1. Ocean of Discovery
FACULTY OF MARINE SCIENCE AND MARITIME
TECHNOLOGY
DEPARTMENT OF MARITIME TECHNOLOGY
By O.O. Sulaiman PhD, CEng, CMarEng
2. Ocean of Discovery
Risk and Hazard Operability Process Of Deep Water Marine System
Sulaiman1, W.B. Wan Nik2, A. H. Saharuddin3, A.S.A.kader4, M.F. Ahmad5
O
12/9/2010 28
3. i. INTRODUCTION
ii. RELATED WORK
iii. RISK PROCESS/ HAZOP PROCESS
iv. CONCLUSION
4. Introduction
the word of water, maritime accident and consequential casualties.
increasing deep sea operation
challenge of design for safety , environment, reliability and
sustainability
uncertainty associated with deep sea operation, system complexity ,
environmental impose and human errors warrant
need for the use of scientific , reliability and risk base model for
sustainable, efficient and reliable system design
Uncertainty associated with HAZID -> use of HAZOP as one of the
best method for HAZID
11/23/2012 4
5. Related Problem
i. Alpha piper
ii. BP oil spill
iii. Exon Valdez
GHG Amount Industrial contribution
CO2 67.5%, Combustion energy sector accounted for
86.7% of total CO2 emissions, landfills
(46.8%) and fugitive emissions from oil
and gas (26.6%)
CH4 32.4% landfills (46.8%) and fugitive emissions
from oil and gas (26.6%) accounted for
73.4% of total CH4 emissions
N2O 0.1% Traditional biomass fuels accounted for
86.4% of total N2O emissions
11/23/2012 5
6. KEY STUDIES
International Maritime Organisation (IMO)., (2006): Amendments to the
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the IMO Rule
Making Process. 2006., MSC/ – MEPC.2 / Circ 5 (MSC/Circ.1023 –
MEPC/Circ.392).
Parry, G. (1996), The Characterization of Uncertainty in
Probabilistic Risk Assessments of Complex Systems. Reliability
Engineering and System Safety. 54:2-3., 119-126.
N. ,, Soares, C., A. P. Teixeira. (2001).Risk Assessment in Maritime
Transportation. Reliability Engineering and System Safety. 74:3.,.,
299-309.
UK, HSE, 1999, Offshore Technology Report” Effective Collision
Risk Management for Offshore Instalation, UK, London
7. 2.LIERATURE REVIEW
Major References Best Practice Human Error Data and Process
US “The US Coast Guard’s (USCG) risk-based decision-making guidelines
Coast categorize human error into four categories, which form a matrix: intentional
Guard’s errors, unintentional errors, errors of omission, and errors of commission”
(USCG) “An error of omission occurs when an operator fails to perform a step or task.
An error of commission occurs when an operator performs a step or task
incorrectly .”
Nivolian “ Technical factors are more readily resolved than human factors through
itou et. technological and regulatory “fixes” leaving human-related errors and
al (2004) breakdowns as the probable cause of industrial accidents.”
Hee et. “ Hee et. al concluded that human inputs to technological and engineering
al (1999) processes may actually contribute to accident risks from the begin stages of
equipment design.”
Human
11/23/2012Factors vs. Human Errors 7
(based on Gordon, 1998)
8. Best Practice
Institution Studies Model Application Drawback
The Norwegian Guidelines on how to apply risk analysis to meet its Brown et al Environmental performance of tankers Damage analysis
(1996) deal only with oil spill
Petroleum regulations
Directorate Sirkar et al Consequences of collisions and Difficulties on
(1997) groundings quantifying
UK Health & Guidance on risk assessment in the context of consequence metrics
Safety Executive Offshore Safety Cases
Brown and Hybrid use of risk assessment, Oil spill assessment
Canada- Guidance on installation Safety Analysis to help Amrozowicz probabilistic simulation and a spill limited to use of fault
(2000) consequence assessment model tree
Newfoundland operators meet its regulations
Offshore Petroleum
Sirkar et al Monte Carlo technique to estimate Lack of cost data
Board (1997) damage and+ spill cost analysis for
environmental damage
American Recommended practice for design and hazard
Petroleum Institute analysis offshore production platforms. IMO (IMO 13F Pollution prevention index from Lack (Sirkar et al
(1995) probability distributions damage and (1997) rational
oil spill.
