1. Conference On Railway Excellence
Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014
MOVING BEYOND COST: EVALUATING LRT AND BRT OPTIONS FOR
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND CITIES
Scott Martin
BA (USyd) MUP (Melb), CMILT - University of Melbourne, VIC, Australia
SUMMARY
Long-running debates over the superiority of light rail transit (LRT) or bus rapid transit (BRT) for
medium-capacity urban public transport tasks hampers development of effective transport policies
and hinders objective project evaluation to ensures transport technologies with the highest overall
benefit are chosen for a given corridor or network.
While there cost-benefit analysis of BRT and LRT options for transport projects is extensively
conducted, performance-based evaluation of BRT and LRT are less so. If such evaluations are
undertaken, they often fail to produce unequivocal findings since definitions of BRT and LRT are
highly elastic. Additionally, comparisons using cost-benefit analysis alone can be complicated by
the absence of common evaluation criteria for construction, operation, and maintenance costs.
The paper aims to outlines some simple performance-based evaluation criteria to evaluate the
adoption of LRT or BRT as appropriate medium-capacity public transport technologies in Australian
and New Zealand (NZ) cities. This topic is relevant as a number of Australian and New Zealand cities
have spent over A$7 billion building new or expanded LRT and BRT networks since the late 1980s,
while other Australian and New Zealand cities are planning or building LRT and BRT systems for
completion by the end of the current decade.
INTRODUCTION
Spending on public transport infrastructure in
Australian and New Zealand (NZ) cities has
accelerated during the 21
st
Century. The cities of
Adelaide, Auckland, Brisbane, Melbourne and
Sydney have invested over A$5 billion (2013
dollars) in new or extended bus rapid transit
(BRT) and light rail transit (LRT) networks
between 2000 and 2010 alone.
In this decade, several billion dollars of projects
extending existing BRT and LRT networks in
Auckland, Brisbane and Sydney are either
proposed or underway; while new BRT and LRT
systems are either under construction on the Gold
Coast, being planned in Australia’s national
capital (Canberra), smaller state capitals (Hobart
and Perth), capital city sub-regions (Western
Sydney) and large regional cities (Newcastle).
New Zealand’s capital city of Wellington is also
evaluating BRT and LRT to augment the city’s
heavy rail and bus networks.
This paper examines how evaluation3 processes
for road-based public transport projects are
influenced by factors other than the capital costs
of project delivery. It tests a hypothesis
challenging the conventional wisdom where BRT
is significantly less expensive to construct than
LRT. If the differences in capital costs between
BRT and LRT are more closely aligned than
previously considered, factors other than cost will
become increasingly important in the minds of
decision-makers.
WHY BRT AND LRT?
Debates over the suitability of BRT or LRT as
appropriate transport technologies for cities have
been contentious in recent decades, particularly
in the United States, Canada and the United
Kingdom. These debates are also important in an
Australasian context, with Australian and NZ cities
investing over A$7 billion (2013 dollars) on BRT
and LRT projects since the late 1980s.
BRT and LRT technologies remain popular
choices for transport planners and policy makers,
offering medium-capacity (between 5,000 and
20,000 passengers per hour) public transport
solutions, at levels of capital expenditure between
street transport and heavy rail technologies. BRT
and LRT are often seen as effective solutions to
mitigate urban road congestion, improve
accessibility to Central Business Districts (CBDs)
and suburban activity centres, and provide
opportunities to alter land-use patterns along
transport corridors and at stations.
In North America and Australia, BRT and LRT are
often viewed as competitors for funding and
patronage with other public transport technologies
such as heavy rail rather than complementary
transport technologies, competing primarily
against private cars for ridership. Both
technologies provide on-road public transport
system ‘packages’ with higher speed, reliability
and passenger capacity street tramways and
buses; often at generally lower capital and

2. Scott Martin Moving beyond cost: Evaluating LRT and BRT
University of Melbourne options for Australian and New Zealand cities
Conference On Railway Excellence
Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014
operating costs than heavy rail technologies and
utilising existing road and rail corridors.
Despite this complementarity, proponents of BRT
and LRT claim each system provides the most
appropriate solutions for urban transport
problems. Supporters of BRT promote the
technology as offering almost all the benefits of
LRT, but delivered faster with lower capital and
operating costs. LRT proponents claim it provides
higher quality of service, is more attractive to
existing and potential users, and can deliver
stronger, more permanent impacts on urban form.
In environments where different transport
technologies compete for capital funding and
patronage, robust and impartial project evaluation
methodologies are required for evaluating claims
of BRT and LRT proponents to ensure the
appropriate technology with the highest overall
benefit is chosen for a given corridor or network.
The following sections define BRT and LRT
systems, why they are important on-road public
transport technologies and what factors influence
their selection as appropriate urban transport
systems for cities.
DEFINING BRT & LRT
The definition of ‘Bus Rapid Transit’ (BRT) and
‘Light Rail Transit’ (LRT) has been debated for
many years with little consensus. Proponents of
each technology claim a wide range of potential
costs, benefits and performance standards,
allowing LRT and BRT to mean different things to
different people. Such elasticity in defining both
BRT and LRT is both a strength and weakness.
