SlideShare une entreprise Scribd logo
1  sur  7
Télécharger pour lire hors ligne
Topics, Issues, and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership
S T A N F O R D C L O S E R L O O K S E R I E S
stanford closer look series		 1
What Is CEO Talent Worth?
Introduction
The topic of executive compensation elicits strong
emotions among corporate stakeholders, practitio-
ners, and observers. On the one hand are those who
believe firmly that chief executive officers in the
United States are overpaid. They cite as evidence
the large and growing disparity between total pay
granted to CEOs and the compensation of the av-
erage worker.1
Their solution is the encouragement
of more shareholder activism (primarily through
proxy measures, such as say on pay) to communi-
cate concerns to companies and induce a voluntary
reduction in compensation levels or stricter perfor-
mance-based features that more closely align com-
pensation to financial and operating results. Some
go so far as to suggest that CEO compensation be
regulated at a fixed multiple of the average worker’s
pay.
	 On the other side of the issue are those who be-
lieve that chief executives are paid the going fair-
market rate. They argue that if compensation levels
are high among the largest U.S. corporations, it is
simply a reflection of the demands of a position
that require considerable time, skill, and attention.
They advocate continued disclosure on compensa-
tion size and structure so that market forces correct
the mispricing of talent in situations where it arises.
	 Researchers have taken various approaches to
evaluating whether CEO pay levels are appropriate.
Gabaix and Landier (2008) measure the relation
between CEO compensation and company size.
They find that although CEO pay increased six-
fold between 1980 and 2003, the market value of
the companies these CEOs managed also increased
sixfold during this period. They conclude that “the
rise in CEO compensation is a simple mirror of the
By David F. Larcker, Usman Liaqat and Brian Tayan
January 24, 2012
rise in the value of large U.S. companies since the
1980s.”2
Similarly, Kaplan and Rauh (2010) com-
pare the growth rate of executive compensation to
the growth rate of other highly paid professionals,
such as hedge fund managers, private equity man-
agers, venture capitalists, lawyers and professional
athletes. They find that pay among these groups all
grew by roughly the same order of magnitude dur-
ing the period 1994 to 2005. They conclude that
CEO compensation has increased due to market
forces that contribute to general wage inflation
among highly paid professionals, and that extreme
compensation growth has not been limited to the
business world.3
	 However, it is important to remember that dem-
onstrating a correlation between executive compen-
sation and firm size or performance does not mean
that pay levels themselves are appropriate. It might
still be the case that CEO pay itself is either too
high or too low on average.4
The only way to make
a determination is to measure whether the total
compensation received is commensurate with the
value of services rendered. To do this, stakeholders
need to understand 1) the value drivers of the or-
ganization, 2) the impact that the executive has on
these value drivers, and 3) the percentage of value
created that should be appropriately offered as com-
pensation for performance. While this is simple in
theory, it is exceptionally difficult in practice.
Performance and Compensation
The value drivers (or key performance indicators)
of an organization include the financial and non-
financial metrics that reflect the current and future
performance of the company (see Exhibit 1). They
might be generic in nature and applicable to most
stanford closer look series		 2
What Is CEO Talent Worth?
companies (such as revenue growth, profit margin,
and return on invested capital) or specific measures
that are relevant to a particular industry or line of
business (such as research and development pipe-
line productivity or on-time delivery rates). Simi-
larly, they might be readily quantifiable (such as
product defect rates) or more qualitative in nature
and therefore require proprietary methods of mea-
surement (such as customer and employee satisfac-
tion). It is the responsibility of management and
the board of directors to identify the value drivers
that are most critical to the success of the corporate
strategy. This process is best accomplished through
rigorous statistical testing that demonstrates a
proven correlation between the relevant metric and
changes in corporate value.5
The valid performance
indicators of the company then serve as the basis for
measuring management performance and awarding
compensation.
	 The challenge for the board is to determine what
level of compensation to offer to chief executive of-
ficers for the achievement of specific performance
objectives. This can be an extremely difficult task,
not least of which because it is not always easy to de-
termine how much corporate value creation should
be attributable to the efforts of a single individual.6
Although a considerable number of theorists and
practitioners have argued that CEOs play a criti-
cal role affecting firm performance, the empirical
research on this issue is mixed. Thomas (1988)
finds that CEOs are responsible for only 3.9 per-
cent of the variance in performance among com-
panies, while Mackey (2005) finds that the impact
is much greater: as high as 29.2 percent.7
The view
that board members have on this issue will have a
substantial impact on what they view as reasonable
CEO compensation (see Exhibit 2).
	 Finally, the board must determine the percent-
age of value creation to award in compensation.
Although there are no agreed upon standards, ob-
servation of compensation practices among other
talent pools might serve as a guide. For example,
the CEOs that manage private-equity owned com-
panies receive on average 5.4 percent of the equity
upside (in the form of stock and options).8
A-list
actors in Hollywood receive $10 to $30 million per
film, plus 10 to 20 percent of gross profits.9
Music
artists receive 8 to 25 percent of the suggested re-
tail price of an album, a $0.08 performance royalty
when a song is played live or broadcast, plus a per-
centage of the gross profit generated on tour (see
Exhibit 3).10
Similarly, in setting compensation for
CEO talent, the board should target a payout in
relation to performance or value creation. In this
regard, the structure of the compensation contract
will be as important as its overall size.
Why This Matters
1.	Executive compensation is a topic that is filled
with much rhetoric (“nobody is worth $20 mil-
lion per year”) but somewhat less critical analysis
(“maybe some CEOs are worth $20 million per
year while many others are not”). Why isn’t more
of the discussion focused on the actual observ-
able impact that a CEO has on value creation
and the percentage of value that should be of-
fered for these efforts?
2.	Why don’t we commonly see explicit calculations
of actual value creation by the CEO in proxy
statements? Is it not possible for boards to per-
form this calculation? If not, how does the board
make rational decisions regarding pay levels? 
1
	 Although precise figures vary depending on the sample and meth-
odology employed, one recent estimate pegs this ratio at 343 among
a sample companies in the S&P 500. See AFL-CIO Executive Pay-
watch, available at: http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/pay-
watch/.
2
	 Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier, “Why Has CEO Pay Increased
So Much?” Quarterly Journal of Economics (2008).
3
	 Steven N. Kaplan and Joshua Rauh, “Wall Street and Main Street:
What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?” Review of
Financial Studies (2010).
4	
Further complicating the matter is the fact that reported compensa-
tion figures in the proxy do not reflect what an executive has earned
but instead combine cash compensation received plus a fair value es-
timate of the expected value of equity compensation granted. If per-
formance does not meet expected results, the actual value of equity
grants will be considerably lower than their original fair value. For a
full discussion of this issue, see: David F. Larcker, Allan McCall, and
Brian Tayan, “What Does It Mean for an Executive to ‘Make’ $1
Million?” CGRP-22, Dec. 14, 2011.
5
	 For a detailed review of this process, see: David F. Larcker and Brian
