation
– Enabling resiliency
• Using multiple microgrids
– Simulation and Results
• On real and standard test feeders
– Conclusions
13
Need for Resiliency Metric & Computation Framework
Resiliency Metrics can help
• justify DMS control actions
• cost-benefit analysis of microgrids
• mitigate loss and inconvenience through
proactive action in anticipation of storm
• improve the network through feedback
• impact economics of power exchange
between grid to consumers in microgrids
Computing Resiliency is a complex
decision making problem.
• ANL proposed an infrastructure survey based
approach, viz, RMI
• LBNL follows a modeling based optimization
approach to compute resiliency (below)
• Resiliency Metric should reflect redundancy
and restoration efforts of the network.
14FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Procedure to compute resiliency metric
• Topological Resiliency (RT)
– Percolation Theory
• Weather Factor (WF), Cyber-attack threat
• Age of Equipments/Maintenance Levels (λ)
• Control Systems and DMS Response
– Restoration schemes by operating switches
– Load flow in damaged network.
• Multi-criteria decision making
– Many approaches possible.
– Chose Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP)
FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Fragility Model
Restoration &
Recovery
Computation
15
Approaches to determine Topological Resiliency
(i) Using Complex Network Analysis
(ii) Using path redundancy as a criteria (direct approach)
However, the first step is to convert the
power systems into a graph
B1
B6
B2 B3
B4
B5
1
2
3
4
5
6
Bus → Node (N)
Branch → Edge (E)
Generator → N/A
Load → N/A
G=(N,E)
16FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Important Graph Theory Parameters
17FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Properties of Distribution System Topology
• Dist. Sys. modeled as a graph G(N,E) with N nodes and E edges.
• Average Degree <k> is a measure of how many nodes are
connected to one node on an average. Higher value indicates
greater fragility.
• Ratio of first moment and second moment of average degree
distribution should tend to zero for less fragile network.
• Determines the most important nodes of a network. Computed as
where nk --> nl,ni = 1 if the shortest path between nk and nl passes
through ni, and 0 otherwise. It is computed through all nodes.
• It is an indicator that captures the fact that the higher the value of
second smallest eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix of the network the
network is more resilient
Degree
Betweenness
Centrality
Algebraic
Connectivity
18FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
During a forceful disruptive event, nodes have high and random probability of
getting damaged.
• Nf  Largest component of the damaged network
• N0  Largest component of the undamaged network
• f  fraction of damaged nodes
For each distribution system a different plot is obtained. So direct conclusion about
resiliency cannot be made.
19FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Percolation theory is used to flow of information/mass in networks with
uncertainties in path of propagation.
• pc  percolation threshold [it’s a value of probability between 0 to 1]
• p  Probability of each node being functional despite an unfavorable event
• <σ>  Average size of the clusters (i.e. no. of nodes in an island) prior to
reaching the percolation threshold
• Percolation Theory is easy to
find a path from a source to a
sink, or check its feasibility.
• It can be used to determine a
condition in the distribution
system – such that no matter
how many nodes are damaged
there is at least one path from a
sink to a source. That condition
is called Percolation
Threshold.
20FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Simplistic Study of Percolation Threshold
• Percolation Threshold is useful in networks where all loads are critical, or
when we are focusing only on critical loads of a network.
[so, if a percolation threshold is known, we can know that up to what probability of node damage,
we can be sure that at least one critical load will be safe. It gives an insight into network
extremities.]
• Probability of each node being functional post-
contingency = p
• Probability of finding a functional node during an
contingent situation is p*(z-1)
• At percolation threshold we know: pc(z-1)=1
• So, pc for such network is 1/(z-1)
• Putting z=3, we get pc=0.5. It means there will be
an infinite path in the network even when
probability of each node being damaged is as
high as 50%
For each network, pc can be determined.
21FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Molloy-Reed Criteria for Percolation Threshold
• In an uncorrelated network with degree distribution P(k), the probability that
an undamaged section is connected to an functional node of degree k is given
by kP(k)/<k> - Molloy et al(’95), Cohen et al(’00), Arisi(’13).
• The percolation threshold is possible if and only if any two nodes, ni and nj of
the infinite path is also connected to another node.
• In a network, percolation threshold can occur only when k2 = 2<k>, where
k2 is the second moment of degree distribution, and <k> is the first moment of
degree distribution.
– The second moment provides the variance measuring the spread in the degrees. Its
square root is the standard deviation.
– The first moment is the average degree of the nodes in the distribution system
By comparing p with pc we can comment on the resiliency of system with respect to the
threat. According to work by Essam(‘80), average cluster size can be determined using
percolation threshold for each threat. This would enable us to get a preliminary idea about
adequacy of redundant resources.
22FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Using Molloy-Reed Criteria to determine Critical Fraction
• fc  fraction of damaged nodes/undamaged nodes critically sufficient to
sustain a critical load. [This is an important criteria to determine the resiliency
metric]
Since <k> and <k2
> are easy to determine from basic properties of the graph, the critical
fraction of the network to sustain at least one important load no matter what the
contingency, can be determined.
23FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
• The critical ratio of damaged to undamaged nodes in a network that
sustained damages, is dependent on the ratio of variance and
average degree distribution of the network configuration under
configuration.
• Resilience of a distribution system configuration is dependent on the
heterogeneity of the network.
– In highly heterogeneous networks, <k2
>  ∞ consequently, fc  1, which
which indicates theoretically infinite resiliency of the distribution system
system network to any sort of damages.
– So, the more resilient design (or re-design) of the distribution system is such
system is such that the variance in its degree distribution be maximized.