The literature indicates precise definitions of BRT
and LRT are difficult. BRT is often described as
encompassing a spectrum of bus-based
infrastructure from low-cost improvements to
street bus routes to ‘full’ BRT in exclusive Rights-
of-Way (ROW) that rival rail-based systems in
performance and capital costs. Equally, ‘LRT’
encompasses a range of capabilities and
performance from street tramways or streetcars
operating in mixed traffic to full LRT systems
running on segregated ROWs.
While obvious differences exist between BRT and
LRT based on different propulsion and guidance
systems, they also share many similarities. Both
BRT and LRT combine vehicles, rights of way,
control systems, passenger facilities and service
quality into a ‘package’ of public transport
technology marketed to present and potential
users with a strongly branded image and identity.
Since the appearance of the earliest railways in
the 19th Century, transport systems are
recognized as representing a ‘machine
ensemble’. The BRT and LRT machine ensemble
consists of three key elements:
 Rights of Way;
 System Technologies, and;
 Service Types.
The machine ensemble of road-based public
transport produces a range of possible
performance when measured against criteria such
as speed, travel time, carrying capacity and
reliability. Manipulating the elements of the road-
based public transport machine ensemble can
improve (or retard) performance. The following
sections outline ways in which all three functional
elements of the public transport machine
ensemble exhibit themselves in both BRT and
LRT systems.
1. Rights of Way
Rights of Way (ROW) are the corridors in which
transport systems operate. The literature
identifies three basic categories of ROW (A, B &
C) based on their level of interaction with other
road traffic, as shown in Figure 1 below (1).
Some propose further segmentation of ROWs into
‘plus’ and ‘minus’ sub-categories through the
presence or absence of control systems
segregating road-based public transport from
other road traffic (1).
Figure 1 – Definition of Right of Way (ROW)
categories for BRT and LRT systems.
In Australian and New Zealand cities, as
elsewhere in the world, BRT and LRT systems
can often operate across all three ROW types,
with outer suburban portions of a system in
Category C, line-haul portions in a segregated
Category A or B ROW and CBD access utilizing
Category C (and occasionally Category A) ROWs.
2. System Technologies
‘System technologies’ are defined as comprising
four key areas: ‘support’, ‘guidance’, ‘propulsion’
and ‘control’ systems.(2) ‘Support’ technology for
BRT and LRT is the vertical interface between
vehicles and road surfaces. BRT uses rubber-

3. Conference On Railway Excellence
Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014
tires on a concrete or asphalt roadway or
guideway. LRT uses steel wheels on steel rails
(either embedded in the roadway or laid on ballast
like a conventional railway).
‘Guidance’ systems refer to the means by which
vehicles are guided along the ROW. Most BRT
systems use buses manually steered by the
driver, while LRT systems utilise wheel/rail
interaction for guidance. Some BRT systems
(most notably Adelaide’s O-Bahn) are ‘guided
busways’, with buses steered on the guideway by
additional sets of wheels.
‘Propulsion’ most commonly describes the means
of providing traction power to buses or LRVs.
BRT systems tend to use internal combustion
engines (ICE) powered by diesel, gas or petrol
fuels: while LRT systems mostly use electric
motors drawing current from overhead wires.
‘Control’ systems monitor and manage operation
of BRT and LRT systems. Most BRT and LRT
systems use visual control to maintain separation
between vehicles on the ROW, while interaction
with other road users at intersections is managed
by traffic signals.
Other control systems include Intelligent
Transportation Systems monitoring the locations
of buses and LRVs, ensuring traffic signal priority
at intersections and providing passengers with
real-time information on vehicle locations and
arrival times.
3. Service type
‘Service type’ describes the range of services and
operating strategies offered to existing and
potential users. Service types generally display
four main characteristics: types of routes, stop
spacing, stopping patterns and span of operating
hours. Many BRT and LRT systems are
constructed to serve regional or metropolitan
travel markets, often from inner and middle
suburbs to Central Business Districts (CBD).
Most BRT and LRT systems run to ‘all stations’
stopping patterns, but some systems run
additional services to ‘limited stop’ or ‘express
patterns’. Most BRT and LRT systems operate ‘all
stops’ service levels across a broad span of
operating hours, often augmented with additional
CBD-focused commuter or peak-hour services in
the AM and PM peaks (2).
The types of vehicles used to provide services are
also important to the capacity and function of BRT
and LRT systems. Both buses and light rail
vehicles (LRVs) offer roughly similar ranges of
passenger capacities ranging from single unit
buses and trams carrying between 50-70
passengers, to articulated buses and coupled or
articulated LRVs carrying between 130-150
passengers.(3) Increasingly, larger buses and
LRVs with multiple articulations provide high
capacity (270-300 passengers) vehicles for BRT
and LRT systems.
Most manufacturers of buses and LRVs now offer
low-floor or semi low-floor options to improve
accessibility to vehicles for a diverse range of
public transport users, complementing improved
stop infrastructure that provides level, ‘no-step’
boarding and alighting.