Tayan, Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organiza-
tional Choices and Their Consequences, Chapter 6: Organizational
Strategy, Business Models, and Risk Management (New York, NY:
FT Press, 2011); and Christopher D. Ittner and David F. Larcker,
“Coming Up Short on Nonfinancial Performance Measurement,”
Harvard Business Review (Nov. 2003).
6
	 Sometimes it is even difficult to compute the value created by a firm.
For example, does a one-year change in market capitalization validly
reflect the change in value creation over the period?
stanford closer look series		 3
What Is CEO Talent Worth?
7
	 Alan Berkeley Thomas. Does Leadership Make a Difference in Or-
ganizational Performance? Administrative Science Quarterly (1988).
Alison Mackey. How Much Do CEOs Influence Firm Perfor-
mance—Really? (2005), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=816065.
8
	 Steven N. Kaplan and Per Strömberg. Leveraged Buyouts and Pri-
vate Equity. Journal of Economic Perspectives (2008).
9
	 Film Budgeting. Wikipedia.
10
	Lee Ann Obringer, “How Music Royalties Work,” Available at:
http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/music-royalties.
htm.
David Larcker is the Morgan Stanley Director of the Center
for Leadership Development and Research at the Stanford
Graduate School of Business and senior faculty member
at the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford
University. Usman Liaqat is a member of the Stanford Ad-
mission’s Office. Brian Tayan is a researcher with Stanford’s
Center for Leadership Development and Research. Larcker
and Tayan are coauthors of the books A Real Look at
Real World Corporate Governance and Corporate Gov-
ernance Matters. The authors would like to thank Mi-
chelle E. Gutman for research assistance in the preparation
of these materials.
The Stanford Closer Look Series is a collection of short
case studies that explore topics, issues, and controversies
in corporate governance and leadership. The Closer Look
Series is published by the Center for Leadership Devel-
opment and Research at the Stanford Graduate School
of Business and the Rock Center for Corporate Gover-
nance at Stanford University. For more information, visit:
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cldr.
Copyright © 2012 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland
Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
stanford closer look series		 4
What Is CEO Talent Worth?
Exhibit 1 — Measures to Determine Corporate Performance (2008-2010)
Source: CEO Performance Metrics. Equilar. June 2011.
Metrics Used in Short-Term Incentive Plans
Sample includes the most prevalent metrics in short- and long-term incentive plans for CEOs at S&P 1500 companies. Note
that nonfinancial performance metrics are not a common feature of long-term plans.
Metrics Used in Long-Term Incentive Plans
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2008
2009
2010
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
2008
2009
2010
stanford closer look series		 5
What Is CEO Talent Worth?
Exhibit 2 — Compensation Levels of the Highest Paid CEOs (2010)
Note: Total compensation excludes changes in pension value and non-qualified deferred compensation.
Name Company Salary
Cash
Bonus
Stock Options Other Total
Phillipe
Dauman
Viacom $2,625,000 $11,250,000 $41,833,309 $28,620,000 $141,206 $84,469,515
Ray
Irani
Occidental
Petroleum
1,191,667 32,975,000 40,250,000 0 1,690,343 76,107,010
Lawrence
Ellison
Oracle 250,001 6,453,254 0 61,946,500 1,493,320 70,143,075
Leslie
Moonves
CBS 3,513,462 27,500,000 7,999,982 14,868,000 2,977,722 56,859,166
Richard
Adkerson
Freeport
McMoRan
2,500,000 10,000,000 5,818,492 15,420,000 1,555,531 35,294,023
Michael
White
DirecTV 1,448,077 4,000,000 14,690,396 12,497,196 296,949 32,932,618
John
Lundgren
Stanley Black
& Decker
1,208,433 4,342,800 25,347,725 1,255,500 416,138 32,570,596
Robert
Iger
Walt Disney 2,000,000 13,460,000 7,359,060 4,399,991 798,433 28,017,484
Brian
Roberts
Comcast 2,800,761 10,922,968 5,308,989 5,917,380 3,205,767 28,155,865
Alan
Mulally
Ford Motor 1,400,000 9,450,000 7,492,493 7,499,993 678,029 26,520,515
Jeffrey
Bewkes
Time Warner 2,000,000 14,420,000 5,519,056 4,073,646 124,129 26,136,831
Samuel
Palmisano
IBM 1,800,000 9,000,000 13,319,450 0 1,061,231 25,180,681
Gregg
Steinhafel
Target 1,500,000 5,301,000 8,017,549 3,189,299 5,501,346 23,509,194
David
Farr
Emerson
Electric
1,187,500 2,200,000 19,081,600 0 474,865 22,943,965
Wesley
Bush
Northrop
Grumman
1,334,615 3,037,500 8,349,848 7,155,028 2,272,297 22,149,288
Howard
Schultz
Starbucks 1,280,804 3,500,000 10,499,986 6,220,559 231,664 21,733,013
William
Weldon
Johnson &
Johnson
1,851,154 12,043,200 2,773,851 4,713,177 254,436 21,635,818
Kevin
Sharer
Amgen 1,748,846 3,635,000 8,306,025 6,691,367 756,895 21,138,133
Rex
Tillerson
ExxonMobil 2,207,000 3,360,000 15,465,375 0 443,921 21,476,296
Michael
Szymanczyk
Altria 1,300,000 14,002,500 4,975,000 0 495,910 20,773,410
Source: Equilar.
stanford closer look series		 6
What Is CEO Talent Worth?
Exhibit 2 — Continued
Note: Reported pay represents the fair value of compensation granted during fiscal year 2010, excluding change in pension
value. Disclosed performance metrics include those discussed in the annual proxy. Five year total shareholder return (TSR)
as reported in the annual proxy or form 10-K, or calculated by the authors for those companies that did not disclose these
figures. In some cases, the tenure of the current CEO is less than five years.
Source: Equilar, Securities and Exchange Commission, Yahoo! Finance.
Name Company
Reported
Pay
Disclosed
Performance Metrics
5 Yr TSR
v.
Peers
Phillipe Dauman Viacom $84,469,515
Operating income, free cash flow,
strategic initiatives, ratings, cost reduction,
corporate goals, compliance, and policy
objectives
-3.5%
v.
-7.8%
Ray Irani
Occidental
Petroleum
76,107,010
TSR, net income, EPS, governance,
functional and operating
accomplishments, health and safety,
diversity, organizational development
168%
v.
56%
Lawrence Ellison Oracle 70,143,075 Pre-tax profit growth
78%
v.
16%
Leslie Moonves CBS 56,859,166
OIBDA, free cash flow, ad revenue growth,
leverage, contract negotiations, Nielsen
ratings, content, other strategic and
operating metrics
-9%
v.
-8%
Richard
Adkerson
Freeport
McMoRan
35,294,023
Operating cash flow, return on investment,
safety performance
109%
v.
26%
Michael
White
DirecTV 32,932,618
Net subscriber growth, CFBIT, OPBDA,
revenue, EPS, churn, ARPU, acquisition
cost, market share, new products,
customer loyalty, cost management, talent
development
196%
v.
-1%
John
Lundgren
Stanley Black &
Decker
32,570,596
EPS, cash flow multiple, TSR, return on
capital
49%
v.
22%
Robert
Iger
Walt Disney 28,017,484
Operating income, return on capital, cash
flow, EPS, content quality and innovation,
brand building, talent development,
integration
55%
v.
-5%
Brian
Roberts
Comcast 28,155,865
Operating cash flow, free cash flow,
revenue growth
34%
v.
36%
Alan
Mulally
Ford Motor 26,520,515
Profit before taxes, cash flow, cost
management, market share, product
quality, functional and technical
excellence, teamwork, modeling values
112%
v.
19%
stanford closer look series		 7
What Is CEO Talent Worth?
Exhibit 3 — Compensation Levels among Highly Paid Professionals (2010)
Source: Forbes, “The World’s Most Powerful Celebrities,” 2010. Available at: http://www.forbes.com/wealth/celebrities.
Highest Paid Actors
Name Earnings Name Earnings
Leornado Dicaprio $77 million Angelina Jolie $30 million
Johnny Depp 50 million Sarah Jessica Parker 30 million
Adam Sandler 40 million Jennifer Aniston 28 million
Will Smith 36 million Reese Witherspoon 28 million
Tom Hanks 35 million Julia Roberts 20 million
Ben Stiller 34 million Kristen Stewart 20 million
Robert Downey Jr 31 million Katherine Heigl 19 million
Mark Wahlberg 28 million Cameron Diaz 18 million
Brad Pitt 20 million Sandra Bullock 15 million
Robert Pattinson 20 million Natalie Portman 8 million
Highest Paid Actresses
Name Earnings Name Earnings
U2 $195 million Tiger Woods $75 million
Bon Jovi 125 million Kobe Bryant 53 million
Elton John 100 million LeBron James 48 million
Lady Gaga 90 million Roger Federer 47 million
Paul McCartney 67 million Phil Mickelson 47 million
Black Eyed Peas 61 million David Beckham 40 million
Justin Bieber 53 million Cristiano Ronaldo 38 million
Toby Keith 50 million Alex Rodriguez 35 million
Usher 46 million Lionel Messi 32 million
Taylor Swift 45 million Tom Brady 31 million
Highest Paid Musicians Highest Paid Athletes