Since <k> and <k2
> are easy to determine from basic properties of the graph, the critical
fraction of the network to sustain at least one important load no matter what the
contingency, can be determined.
Some insights:
24FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Other metrics that give insight into topological resiliency
• The metrics introduced are mainly divided into two groups: (i)
statistical metrics, and (ii) spectral metrics.
• Statistical metrics are used to quantify the constructional
properties.
• Spectral metrics are derived from analysis of eigenvalues of
finite sets.
• Thus the first step of a more accurate analysis is determining
the most important nodes from the weighted adjacency matrix
A(G) of the graph.
25FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Insights from Adjacency Matrix
• The centrality vector of A(G) can be used to determine the most important node of the
network, which leads to most fragmentation.
• The centrality vector computes the importance of the node in terms of degree, betweenness,
closeness or eigenvectors.
• The elements of the dominant eigenvector of the adjacency matrix represent the nodes
whose functionality is crucial to the resilience of the network.
• Centrality vector of the previous system is C(A(G)) = [0.11, 0.48.0.69.0.46, 0.15, 0.15], which
suggests that the third node C is the most important node of the network as well.
26FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Adjacency Matrix
Spectral Gap
Algebraic
connectivity
Programming ease
of other network
parameters
Identifying critical nodes of a distribution system from Adjacency Matrix
27
Data from R1-12.47 PNNL Prototypical Feeder-1
FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Determining Topological Resiliency
• Metrics such as ‘Algebraic Connectivity’ and ‘Spectral Gap’ are
often used to quantify the ‘strength of connectedness’ of the
network.
28
Topological Resiliency Vector
• It includes the different criteria that can be
used to determine topological resiliency.
• These multiple criteria is used for a
complex decision making process that
computes the resiliency metric.
FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Computing Resiliency Metrics
• Used in complex decision making problems
• Used in computation of resilience of water distribution networks [Pandit '2014]
• Using all the factors affecting resiliency a decision making matrix is created as follows,
where we are evaluating between n distribution system scenarios, and there are m
evaluation criteria.
• xij gives the raw score of performance of one scenario over another.
• The relative importance of each criterion is denoted by a one- dimensional weighing
vector W which contains m weights, with wj denoting the weight assigned to the jth
criterion.
Goal is to assign a Resiliency Metric, a single numerical measure of an dist. sys. op.
condition relative to the other op. condition; to each decision option by defining a utility
function ui=f(X,W), where U={u1, u2, ... un}
29FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Computing Topological Resiliency Metrics
• Weights are assigned based on a relative interaction
between all the resiliency indicator metrics using fractions
a through u in the interval (0, 1].
30FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Computing Resiliency Metrics (Cont'd)
• In order to develop a Resiliency Metric (Ri) for each topology of the distribution
system, the comparison scores (xij) for each criterion need to be transformed to
a unit less value score (pij).
• Then a linear transformation is taken to convert xij to pij as shown above.
– Higher value indicates higher resiliency.
• AHP is used to determine relative weights W between all factors that affect
resiliency as mentioned earlier. The most dominant eigenvector has the form
• where A, B, . . . , G are the derived weights of importance of the metric in its
suffix.
• Overall topological resiliency metric
31FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Other Factors that impact resiliency of distribution
system
• Distribution system is more complicated than simple networks.
So several parameters must be considered
• Power Flow Feasibility [PFF]
• Inclusion of Distributed Generators on topological resiliency
[LNLF]
• Influence of Weather [WF]
• Influence of quality of power distribution equipment [λeqp]
• Influence of restoration strategies being used at DMS level.
[LNLF]
• Microgrids
It is possible to add other factors into composite resiliency
computation.
32FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Power Flow Feasibility
• It is possible to design a distribution network with great topological resilience, but
impossible to sustain power system wise due to physical constraints.
If a is the vector of independent terms
and b is the vector of dependent terms,
then the power flow solution of the
system is: F(a,b)=a+F(b)=0
For power flow to be
feasible, Op. Point must
be within here
If power flow is feasible, PFF=1
33
• All faulted paths need to eliminated and power flow criteria must be satisfied.
FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Presentation Outline
– Problem Statement
• Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems
– Literature Review
• What has been done so far and what are the research gaps?
– Computation of Resiliency Metrics
• mathematical formulation
– Enabling resiliency
• Using multiple microgrids
– Simulation and Results
• On real and standard test feeders
– Conclusions
34
Enabling resiliency with Microgrids
35ENABLING RESILIENCY OF MICROGRIDS
Determining Load Not Lost during an extreme event
• Modified Depth-First Search algorithm is used to compute Load not Lost Factor (LNLF).
• After, topological resiliency, weather factor, power
flow feasibility, LNLF  AHP is used to compute
the Composite resiliency, just as topological
resiliency was computed.
36FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Summary of steps to compute composite resiliency metrics
37FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
Evaluate Composite Resiliency
Consider several other
factors that impact the
overall resiliency of the
network
Check how many loads
remain connected
Verify Power Flow
Feasibility
Use Multi-criteria decision
making to come up with a
single value of Composite
Resiliency
Evaluate Topological Resiliency
Use AHP to assign weights to different
constructional parameters of the network
Linearize all parameters to a single composite value
of topological resiliency
Modeling the distribution system as a graph
Evaluate Network
Parameters
Determine Percolation
Threshold
Determine Critical Fraction
of nodes that can be
damaged
Presentation Outline
– Problem Statement
• Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems
– Literature Review
• What has been done so far and what are the research gaps?