4. A definition of BRT and LRT
In order to provide consistent and comparable
definitions of BRT and LRT in this paper, the
following parameters will be used:
 BRT is generally powered by ICE; LRT is
generally powered by electricity;
 BRT technology uses rubber tires on
asphalt or concrete roadways, with
steering usually provided by the driver;
LRT uses steel wheel on steel rail,
steered by wheel/rail interaction;
 BRT is capable of line capacities between
4,000-20,000 spaces per hour, although
some high capacity BRT systems have
capacities of up to 40,000 spaces per
hour. LRT is capable of line capacities of
between 5,000-24,000 spaces per hour;
 BRT & LRT vehicles run to distinctive
stops or stations with good passenger
facilities, with average stop spacing of
between 300-600m apart in CBDs and
between 600-1000m in suburban areas;
 Operates predominantly in dedicated
(Category B) ROWs separated from other
road users (i.e. taxis, high-occupancy
vehicles). BRT/LRT can also operate in
fully segregated elevated or tunnelled
(Category A) ROWs. Only limited
sections should be in shared on-road
(Category C) ROWs.
These parameters show both the unique and
shared attributes of BRT and LRT and allows
analysis of Australian and NZ systems to occur on
a ‘like for like’ basis, rather than attempting to
sweep up a range of bus-based and tram-based
systems under all-encompassing definitions of
‘LRT’ and ‘BRT’. This is particularly important in
comparing capital costs of BRT and LRT systems,
but also in comparing the performance
parameters of both transport technologies.
CAPITAL, OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE
COSTS OF BRT & LRT
Better knowledge of public transport infrastructure
project and operating costs can assist
governments, transport agencies, contractors and
consultants in developing more robust business
cases that accurately estimate project costs and
benefits. More accurate data can give political

4. Scott Martin Moving beyond cost: Evaluating LRT and BRT
University of Melbourne options for Australian and New Zealand cities
Conference On Railway Excellence
Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014
leaders, gateway agencies (such as state and
federal treasuries) and decision-makers greater
confidence in the likelihood of public transport
projects to be delivered on time and on budget.
There is a growing body of literature examining
methods of costing capital and operational
expenditure on major transport and other
infrastructure projects, placing these elements of
project selection and development on more sound
footings. The literature outlines tools for analysing
large-scale infrastructure projects, which are
increasingly relevant to projects with metropolitan
or regional level size and scope such as BRT and
LRT projects. These tools offer improved capital
and operating cost forecasting, but are also
important in looking at political and other factors
that guide project selection and development.
A common claim in favour of BRT as a transport
technology is its lower capital and operating costs
and lower frequency of cost overruns compared
to similar LRT systems. This argument is
frequently heard in North American debates on
selection of BRT and LRT as appropriate urban
public transport technologies, however such
claims often highly contentious and emotionally
charged. Large-scale meta-analyses of BRT and
LRT projects in North America (4, 5), the United
Kingdom (6, 7) and Europe (8) provide more
nuanced views of the differences between capital
and operational costs.
These meta-analyses allow assembly of a
‘reference class’ of completed BRT and LRT
projects that Flyvbjerg (9) views as permitting
more accurate forecasting of future project costs.
While some efforts have been made at compiling
reference classes of BRT (10, 11) and LRT
projects (12) in Australia and New Zealand, the
paper’s research is, to the author’s knowledge,
the first effort at developing such a reference
class of Australian and NZ BRT and LRT projects.
Low knowledge levels of project capital costs for
public transport and its impacts (such as
escalating capital costs) have not gone unnoticed
in various Australian jurisdictions, with inquiries
made by Parliamentary Committees into project
costs; along with ex-post facto inquiries into
completed LRT and BRT projects. Understanding
capital costs for public transport projects has also
been of interest to other bodies scrutinising the
executive arms of Australian government,
particularly Auditor-General’s offices in Victoria
and New South Wales.
Operating costs are another factor decision-
makers must examine when evaluating full-life
costs of transport projects. While US operating
cost data exists from meta-analyses of US (5) and
UK (7) BRT and LRT systems, reporting
inconsistencies by individual transport operators
and possible bias in data sources makes it hard to
provide consistent analysis of operating costs in
Australia and NZ.
The absence of detailed system operating cost
data for new BRT and LRT systems in Australia
and NZ is concerning. Such systems, whether
operated by public sector authorities, private
sector contractors or franchisees tend to report
operational data (where it is available) at a
system-wide level, with aggregate figures for
operating costs, as well as service kilometres
operated, subsidies paid and passengers carried.
Finding detailed operational cost data through
open sources is often complicated by it often
being viewed as ‘commercial-in-confidence’
information. Disaggregating such operating cost
data for BRT and LRT systems in Australia and
NZ is extremely challenging. The author was
unable to hypothecate or ‘reverse engineer’
operating costs to sufficiently robust levels of
confidence to warrant their inclusion in this paper.
A ‘REFERENCE CLASS’ OF BRT AND LRT
PROJECTS IN AUSTRALIA AND NZ
Development of a ‘reference class’ of BRT and
LRT projects in Australian and NZ cities is
desirable to achieve accurate estimates of capital
costs for future BRT and LRT projects based on
past delivery costs for similar projects. Flyvbjerg
(9) concludes reference class forecasting is
particularly useful, especially for calculating
estimates of project costs and better predicting
final costs after accounting for optimism bias,
especially in patronage estimates. In an
Australian context, reference class forecasting is
viewed as a useful addition to the practice of
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) for public sector
projects (13).
Knowledge of project costs is important, not
merely for forecasting the financial performance
of future projects, but also as part of broader
performance-based evaluation processes for
road-based public transport. Later in this paper,
BRT and LRT project costs developed in the
reference class will be used alongside operational
data to produce a tentative set of performance-
based evaluation measures for proposed BRT
and LRT projects in Australia and NZ.