Contenu connexe

Tendances

Dr. Aloke Ghosh at The University of Memphis, June 2009
Dr. Aloke Ghosh at The University of Memphis, June 2009Dr. Aloke Ghosh at The University of Memphis, June 2009
Dr. Aloke Ghosh at The University of Memphis, June 2009ProfessorAlokeGhosh
 
OrgDesign_ResearchProposal_Steele[1]
OrgDesign_ResearchProposal_Steele[1]OrgDesign_ResearchProposal_Steele[1]
OrgDesign_ResearchProposal_Steele[1]Gigi Steele McAlwee
 
Driving Organizational Performance in Complex Times - Mark Kinnich 031710
Driving Organizational Performance in Complex Times - Mark Kinnich  031710Driving Organizational Performance in Complex Times - Mark Kinnich  031710
Driving Organizational Performance in Complex Times - Mark Kinnich 031710Mark Kinnich
 
Driving Organizational Performance in Uncertain Times - Mark Kinnich 031710
Driving Organizational Performance in Uncertain Times - Mark Kinnich  031710Driving Organizational Performance in Uncertain Times - Mark Kinnich  031710
Driving Organizational Performance in Uncertain Times - Mark Kinnich 031710Mark Kinnich
 
Contoh Penelitian Tentang Pengaruh Profitabilitas Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan
Contoh Penelitian Tentang Pengaruh Profitabilitas Terhadap Nilai PerusahaanContoh Penelitian Tentang Pengaruh Profitabilitas Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan
Contoh Penelitian Tentang Pengaruh Profitabilitas Terhadap Nilai PerusahaanTrisnadi Wijaya
 
Does firm volatility affect managerial influence
Does firm volatility affect managerial influenceDoes firm volatility affect managerial influence
Does firm volatility affect managerial influenceAlexander Decker
 
My s mgt presentation
My s mgt presentationMy s mgt presentation
My s mgt presentationBdb Bhatt
 
Eesley Second Time
Eesley Second TimeEesley Second Time
Eesley Second TimeChuck Eesley
 
Examining CEO Tenure- %22Short & Sweet%22 Vs %22Long & Illustrious%22
Examining CEO Tenure- %22Short & Sweet%22 Vs %22Long & Illustrious%22Examining CEO Tenure- %22Short & Sweet%22 Vs %22Long & Illustrious%22
Examining CEO Tenure- %22Short & Sweet%22 Vs %22Long & Illustrious%22Andrew Doyle
 
Aom Stakeholders 08 14 06
Aom Stakeholders 08 14 06Aom Stakeholders 08 14 06
Aom Stakeholders 08 14 06Chuck Eesley
 
200671838 - Dissertation
200671838 - Dissertation200671838 - Dissertation
200671838 - DissertationMohit Kumar
 
Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)
Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)
Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)sanmakhani
 

Tendances (20)

Independent Chairman - Research Spotlight
Independent Chairman - Research SpotlightIndependent Chairman - Research Spotlight
Independent Chairman - Research Spotlight
 
CEO Turnover - Research Spotlight
CEO Turnover - Research SpotlightCEO Turnover - Research Spotlight
CEO Turnover - Research Spotlight
 
Dr. Aloke Ghosh at The University of Memphis, June 2009
Dr. Aloke Ghosh at The University of Memphis, June 2009Dr. Aloke Ghosh at The University of Memphis, June 2009
Dr. Aloke Ghosh at The University of Memphis, June 2009
 
Internal vs. External CEOs
Internal vs. External CEOsInternal vs. External CEOs
Internal vs. External CEOs
 
Board Structure: Data Spotlight, Quick Guide Series
Board Structure: Data Spotlight, Quick Guide SeriesBoard Structure: Data Spotlight, Quick Guide Series
Board Structure: Data Spotlight, Quick Guide Series
 
Ssrn id1582232
Ssrn id1582232Ssrn id1582232
Ssrn id1582232
 
Six question
Six questionSix question
Six question
 
OrgDesign_ResearchProposal_Steele[1]
OrgDesign_ResearchProposal_Steele[1]OrgDesign_ResearchProposal_Steele[1]
OrgDesign_ResearchProposal_Steele[1]
 
agency theory
agency theoryagency theory
agency theory
 
Driving Organizational Performance in Complex Times - Mark Kinnich 031710
Driving Organizational Performance in Complex Times - Mark Kinnich  031710Driving Organizational Performance in Complex Times - Mark Kinnich  031710
Driving Organizational Performance in Complex Times - Mark Kinnich 031710
 
Driving Organizational Performance in Uncertain Times - Mark Kinnich 031710
Driving Organizational Performance in Uncertain Times - Mark Kinnich  031710Driving Organizational Performance in Uncertain Times - Mark Kinnich  031710
Driving Organizational Performance in Uncertain Times - Mark Kinnich 031710
 
Contoh Penelitian Tentang Pengaruh Profitabilitas Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan
Contoh Penelitian Tentang Pengaruh Profitabilitas Terhadap Nilai PerusahaanContoh Penelitian Tentang Pengaruh Profitabilitas Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan
Contoh Penelitian Tentang Pengaruh Profitabilitas Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan
 
Does firm volatility affect managerial influence
Does firm volatility affect managerial influenceDoes firm volatility affect managerial influence
Does firm volatility affect managerial influence
 
My s mgt presentation
My s mgt presentationMy s mgt presentation
My s mgt presentation
 
Eesley Second Time
Eesley Second TimeEesley Second Time
Eesley Second Time
 
Governance Aches and Pains: Is Bad Governance Chronic?
Governance Aches and Pains: Is Bad Governance Chronic?Governance Aches and Pains: Is Bad Governance Chronic?
Governance Aches and Pains: Is Bad Governance Chronic?
 