The UK Offshore Procedure for the conduct of formal safety Research Alternative rational approach to Lack employment of
operators assessment of offshore installations, with very brief Council measuring impact of oil spills stochastic
Associations coverage of hazard assessment. Committee(199 probabilistic methods
9)
Pitblado & Turney Introduction to QRA for the process industries,
(1995) Prince William The most complete risk assessment Lack of logical risk
Sound, Alaska, assessment
Aven (1992) Discussion of offshore QRA, focusing in particular (PWS (1996) framework (NRC
on reliability analysis. (1998))
Volpe National Accident probabilities using statistics Lack employment of
Crook (1997) Qualitative review of recent technical and Transportation and expert opinion. stochastic methods
regulatory developments in the field of safety Center (1997)).
against fire, inherently safer design, and human
factor. Puget Sound Simulation or on expert opinion for Clean up cost and
Area, USCG cost benefit analysis environmental
Brian Veitch Rescue and evacuation from offshore platform (1999)) damage omission
11/23/2012 8
9. 3.0 Qualitative Analysis Process
Methods:
Case study
Baseline data
• Qualitative: Determine and collect the ship paint
• constructivist, naturalistic, application parameters and standards.
interpretive, postpositivist or
postmodern perspective.(Creswell, Interviews:- Industry, ship Owner, classification
2003) Society (Lloyd’s Register of Shipping), -
Manufacturer
• Used to describe the overall Phone calls
framework/procedure
• used to look at reality,
• based on a philosophical stance
Data analysis- HAZOP, expert rating
- models identify basic concepts and
describe what reality is like, and the
conditions by which we can study it. Deductive recommendation
- ideas identified in models are refer
to concepts.
10. DATA ANALYSIS
POP&C – POLLUTION PREVENTION & CONTROL
Safe Transportation of Hazardous Goods by Tankers
PASSIVE SAFETY ACTIVE SAFETY
P2 P3 C alibration of P5 P6
Probabilis tic Index-A
us ing pertinent s ce rio
na s
to match his torical ris k
Po llu tio n Preven tion
En v iro n m tal Impact A s
en sessmnt
e
LOSS OF WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY
LO SS O F D AMAG E
FIR E/ EX PLOSION
STA BILITY /
p f1 SIN K A GE
Pfd
(Waterways and vessel
OIL OU TFLOW- Co
RISK RED U CTIO N
COLLISION/ MEA SU RES/
Database)
STA Y A FLOAT
HAZID
GR OU N DING LOSS OF V ESSEL-Cp IN CID EN T
P fi MA N A G EMENT
p f2 P4 Rf
LOSS OF D EA TH/IN J UR Y - Cl
STR U C TU RA L STRU CTU RA L P7
FA ILU R E IN TEG RITY
p f3 P fs Po llu tio n Mitig atio n an d Con trol
C alibration of
En v iro n m tal Impact A s
en sessmnt
e
Pf through pertinent
s cenarios , us ing
s tructural reliability, to
match his torical ris k
Formalised Risk Assessment or Risk -Based Design of Tankers
Risk = Σ w. Pfi x Σ w. C i. Rf
11/23/2012 10
11. Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques
Qualitative Application Quantitative tools Application
Methods Frequency and Consequence Involve analysis of causal
Checklist Ensure that organizations are complying with standard practice Analysis factor and impact of accident
Failure Modes and Effects Use to analyse the components
Safety/Review Identify equipment conditions or operating procedures that could
Analysis (FMEA) (equipment) failure modes and
Audit lead to a casualty or result in property damage or environmental
the impacts on the surrounding
impacts.
components and the system
What-If Identify hazards, hazardous situations, or specific accident events
that could lead to undesirable consequences. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Use to analyse combinations
of equipment failures and
Hazard and Identify system deviations and their causes that can lead to human errors that can result in
Operability undesirable consequences and determine recommended actions to an accident
Study reduce the frequency and/or consequences of the deviations. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) Use to analyse various
(HAZOP) consequences of events, both
Preliminary Identify and prioritize hazards leading to undesirable failures and successes that can
Hazard consequences early in the life of a system. lead to an accident.
Analysis
(PrHA) Determine recommended actions to reduce the frequency and/or Technique for Human Use to analyse human error
consequences of prioritized hazards. Performance Reliability
Prediction (THERP)
Components of
risk based method
11/23/2012 11
12. Components of Risk based Methods
Components of RBM Cause of Accident
Process Suitable techniques
HAZID HAZOP, What if analysis,
FMEA, FMECA
Risk analysis FTA, ETA
Risk Influence diagram,
evaluation decision analysis
Risk control Regulatory, economic,
option environmental and
function elements
matching and iteration
Cost benefit ICAF, Net Benefit
analysis
Human Simulation/ Probabilistic
reliability
Uncertainty Simulation/probabilistic
Risk Simulation/ probabilistic
Monitoring
13. HAZOP PROCESS
• A HAZOP analysis is detail HAZID, it mostly divided into section or
nodes involve systemic thinking and assessment a systematic
manner the hazards associated to the operation. Hazard operability
(HAZOP) is done to ensure that the systems are designed for safe
operation with respect to personnel, environment and asset.