1. Project definition and filtering
In developing a reference class of projects, an
initial long list was identified using open source
material including government documents,
transport industry trade press and academic
literature An initial list of approximately 50 BRT
and LRT projects was developed, with projects
either being completed or underway during the
25-year period from 1987 to 2012. After the long
list of candidate projects was developed, filters
were applied to remove certain project types.
Projects that did not comply with the earlier

5. Conference On Railway Excellence
Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014
definition of BRT and LRT were excluded, on
grounds including:
 Network level or spot bus and light rail
priority treatments (e.g. peak-period lanes
and traffic signal priority);
 New and upgraded bus and light rail
services on existing corridors, and;
 Infrastructure projects that support
improved urban bus and light rail
operations (e.g. depots, workshops).
By applying these filters, a core list of 28 BRT and
LRT infrastructure projects remained within scope
for consideration. The short-listed projects were
investigated further to develop more detailed
profiles of project scope, size and cost, with the
final list consisting of three project categories:
 Construction of new BRT and LRT routes;
 Extensions to existing BRT and LRT
routes, and;
 Conversion of heavy rail routes to LRT or
BRT routes.
2. Refinement of included projects and
methodology
The capital costs of the 28 candidate projects
based on the reported final outturn cost were
initially developed, with data obtained using ‘open
source’ (that is, publicly available) data from
annual reports, budget papers, media releases,
newspaper articles and the transport trade press.
Where information was available, each project
was further refined to strip out operating cost
items, the costs of ‘fixed’ infrastructure (ROW
acquisition, stations), ‘movable’ infrastructure
(rolling stock) and costs of ‘enabling’ or ‘network-
wide’ infrastructure works (relocation of utilities,
depots and control systems) to provide a final per-
kilometre construction cost for rights-of way,
stations and system technologies.
An attempt to screen the capital costs of the 28
candidate projects further to develop a ‘basic’ per
route-kilometre cost for rights-of-way only was
considered, but this was not pursued due to
difficulties encountered in collecting such detailed
information through open source methods. The
success or otherwise of this methodology and the
level to which costs can be isolated depends on
levels of quality and transparency in the data
published by consultants, infrastructure delivery
organisations and governments in annual reports,
budget papers and other material. The quality and
quantity of this material varies between
jurisdictions and has differed over time.
Once the basic capital cost profile was developed,
there was a need to normalise all project costs
across the 25-year time horizon from dollars of
the day into constant dollars. As these projects
either commenced or were completed between
1987 and 2012, a method was sought that
escalated each project’s final outturn capital cost
at the time of completion into constant dollars.
Three methodologies for were examined for
developing projects costs in constant dollars for
the reference set of project costs. The first
method involved simple escalation from dollars of
the day into constant (2013) dollars utilising the
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Consumer
Price Index (CPI) figures. While useful for cost
escalation into constant dollars, CPI is limited by
its basis in the price movements of a basket of
goods and services.
The second method mirrors that used in a
comparative, trans-national study of rail project
costs in Europe and the US, based on
movements of the OECD’s Construction Cost
Index or CCI (14). The Australian and New
Zealand components of the CCI utilises the ABS
Producer Price Index (PPI) data for road and
bridge construction projects (15) and Statistics
NZ’s PPI data on heavy and civil engineering
construction (16). Discussions with a range of
stakeholders indicated using PPI instead of CPI to
would provide more accurate results.
The third methodology was a hybrid method used
only for Australian projects completed prior to the
start of the ABS’ PPI (road and bridge
construction) data set in the September 1997
quarter. This method uses Australian CPI data to
escalate project costs to September quarter 1997
levels and then utilises Australian PPI data to
escalate costs to June quarter 2013 levels.
Project costs at the time of completion were
multiplied using PPI (and CPI where appropriate)
price inflators to June 2013 Australian dollars. For
the single NZ project, the project costs in NZ
dollars was converted into Australian dollars using
the average interbank exchange rate for the year
the project was completed then escalated using
the NZ PPI price inflator.
EVALUATING COSTS OF BRT & LRT
PROJECTS IN AUSTRALIA & NZ
The capital costs for all 28 BRT and LRT projects
in Australian and NZ cities examined in this article
are shown in Table 1 below and are ranked by
per-kilometre capital cost. Sorting the reference
class this way illustrates the wide range of per-
kilometre capital costs, ranging from $450
million/km for Stage 1 of Brisbane’s Eastern
Busway to the Port Melbourne Light Rail
conversion at $5.8 million/km.
Capital costs are shown both in Australian dollars
at the year of completion and also escalated to
(June 2013) Australian dollars. Table 1 shows the
significant public sector investment in BRT & LRT
projects in Australia and NZ (mostly by state and

6. Scott Martin Moving beyond cost: Evaluating LRT and BRT
University of Melbourne options for Australian and New Zealand cities
Conference On Railway Excellence
Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014
Table 1: Australian and NZ BRT & LRT projects ranked by per kilometre capital cost in constant (2013 $A).
Sources: Federal/State government budget papers (Australia); National/Regional government budget papers (NZ).
regional governments) since 1987 of just over $7
billion (2013 $A). This amount pales in
comparison to over $55 billion of public funds
spent by national, state, territory and local
governments on Australia’s road network between
1987 and 2009.