Examining CEO Tenure- %22Short & Sweet%22 Vs %22Long & Illustrious%22
Examining CEO Tenure- %22Short & Sweet%22 Vs %22Long & Illustrious%22Examining CEO Tenure- %22Short & Sweet%22 Vs %22Long & Illustrious%22
Examining CEO Tenure- %22Short & Sweet%22 Vs %22Long & Illustrious%22
 
Aom Stakeholders 08 14 06
Aom Stakeholders 08 14 06Aom Stakeholders 08 14 06
Aom Stakeholders 08 14 06
 
200671838 - Dissertation
200671838 - Dissertation200671838 - Dissertation
200671838 - Dissertation
 
Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)
Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)
Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)
 

Similaire à What Is CEO Talent Worth?

The impact of managerial incentives on ipo mortality
The impact of managerial incentives on ipo mortalityThe impact of managerial incentives on ipo mortality
The impact of managerial incentives on ipo mortalityGiwrgos Loukopoulos
 
The Impact of Managerial Incentives on IPO Mortality
The Impact of Managerial Incentives on IPO MortalityThe Impact of Managerial Incentives on IPO Mortality
The Impact of Managerial Incentives on IPO MortalityGiwrgos Loukopoulos
 
CEO Salary - Group 10 Report - Final
CEO Salary - Group 10 Report - FinalCEO Salary - Group 10 Report - Final
CEO Salary - Group 10 Report - FinalStephanie Simopoulos
 
Study to investigate the correlation between the operating performances of fi...
Study to investigate the correlation between the operating performances of fi...Study to investigate the correlation between the operating performances of fi...
Study to investigate the correlation between the operating performances of fi...Charm Rammandala
 
Accounting Research Paper revised
Accounting Research Paper revisedAccounting Research Paper revised
Accounting Research Paper revisedRob Simmons
 
How Corporate Governance Matters - Credit Suisse 2016 Report
How Corporate Governance Matters - Credit Suisse 2016 ReportHow Corporate Governance Matters - Credit Suisse 2016 Report
How Corporate Governance Matters - Credit Suisse 2016 ReportTurlough Guerin GAICD FGIA
 
Essay on executive compensation
Essay on executive compensationEssay on executive compensation
Essay on executive compensationAtam Motufoua
 
Performance driven-compensation-1720594 (1)
Performance driven-compensation-1720594 (1)Performance driven-compensation-1720594 (1)
Performance driven-compensation-1720594 (1)eriefenstahl
 
The causes and risk-taking on the change of CEO equity-based compensation
The causes and risk-taking on the change of CEO equity-based compensationThe causes and risk-taking on the change of CEO equity-based compensation
The causes and risk-taking on the change of CEO equity-based compensationMax Lai
 
Minimum of 400 words in the body Minimum of 2 sources from the l.docx
Minimum of 400 words in the body Minimum of 2 sources from the l.docxMinimum of 400 words in the body Minimum of 2 sources from the l.docx
Minimum of 400 words in the body Minimum of 2 sources from the l.docxssuserf9c51d
 
How Opinion About Job Performance Becomes Fact
How Opinion About Job Performance Becomes FactHow Opinion About Job Performance Becomes Fact
How Opinion About Job Performance Becomes FactMiqui Mel
 
Aloke Ghosh Speaks at Fox Business School, Temple University, Philadelphia
Aloke Ghosh Speaks at Fox Business School, Temple University, PhiladelphiaAloke Ghosh Speaks at Fox Business School, Temple University, Philadelphia
Aloke Ghosh Speaks at Fox Business School, Temple University, PhiladelphiaProfessorAlokeGhosh
 
Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)
Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)
Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)sanmakhani
 
119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM
119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ  CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ  CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM
119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EMSantosConleyha
 
119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM
119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ  CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ  CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM
119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EMBenitoSumpter862
 
How Extraordinary Leaders Double Profit
How Extraordinary Leaders Double ProfitHow Extraordinary Leaders Double Profit
How Extraordinary Leaders Double ProfitJim Clemmer
 
An Analysis of Managerial Coordination: Wil AI Technology Counter the Princi...
An Analysis of Managerial Coordination:  Wil AI Technology Counter the Princi...An Analysis of Managerial Coordination:  Wil AI Technology Counter the Princi...
An Analysis of Managerial Coordination: Wil AI Technology Counter the Princi...Alegra N Horne
 

Similaire à What Is CEO Talent Worth? (20)

Pay for Performance… But Not Too Much Pay: The American Public’s View of CEO Pay
Pay for Performance… But Not Too Much Pay: The American Public’s View of CEO PayPay for Performance… But Not Too Much Pay: The American Public’s View of CEO Pay
Pay for Performance… But Not Too Much Pay: The American Public’s View of CEO Pay
 
The impact of managerial incentives on ipo mortality
The impact of managerial incentives on ipo mortalityThe impact of managerial incentives on ipo mortality
The impact of managerial incentives on ipo mortality
 
The Impact of Managerial Incentives on IPO Mortality
The Impact of Managerial Incentives on IPO MortalityThe Impact of Managerial Incentives on IPO Mortality
The Impact of Managerial Incentives on IPO Mortality
 
CEO Salary - Group 10 Report - Final
CEO Salary - Group 10 Report - FinalCEO Salary - Group 10 Report - Final
CEO Salary - Group 10 Report - Final
 
Study to investigate the correlation between the operating performances of fi...
Study to investigate the correlation between the operating performances of fi...Study to investigate the correlation between the operating performances of fi...
Study to investigate the correlation between the operating performances of fi...
 
Accounting Research Paper revised
Accounting Research Paper revisedAccounting Research Paper revised
Accounting Research Paper revised
 
How Corporate Governance Matters - Credit Suisse 2016 Report
How Corporate Governance Matters - Credit Suisse 2016 ReportHow Corporate Governance Matters - Credit Suisse 2016 Report
How Corporate Governance Matters - Credit Suisse 2016 Report
 
Essay on executive compensation
Essay on executive compensationEssay on executive compensation
Essay on executive compensation
 
WriteUp.docx
WriteUp.docxWriteUp.docx
WriteUp.docx
 
Performance driven-compensation-1720594 (1)
Performance driven-compensation-1720594 (1)Performance driven-compensation-1720594 (1)
Performance driven-compensation-1720594 (1)
 
The causes and risk-taking on the change of CEO equity-based compensation
The causes and risk-taking on the change of CEO equity-based compensationThe causes and risk-taking on the change of CEO equity-based compensation
The causes and risk-taking on the change of CEO equity-based compensation
 
Minimum of 400 words in the body Minimum of 2 sources from the l.docx
Minimum of 400 words in the body Minimum of 2 sources from the l.docxMinimum of 400 words in the body Minimum of 2 sources from the l.docx
Minimum of 400 words in the body Minimum of 2 sources from the l.docx
 
CEO Pay Levels Research Spotlight
CEO Pay Levels Research SpotlightCEO Pay Levels Research Spotlight
CEO Pay Levels Research Spotlight
 
How Opinion About Job Performance Becomes Fact
How Opinion About Job Performance Becomes FactHow Opinion About Job Performance Becomes Fact
How Opinion About Job Performance Becomes Fact
 
Aloke Ghosh Speaks at Fox Business School, Temple University, Philadelphia
Aloke Ghosh Speaks at Fox Business School, Temple University, PhiladelphiaAloke Ghosh Speaks at Fox Business School, Temple University, Philadelphia
Aloke Ghosh Speaks at Fox Business School, Temple University, Philadelphia
 
Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)
Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)
Wrr chapter 1 (1)(2)
 
119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM
119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ  CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ  CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM
119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM
 
119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM
119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ  CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ  CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM
119E ECUTIVE BAR AININ CEOS NE OTIATIN THEIR PAWITH EM
 
How Extraordinary Leaders Double Profit
How Extraordinary Leaders Double ProfitHow Extraordinary Leaders Double Profit
How Extraordinary Leaders Double Profit
 
An Analysis of Managerial Coordination: Wil AI Technology Counter the Princi...
An Analysis of Managerial Coordination:  Wil AI Technology Counter the Princi...An Analysis of Managerial Coordination:  Wil AI Technology Counter the Princi...
An Analysis of Managerial Coordination: Wil AI Technology Counter the Princi...
 

