Individual Project Final

Corruption in International Athletics Governing
Bodies: An analysis of British athletes’
Experiences
Thomas J. Smith
33371349
BSc (Hons) Sports Events Management
27th
March 2015

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Synopsis
This study investigates the views of international British athletes in order to understand and
explore their experiences of the international since competing, and how this has influenced
their opinions on corruption in athletics.
The aim is to critically analyse the extent of athletes influence on governance of international
athletics governing bodies and their knowledge around the topic of corruption exploring
whether international athletes are aware of their position of power in these organisations and
the implications of corruption on elite British athletes.
The review of secondary sources looks at academic literature mentioning historical context of
corruption in the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and International Association of
Athletics Federations (IAAF) and the implications sports corruption has on athletics,
including performance enhancing drugs and how it is governed by the Court of Arbitration
for Sport and the World Anti-Doping Agency. The literature review then explores corruption
as a social issue and the importance of accountability and transparency in international sport
governance. The third sub-section focuses on the importance of athlete commissions and
athlete representation in international and British athletics governance to the integrity of the
sport. The final sub-section applies how British governing bodies, British Athletics and UK
Anti-Doping manages issues of corruption and doping.
The primary research was then formulated of semi-structured interviews with 5 former and
current British athletes. The interview questions were based on the topics discussed in the
literature review.
The project’s findings concluded that corruption is an international issue rather than a British
one. Athletes are isolated from decision-making power despite being a valuable stakeholder
for International Non-Government Sports Organisations. Their opinions on corruption,
specifically doping, aren’t reflected in international governance by administrators and policy
makers.
Recommendations from the study include introducing an independent ethics organisation and
independent doping body. Other industry recommendations include linking athletes’
commissions and representatives and executive committee members. The researcher
recommends further study into the power relations of stakeholder groups, athletes in
particular.

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Acknowledgements
I wish to thank the athletes for agreeing to take part in my study. I really valued your
enthusiasm for the topic and sharing your knowledge experiences with me.
I would also like to thank the university staff, particularly Nicola McCollough, Dr. Kate
Dashper and Dr. Thomas Fletcher for their guidance.
Finally thank you to my parents Bev and Paul for your over-whelming support and
understanding throughout my time at University, I am eternally grateful.

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List of abbreviations
BOA – The British Olympic Committee
CAS – The Court of Arbitration
EC – European Commission
FBI – FederalBureau of Intelligence
IAAF – The International Association of Athletics Federation
ILTF – International Lawn Tennis Federation
IMF – International Monetary Fund
INGSO is an umbrella term for international non-governmental sport organisations
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SLOC – Salt Lake Organising Committee
TOP – The Olympic Partner programme
UKA – United Kingdom Athletics
UNEP – United Nations Development Programme
USADA – United States Anti-Doping Agency
USOC – United States Olympic Committee
WADA – The World Anti-Doping Agency
WADC – Wold Anti-Doping Code

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Table of Contents
Synopsis.......................................................................................................................................................................................i
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................................................ii
List of abbreviations................................................................................................................................................................iii
1. Introduction & Context ....................................................................................................................................................1
1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................................1
1.2 Aim & Objectives..........................................................................................................................................................2
2. Literature Review...............................................................................................................................................................3
2.1. Chapter Introduction....................................................................................................................................................3
2.2. International Governing Bodies .................................................................................................................................3
2.2.1 IOC....................................................................................................................................................................3
2.2.2 IAAF .................................................................................................................................................................5
2.2.3 WADA & CAS ...............................................................................................................................................5
2.2.4 Commercialisation of the Olympics ...........................................................................................................7
2.3. Corruption in Sports Governance..............................................................................................................................8
2.3.1 Macro-social Corruption................................................................................................................................8
2.3.2 Accountability and Transparency ................................................................................................................9
2.3.3 Case study: 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympic bid ..........................................................................10
2.4. Athlete Commissions and Representation .............................................................................................................12
2.4.1 IOC Athletes’ Commission.........................................................................................................................12
2.4.2 IAAF Athletes’ Commission......................................................................................................................12
2.4.3 British Olympic Association Athletes’ Commission..............................................................................13
2.4.4 WADA Athletes’ Commission...................................................................................................................13
2.4.5 Athlete Representation.................................................................................................................................13
2.5 Athletics Governance in the UK ...............................................................................................................................15
2.5.1 UKA ................................................................................................................................................................15
2.5.2 British Anti-Doping......................................................................................................................................15
2.6 Chapter Summary........................................................................................................................................................16
3. Methodology ......................................................................................................................................................................18
3.1 Chapter Introduction...................................................................................................................................................18
3.2 Research Process .........................................................................................................................................................18
3.3 Clarifying the Research Topic...................................................................................................................................20
3.4 Conducting Literature Review ..................................................................................................................................20
3.5 Research Approach.....................................................................................................................................................20
3.6 Data Collection ............................................................................................................................................................21
3.6.1 Interviews .......................................................................................................................................................21