The 13 BRT projects in the reference class range
from $450 million/km (Brisbane’s Eastern Busway
Stage 1) to $11.4 million/km (Perth’s Kwinana
Freeway Busway). The 15 LRT projects range
from $99.7 million/km (Gold Coast Light Rail) to
$5.8 million/km for the Port Melbourne Light Rail
conversion. The wide span of per-kilometre
capital costs shows the diversity of environments
and methods in which BRT and LRT projects are
delivered in Australia and New Zealand.
The five most expensive projects on a per-
kilometre basis (bar one) are all BRT projects in
Brisbane (Eastern Busway Stage 1 [EB1], Inner
Northern Busway Stage 2 [INB2], Boggo Road
Busway [BRB] and Northern Busway Stage 2
[BNB2]). These four are among the most
Project Name State
Length
(km)
Stations
/Stops
Opened
Cost $M
(2013)
Cost per
km $M
(2013)
Eastern Busway Stage 1
(Buranda-Coorparoo)
QLD 1.1 2 2011 $494.9 $449.9
Inner Northern Busway Stage 2
(KG Square - Roma St)
QLD 1.3 2 2008 $395.1 $316.1
Boggo Road Busway
(UQ Lakes-Buranda)
QLD 1.5 4 2009 $257.6 $171.7
Northern Busway Stage 2
(Windsor-Kedron)
QLD 3.0 10 2012 $453.6 $151.2
Gold Coast Light Rail QLD 13.0 16 2014 $1,296.0 $99.7
Northern Busway Stage 1
(Herston - Windsor)
QLD 2.4 8 2009 $225.7 $94.0
Inner Northern Busway
Stage 1 (Roma St - Herston)
QLD 2.8 3 2005 $218.2 $77.9
South-East Busway QLD 16.5 11 2001 $1,097.2 $66.5
Sydney Inner West
Light Rail Extension
NSW 5.6 9 2014 $214.0 $38.2
Auckland Northern Busway NZ 8.7 5 2008 $295.5 $34.0
Sydney Light Rail NSW 3.6 10 1997 $118.8 $33.0
M2 Motorway Busway NSW 7.0 2 1997 $201.1 $28.7
North West Transitway NSW 24.0 30 2007 $672.0 $28.0
Port Road Tram extension SA 2.8 4 2010 $53.0 $18.9
Liverpool-Parramatta Transitway NSW 30.0 31 2003 $532.8 $17.8
Adelaide O-Bahn SA 12.0 3 1989 $197.6 $16.5
Box Hill tram extension VIC 2.2 5 2003 $35.2 $16.0
Adelaide CBD tram extension SA 2.1 5 2008 $33.6 $16.0
Vermont South tram extension VIC 3.0 5 2005 $36.5 $12.2
Kwinana Freeway Bus Transitway WA 5.9 1 2002 $67.0 $11.4
Plenty Road Tram Extension Stage
4 (McLeans Road - McKimmies
Road)
VIC 2.1 4 1995 $23.5 $11.2
Docklands Drive tram extension VIC 1.0 5 2005 $9.0 $9.0
Sydney Light Rail Extension NSW 3.6 4 2000 $32.3 $9.0
Plenty Road Tram Extension Stage
3 (La Trobe University - McLeans
Road)
VIC 3.2 7 1987 $26.3 $8.2
Airport West Tram Extension VIC 1.2 3 1992 $9.1 $7.6
St Kilda Light Rail VIC 4.4 8 1987 $29.9 $6.8
East Burwood Tram VIC 2.0 4 1993 $12.9 $6.5
Port Melbourne Light Rail VIC 2.8 6 1987 $16.1 $5.8
TOTAL ALL PROJECTS (2013 $A Million) $7054.5

7. Scott Martin Moving Beyond Cost: Evaluating BRT & LRT
University of Melbourne options for Australian and New Zealand cities
Conference On Railway Excellence
Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014
expensive urban public transport projects
constructed in Australia over the last decade.
They reflect the choice of extensively tunnelled
engineering solutions to deal with access through
the Brisbane CBD or transitioning from elevated
to tunnelled ROWs for grade-separated crossings
with rail and road corridors (17).
On a per-kilometre basis the cost of the first two
BRT projects exceeds Australia’s most expensive
urban rail project (Sydney’s Epping-Chatswood
line costing $208 million/km), while the next two
BRT projects cost more than Australia’s second
most expensive urban rail project, Sydney’s
Airport Rail Link, costing $125 million/km (18).
The fifth most expensive is the Gold Coast Light
Rail project. Its per-kilometre cost reflects the high
cost of retrofitting a completely new on-road LRT
system into a mature urban environment, and
includes aggregated one-off network set up costs
for vehicles, depots, traction power and control
systems.
Where good quality ROWs are available, capital
costs can be relatively low for either BRT or LRT
projects. Re-use of an abandoned freeway
corridor played a major role in keeping the costs
of Adelaide’s O-Bahn busway to a modest $16.5
million/km, while partial usage of a water pipeline
corridor kept the cost of the Liverpool-Parramatta
T-Way at $17.8 million/km. Constructing BRT
corridors in freeway medians has also kept capital
costs low, with busways constructed in Perth’s
Kwinana Freeway and Sydney’s M2 tollway
costing $11.4 million/km and $28.7 million/km
respectively (19, 20). Disused rail corridors have
also provided low-cost ROWs for LRT, with
minimal land acquisition, straightforward
conversion of electrical systems and track to LRT
and using existing rolling stock. Examples include
the mid-1980s conversion of the Port Melbourne
and St Kilda heavy rail lines into LRT and the
conversion of an abandoned freight line into the
first two stages of Sydney’s single LRT line a
decade later (21-23).