Plus de Stanford GSB Corporate Governance Research Initiative

Plus de Stanford GSB Corporate Governance Research Initiative (20)

The Spread of COVID-19 Disclosure
The Spread of COVID-19 DisclosureThe Spread of COVID-19 Disclosure
The Spread of COVID-19 Disclosure
 
Board Composition, Quality, & Turnover: Research Spotlight
Board Composition, Quality, & Turnover: Research SpotlightBoard Composition, Quality, & Turnover: Research Spotlight
Board Composition, Quality, & Turnover: Research Spotlight
 
The First Outside Director
The First Outside DirectorThe First Outside Director
The First Outside Director
 
Diversity in the C-Suite: The Dismal State of Diversity Among Fortune 100 Sen...
Diversity in the C-Suite: The Dismal State of Diversity Among Fortune 100 Sen...Diversity in the C-Suite: The Dismal State of Diversity Among Fortune 100 Sen...
Diversity in the C-Suite: The Dismal State of Diversity Among Fortune 100 Sen...
 
Governance of Corporate Insider Equity Trades
Governance of Corporate Insider Equity TradesGovernance of Corporate Insider Equity Trades
Governance of Corporate Insider Equity Trades
 
The Principles of Corporate Governance: A Guide to Understanding Concepts of ...
The Principles of Corporate Governance: A Guide to Understanding Concepts of ...The Principles of Corporate Governance: A Guide to Understanding Concepts of ...
The Principles of Corporate Governance: A Guide to Understanding Concepts of ...
 
Survey | 2019 U.S. Tax Survey
Survey | 2019 U.S. Tax SurveySurvey | 2019 U.S. Tax Survey
Survey | 2019 U.S. Tax Survey
 
Stakeholders Take Center Stage: Director Views on Priorities and Society
Stakeholders Take Center Stage: Director Views on Priorities and SocietyStakeholders Take Center Stage: Director Views on Priorities and Society
Stakeholders Take Center Stage: Director Views on Priorities and Society
 
Loosey-Goosey Governance Four: Misunderstood Terms in Corporate Governance
Loosey-Goosey Governance Four: Misunderstood Terms in Corporate GovernanceLoosey-Goosey Governance Four: Misunderstood Terms in Corporate Governance
Loosey-Goosey Governance Four: Misunderstood Terms in Corporate Governance
 
Stakeholders and Shareholders: Are Executives Really “Penny Wise and Pound Fo...
Stakeholders and Shareholders: Are Executives Really “Penny Wise and Pound Fo...Stakeholders and Shareholders: Are Executives Really “Penny Wise and Pound Fo...
Stakeholders and Shareholders: Are Executives Really “Penny Wise and Pound Fo...
 
2019 Survey On Shareholder Versus Stakeholder Interests
2019 Survey On Shareholder Versus Stakeholder Interests 2019 Survey On Shareholder Versus Stakeholder Interests
2019 Survey On Shareholder Versus Stakeholder Interests
 
Core Concept: Shareholders & Activism
Core Concept: Shareholders & ActivismCore Concept: Shareholders & Activism
Core Concept: Shareholders & Activism
 
The Business Case for ESG
The Business Case for ESGThe Business Case for ESG
The Business Case for ESG
 
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Activities
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) ActivitiesEnvironmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Activities
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Activities
 
Dual-Class Shares - Research Spotlight
Dual-Class Shares - Research SpotlightDual-Class Shares - Research Spotlight
Dual-Class Shares - Research Spotlight
 
Where Does Human Resources Sit at the Strategy Table?
Where Does Human Resources Sit at the Strategy Table?Where Does Human Resources Sit at the Strategy Table?
Where Does Human Resources Sit at the Strategy Table?
 
Scaling Up: The Implementation of Corporate Governance in Pre-IPO Companies
Scaling Up: The Implementation of Corporate Governance in Pre-IPO CompaniesScaling Up: The Implementation of Corporate Governance in Pre-IPO Companies
Scaling Up: The Implementation of Corporate Governance in Pre-IPO Companies
 
The Evolution of Corporate Governance: 2018 Study of Inception to IPO
The Evolution of Corporate Governance: 2018 Study of Inception to IPOThe Evolution of Corporate Governance: 2018 Study of Inception to IPO
The Evolution of Corporate Governance: 2018 Study of Inception to IPO
 
The Double-Edged Sword of CEO Activism
The Double-Edged Sword of CEO ActivismThe Double-Edged Sword of CEO Activism
The Double-Edged Sword of CEO Activism
 
2018 CEO Activism Survey
2018 CEO Activism Survey2018 CEO Activism Survey
2018 CEO Activism Survey
 

Dernier

Memorándum de Entendimiento (MoU) entre Codelco y SQM
Memorándum de Entendimiento (MoU) entre Codelco y SQMMemorándum de Entendimiento (MoU) entre Codelco y SQM
Memorándum de Entendimiento (MoU) entre Codelco y SQMVoces Mineras
 
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Kotla Mubarakpur Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Kotla Mubarakpur Delhi NCR8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Kotla Mubarakpur Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Kotla Mubarakpur Delhi NCRashishs7044
 
Darshan Hiranandani [News About Next CEO].pdf
Darshan Hiranandani [News About Next CEO].pdfDarshan Hiranandani [News About Next CEO].pdf
Darshan Hiranandani [News About Next CEO].pdfShashank Mehta
 
Pitch deck sample detail for New Business Proposal
Pitch deck sample detail for New Business ProposalPitch deck sample detail for New Business Proposal
Pitch deck sample detail for New Business ProposalEvelina300651
 
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Saket Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Saket Delhi NCR8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Saket Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Saket Delhi NCRashishs7044
 
Market Sizes Sample Report - 2024 Edition
Market Sizes Sample Report - 2024 EditionMarket Sizes Sample Report - 2024 Edition
Market Sizes Sample Report - 2024 EditionMintel Group
 
Horngren’s Financial & Managerial Accounting, 7th edition by Miller-Nobles so...
Horngren’s Financial & Managerial Accounting, 7th edition by Miller-Nobles so...Horngren’s Financial & Managerial Accounting, 7th edition by Miller-Nobles so...
Horngren’s Financial & Managerial Accounting, 7th edition by Miller-Nobles so...ssuserf63bd7
 
Entrepreneurship lessons in Philippines
Entrepreneurship lessons in  PhilippinesEntrepreneurship lessons in  Philippines
Entrepreneurship lessons in PhilippinesDavidSamuel525586
 