– Computation of Resiliency Metrics
• mathematical formulation
– Enabling resiliency
• Using multiple microgrids
– Simulation and Results
• On real and standard test feeders
– Conclusions
38
Test System - 1
• IEEE Distribution Feeder System
39SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
Resiliency Results of IEEE Comprehensive Distribution System
40SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
Test System - 2
• South Pullman (SPU) Feeders in Avista’s Pullman distribution system
Feeder 1 (F1) F1Topological Resiliency Analysis Results
F1 Composite Resiliency Analysis Results
Variation of Composite Resiliency with node failure
probability (p)
41SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
Pullman Analysis (Cont’d)
F2, F3, F4, F5 & F6 Topological Resiliency
Analysis Results
F2, F3, F4, F5 & F6 Composite Resiliency
Analysis Results
• Resiliency of whole Pullman is higher than
individual feeders.
• Availability on DGs affected composite
resiliency.
• Nodes with higher betweenness centrality are
located proximal to each other.
Whole Pullman Visualization of Critical
Nodes
42
F-2
F-3
F-4
F-5
SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
Test System – 3: Multiple Microgrids based on CERTS
Concept
CERTS Multiple Microgrids Topological Resiliency
Analysis Results
CERTS Multiple Microgrids Composite Resiliency
Analysis Results
43ENABLING RESILIENCY OF MICROGRIDS
CERTS Multiple Microgrid Analysis (Cont’d)
Microgrid 1 Islanded Microgrid 1 & 2 IslandedMicrogrid 2 Islanded
• Thus with two microgrids, over all system resiliency can be improved.
• Direct correlation of topological resiliency with betweenness centrality can be
observed above.
• Additional Distributed Generators increase the resiliency of the system.
44SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
Presentation Outline
– Problem Statement
• Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems
– Literature Review
• What has been done so far and what are the research gaps?
– Computation of Resiliency Metrics
• mathematical formulation
– Enabling resiliency
• Using multiple microgrids
– Simulation and Results
• On real and standard test feeders
– Conclusions
45
Conclusions
• Provided a literature review to identify
state-of-the-art in resiliency metrics in
distribution systems.
• Developed a resiliency metric for power
distribution systems.
• Modified previously developed
reconfiguration algorithm for enabling
the resiliency of the distribution system.
• Tested and validated developed
resiliency metric on industry-standard
and real distribution systems.
• Sensitivity of the metric depends on all the factors that
affect resiliency. However, how much change occurs
due to variation of a single parameter keeping others
constant – is a future work.
• Compare the resiliency metrics with other formulations
based on path redundancy method.
• Possible to include more Smart Grid algorithms and
technologies like VVC, Look-ahead and Robust
Controller, Demand Response, V2G and other
methods of enabling resiliency.
• Alternative path based simple resiliency metric
Future Work
46
Future Work: Alternative path based simple resiliency metric
47
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DNetworkkinNodesofNoTotal
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opwithout_loPath_Comb_ofResiliency
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Resiliency of Path_Comb_without_Loop
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Resiliency of each path in
Path_Comb_without_Loop
for kth network
Impact of combination of
paths for kth network
Key References
• K. H. LaCommare and J. H. Eto, “Cost of power interruptions to electricity consumers in
the United States,” Energy, vol. 31, no. 12, pp. 1845–1855, 2006.
• R. J. Campbell, “Weather-related power outages and electric system resiliency,”
Congres- sional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2012.
• A. Kwasinski, “Technology planning for electric power supply in critical events considering
a bulk grid, backup power plants, and micro-grids,” IEEE Systems Journal, vol. 4, no. 2,
pp. 167–178, 2010.
• D. P. Chassin and C. Posse, “Evaluating North American electric grid reliability using the
Barabasi–Albert network model,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,
vol. 355, no. 2, pp. 667–677, 2005.
• E. D. Vugrin, D. E. Warren, M. A. Ehlen, and R. C. Camphouse, “A framework for
assessing the resilience of infrastructure and economic systems,” in Sustainable and
Resilient Critical Infrastructure Systems, Springer, 2010, pp. 77–116.
• K. Sun, “Complex networks theory: A new method of research in power grid,” in
Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition: Asia and Pacific, IEEE/PES,
2005, pp. 1–6.
• Y. Zhang and L. Guo, “Network percolation based on complex network,” Journal of
Networks, vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 1874–1881, 2013.
• R. Albert, I. Albert, and G. L. Nakarado, “Structural vulnerability of the North American
power grid,” Physical review E, vol. 69, no. 2, p. 025 103, 2004.
Publications
1. Chanda, S., Shariatzadeh, F., Srivastava, A., Lee, E., Stone, W., & Ham, J. “Implementation of non-intrusive energy saving estimation for Volt/VAr control of
smart distribution system”. Electric Power Systems Research, vol. 120, (pp. 39-46).