COMPARISONS WITH INTERNATIONAL
BENCHMARKS
As discussed previously, many BRT promoters
claim it is cheaper than LRT on a capital cost per-
kilometre basis by a wide margin. Meta-analyses
of reference classes of BRT and LRT projects in
North America (4, 5, 8), the UK and Europe (7, 8)
indicate capital costs of LRT are approximately
2.6 times that of BRT.
These results should be viewed with caution as
they compare LRT systems to the full range of
bus-based public transport projects ranging from
improved street bus operations in dedicated bus
lanes up to full BRT. Differences in data collection
and quality of data used in these meta-analyses
can lead to perpetuating the ‘apples and oranges
error’ of drawing erroneous conclusions from
uneven and dissimilar data. By comparing ‘apples
with apples’ using a methodology that more
rigorously defines the set of reference class
projects, BRT proponents’ claims can be more
rigorously tested.
Using the reference set of projects and author’s
previous research into capital construction costs
of public transport projects in Australia and NZ,
only a small sample size of six new BRT and LRT
projects is available for comparison to overseas
meta-analyses. Since 1997, only two new LRT
projects were completed (Sydney Light Rail) or
under construction (Gold Coast Light Rail), with
an average capital cost of A$57 million/km,
compared to four new BRT projects completed in
the same period with an average capital cost of
A$32.8 million/km (17).
A surprising result of testing the data is that the
ratio of capital cost difference for Australian and
New Zealand BRT and LRT projects is 1 to 1.7, a
ratio smaller than the overseas meta-analyses
would suggest. The comparison of results is
shown in Figure 2 below. The finding in Figure 2
is significant as it reflects efforts to create greater
acceptance of BRT as a ‘rail-like’ technology in
Australia and NZ: either by designing them to
higher, LRT-like standards (11, 24), or by future-
proofing the ability to convert BRT into LRT or
heavy rail technology (25-27).
Figure 2: Per-kilometre capital cost ratios of US, UK,
European, Australian and NZ BRT & LRT projects.
Further research that better separates out the
component costs for BRT and LRT projects could
narrow the gap between LRT and ‘rail-like’ BRT
infrastructure closer to the 1 to 1.5 ratio identified
in a case study comparing capital costs of BRT,
Guided BRT and LRT options in the UK (6).
EVALUATING ROAD-BASED PUBLIC
TRANSPORT PROJECTS ON PERFORMANCE
AND COST
Comparison of different transport modes or
technologies on capital costs alone is critiqued as
a false comparison, failing to fully consider other
values such as capacity, productivity and
performance levels (3). A range of non-cost
criteria are available to measure performance of

8. Scott Martin Moving beyond cost: Evaluating LRT and BRT
University of Melbourne options for Australian and New Zealand cities
Conference On Railway Excellence
Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014
public transport systems, including ‘Workrate’
(measuring frequencies) which, along with vehicle
and ROW characteristics generate ‘Capacity’ that
measures the maximum amount of units moving
past fixed points in set periods of time. (2)
The most common unit of capacity is ‘person
capacity’, being the number of people that can
reliably move past a fixed point during a set
period of time without unreasonable delay, hazard
or discomfort. (28). ‘Space capacity’ (both seats
and standing room) further modifies person
capacity to provide a better measure of ‘offered
capacity’ from the number of passenger spaces
moving past a fixed point over an hour. Offered
capacity measures have the advantage of being
determined largely using open source data such
as operator’s public timetables and known vehicle
capacities, rather than requiring patronage data or
direct observation and counting of passengers.
Levels of Service (LOS) measures are also useful
when assessing existing or planned transport
infrastructure’s ability to satisfy present and future
demand. LOS measures include service
frequency, span of operating hours, service
coverage, passenger loadings, on-time
performance, headway adherence and average
speeds (29). LOS measures add information on
congestion, as high (spaces per hour) capacity on
a route is often only possible with unacceptable
levels of congestion and degraded LOS (28).
While LOS measures are useful for comparing
options between technologies (such as BRT and
LRT), operating strategies and service standards,
are less useful in determining factors such as
passenger comfort, overcrowding and ride quality.
For this analytical exercise, average operating
speeds will be utilised as a proxy measure of
LOS. When combined with offered capacity it
creates a measure of ‘productive’ capacity,
providing good composite representation of both
operator-focused (capacity) and passenger-
focused (speed) public transport performance (2).
Of the 28 reference class projects, 18 were
selected for performance evaluation. Ten projects
were removed from consideration, including all
seven LRT-like extensions to Melbourne’s
predominantly on-street tram network and the
removal of the Kwinana Freeway busway after its
conversion to heavy rail in 2006. Other projects
were modified, with Sydney’s North-West T-Way
project split into its constituent parts (the
Parramatta-Rouse Hill and Blacktown-Parklea
busways), while the LRT lines in Sydney and
Adelaide were amalgamated to form ‘Sydney
Light Rail’ and ‘Adelaide Light Rail’ lines for
evaluation. Due to Brisbane’s busway network
structure of frequent branching from main trunks,
each section of the Northern and Eastern
busways along with the outer section of the
Southeast busway were examined separately.