Call US-88OO1O2216 Call Girls In Mahipalpur Female Escort Service
Call US-88OO1O2216 Call Girls In Mahipalpur Female Escort ServiceCall US-88OO1O2216 Call Girls In Mahipalpur Female Escort Service
Call US-88OO1O2216 Call Girls In Mahipalpur Female Escort Servicecallgirls2057
 
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCRashishs7044
 
Send Files | Sendbig.comSend Files | Sendbig.com
Send Files | Sendbig.comSend Files | Sendbig.comSend Files | Sendbig.comSend Files | Sendbig.com
Send Files | Sendbig.comSend Files | Sendbig.comSendBig4
 
Traction part 2 - EOS Model JAX Bridges.
Traction part 2 - EOS Model JAX Bridges.Traction part 2 - EOS Model JAX Bridges.
Traction part 2 - EOS Model JAX Bridges.Anamaria Contreras
 
Call Us 📲8800102216📞 Call Girls In DLF City Gurgaon
Call Us 📲8800102216📞 Call Girls In DLF City GurgaonCall Us 📲8800102216📞 Call Girls In DLF City Gurgaon
Call Us 📲8800102216📞 Call Girls In DLF City Gurgaoncallgirls2057
 
Intermediate Accounting, Volume 2, 13th Canadian Edition by Donald E. Kieso t...
Intermediate Accounting, Volume 2, 13th Canadian Edition by Donald E. Kieso t...Intermediate Accounting, Volume 2, 13th Canadian Edition by Donald E. Kieso t...
Intermediate Accounting, Volume 2, 13th Canadian Edition by Donald E. Kieso t...ssuserf63bd7
 
Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024
Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024
Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024Kirill Klimov
 
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Dwarka mor Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Dwarka mor Delhi NCR8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Dwarka mor Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Dwarka mor Delhi NCRashishs7044
 
Kenya Coconut Production Presentation by Dr. Lalith Perera
Kenya Coconut Production Presentation by Dr. Lalith PereraKenya Coconut Production Presentation by Dr. Lalith Perera
Kenya Coconut Production Presentation by Dr. Lalith Pereraictsugar
 
Church Building Grants To Assist With New Construction, Additions, And Restor...
Church Building Grants To Assist With New Construction, Additions, And Restor...Church Building Grants To Assist With New Construction, Additions, And Restor...
Church Building Grants To Assist With New Construction, Additions, And Restor...Americas Got Grants
 

Dernier (20)

Japan IT Week 2024 Brochure by 47Billion (English)
Japan IT Week 2024 Brochure by 47Billion (English)Japan IT Week 2024 Brochure by 47Billion (English)
Japan IT Week 2024 Brochure by 47Billion (English)
 
Memorándum de Entendimiento (MoU) entre Codelco y SQM
Memorándum de Entendimiento (MoU) entre Codelco y SQMMemorándum de Entendimiento (MoU) entre Codelco y SQM
Memorándum de Entendimiento (MoU) entre Codelco y SQM
 
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Kotla Mubarakpur Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Kotla Mubarakpur Delhi NCR8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Kotla Mubarakpur Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Kotla Mubarakpur Delhi NCR
 
Darshan Hiranandani [News About Next CEO].pdf
Darshan Hiranandani [News About Next CEO].pdfDarshan Hiranandani [News About Next CEO].pdf
Darshan Hiranandani [News About Next CEO].pdf
 
Pitch deck sample detail for New Business Proposal
Pitch deck sample detail for New Business ProposalPitch deck sample detail for New Business Proposal
Pitch deck sample detail for New Business Proposal
 
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Saket Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Saket Delhi NCR8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Saket Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Saket Delhi NCR
 
Market Sizes Sample Report - 2024 Edition
Market Sizes Sample Report - 2024 EditionMarket Sizes Sample Report - 2024 Edition
Market Sizes Sample Report - 2024 Edition
 
Horngren’s Financial & Managerial Accounting, 7th edition by Miller-Nobles so...
Horngren’s Financial & Managerial Accounting, 7th edition by Miller-Nobles so...Horngren’s Financial & Managerial Accounting, 7th edition by Miller-Nobles so...
Horngren’s Financial & Managerial Accounting, 7th edition by Miller-Nobles so...
 
Entrepreneurship lessons in Philippines
Entrepreneurship lessons in  PhilippinesEntrepreneurship lessons in  Philippines
Entrepreneurship lessons in Philippines
 
Call US-88OO1O2216 Call Girls In Mahipalpur Female Escort Service
Call US-88OO1O2216 Call Girls In Mahipalpur Female Escort ServiceCall US-88OO1O2216 Call Girls In Mahipalpur Female Escort Service
Call US-88OO1O2216 Call Girls In Mahipalpur Female Escort Service
 
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Shivaji Enclave Delhi NCR
 
Send Files | Sendbig.comSend Files | Sendbig.com
Send Files | Sendbig.comSend Files | Sendbig.comSend Files | Sendbig.comSend Files | Sendbig.com
Send Files | Sendbig.comSend Files | Sendbig.com
 
No-1 Call Girls In Goa 93193 VIP 73153 Escort service In North Goa Panaji, Ca...
No-1 Call Girls In Goa 93193 VIP 73153 Escort service In North Goa Panaji, Ca...No-1 Call Girls In Goa 93193 VIP 73153 Escort service In North Goa Panaji, Ca...
No-1 Call Girls In Goa 93193 VIP 73153 Escort service In North Goa Panaji, Ca...
 
Traction part 2 - EOS Model JAX Bridges.
Traction part 2 - EOS Model JAX Bridges.Traction part 2 - EOS Model JAX Bridges.
Traction part 2 - EOS Model JAX Bridges.
 
Call Us 📲8800102216📞 Call Girls In DLF City Gurgaon
Call Us 📲8800102216📞 Call Girls In DLF City GurgaonCall Us 📲8800102216📞 Call Girls In DLF City Gurgaon
Call Us 📲8800102216📞 Call Girls In DLF City Gurgaon
 
Intermediate Accounting, Volume 2, 13th Canadian Edition by Donald E. Kieso t...
Intermediate Accounting, Volume 2, 13th Canadian Edition by Donald E. Kieso t...Intermediate Accounting, Volume 2, 13th Canadian Edition by Donald E. Kieso t...
Intermediate Accounting, Volume 2, 13th Canadian Edition by Donald E. Kieso t...
 
Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024
Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024
Flow Your Strategy at Flight Levels Day 2024
 
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Dwarka mor Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Dwarka mor Delhi NCR8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Dwarka mor Delhi NCR
8447779800, Low rate Call girls in Dwarka mor Delhi NCR
 
Kenya Coconut Production Presentation by Dr. Lalith Perera
Kenya Coconut Production Presentation by Dr. Lalith PereraKenya Coconut Production Presentation by Dr. Lalith Perera
Kenya Coconut Production Presentation by Dr. Lalith Perera
 
Church Building Grants To Assist With New Construction, Additions, And Restor...
Church Building Grants To Assist With New Construction, Additions, And Restor...Church Building Grants To Assist With New Construction, Additions, And Restor...
Church Building Grants To Assist With New Construction, Additions, And Restor...
 

What Is CEO Talent Worth?