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3.7 Qualitative Research...................................................................................................................................................23
3.7 Phenomenology ...........................................................................................................................................................23
3.7 Sampling .......................................................................................................................................................................24
3.7 Pilot Interview..............................................................................................................................................................24
3.8 Data Analysis ...............................................................................................................................................................25
3.9 Ethics & Access...........................................................................................................................................................25
3.10 Research Limitations ...............................................................................................................................................26
3.11 Chapter Summary......................................................................................................................................................26
4. Discussion & Findings.....................................................................................................................................................27
4.2 Corruption in International Athletics Governance.................................................................................................27
4.4 Doping...........................................................................................................................................................................31
4.5 Athlete Representation & Athlete Commissions ...................................................................................................33
4.1 Additional Study Limitations ....................................................................................................................................36
4.1 Chapter Summary........................................................................................................................................................37
5. Conclusions & Recommendations ...............................................................................................................................38
5.2 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................................................38
5.3 Recomendations...........................................................................................................................................................39
5.5.1 Industry...........................................................................................................................................................39
5.2.2 Academia........................................................................................................................................................40
5. Appendices .........................................................................................................................................................................41
5.2 AppendixA ..................................................................................................................................................................44
5.2 Appendix B...................................................................................................................................................................45
5.2 Appendix C...................................................................................................................................................................46
5.2 Appendix D ..................................................................................................................................................................45
5.2 Appendix E...................................................................................................................................................................48
5.2 AppendixF ...................................................................................................................................................................50
5.2 Appendix G ..................................................................................................................................................................51
5. References ..........................................................................................................................................................................54

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Introduction & Context
1.1 Introduction
Sport is susceptible to corruption, undermining the societal values that sport possesses, such
as ‘Olympism’ and sportsmanship (Schenk, 2011). Corruption has become a contemporary
issue in athletics governing bodies such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and
the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), and has been increasingly in
the public eye since the emergence of the Salt Lake City bidding scandal in 1998-1999
(Lenskyj, 2000, Girginov & Parry, 2005, Horne & Whannel, 2012).
The Olympic bidding process has changed dramatically in the last 25 years with the
emergence of allegations of corruption in the Salt Lake City bid during 1998-1999 against the
United States Olympic Committee and Salt Lake Organising Committee (SLOC) (Lenskyj,
2000). Intense scrutiny has resulted in a number of reforms leading to the establishment of
various committees and commissions yet little evidence of fundamental change (Lenskyj &
Wagg, 2012).
The commercialisation of international athletics and the Olympics into a globalised entity
controlled by financial gain is seen as instigating dishonesty and corruption in International
Non-Government Sports Organisations (INGSO’s) (Katwala, 2000, Tomlinson, 2005).
One particular problem athletics has faced is banned performance enhancing drugs and is a
topical issue in athletics world with current IAAF president Lamine Diack describing the
problem as a ‘crisis’ for the sport (Guardian, 2015). Ritchie (cited in Lenskj & Wagg, 2012)
notes the extent of the problem;
“No other single issue in sport is thought to pose a greater thought to the integrity of
the sport.”
(2012:410)
The first International non-government sport organisations (INGSO’s) were established at the
end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century to preserve the integrity of sport
because politicians don’t always have the best interests of sport in mind (Geeraert et al.,
2013).