To evaluate productive capacities of Australian
and NZ BRT and LRT systems, data was
collected to determine average speeds and
offered AM peak (07.30-08.30) capacity on each
corridor. Offered capacity was determined using
public timetables of each operator and data on
vehicle capacities. Cordon points on each corridor
or corridor section were chosen to ensure
accurate counting of offered capacity. Detailed
tabulation of cordon points, vehicle numbers,
offered capacity and productive capacity for each
project is provided at Appendix One.
Offered capacity on BRT is conservatively
estimated, as many systems use a mix of
standard, long-wheelbase and articulated buses.
For this analysis, all buses are assumed to be
standard buses with 70 spaces (seated and
standing) per bus (2). In practice, BRT offered
capacity is significantly higher on most systems
with the use of long wheelbase rigid and
articulated buses. LRT projects use capacities for
LRVs in service on each line (12, 30).
Performance parameters for ‘street’ transit (buses
and trams), ‘semi-rapid’ transit (BRT and LRT)
and ‘rapid’ transit are also overlaid to locate the
projects within these generally accepted
performance parameters (2).
This data is plotted in graphical form and is
displayed in Figure 3 below. Key findings include:
 The majority (14 from 18) of BRT and
LRT projects have offered capacities
closer to (and often below) accepted
parameters for street transit than those of
semi-rapid transit;
 Most BRT and LRT projects use
separated ROWs to operate at higher
average speeds than street transit, and;
 Only three projects (Adelaide’s O-Bahn,
Brisbane’s Southeast Busway and Inner
Northern Busway Stage 2) operate at
levels of offered capacity and speed that
can be considered as truly semi-rapid
transit, while a fourth (Sydney’s M2
Tollway Busway) approaches semi-rapid
transit performance levels.
When per-kilometre capital cost data for the 18
projects are plotted along with data on productive
capacity derived from Figure 3, relationships
showing each project’s relative effectiveness as
transportation systems can be developed. Figure
4 plots this relationship with performance values
for different classes of transit overlaid as a
comparative benchmark. Note also the vertical
axis (capital costs) is displayed in a logarithmic
rather than linear scale for easier readability.

9. Scott Martin Moving beyond cost: Evaluating LRT and BRT
University of Melbourne options for Australian and New Zealand cities
Conference On Railway Excellence
Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014
AOB
SEB
ANB
INB2
BNB1
BNB2
ANB
LPB
RHB
BPB
M2B
BRB
BEB1
ADL
SKL
PML
SYL
GCL
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
AverageOperatingSpeed(km/h)
Peak hour/peak direction offered capacity (Spaces per hour)
Street transit
Semirapid
transit
Figure 3: Measuring productive capacity of Australian and NZ BRT & LRT systems
Figure 4: Relationship between productive capacity and per-kilometre construction costs
for Australian and NZ BRT and LRT systems
AOB
SEBINB1
INB2
BNB2
BNB2
ANB
LPB
RHB
BPB
M2B
BRB
BEB1
ADL
SKL
PML
SYL
GCL
$1
$10
$100
$1,000
0 100 200 300 400 500
Capitalcostperkm(2013A$Millions)
Productive capacity (offered spaces x average operating speed) '000s
Street transit
Semirapid transit
Rapid
transit
Key: ADL: Adelaide Light Rail; ANB - Auckland Northern Busway; AOB – Adelaide O-Bahn; BEB1 –
Brisbane Eastern Busway Stage 1; BNB1 – Brisbane Northern Busway Stage 1; BNB2 – Brisbane
Northern Busway Stage 2; BPB - Blacktown to Parklea Busway; BRB – Boggo Road Busway; GCL –
Gold Coast Light Rail; LPB – Liverpool to Parramatta Busway; M2B – M2 Tollway Busway; PML – Port
Melbourne Light Rail; RHB - Parramatta to Rouse Hill Busway; SEB - Brisbane Southeast Busway;
SKL – St Kilda Light Rail; SYL – Sydney Light Rail.

10. Scott Martin Moving beyond cost: Evaluating LRT and BRT
University of Melbourne options for Australian and New Zealand cities
Conference On Railway Excellence
Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014
The key findings from Figure 4 include:
 The majority of BRT and LRT projects in
the reference class offer street transit-
levels of productive capacity, but at high
per-kilometre capital costs;
 Five BRT and LRT projects offer semi
rapid transit levels of productive capacity
and capital costs, with another BRT
project offering similar productive capacity
at higher capital costs, and;
 One BRT project (Adelaide’s O-Bahn) has
productive capacity approaching the
threshold of rapid transit performance.
FINDINGS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
A significant finding of this paper was the closer
alignment between BRT and LRT capital costs in
Australia and NZ than in Europe, North America
and the UK. Reasons may include the higher
costs of designing BRT to be more ‘rail-like’, with
high-quality, high-capacity bus infrastructure
segregated from other road users along with
constraints faced by BRT routes in finding
corridors through inner city areas. This merits
further investigation as part of a longer-term
research program on BRT and LRT.