  • 1. Topics, Issues, and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership S T A N F O R D C L O S E R L O O K S E R I E S stanford closer look series 1 What Is CEO Talent Worth? Introduction The topic of executive compensation elicits strong emotions among corporate stakeholders, practitio- ners, and observers. On the one hand are those who believe firmly that chief executive officers in the United States are overpaid. They cite as evidence the large and growing disparity between total pay granted to CEOs and the compensation of the av- erage worker.1 Their solution is the encouragement of more shareholder activism (primarily through proxy measures, such as say on pay) to communi- cate concerns to companies and induce a voluntary reduction in compensation levels or stricter perfor- mance-based features that more closely align com- pensation to financial and operating results. Some go so far as to suggest that CEO compensation be regulated at a fixed multiple of the average worker’s pay. On the other side of the issue are those who be- lieve that chief executives are paid the going fair- market rate. They argue that if compensation levels are high among the largest U.S. corporations, it is simply a reflection of the demands of a position that require considerable time, skill, and attention. They advocate continued disclosure on compensa- tion size and structure so that market forces correct the mispricing of talent in situations where it arises. Researchers have taken various approaches to evaluating whether CEO pay levels are appropriate. Gabaix and Landier (2008) measure the relation between CEO compensation and company size. They find that although CEO pay increased six- fold between 1980 and 2003, the market value of the companies these CEOs managed also increased sixfold during this period. They conclude that “the rise in CEO compensation is a simple mirror of the By David F. Larcker, Usman Liaqat and Brian Tayan January 24, 2012 rise in the value of large U.S. companies since the 1980s.”2 Similarly, Kaplan and Rauh (2010) com- pare the growth rate of executive compensation to the growth rate of other highly paid professionals, such as hedge fund managers, private equity man- agers, venture capitalists, lawyers and professional athletes. They find that pay among these groups all grew by roughly the same order of magnitude dur- ing the period 1994 to 2005. They conclude that CEO compensation has increased due to market forces that contribute to general wage inflation among highly paid professionals, and that extreme compensation growth has not been limited to the business world.3 However, it is important to remember that dem- onstrating a correlation between executive compen- sation and firm size or performance does not mean that pay levels themselves are appropriate. It might still be the case that CEO pay itself is either too high or too low on average.4 The only way to make a determination is to measure whether the total compensation received is commensurate with the value of services rendered. To do this, stakeholders need to understand 1) the value drivers of the or- ganization, 2) the impact that the executive has on these value drivers, and 3) the percentage of value created that should be appropriately offered as com- pensation for performance. While this is simple in theory, it is exceptionally difficult in practice. Performance and Compensation The value drivers (or key performance indicators) of an organization include the financial and non- financial metrics that reflect the current and future performance of the company (see Exhibit 1). They might be generic in nature and applicable to most
  • 2. stanford closer look series 2 What Is CEO Talent Worth? companies (such as revenue growth, profit margin, and return on invested capital) or specific measures that are relevant to a particular industry or line of business (such as research and development pipe- line productivity or on-time delivery rates). Simi- larly, they might be readily quantifiable (such as product defect rates) or more qualitative in nature and therefore require proprietary methods of mea- surement (such as customer and employee satisfac- tion). It is the responsibility of management and the board of directors to identify the value drivers that are most critical to the success of the corporate strategy. This process is best accomplished through rigorous statistical testing that demonstrates a proven correlation between the relevant metric and changes in corporate value.5 The valid performance indicators of the company then serve as the basis for measuring management performance and awarding compensation. The challenge for the board is to determine what level of compensation to offer to chief executive of- ficers for the achievement of specific performance objectives. This can be an extremely difficult task, not least of which because it is not always easy to de- termine how much corporate value creation should be attributable to the efforts of a single individual.6 Although a considerable number of theorists and practitioners have argued that CEOs play a criti- cal role affecting firm performance, the empirical research on this issue is mixed. Thomas (1988) finds that CEOs are responsible for only 3.9 per- cent of the variance in performance among com- panies, while Mackey (2005) finds that the impact is much greater: as high as 29.2 percent.7 The view that board members have on this issue will have a substantial impact on what they view as reasonable CEO compensation (see Exhibit 2). Finally, the board must determine the percent- age of value creation to award in compensation. Although there are no agreed upon standards, ob- servation of compensation practices among other talent pools might serve as a guide. For example, the CEOs that manage private-equity owned com- panies receive on average 5.4 percent of the equity upside (in the form of stock and options).8 A-list actors in Hollywood receive $10 to $30 million per film, plus 10 to 20 percent of gross profits.9 Music artists receive 8 to 25 percent of the suggested re- tail price of an album, a $0.08 performance royalty when a song is played live or broadcast, plus a per- centage of the gross profit generated on tour (see Exhibit 3).10 Similarly, in setting compensation for CEO talent, the board should target a payout in relation to performance or value creation. In this regard, the structure of the compensation contract will be as important as its overall size. Why This Matters 1. Executive compensation is a topic that is filled with much rhetoric (“nobody is worth $20 mil- lion per year”) but somewhat less critical analysis (“maybe some CEOs are worth $20 million per year while many others are not”). Why isn’t more of the discussion focused on the actual observ- able impact that a CEO has on value creation and the percentage of value that should be of- fered for these efforts? 2. Why don’t we commonly see explicit calculations of actual value creation by the CEO in proxy statements? Is it not possible for boards to per- form this calculation? If not, how does the board make rational decisions regarding pay levels?  1 Although precise figures vary depending on the sample and meth- odology employed, one recent estimate pegs this ratio at 343 among a sample companies in the S&P 500. See AFL-CIO Executive Pay- watch, available at: http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/pay- watch/. 2 Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier, “Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?” Quarterly Journal of Economics (2008). 3 Steven N. Kaplan and Joshua Rauh, “Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?” Review of Financial Studies (2010). 4 Further complicating the matter is the fact that reported compensa- tion figures in the proxy do not reflect what an executive has earned but instead combine cash compensation received plus a fair value es- timate of the expected value of equity compensation granted. If per- formance does not meet expected results, the actual value of equity grants will be considerably lower than their original fair value. For a full discussion of this issue, see: David F. Larcker, Allan McCall, and Brian Tayan, “What Does It Mean for an Executive to ‘Make’ $1 Million?” CGRP-22, Dec. 14, 2011. 5 For a detailed review of this process, see: David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organiza- tional Choices and Their Consequences, Chapter 6: Organizational Strategy, Business Models, and Risk Management (New York, NY: FT Press, 2011); and Christopher D. Ittner and David F. Larcker, “Coming Up Short on Nonfinancial Performance Measurement,” Harvard Business Review (Nov. 2003). 6 Sometimes it is even difficult to compute the value created by a firm. For example, does a one-year change in market capitalization validly reflect the change in value creation over the period?