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Athletes have become an increasingly important stakeholder in athletics governance in the
development of sport policies and decisions in athlete commissions (Thibault et al, 2010).
Athlete commissions have been outlined as a catalyst for achieving transparent sport
governance in athletics and preserving the integrity of the sport (Thibault et al, 2010,
Geeraert et al, 2014).
This research can be rationalised because of the lack of research that has been conducted into
how athlete commissions can benefit athletics governance, at both international and national
governing body level. This project intends to widen the topic of how athletes view corruption
and how governing bodies deal with the issue in the quest for ‘good governance’ and social
justice.
1.2 Aim & Objectives
Aim:
To critically analyse the extent of athletes influence on governance of international athletics
governing bodies and their knowledge around the topic of corruption exploring whether
international athletes are aware of their position of power in these organisations and the
implications of corruption on elite athletes.
Objectives of the study:
1. Investigate athlete’s views of corruption in international athletics governing bodies.
2. Investigate the implications of corruption on the sport of athletics, the athletes and sport
governance.
3. To explore allegations of corruption against international governing bodies using external
publications and contemporary academic literature to theorise and contextualise my research.
4. Explore British athletes’ experiences of corruption & associated issues since competing
internationally and the implications they have had in a wider context.
5. Analyse the importance of athlete commissions to good governance in international
athletics governing bodies.

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2. Literature Review
2.1 Chapter Introduction
This chapter evaluates the secondary sources including academic journals, books and others
to provide a firm base for the research project. Setting a historical background into Olympic
and athletics governance contextualise the primary research, discussion, recommendations
and conclusions.
2.2 International Governing Bodies
Governance is defined by Kooiman (1993, cited in Geeraert et al., 2013, p.281) as ‘societal
activities which make a purposeful effort to guide, steer, control, or manage societies’. The
quest for ‘good governance’ in sports organisations has been come later than other
organisations, due to sport governance’s uniqueness and self-autonomy in comparison to
other forms (Geeraert et al, 2013), despite the early emergence of sport bodies;
“Sport was at the forefront of globalising processes – some of the first international
bodies were sport-related ones such as the IOC, the IAAF and the ILTF.”
(Horne & Whannel, 2012)
2.2.1 The IOC
The International Olympic Committee is the global governing body for the Olympic Games
looking over and coordinating with 27 international sports federations, including the
International Association of Athletics Federations. Founded in 1894, the IOC is comprised of
111 members appointed by the organisation (delegated, not elected) that represent the IOC in
their countries promoting interests of the IOC and of the Olympic movement in the countries
and organisations of the Olympic movement which they serve. (Wagner, 2014, IOC, 2004
cited in Horne & Whannel, 2012 p.29).
Chatzigianni (2006) cynically defines the IOC is a hierarchical and bureaucratic organisation
designed to promote Olympic ideals and stage the Olympic Games. Mason (2006) describes
the IOC as exclusionary, with reference to the organisations gender inequality; only 12 of its
116 members are women.
Chatzigianni (2006) writes in favour of the International Olympic Committee by supporting
the reactive nature of the organisations former president Juan Antonio de Samaranch during

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the Salt Lake City corruption allegations. Sugden & Tomlinson (2012) take an interpretivist
perspective, suggesting that the IOC took action because of the allegations to protect the
Olympic brand because of media scrutiny rather than the moral motives which it may have
already been aware of prior to public knowingness. Chatzigianni (2006) contextualises how
an organisation can adapt to political and social pressure to maintain public image. Critics
describe the introduction of the IOC ethics commission and WADA as a ‘put-up job’
(MacAloon, 2011, p.294).
Mason et al. (2006:67) state the implications of the IOC having an ‘unfavourable image’;
“…lower numbers of television viewers and, consequently, lower revenues for the
media corporations from advertisers. This would invariably affect the value of
broadcasting rights for future Olympic Games and thus impact an important revenue
source for the IOC.”
Sugden and Tomlinson (2012) support this, concluding that putting the image of the Olympic
movement ahead of the best interests of sport (doping, transparency and regulated
governance) was of serious concern to potential host cities and governments (Sugden &
Tomlinson, 2012).
Chatzigianni (2006, p.99) uses WADA as an example of how the IOC has ‘safeguarded its
universal status’ and Sugden and Tomlinson believe that WADA has been successful in
developing an international policy regime tackling doping. Since Chatzigianni, and Sugden
and Tomlinson’s work was published an investigation undertaken by a German journalist
found evidence suggesting that 99% of Russian Olympic athletes are involved with doping,
questioning WADA’s credibility, as it stems from the IOC. Sebastian Coe has suggested that
there should be an independent drug-testing governing body to address questions of
legitimacy (Independent, 2014). This is backed by Howman (2013, p.247) who suggests an
individual sports integrity agency similar to WADA’s governance to regulate doping, betting,
bribery, and corruption.
Jennings (2011) is a stern critic of the IOC and uses emotive language to demonise those in
positions of power within both organisations, branding Samaranch a ‘card-carrying facist’
(2011, p.390). His journalistic views are supported by strong evidence despite the
intentionally bias blending of fact and non-academic language.