The use of capital cost data alongside operational
data produced worthwhile findings on the
operational performance of the reference class of
projects. Most surprising was the lower offered
capacity of the majority of the reference class of
BRT and LRT projects compared to high average
operating speeds of BRT and LRT. Effectively,
performance of most BRT and LRT projects are
closer to street transit (bus and tram) than semi-
rapid transit. Another important finding was that
where Australian and NZ BRT and LRT projects
did deliver semi-rapid transit performance levels,
it was often at higher per-kilometre capital costs
than UK, European and North American projects.
The literature review also identified a range of
factors other than capital cost and transport
performance that influence decision-making on
the transport project development and selection of
transport technology. These factors occur
throughout project evaluation and development
processes and influence transport systems at
strategic and operational levels. These factors fall
into the following broad categories:
 Project selection and evaluation
mechanisms;
 Political, ideological and financial
imperatives;
 What comparable ‘peer cities’ are doing;
 Availability and selection of appropriate
corridors;
 Land use planning environment;
 Road management policies and
strategies;
 Levels of integration with existing public
transport networks;
These qualititative factors would benefit from
further examination as part of a wider research
program into selection and development of BRT
and LRT projects.
Such findings prompt the question as to whether
transport policy in Australian cities should focus
on ensuring all options for improving and
upgrading productive capacities of existing bus or
tram-based street transit systems are examined,
implemented and evaluated, before investigating
options for investment in new, high capital cost
BRT and LRT projects. These factors also require
further examination as part of a wider research
program.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, defining cost and performance
parameters of semi rapid transit technology
represented by BRT and LRT is important to
ensure less-capable substitute technologies
(such as ‘improved bus’ and ‘improved tram’) are
not marketed as BRT and LRT systems. The core
definition of BRT and LRT provided in this paper
represents irreducible minimums for truthfully
labelling transport systems BRT or LRT.
Misrepresentation (intentionally or unintentionally)
of the costs and benefits of BRT and LRT
diminishes the capabilities of both. Articulating
definitions for BRT and LRT as transport
technologies enabled development of capital cost
profiles for Australian and NZ projects that
compares ‘apples with apples’ (possibly red
apples with green apples!) providing consistency
in estimating likely costs for new projects.
Based on the findings of the analysis of capital
costs, a set of performance-based criteria were
developed to better evaluate BRT and LRT
projects in Australia and NZ. Analysing costs of
investment against transport performance criteria
has a potentially important role to play in
providing easily understood evaluation tools for
non-technical decision-makers. By using
performance-based evaluation of previously
completed projects, many Australian and NZ BRT
and LRT systems were found to be operating at
sub-optimal performance levels. This may have
implications for the ways in which government
agencies evaluate and prioritise investment in
new transport technology options against
upgrading existing systems to higher levels of
performance. These findings suggest the most
rational transport planning option may be
foregoing investment in new systems to invest in
upgrading existing road-based public transport
systems to improve efficiency and performance.

11. Scott Martin Moving Beyond Cost: Evaluating BRT & LRT
University of Melbourne options for Australian and New Zealand cities
Conference On Railway Excellence
Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author thanks the RTSA and the conference
organisers for the opportunity to present this
paper. Particular thanks are due to my thesis
supervisors (Dr Leigh Glover and Dr Chris Hale)
and the anonymous referee for their extensive
and constructive comments on the draft paper.
The views expressed in this paper remain the
author’s and are not those of his employer.
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12. Scott Martin Moving beyond cost: Evaluating LRT and BRT
University of Melbourne options for Australian and New Zealand cities
Conference On Railway Excellence
Adelaide, 5 – 7 May 2014
APPENDIX ONE – BRT & LRT CAPACITY DATA
BRT/LRT
corridor
Cordon point Vehicles
per hour
Average
operating
speed
(km/h)
Offered
Capacity
(Spaces
per hour)
Productive
Capacity
Adelaide
O-Bahn
Paradise
Interchange
70 80 4900 392000
Adelaide
Light Rail
Greenhill Road 7 33 1267 41811
Auckland
Northern
Busway
Albany Station 20 31 1400 43400
Southeast
Busway
Greenslopes
Station
67 57 4690 267330
Inner Northern
Busway Stage 1
QUT Kelvin Grove 38 31 2660 82460
Inner Northern
Busway Stage 2
Roma Street
Station
77 34 5390 183260
Northern
Busway Stage 1
Lutwyche Road,
Windsor
38 18 2660 47880
Northern
Busway Stage 2
Lutwyche Station 25 36 1750 63000
Boggo Road
Busway
PA Hospital Station 17 20 1890 37800
Eastern Busway
Stage 1
Stones Corner
Station
32 20 2240 44800
Gold Coast
Light Rail
Cavill Avenue
Station
8 21 2472 51912
Port Melbourne
Light Rail
Southbank Station 12 31 1920 59520
St Kilda
Light Rail
South Melbourne
Station
12 36 2040 73440
Liverpool to
Parramatta
Busway
Bonnyrigg Station 12 32 840 26880
Parramatta to
Rouse Hill
Busway
Abbot Station 23 29 1610 46690
Blacktown to
Parklea Busway
James Cook
Station
15 18 1050 18900
M2 Tollway
Busway
Oakes Road
Interchange
54 38 3780 143640
Sydney Light
Rail
The Star Station 6 34 1302 44268