2. Shariatzadeh, F., Chanda, S., Srivastava, A. K., & Bose, A. “Real time benefit computation for electric distribution system automation and control” IEEE
Industry Applications Society Annual Meeting, 2014 (pp. 1-8)
3. Chanda, S., & Srivastava, A. K. “Quantifying Resiliency of Smart Power Distribution Systems with Distributed Energy Resources” 24th IEEE International
Symposium on Industrial Electronics, 2015
4. Chanda, S., Venkataramanan, V., & Srivastava, A. K. “Real time modeling and simulation of campus microgrid for voltage analysis” Proceedings of the
North American Power Systems Conference, 2014
49
Posters presented
1. Modeling & Analysis of Campus Microgrid Distribution Systems – IEEE PESGM 2013
2. Real-Time Energy Savings Calculations for Integrated Volt/VAR Control – ESIC Summit 2013
3. Developing Integrated Load Modeling Framework for Campus Microgrids with Large Buildings – IEEE T&D 2014
4. Distribution system resiliency with distributed generation and storage – ESIC Summit 2015
Awards
1. Best Graduate Student Poster Award (3rd prize) – IEEE PESGM (2013)
2. Best Graduate Student Poster Award (2nd prize) – IEEE T&D (2014)
3. Team Member of winning team, DOE Hydrogen Design Project (2014)
4. William R. Wiley Research Exposition Scholarship Recipient (2nd Prize for Best Oral presentation) – Washington State University (2015)
1. Chanda, S., & Srivastava, A. K. “Defining and Enabling Resiliency of Electric Distribution Systems with Multiple Microgrids” IEEE Transactions on Smart
Grid: Special Issue on Power Grid Resilience [Abstract Accepted]
2. Chanda, S., & Srivastava, A. K. “Application of Complex Network Theory to Evaluate Resiliency of Smart Distribution Systems”, IEEE Power And Energy
Technology Systems Journal
3. Shariatzadeh, F., Chanda, S., Srivastava, A. K., & Bose, A. “Real time benefit computation for electric distribution system automation and control” IEEE
Transactions on Industry Applications Society [Under Review]
4. Shariatzadeh, F., Chanda, S., & Srivastava, A. K. “Robust Look-Ahead Approach for Heat Ventilation and Air Conditioning Control Systems in Active
Distribution Systems” IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy.
5. Shariatzadeh, F., Chanda, S., & Srivastava, A. K. “Multilayer Architecture and Control of Active Distribution Systems” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery
Upcoming Publications
Thank You.
50

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Sayon MS Thesis Presentation Draft-4

  • 1. Measuring and Enabling Resiliency in Distribution Systems With Multiple Microgrids Sayonsom Chanda Major Advisor: Dr. Anurag K. Srivastava 1
  • 2. Presentation Outline – Problem Statement • Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems – Literature Review • What has been done so far and what are the research gaps? – Computation of Resiliency Metrics • mathematical formulation – Enabling resiliency • Using multiple microgrids – Simulation and Results • On real and standard test feeders – Conclusions 2
  • 3. Presentation Outline – Problem Statement • Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems – Literature Review • What has been done so far and what are the research gaps? – Computation of Resiliency Metrics • mathematical formulation – Enabling resiliency • Using multiple microgrids – Simulation and Results • On real and standard test feeders – Conclusions 3
  • 4. Vulnerabilities of power distribution system 4 High impact, Low frequency events Smart Grid has information flow as critical to its operation: increasing Vulnerability to getting hacked. Level of servicing, OH/UG Construction Mitigation Schemes Protective relays Enough resources to meet demands? Energy security issues. Acts of terrorism. PROBLEM STATEMENT Focus of the thesis: for any extreme event, analysis of resiliency.
  • 5. Background: Effect of weather on continuity of power supply 400% increase in number of weather related power outages over the last 20 years, in US . In 2012, Superstorm Sandy left more than 8.5 million customers without power Economic Benefits of Increasing Electric Grid Resilience to Weather Outages estimates the average annual cost of weather-related power outages to be between $18 and $33 billion over the past decade To reduce these losses and avert discontinuity of power supply during unfavorable weather events, we must re-engineer our existing systems to be resilient to weather changes. Weather-related outages in US between 1992-2012 Picture: Region-wise most financial losses as a result of power interruption due to weather-related events. Source: National Climatic Data Center PROBLEM STATEMENT 5
  • 6. Presentation Outline – Problem Statement • Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems – Literature Review • What has been done so far and what are the research gaps? – Computation of Resiliency Metrics • mathematical formulation – Enabling resiliency • Using multiple microgrids – Simulation and Results • On real and standard test feeders – Conclusions 6
  • 7. Concept of resilience applied to power systems • Resilience of networks [social networks, water networks, airport networks] is well-studied. However, resilience of power distribution system is a new topic of interest. • Multiple definitions of resiliency – US PPD-21: reducing the risk to critical infrastructure by physical means or defense cyber measures to intrusions, attacks, or the effects of natural or man-made disasters. – NARUC: robustness and recovery characteristics of utility infrastructure and operations, which avoid or minimize interruptions of service during an extraordinary and hazardous event. – Dominion Power Virginia: ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of a disruptive event – SNL – Resiliency is the ability of system to respond and remain functional during an event X, given there is a threat Y of it happening. 7LITERATURE REVIEW
  • 8. • Resiliency has been studied from several perspectives, for both long and short time scales. Interest in resiliency power system research has increased over the years. LITERATURE REVIEW Summary of literature review Database: IEEExplore Digital Library Keyword: Power System Resiliency Database: Google Scholar Keyword: Resiliency Metrics • Metrics can evaluate both Operational and Planning resiliency, or deal with them separately. • No formal resiliency metric for power distribution system 8
  • 9. Power System resilience has been studied from complex network point of view. Fig: European Power Grid • 3,000 Nodes, 150,000 mi of HV network • Resiliency of this network has been studied by Pagani (’12), Solé (’08), Rosas-Casals(’07), Albert(’04), Crucitti(’04) For the US Power Grid: • Watts(’99)- studied US Power Grid resiliency in his book. • Holmgren(’07)- compared US Grid resiliency to Nordic Grid Resiliency • Wei(’10), Chen(’07)- Vulnerability Evaluation Models • Wang(’10)- NYISO-2935 bus system, WECC system • Bompard(’10), Dwivedi(’10), Pahwa(’10)- complex network analysis of IEEE Systems 9LITERATURE REVIEW