  • 3. stanford closer look series 3 What Is CEO Talent Worth? 7 Alan Berkeley Thomas. Does Leadership Make a Difference in Or- ganizational Performance? Administrative Science Quarterly (1988). Alison Mackey. How Much Do CEOs Influence Firm Perfor- mance—Really? (2005), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ab- stract=816065. 8 Steven N. Kaplan and Per Strömberg. Leveraged Buyouts and Pri- vate Equity. Journal of Economic Perspectives (2008). 9 Film Budgeting. Wikipedia. 10 Lee Ann Obringer, “How Music Royalties Work,” Available at: http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/music-royalties. htm. David Larcker is the Morgan Stanley Director of the Center for Leadership Development and Research at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and senior faculty member at the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University. Usman Liaqat is a member of the Stanford Ad- mission’s Office. Brian Tayan is a researcher with Stanford’s Center for Leadership Development and Research. Larcker and Tayan are coauthors of the books A Real Look at Real World Corporate Governance and Corporate Gov- ernance Matters. The authors would like to thank Mi- chelle E. Gutman for research assistance in the preparation of these materials. The Stanford Closer Look Series is a collection of short case studies that explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance and leadership. The Closer Look Series is published by the Center for Leadership Devel- opment and Research at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and the Rock Center for Corporate Gover- nance at Stanford University. For more information, visit: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cldr. Copyright © 2012 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
  • 4. stanford closer look series 4 What Is CEO Talent Worth? Exhibit 1 — Measures to Determine Corporate Performance (2008-2010) Source: CEO Performance Metrics. Equilar. June 2011. Metrics Used in Short-Term Incentive Plans Sample includes the most prevalent metrics in short- and long-term incentive plans for CEOs at S&P 1500 companies. Note that nonfinancial performance metrics are not a common feature of long-term plans. Metrics Used in Long-Term Incentive Plans 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 2008 2009 2010 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 2008 2009 2010
  • 5. stanford closer look series 5 What Is CEO Talent Worth? Exhibit 2 — Compensation Levels of the Highest Paid CEOs (2010) Note: Total compensation excludes changes in pension value and non-qualified deferred compensation. Name Company Salary Cash Bonus Stock Options Other Total Phillipe Dauman Viacom $2,625,000 $11,250,000 $41,833,309 $28,620,000 $141,206 $84,469,515 Ray Irani Occidental Petroleum 1,191,667 32,975,000 40,250,000 0 1,690,343 76,107,010 Lawrence Ellison Oracle 250,001 6,453,254 0 61,946,500 1,493,320 70,143,075 Leslie Moonves CBS 3,513,462 27,500,000 7,999,982 14,868,000 2,977,722 56,859,166 Richard Adkerson Freeport McMoRan 2,500,000 10,000,000 5,818,492 15,420,000 1,555,531 35,294,023 Michael White DirecTV 1,448,077 4,000,000 14,690,396 12,497,196 296,949 32,932,618 John Lundgren Stanley Black & Decker 1,208,433 4,342,800 25,347,725 1,255,500 416,138 32,570,596 Robert Iger Walt Disney 2,000,000 13,460,000 7,359,060 4,399,991 798,433 28,017,484 Brian Roberts Comcast 2,800,761 10,922,968 5,308,989 5,917,380 3,205,767 28,155,865 Alan Mulally Ford Motor 1,400,000 9,450,000 7,492,493 7,499,993 678,029 26,520,515 Jeffrey Bewkes Time Warner 2,000,000 14,420,000 5,519,056 4,073,646 124,129 26,136,831 Samuel Palmisano IBM 1,800,000 9,000,000 13,319,450 0 1,061,231 25,180,681 Gregg Steinhafel Target 1,500,000 5,301,000 8,017,549 3,189,299 5,501,346 23,509,194 David Farr Emerson Electric 1,187,500 2,200,000 19,081,600 0 474,865 22,943,965 Wesley Bush Northrop Grumman 1,334,615 3,037,500 8,349,848 7,155,028 2,272,297 22,149,288 Howard Schultz Starbucks 1,280,804 3,500,000 10,499,986 6,220,559 231,664 21,733,013 William Weldon Johnson & Johnson 1,851,154 12,043,200 2,773,851 4,713,177 254,436 21,635,818 Kevin Sharer Amgen 1,748,846 3,635,000 8,306,025 6,691,367 756,895 21,138,133 Rex Tillerson ExxonMobil 2,207,000 3,360,000 15,465,375 0 443,921 21,476,296 Michael Szymanczyk Altria 1,300,000 14,002,500 4,975,000 0 495,910 20,773,410 Source: Equilar.
  • 6. stanford closer look series 6 What Is CEO Talent Worth? Exhibit 2 — Continued Note: Reported pay represents the fair value of compensation granted during fiscal year 2010, excluding change in pension value. Disclosed performance metrics include those discussed in the annual proxy. Five year total shareholder return (TSR) as reported in the annual proxy or form 10-K, or calculated by the authors for those companies that did not disclose these figures. In some cases, the tenure of the current CEO is less than five years. Source: Equilar, Securities and Exchange Commission, Yahoo! Finance. Name Company Reported Pay Disclosed Performance Metrics 5 Yr TSR v. Peers Phillipe Dauman Viacom $84,469,515 Operating income, free cash flow, strategic initiatives, ratings, cost reduction, corporate goals, compliance, and policy objectives -3.5% v. -7.8% Ray Irani Occidental Petroleum 76,107,010 TSR, net income, EPS, governance, functional and operating accomplishments, health and safety, diversity, organizational development 168% v. 56% Lawrence Ellison Oracle 70,143,075 Pre-tax profit growth 78% v. 16% Leslie Moonves CBS 56,859,166 OIBDA, free cash flow, ad revenue growth, leverage, contract negotiations, Nielsen ratings, content, other strategic and operating metrics -9% v. -8% Richard Adkerson Freeport McMoRan 35,294,023 Operating cash flow, return on investment, safety performance 109% v. 26% Michael White DirecTV 32,932,618 Net subscriber growth, CFBIT, OPBDA, revenue, EPS, churn, ARPU, acquisition cost, market share, new products, customer loyalty, cost management, talent development 196% v. -1% John Lundgren Stanley Black & Decker 32,570,596 EPS, cash flow multiple, TSR, return on capital 49% v. 22% Robert Iger Walt Disney 28,017,484 Operating income, return on capital, cash flow, EPS, content quality and innovation, brand building, talent development, integration 55% v. -5% Brian Roberts Comcast 28,155,865 Operating cash flow, free cash flow, revenue growth 34% v. 36% Alan Mulally Ford Motor 26,520,515 Profit before taxes, cash flow, cost management, market share, product quality, functional and technical excellence, teamwork, modeling values 112% v. 19%
  • 7. stanford closer look series 7 What Is CEO Talent Worth? Exhibit 3 — Compensation Levels among Highly Paid Professionals (2010) Source: Forbes, “The World’s Most Powerful Celebrities,” 2010. Available at: http://www.forbes.com/wealth/celebrities. Highest Paid Actors Name Earnings Name Earnings Leornado Dicaprio $77 million Angelina Jolie $30 million Johnny Depp 50 million Sarah Jessica Parker 30 million Adam Sandler 40 million Jennifer Aniston 28 million Will Smith 36 million Reese Witherspoon 28 million Tom Hanks 35 million Julia Roberts 20 million Ben Stiller 34 million Kristen Stewart 20 million Robert Downey Jr 31 million Katherine Heigl 19 million Mark Wahlberg 28 million Cameron Diaz 18 million Brad Pitt 20 million Sandra Bullock 15 million Robert Pattinson 20 million Natalie Portman 8 million Highest Paid Actresses Name Earnings Name Earnings U2 $195 million Tiger Woods $75 million Bon Jovi 125 million Kobe Bryant 53 million Elton John 100 million LeBron James 48 million Lady Gaga 90 million Roger Federer 47 million Paul McCartney 67 million Phil Mickelson 47 million Black Eyed Peas 61 million David Beckham 40 million Justin Bieber 53 million Cristiano Ronaldo 38 million Toby Keith 50 million Alex Rodriguez 35 million Usher 46 million Lionel Messi 32 million Taylor Swift 45 million Tom Brady 31 million Highest Paid Musicians Highest Paid Athletes