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The author clearly plays a significant role in attempting to expose the flaws of the IOC and its
associates. He is keen to share with the reader how the organisation attempts to censor
negative press to maintain the Olympic image. Although it is debatable whether Jennings
(2011) has broadcasted his articles to the general public enough to put pressure on the IOC
for organisational change.
2.2.2 The IAAF
The International Association of Athletics Federations, formerly the International Amateur
Athletics Federation, changed its name for a number of reasons; to alleviate issues around
amateurism in the sport and to establish a ‘structural basis’ to facilitate sports
commercialisation and commodification through athlete professionalism (Horne & Whannel,
2012, p.77). The IAAF consists of 213 members and is the rights holder for the World
Championships, World Indoor Championships, Cross Country World Championships and
Half-Marathon Championships (Tomlinson, 2010).
2.2.3 WADA & CAS
Doping has been a contentious issue in modern athletics. The morality and devotion to fair
play of the sport are questioned by athletes that take performance enhancing drugs. McLaren
(2008:34) notes the impact of doping in sport on future elite competition;
“Not only does doping tarnish fair play, but it also creates scepticism whenever an
athlete is able to perform at a high ability and surpass past benchmarks; eyebrows
are almost always raised with doubts centered on doping.”
For international doping governance, there are two established organisations; The World
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). WADA was set
up as collaboration between the Olympic movement and public authorities with the main
purpose of creating “a comprehensive approach to fight doping in sport” (Wendt, 2012
page).
WADA have become a fundamental catalyst in anti-doping policy-making, collaborating
with governments and non-governmental organisations (Sugden & Tomlinson, 2012). In
November 2014 the German government made performance-enhancing doping a criminal
offence, which affects foreign athletes caught doping in Germany, and has urged other
nations to follow suit (sportindustry.co.za, 2014). One of Katwala’s (2000) guidelines for

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modern sport governance is cooperation between different governing bodies. Howman (2013,
p.348) highlights the importance of introducing government prosecution to give ‘statutory
teeth’ to sanctions.
There is inconsistency across international doping governance, clear when Germany’s
criminalisation of performance-enhancing doping is compared to Kenya that did not have a
national doping governing body prior to 2015, but the set-up of Anti-Doping Agency of
Kenya (ADAK) and an increase of three percent in WADA’s budget from 2015 is step in the
right direction (WADA, 2014).
The World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) was established as one of WADA’s first actions,
coming into force in 2004 it became the most established reference document for all major
international sport events.
The WADC’s introduction helped clarify a systematic process for the Court of Arbitration.
The Court of Arbitration is a sport-specific, independent authority (TAS/CAS, 2014). CAS
was formed to resolve international sport-related disputes, in particular acting as a court of
appeal for doping cases (Sugden & Tomlinson, 2012, TAS/CAS, 2014), for example WADA
is governed by 50% public authorities and 50% sports governing bodies such as the IOC
(Howman, 2013, p.245) Although Jarvie (2006, p.126) cynically theorises that CAS was
established to ‘forestall intervention from external law’.
On the other hand, Hamilton (2010, p.220) describes the IOC’s set-up of WADA and the
Court of Arbitration for Sport ‘great efforts’ to combat doping in sport. Furthermore, Wendt
(2012) believes WADA have been highly successful given the time period since it’s set-up in
1999 stating that
“WADA’s authority to lead a globalised harmonised approach in the war against
doping has now been firmly recognised and solidified”
(Wendt, 2012:169).
Generally, research into doping organisations has focused on the IOC’s role described by
Lenskj (2012, p.570) as the ‘supreme governing body of sport’ which he references to the
political position of the IOC since the Olympics adopted the capitalist culture whereby the
IOC had political power influencing global anti-doping policy, especially considering