  • 10. Differences between Reliability and Resiliency Resiliency • Measured in anticipation of some form of threat Reliability • Measure of operational consistency and good performance of Utility towards its customers over long time period. • Priority of critical loads is considered • No classification load is reflected in measurement of reliability • Resiliency is an indication of preparedness of a network to withstand or avert damage coming from outside the power system [like weather] • Reliability accounts for only power lost due to operational or equipment damages, over which Utility has control. It doesn't consider external factors • No formal metrics • SAIDI, SAIFI, MAIFI, etc 10LITERATURE REVIEW
  • 11. LITERATURE REVIEW Approaches towards studying Resiliency System A and System B show different resiliency based on what reconfiguration algorithms are there in the DMS [ RAND] Sandia National Lab Conceptual Framework for deriving Resiliency Metrics as a PDF. Higher Resiliency is shifting the peak to the left. Resiliency Metrics Computation and Enabling Framework proposed by Panteli et al 11
  • 12. Thus, a resilient distribution system should be able to: W R A P Withstand any sudden inclement weather or human attack on the infrastructure. Respond quickly, to restore balance in the community as quickly as possible, after an inevitable attack. Adapt to abrupt and new operating conditions, while maintaining smooth functionality, both locally and globally. Predict or Prevent future attacks based on patterns of past experiences, or reliable forecasts. 12LITERATURE REVIEW
  • 13. Presentation Outline – Problem Statement • Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems – Literature Review • What has been done so far and what are the research gaps? – Computation of Resiliency Metrics • mathematical formulation – Enabling resiliency • Using multiple microgrids – Simulation and Results • On real and standard test feeders – Conclusions 13
  • 14. Need for Resiliency Metric & Computation Framework Resiliency Metrics can help • justify DMS control actions • cost-benefit analysis of microgrids • mitigate loss and inconvenience through proactive action in anticipation of storm • improve the network through feedback • impact economics of power exchange between grid to consumers in microgrids Computing Resiliency is a complex decision making problem. • ANL proposed an infrastructure survey based approach, viz, RMI • LBNL follows a modeling based optimization approach to compute resiliency (below) • Resiliency Metric should reflect redundancy and restoration efforts of the network. 14FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 15. Procedure to compute resiliency metric • Topological Resiliency (RT) – Percolation Theory • Weather Factor (WF), Cyber-attack threat • Age of Equipments/Maintenance Levels (λ) • Control Systems and DMS Response – Restoration schemes by operating switches – Load flow in damaged network. • Multi-criteria decision making – Many approaches possible. – Chose Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS Fragility Model Restoration & Recovery Computation 15
  • 16. Approaches to determine Topological Resiliency (i) Using Complex Network Analysis (ii) Using path redundancy as a criteria (direct approach) However, the first step is to convert the power systems into a graph B1 B6 B2 B3 B4 B5 1 2 3 4 5 6 Bus → Node (N) Branch → Edge (E) Generator → N/A Load → N/A G=(N,E) 16FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 17. Important Graph Theory Parameters 17FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 18. Properties of Distribution System Topology • Dist. Sys. modeled as a graph G(N,E) with N nodes and E edges. • Average Degree <k> is a measure of how many nodes are connected to one node on an average. Higher value indicates greater fragility. • Ratio of first moment and second moment of average degree distribution should tend to zero for less fragile network. • Determines the most important nodes of a network. Computed as where nk --> nl,ni = 1 if the shortest path between nk and nl passes through ni, and 0 otherwise. It is computed through all nodes. • It is an indicator that captures the fact that the higher the value of second smallest eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix of the network the network is more resilient Degree Betweenness Centrality Algebraic Connectivity 18FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 19. During a forceful disruptive event, nodes have high and random probability of getting damaged. • Nf  Largest component of the damaged network • N0  Largest component of the undamaged network • f  fraction of damaged nodes For each distribution system a different plot is obtained. So direct conclusion about resiliency cannot be made. 19FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 20. Percolation theory is used to flow of information/mass in networks with uncertainties in path of propagation. • pc  percolation threshold [it’s a value of probability between 0 to 1] • p  Probability of each node being functional despite an unfavorable event • <σ>  Average size of the clusters (i.e. no. of nodes in an island) prior to reaching the percolation threshold • Percolation Theory is easy to find a path from a source to a sink, or check its feasibility. • It can be used to determine a condition in the distribution system – such that no matter how many nodes are damaged there is at least one path from a sink to a source. That condition is called Percolation Threshold. 20FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 21. Simplistic Study of Percolation Threshold • Percolation Threshold is useful in networks where all loads are critical, or when we are focusing only on critical loads of a network. [so, if a percolation threshold is known, we can know that up to what probability of node damage, we can be sure that at least one critical load will be safe. It gives an insight into network extremities.] • Probability of each node being functional post- contingency = p • Probability of finding a functional node during an contingent situation is p*(z-1) • At percolation threshold we know: pc(z-1)=1 • So, pc for such network is 1/(z-1) • Putting z=3, we get pc=0.5. It means there will be an infinite path in the network even when probability of each node being damaged is as high as 50% For each network, pc can be determined. 21FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 22. Molloy-Reed Criteria for Percolation Threshold • In an uncorrelated network with degree distribution P(k), the probability that an undamaged section is connected to an functional node of degree k is given by kP(k)/<k> - Molloy et al(’95), Cohen et al(’00), Arisi(’13). • The percolation threshold is possible if and only if any two nodes, ni and nj of the infinite path is also connected to another node. • In a network, percolation threshold can occur only when k2 = 2<k>, where k2 is the second moment of degree distribution, and <k> is the first moment of degree distribution. – The second moment provides the variance measuring the spread in the degrees. Its square root is the standard deviation. – The first moment is the average degree of the nodes in the distribution system By comparing p with pc we can comment on the resiliency of system with respect to the threat. According to work by Essam(‘80), average cluster size can be determined using percolation threshold for each threat. This would enable us to get a preliminary idea about adequacy of redundant resources. 22FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 23. Using Molloy-Reed Criteria to determine Critical Fraction • fc  fraction of damaged nodes/undamaged nodes critically sufficient to sustain a critical load. [This is an important criteria to determine the resiliency metric] Since <k> and <k2 > are easy to determine from basic properties of the graph, the critical fraction of the network to sustain at least one important load no matter what the contingency, can be determined. 23FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 24. • The critical ratio of damaged to undamaged nodes in a network that sustained damages, is dependent on the ratio of variance and average degree distribution of the network configuration under configuration. • Resilience of a distribution system configuration is dependent on the heterogeneity of the network. – In highly heterogeneous networks, <k2 >  ∞ consequently, fc  1, which which indicates theoretically infinite resiliency of the distribution system system network to any sort of damages. – So, the more resilient design (or re-design) of the distribution system is such system is such that the variance in its degree distribution be maximized. Since <k> and <k2 > are easy to determine from basic properties of the graph, the critical fraction of the network to sustain at least one important load no matter what the contingency, can be determined. Some insights: 24FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 25. Other metrics that give insight into topological resiliency • The metrics introduced are mainly divided into two groups: (i) statistical metrics, and (ii) spectral metrics. • Statistical metrics are used to quantify the constructional properties. • Spectral metrics are derived from analysis of eigenvalues of finite sets. • Thus the first step of a more accurate analysis is determining the most important nodes from the weighted adjacency matrix A(G) of the graph. 25FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 26. Insights from Adjacency Matrix • The centrality vector of A(G) can be used to determine the most important node of the network, which leads to most fragmentation. • The centrality vector computes the importance of the node in terms of degree, betweenness, closeness or eigenvectors. • The elements of the dominant eigenvector of the adjacency matrix represent the nodes whose functionality is crucial to the resilience of the network. • Centrality vector of the previous system is C(A(G)) = [0.11, 0.48.0.69.0.46, 0.15, 0.15], which suggests that the third node C is the most important node of the network as well. 26FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS Adjacency Matrix Spectral Gap Algebraic connectivity Programming ease of other network parameters
  • 27. Identifying critical nodes of a distribution system from Adjacency Matrix 27 Data from R1-12.47 PNNL Prototypical Feeder-1 FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 28. Determining Topological Resiliency • Metrics such as ‘Algebraic Connectivity’ and ‘Spectral Gap’ are often used to quantify the ‘strength of connectedness’ of the network. 28 Topological Resiliency Vector • It includes the different criteria that can be used to determine topological resiliency. • These multiple criteria is used for a complex decision making process that computes the resiliency metric. FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 29. Computing Resiliency Metrics • Used in complex decision making problems • Used in computation of resilience of water distribution networks [Pandit '2014] • Using all the factors affecting resiliency a decision making matrix is created as follows, where we are evaluating between n distribution system scenarios, and there are m evaluation criteria. • xij gives the raw score of performance of one scenario over another. • The relative importance of each criterion is denoted by a one- dimensional weighing vector W which contains m weights, with wj denoting the weight assigned to the jth criterion. Goal is to assign a Resiliency Metric, a single numerical measure of an dist. sys. op. condition relative to the other op. condition; to each decision option by defining a utility function ui=f(X,W), where U={u1, u2, ... un} 29FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 30. Computing Topological Resiliency Metrics • Weights are assigned based on a relative interaction between all the resiliency indicator metrics using fractions a through u in the interval (0, 1]. 30FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 31. Computing Resiliency Metrics (Cont'd) • In order to develop a Resiliency Metric (Ri) for each topology of the distribution system, the comparison scores (xij) for each criterion need to be transformed to a unit less value score (pij). • Then a linear transformation is taken to convert xij to pij as shown above. – Higher value indicates higher resiliency. • AHP is used to determine relative weights W between all factors that affect resiliency as mentioned earlier. The most dominant eigenvector has the form • where A, B, . . . , G are the derived weights of importance of the metric in its suffix. • Overall topological resiliency metric 31FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 32. Other Factors that impact resiliency of distribution system • Distribution system is more complicated than simple networks. So several parameters must be considered • Power Flow Feasibility [PFF] • Inclusion of Distributed Generators on topological resiliency [LNLF] • Influence of Weather [WF] • Influence of quality of power distribution equipment [λeqp] • Influence of restoration strategies being used at DMS level. [LNLF] • Microgrids It is possible to add other factors into composite resiliency computation. 32FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 33. Power Flow Feasibility • It is possible to design a distribution network with great topological resilience, but impossible to sustain power system wise due to physical constraints. If a is the vector of independent terms and b is the vector of dependent terms, then the power flow solution of the system is: F(a,b)=a+F(b)=0 For power flow to be feasible, Op. Point must be within here If power flow is feasible, PFF=1 33 • All faulted paths need to eliminated and power flow criteria must be satisfied. FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 34. Presentation Outline – Problem Statement • Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems – Literature Review • What has been done so far and what are the research gaps? – Computation of Resiliency Metrics • mathematical formulation – Enabling resiliency • Using multiple microgrids – Simulation and Results • On real and standard test feeders – Conclusions 34