• In HAZOP all potential hazard and error, including operational
issues related to the design is identified. The quality of the HAZOP
depends on the participants. Good quality of HAZOP participants
are (HSE, 1999):
Politeness and unterupting
To the point discussion- avoid endless discussion
Be active and positive
Be responsible
Allow HAZOP leader to lead
14. HAZOP PROCESS
• It involve How to apply the API 14C for those process
hazard with potential of the Major Accident.
• Dynamic simulation for consequence assessment of the
process deviation, failure on demand and spurious
function of the safety system, alarm function and
operator intervention is very important for HAZOP study.
• Identification of HAZOP is followed with application of
combined Event tree and Fault tree analysis for
determination of safety critical elements, training
requirement for the operators and integrity and review of
maintenance manuals.
15. HAZOP PROCESS
• HAZOP process is as followed:
• Guide word/ brainstorming -> Deviation -> Consequence -> Safeguard -
>Recommended action
Propulsion failure HAZOP could follow the following:
• Guide word :i.e. No pitch, No blade
• Description: I.e. No rotational energy transformed, object in water break the
blade
• Causes: i.e. operation control mechanism
• Safety measurement to address implementation of propeller protection such
grating, jet
• Also important HAZOP, is implementation of IEC61511 to assess the
hazards associated to failure on demand and spurious trips,
• In HAZOP record the worksheets efficiently to cover all phases also play
important role.
16. HAZOP PROCESS
• Advance HAZOP can also e implemented through Simulation operations to
identify, quantify, and evaluate the risks. SIMOP Methodology includes:
• Consequence Assessment
• Frequency Analysis
• Risk Calculation
• Risk Analysis
• Safety Criticality Elements
• HAZOP is not intended to solve everything in a meeting. Identified hazard is solved
in the closing process of the finding from the study. Table 2 shows typical HAZOP
report.
• Safety barrier management involve optimisation between the preventive and
mitigation measures fundamental.
• To determination of the safety critical elements (SCE), performance standards for
the design of safety Critical Elements and in integrity assurance.
17. HAZOP PROCESS
• Safety level integrity (SIL) involves assessment and
verification according to IEC61508 and
IEC61511Qualitative SIL assessment uses the risk
graphs and calibration tables during the brainstorming
sessions where the required SIL is assigned to the
safety systems.
• dynamic simulation could be optimised with greater
accuracy. This saves a significant effort, time and cost
for the project. It involve application of
HAZOP & SIL assessment
Alarm Management
Fire & Explosion Stud
Case study
19. Fire Accident Scenario Analysis
Compression Fire Hot work 3
area
Manifold area Toxicity Radio active 4
products
HP gas area PPE 2
Separation Management If PTW is not 3
area of work followed correctly
permit (A) , the accident may
happen
Compressor Fire & 3 Loading Condition
Loading Condition
area Explosion Model
Model
Process area Handling Halting of 4 Engine
Engine
proximity of room
room Fire Protection Model
Fire Protection Model
process under
pressure CONSEQUENCE
Untility area Fire fighting No availability of 2 Cargo leakage Model
Cargo leakage Model
Fire Explosion
Fire Explosion
system Fire Fighting Model consequence
consequence
Model Accommodation
Accommodation
system
Separation Fire & Escape routes are 3 LPG Hazard Model
LPG Hazard Model
Explosion obstructed
PPE Contractor not 2 Suvivability Model
Suvivability Model
using PPE Compressor
Compressor
PPE 3 room
room
Evacuation model
Evacuation model
Tank area Fire No Fire & Gas 2
detection
Compression Explosion Escape routes are 3
area obstructed
Compression Fire Hot work 3
area
Manfold area Toxicity Radio active 4
products
21. Data and Model
Assessment of rainfall-Runoff model
Assess the impacts of wind loading
Assessment of wave loading
Assessment of system design
Assessment of disposal
Assessment of dynamic positioning
Assessment of energy system
Assessment of passing vessel
Assessment of human reliability analysis
Assessment of location
Assessment of historical data
11/23/2012 21
22. (v). ACCIDENT DATA
Primary data
Secondary data from UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB)
Categorized different types of marine casualties and incidents
Risk based regulation
risk based operation
risk based design
Total risk