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WADA wasn’t set up until 1999 (Wagner, 2011). This was first illustrated at the Los Angeles
1984 summer Olympics and described by Sugden & Tomlinson;
“The most compelling and fundamental change is the way the Olympics have moved
steadily and inexorably away from being an amateur, peoples’, sporting festival
towards a state-choreographed, commercially driven, internationally controlled,
media mega-event”
(Sugden and Tomlinson, 2012:243).
4 years on from the Los Angeles games at the Seoul Olympics, the hundred metres suffered
from multiple doping cases, described by one journalist as ‘the most tainted race in sport’.
Six of the eight runners having been associated with doping related offences since (Scott-
Elliot, 2013).
2.2.4 Commercialisation of the Olympics
Jennings’ article (2011) illustrates the importance of the commercialisation of sport and
capitalist culture for international organisations like the IAAF and the IOC. Particularly
financially for individual members and the organisation as a whole, and the importance of
maintaining the Olympic image through sponsorship and broadcasting which has made the
IOC one of the most successful organisations of the 20th Century (Horne & Whannel, 2012).
This has no sign of slowing up, with an Olympic broadcasting channel commissioned by the
IOC, decided by a unanimous decision by committee members in 2014 (Owen, 2014).
The aim of providing a global channel is to provide footage from the extensive Olympic
archive and broadcast Olympic and non-Olympic sports that receive little mainstream
coverage (Owen, 2014). Broadcasting rights are the biggest revenue source (47%) suggesting
the IOC would like to expand this area and benefit from the numerous partners the IOC have,
with £105 million coming from TV rights and TOP sponsorship programme sales. The
corporate revenue stream symbolises the gravity of sport globalisation and commercialisation
which can be seen as positive for world sport because of its increasing popularity and
reinvestment (Owen, 2014). Although Jarvie (2006) argues that trans-national corporations
are associated more with corruption and corporatism than providing a positive social role,
which is supported by Katwala (2000).

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The use of the Olympics and international athletics events as a commercial commodity is
acclaimed by some authors and criticised by others. Tomlinson (2005, p.4) is particularly
critical, describing the combination of sponsorship and television revenues as ‘potent’, in
contrast.
Simson & Jennings (1992) solution is to re-establish the amateur ideal of the Olympics,
which is seen by Guttman (1994, p.177) as ‘naïve’ stating that the only answer was to ‘open
the Olympics up to the world’s best athletes’.
2.3 Corruption in sport governance
Corruption can be defined as;
“the use of a position by its occupant in such a way as to fulfil tasks required of the
occupant by the employing institution in a manner consciously different to the
objectives of that institution. Such activity results from a desire for advantages for the
occupant of the position”
(Maennig 2005:189).
Maennig (2005) illustrates how corruption and bribery have been a timeless issue for
international sport governance with modern examples the IOC has faced in the late 20th
century and early 21st century; the 1998-1999 Salt Lake City bidding scandal, 2002 figure-
skating, Olympic boxing in Seoul 1988.
2.3.1 Macro-social Corruption
In Numerato’s (2009) analysis of the macro-social aspect of sports corruption he identifies
that those that take part in such activities are often about a political, commercial or financial
outcome using the media as a catalyst, with little emphasis on influencing the sporting result.
Corruption at the highest level in the Olympic movement isn’t solely an IOC issue but also
affects National Olympic Committee’s; Numerato (2009) views on macro-social corruption
are supported with examples of public corruption in Italian sport governing bodies in 2006
(with reference to the Italian Olympic Committee). Numerato uses a combination of
academic literature and qualitative primary research including statements from athletes and
sports fans which provide a broader perspective of how sport corruption is viewed.