  • 35. Enabling resiliency with Microgrids 35ENABLING RESILIENCY OF MICROGRIDS
  • 36. Determining Load Not Lost during an extreme event • Modified Depth-First Search algorithm is used to compute Load not Lost Factor (LNLF). • After, topological resiliency, weather factor, power flow feasibility, LNLF  AHP is used to compute the Composite resiliency, just as topological resiliency was computed. 36FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS
  • 37. Summary of steps to compute composite resiliency metrics 37FORMULATING RESILIENCY METRICS Evaluate Composite Resiliency Consider several other factors that impact the overall resiliency of the network Check how many loads remain connected Verify Power Flow Feasibility Use Multi-criteria decision making to come up with a single value of Composite Resiliency Evaluate Topological Resiliency Use AHP to assign weights to different constructional parameters of the network Linearize all parameters to a single composite value of topological resiliency Modeling the distribution system as a graph Evaluate Network Parameters Determine Percolation Threshold Determine Critical Fraction of nodes that can be damaged
  • 38. Presentation Outline – Problem Statement • Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems – Literature Review • What has been done so far and what are the research gaps? – Computation of Resiliency Metrics • mathematical formulation – Enabling resiliency • Using multiple microgrids – Simulation and Results • On real and standard test feeders – Conclusions 38
  • 39. Test System - 1 • IEEE Distribution Feeder System 39SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
  • 40. Resiliency Results of IEEE Comprehensive Distribution System 40SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
  • 41. Test System - 2 • South Pullman (SPU) Feeders in Avista’s Pullman distribution system Feeder 1 (F1) F1Topological Resiliency Analysis Results F1 Composite Resiliency Analysis Results Variation of Composite Resiliency with node failure probability (p) 41SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
  • 42. Pullman Analysis (Cont’d) F2, F3, F4, F5 & F6 Topological Resiliency Analysis Results F2, F3, F4, F5 & F6 Composite Resiliency Analysis Results • Resiliency of whole Pullman is higher than individual feeders. • Availability on DGs affected composite resiliency. • Nodes with higher betweenness centrality are located proximal to each other. Whole Pullman Visualization of Critical Nodes 42 F-2 F-3 F-4 F-5 SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
  • 43. Test System – 3: Multiple Microgrids based on CERTS Concept CERTS Multiple Microgrids Topological Resiliency Analysis Results CERTS Multiple Microgrids Composite Resiliency Analysis Results 43ENABLING RESILIENCY OF MICROGRIDS
  • 44. CERTS Multiple Microgrid Analysis (Cont’d) Microgrid 1 Islanded Microgrid 1 & 2 IslandedMicrogrid 2 Islanded • Thus with two microgrids, over all system resiliency can be improved. • Direct correlation of topological resiliency with betweenness centrality can be observed above. • Additional Distributed Generators increase the resiliency of the system. 44SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
  • 45. Presentation Outline – Problem Statement • Concept of Resiliency applied to power systems – Literature Review • What has been done so far and what are the research gaps? – Computation of Resiliency Metrics • mathematical formulation – Enabling resiliency • Using multiple microgrids – Simulation and Results • On real and standard test feeders – Conclusions 45
  • 46. Conclusions • Provided a literature review to identify state-of-the-art in resiliency metrics in distribution systems. • Developed a resiliency metric for power distribution systems. • Modified previously developed reconfiguration algorithm for enabling the resiliency of the distribution system. • Tested and validated developed resiliency metric on industry-standard and real distribution systems. • Sensitivity of the metric depends on all the factors that affect resiliency. However, how much change occurs due to variation of a single parameter keeping others constant – is a future work. • Compare the resiliency metrics with other formulations based on path redundancy method. • Possible to include more Smart Grid algorithms and technologies like VVC, Look-ahead and Robust Controller, Demand Response, V2G and other methods of enabling resiliency. • Alternative path based simple resiliency metric Future Work 46
  • 47. Future Work: Alternative path based simple resiliency metric 47         DNetworkkinNodesofNoTotal NetwrokkindNodeofCNetworkkindNodeofOrder CAgg CAgg NR th D d th b th kb kb k k      . opwithout_LoPath_Comb_ofResiliency 1   loadsCriticalofnoTotalL OES RS E kk kL l k g k . opwithout_loPath_Comb_ofResiliency 1 lg                     Resiliency of Path_Comb_without_Loop for kth network depends upon Resiliency of each path in Path_Comb_without_Loop for kth network Impact of combination of paths for kth network
  • 48. Key References • K. H. LaCommare and J. H. Eto, “Cost of power interruptions to electricity consumers in the United States,” Energy, vol. 31, no. 12, pp. 1845–1855, 2006. • R. J. Campbell, “Weather-related power outages and electric system resiliency,” Congres- sional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2012. • A. Kwasinski, “Technology planning for electric power supply in critical events considering a bulk grid, backup power plants, and micro-grids,” IEEE Systems Journal, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 167–178, 2010. • D. P. Chassin and C. Posse, “Evaluating North American electric grid reliability using the Barabasi–Albert network model,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 355, no. 2, pp. 667–677, 2005. • E. D. Vugrin, D. E. Warren, M. A. Ehlen, and R. C. Camphouse, “A framework for assessing the resilience of infrastructure and economic systems,” in Sustainable and Resilient Critical Infrastructure Systems, Springer, 2010, pp. 77–116. • K. Sun, “Complex networks theory: A new method of research in power grid,” in Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition: Asia and Pacific, IEEE/PES, 2005, pp. 1–6. • Y. Zhang and L. Guo, “Network percolation based on complex network,” Journal of Networks, vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 1874–1881, 2013. • R. Albert, I. Albert, and G. L. Nakarado, “Structural vulnerability of the North American power grid,” Physical review E, vol. 69, no. 2, p. 025 103, 2004.