concept Risk based
method
Technolohgy element
Environmetal elements
Human element
Risk (R) = Probability (P) X Consequence (C)
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23. System Risk Analysis: Components of System Vs
Standard Compliance Analysis
High level goal assessment / Safety and environmental
protection objective Tier
-Standards requirement 1&2
- Functional requirement
Goal Analysis
criteria
compliance
verification of
Goal based
Tier 3
Regulatory instruments/ Classification rules, industrial Tier 4
standards
Class guides, technical procedure
Design process
process
Approval
Secondary standards for company or individual system
- Code of practice, safety and quality systems Tier 5
shipbuilding, operation maintenance and manning
11/23/2012 23
25. System Level Analysis -Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Simplified Processes of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Action & Check
STEP 1:
Identify a
Failure Mode
Risk Priority STEP 2:
Number Determine
(RPN) Severity
FMEA
STEP 4: STEP 3:
Determine Determine
Detectability Occurrence
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RPN = Severity Rating x Occurrence Rating x Detection Rating
26. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Five steps of FTA:
Define the undesired event to
study
i. Obtain an understanding of
the system
ii. Construct the fault tree
iii. Evaluate the fault tree
iv. Control the hazards identified
Output event Output event Basic Undeveloped
Event Event
AND OR
Gate Gate
Input events Input events
Figure 1: Logic Gates & Typical Primary Events
11/23/2012 26
27. Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
ETA process:
i. Define the system.
ii. Identify the accident scenarios.
iii. Identify the initiating event (IE).
iv. Identify pivotal events.
v. Build the event tree diagram.
vi. Obtain the failure event probabilities.
vii.Identify the outcome risk.
11/23/2012 27
28. Accident Consequence Modeling
C11
Causes
Accident C12
Categories d
an ort
ate nsp
F ra
T
C1
C2
C3
Failures, Human and Organizational Errors, Environmental Stressors
Safeguards, Barriers, Operational Controls, Risk Control Options
C
28
Consequences
29. As Low as Reasonable Possible Principle (ALARP), Risk
Acceptability Criteria, cost Effectiveness Assessment (CEA)
Scenario Probability Consequence Cumulative Probability
S1 P1 C1 P1=P1+P2
S2 P2 C2 P2=P3+P2
Si Pi Ci Pi=Pi+3+Pi
Sn+1 Pn+1 Cn+1 Pn-1=Pn+Pn+1
Sn Pn Cn Pn=Pn
11/23/2012 29
31. Cost Benefit Analysis, RCO
• Risk control measures are used to group risk into a limited number of
well practical regulatory and capability options. Risk Control Option
(RCO) aimed to achieve (David, 1996):
– Preventive: reduce probability of occurrence
– Mitigation: reduce severity of consequence
• In estimating RCO, the following are taken into consideration:
• DALY (Disability Adjusted Life Years) or QALY (Quality Adjusted
Life Years)
• LQI (Life Quality Index)
• GCAF (Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality)
• NCAF (Net Cost of Averting a Fatality)
• ICAF (Implied Cost of Averting Fatality
11/23/2012 31
32. Sustainability Analysis
costt Diferent between cost of polution
control and environmetal damage
Minimum sum of cost Cost of polution control
High damage cost with
no control
No economic gain from
polusion control
Cost of damage from
polution
Minimum sum of cost
11/23/2012 32
33. Validation
Frequency model
Consequence Model
ALARP
11/23/2012 33
34. Validation of HAZOP
Expert Rating workshop:
Industry
Manufacture
Classification Society
Operator
accademecian
35. Conclusion
• Following need for maritime activities to operate in much harsh
condition, institutions are adopting system based approach that
account for total risk associated with system lifecycle to protect the
environment and prevent accident.
• Employment of risk method to address each contributing factor to
accident is very important. Qualitative risk in system description and
hazard identification can best be tackled through HAZOP.
• The outcome of HAZOP can be processed in quantitative analysis
which may include probabilistic and stochastic dynamic simulation
process for system level analysis, while fault tree and event tree
quantitative analysis can be utilized to determine risk index
• Translation of dynamic risk analysis can be translated into ALARP
influence diagram can provide decision support risk cost control option
towards sustainable, reliable, efficient propulsion technology choice y
for system design and operability.