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MacAloon (2011) is critical of Juan Antonio de Samaranch’s actions as IOC president and
the IOC as an organisation by making suggestions there is much still much to be done;
including administrative reforms, financial transparency and barriers in the bidding process.
However he still acknowledges the ‘success’ of the Hodler rules and IOC ethics commission
and in previous work shows a romantic idealist view on the philosophy of the Olympic
movement (MacAloon, 1981). MacAloon’s initial criticism is supported by Lenskyj and
Wagg that condemn the leadership of the IOC:
“in a rigidly hierarchical organisation such as the IOC, leaders who fail to set high
ethical standards and whose public behaviour is characterised by hyperbole and
hypocrisy make it difficult, if not impossible for well-intentioned Olympic
administrators further down the ladder to bring about any positive changes”
(MacAloon, 2012:571).
The hierarchy of power and leadership in the IOC is an example of the sports corruption
culture cycle which has made international sport governance toxic. Numerato (2008, cited in
Numerato 2009 p.264) theorises this cycle;
“By portraying corruption as an acceptable form of social behaviour can reinforce a
systematic diffusion of corruption”.
This study could contradict Lenskyj and Wagg (2012) by viewing administrators in a lower
position of power are just as susceptible to corruption as those above.
In contrast to Lenskyj, Guttman (1994, p.172) praises Antonio Samaranch for his
contribution to the democratisation of the Olympic movement. It should be noted that
Guttman’s book was published in 1994 and doesn’t take into account the Salt Lake City
bidding scandal which is acknowledged by Lenskyj (2000, 2012) and other authors (Girginov
& Parry, 2005, Horne & Whannel, 2012).
2.3.2 Accountability and Transparency
Katwala (2000) identifies that greater transparency is one of major steps needed toward
modernising sport governance. Hamilton (2010, p.223) suggests that the IOC does not accept
accountability for allegations of corruption during the bidding process for the 1996 Summer
Olympic Games by stating that there is no acknowledgement by the IOC of any wrongdoing
in any public documentation to date.

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By not accepting responsibility for wrongdoing it has struggled to convince people outside
the IOC of its democratic governance and accept its Olympic ideology, in which doping has
been a catalyst in the mistrust from the general public, according to Horne and Whannel
(2012, p.163).
In research undertaken by Geeraert et al. into sports governing bodies’ accountability which
finds that 77% of the organisations in the study can be found in Switzerland (2013, p.18). A
suggested explanation for this is the lenient legal system which provides protection from both
internal and external examination and has low taxation regulations allowing organisations to
keep more revenue than they would in other countries. This contradicts the IOC’s stance on
self-governance in an external publication by the organisation ‘Basic Universal Principles of
Good Governance’ with a specific section on accountability and transparency (IOC, 2008).
Non-transparency and non-accountability ultimately promotes corruption (O’Higgins, 2006,
p.238).
Geeraert (2014) identifies key principles of good governance through international
institutions including United Nations Development Programme, European Commission,
World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the
International Monetary Fund; such as accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, predictability,
sound financial management, fighting corruption and transparency.
The IAAF may not appear as opaque to many but the IAAF has shown a façade of ignorance
when faced with the task of investigating and dealing with corruption not dissimilar in
management to the IOC which The son of the IAAF president, Papa Massata Diack asked for
$4.5m via bank transfer and a further payment of $440,000 in the build-up to Doha’s failed
bid to win the right to host the 2017 world championships. Despite these allegations Doha
successfully won the rights to host the 2019 event. Former athlete and IAAF Spanish
representative José Maria Odriozola commented on Doha’s success; “all they have is money.”
(Rowbottom, 2014). Lenskj & Wagg (2012, p.572) denotes the reason why unexpected host
selections are made by international sports organisations as giving the ‘developing world’ the
chance to host mega-events, when in fact power and money were influential.
2.3.3 Case study: 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympic bid
In 1994-1995 figure-heads in the SLOC were found to have bribed IOC members to vote for
Salt Lake City to host the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. A total of $2 million was paid by the