  • 49. Publications 1. Chanda, S., Shariatzadeh, F., Srivastava, A., Lee, E., Stone, W., & Ham, J. “Implementation of non-intrusive energy saving estimation for Volt/VAr control of smart distribution system”. Electric Power Systems Research, vol. 120, (pp. 39-46). 2. Shariatzadeh, F., Chanda, S., Srivastava, A. K., & Bose, A. “Real time benefit computation for electric distribution system automation and control” IEEE Industry Applications Society Annual Meeting, 2014 (pp. 1-8) 3. Chanda, S., & Srivastava, A. K. “Quantifying Resiliency of Smart Power Distribution Systems with Distributed Energy Resources” 24th IEEE International Symposium on Industrial Electronics, 2015 4. Chanda, S., Venkataramanan, V., & Srivastava, A. K. “Real time modeling and simulation of campus microgrid for voltage analysis” Proceedings of the North American Power Systems Conference, 2014 49 Posters presented 1. Modeling & Analysis of Campus Microgrid Distribution Systems – IEEE PESGM 2013 2. Real-Time Energy Savings Calculations for Integrated Volt/VAR Control – ESIC Summit 2013 3. Developing Integrated Load Modeling Framework for Campus Microgrids with Large Buildings – IEEE T&D 2014 4. Distribution system resiliency with distributed generation and storage – ESIC Summit 2015 Awards 1. Best Graduate Student Poster Award (3rd prize) – IEEE PESGM (2013) 2. Best Graduate Student Poster Award (2nd prize) – IEEE T&D (2014) 3. Team Member of winning team, DOE Hydrogen Design Project (2014) 4. William R. Wiley Research Exposition Scholarship Recipient (2nd Prize for Best Oral presentation) – Washington State University (2015) 1. Chanda, S., & Srivastava, A. K. “Defining and Enabling Resiliency of Electric Distribution Systems with Multiple Microgrids” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid: Special Issue on Power Grid Resilience [Abstract Accepted] 2. Chanda, S., & Srivastava, A. K. “Application of Complex Network Theory to Evaluate Resiliency of Smart Distribution Systems”, IEEE Power And Energy Technology Systems Journal 3. Shariatzadeh, F., Chanda, S., Srivastava, A. K., & Bose, A. “Real time benefit computation for electric distribution system automation and control” IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications Society [Under Review] 4. Shariatzadeh, F., Chanda, S., & Srivastava, A. K. “Robust Look-Ahead Approach for Heat Ventilation and Air Conditioning Control Systems in Active Distribution Systems” IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy. 5. Shariatzadeh, F., Chanda, S., & Srivastava, A. K. “Multilayer Architecture and Control of Active Distribution Systems” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery Upcoming Publications

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. Template-Primary on 201-shield
  2. However, none of these definitions of resiliency are rather subjective. They cannot be directly used to quantify resiliency of the distribution system
  3. This is a preliminary work. There could be several other ways. Tried to adopt resiliency metrics done for other systems to power system. Investigated what can be done and what cannot be. Aggregated Indices Randomization Method (AIRM) Analytic hierarchy process (AHP) Analytic network process (ANP) Best worst method (BWM)[30] PROMETHEE (Outranking) Superiority and inferiority ranking method (SIR method) Technique for the Order of Prioritisation by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) Value analysis (VA) Value engineering (VE) VIKOR method[32]
  4. Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the influence of a node in a network. • Adjacency Matrix: A matrix A related to a graph by aij = 1 if vertex i is connected to vertex j by an edge, and 0 if it is not.
  5. Algebraic Connectivity (λ2): It is an indicator that captures the fact that the higher the value of second smallest eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix of the network, the network is more resilient. Spectral Gap (∆λ): It is used to identify the Good Expansion(GE) properties of a graph. GE graphs are sparse graphs with enhanced robustness. It is quantified by measuring the difference between first and second eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix of the network.
  6. N scenarios and M criteria. The goal of an MCA model is to assess a finite set of decision options or alternative scenarios based on a set of evaluation criteria. To warranty an outcome of the MCA evaluation there needs to be at least two alternatives and two decision criteria, i.e. n >= 2 and m >= 2. In order to develop a utility score (ui) for each alternative, the raw performance scores (xi,j) for each criterion need to be transformed to a unit less value score (vi,j)
  7. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to assign weights to the network metrics. AHP essentially arranges the criteria in a hierarchical manner to meet the goal or objective of the MCA. In AHP the criteria are compared pair wise based on a semantic scale of 1-9, which is defined to indicate how many times more important or dominant one element is over another element with respect to the criterion or property with respect to which they are compared to construct a n n matrix, where n is the number of criterion being compared All the alternatives were compared pair-wise with respect to the objective, which was to maximize the network resilience. For example, in Resilience Scenario, it is assumed that algebraic connectivity (λ2) is strongly preferred (4 times) over characteristic length (l) in maximizing network resilience. The normalized principal Eigen vector of the pair wise comparison matrix provides the weighting matrix for the criteria. One important attribute of the decision making process in the AHP is the consistency of the estimator. In the instance of absolute consistence, the principal eigenvalue (λmax) would be equal to n. For general cases, absolute consistence is unrealistic to be achieved.
  8. If a fault occurs within ∆t and the relays are not able to clear the fault within that time, or in events of excess or under generation, Vi shall be beyond the acceptable range 114 ≤ Vi ≤ 126 V. Since the controllers in the system will try to ensure optimal power flow in the network, there will be additional optimization problems due to convexity or non-convexity of constraints in the injection region of the network.