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SLOC in the form of travel, real estate, medical operations, cash payments, residency permits
and university tuition fees paid for children of some IOC delegates (Maenning, 2005, p.195).
Hosting an event the size of the Olympics brings potential benefits such as economic growth
and establishing national identity on the international community, therefore host city
candidates are willing to go to extreme lengths to secure the Games (Girginov & Parry,
2004). Horne & Whannel (2012) point out that there has been an underestimation of the costs
of mega-events like the Olympics and IAAF World Championships. The Hodler-rules were
adopted by the IOC in February 1994 to address the issue of financial cost for bidding cities,
not corruption in the bidding process according to the IOC ad hoc commission, which
Lenskyj is notably less than convinced about (1999, cited in Lenskyj, 2000).
In 1998 a number of commissions were made as a result of the Salt Lake Organising
Committee allegations by the IOC, the US Olympic Committee and Utah’s Board of Ethics.
The incidents were investigated by the Federal Beareau of Intelligence (FBI). The IOC
formed an ad hoc commission led by IOC Canadian member Richard Pound to investigate
and make recommendations. A week after the ad hoc commission was initiated, the SLOC
instructed its internal ethics board to investigate the bidding process which Lenskyj views as
‘toothless’ (2000, p.14). Lenskyj (2000) is a scathing critic of the IOC before and after the
Salt Lake City bidding scandal.
By taking a realist view of sporting bodies, of the IOC in particular, Lenskyj (2000) fails to
acknowledge the benefits of the delivering sport through globalisation processes for a more
liberal society, some of which are outlined by Horne & Whannel (2012, p.38); increased
involvement in physical activity, employment and civil engagement such as volunteering. A
neo-liberal perspective should be taken into account, like MacAloon’s speculative appraisal
of IOC successes (Jarvie, 2006).
Since the Salt Lake City allegations, what Girginov and Parry (2005) describe as the most
profound crises of the Olympic Movement in recent times, the IOC ethics commission was
established because of discrepancies around how National Organising Committees and
Olympic Committees treat IOC members with hospitality and gifts. Rules on this matter
were unclear prior to the 2000 reforms and questions into the legitimacy of an ethics
commission with ties in the IOC have been raised (Girginov & Parry, 2005, Horne &
Whannel, 2012).

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2.4 Athlete Commissions and Representation
Habermas notes the importance of athletes having a voice through the informal public sphere;
“The end goal of placing political pressure on bureaucrats and politicians with an
aim of bringing about policy change that reflects a more pronounced athlete-centered
sport system.”
(1996, p. 485, cited in Kihl, 2007, p.19)
Kihl et al. (2007, p.24) explains the importance of incorporating athlete’s views and
contributions to sport governance;
“Sport bureaucrats’ use of discretion in determining what is in the best interest of the
athletes does not always symbolize the principle of athlete-centred sport.”
2.4.1 IOC athletes’ commission
The IOC Athletes commission is an organisation that provides the opportunity for athletes to
influence decisions in how the IOC is run and bridges the relationship between active athletes
and IOC leadership. The commission’s agenda includes the Olympic candidate city
evaluation process, monitoring of the programme and organisation of the Olympics, the ‘IOC
athlete career programme’, supporting humanitarian schemes, addressing the environment,
and gender equality (IOC, 2014). The commission is made up of 12 elected athletes for an
eight year tenancy, of which seven athletes are appointed by the IOC president. Adam
Pengilly, former Olympic skeleton athlete is currently the only British member of the IOC
athletes’ commission (IOC, 2014).
3.4.2 IAAF Athletes’ commission
Thibault et al. (2010) outlines how athlete representation is used in athletics:
“The Athletes’ Commission was created in 1989. The commission is composed of 19
members who serve a four-year term. Of these members, seven are appointed by the
IAAF Council, and 12 members are athletes elected by their peers.”
(Thibault et al, 2010:284)
Thibault et al. (2010) includes an appraisal from former British Olympian, Sebastian Coe, on
Samaranch’s introduction of the IOC Athletes’ Commission. Coe has significant public

13
backing from the athletics community and competing athletes, including 400 metre world
champion Christine Ohuruogu (Guardian, 2015). But Coe’s intention to be in a high political
position in the IAAF and current power struggle to achieve IAAF presidency in 2015 after a
16 year reign could be influential in his support for political figureheads in hope that the
favour will be returned during the presidential election (Guardian, 2014, IAAF).
2.4.3 WADA athletes’ commission
WADA’s Athlete Commission was established in 2005 and is made up of 17 Olympic and
Paralympic athletes. The Commission sets out to represent the views and rights of athletes,
internationally bridging the gap between athletes and WADA, providing insight and oversight
of doping governance (WADA, 2010).
2.4.4 British Olympic Association athletes’ commission
Bill Sweeney, BOA chief executive, spoke about the role of the BOA athletes’ commission
"Since 2010, the Commission has been an integral part of the BOA in allowing us to
have the athletes' voice at the very heart of everything we do" (Etchells, 2014).
Goldie Sayers and Christian Malcolm are the only representatives of athletics on the BOA
athletes’ commission (BOA, n.d.).
2.4.5 Athlete Representation
Thibault et al. (2010) investigates the use of athlete representation through commissions in
individual federations. The article suggests that across the Olympic sporting spectrum, athlete
commissions/boards have been implemented which can help to improve the quality and
legitimacy of decisions. Habermas’s (1995, cited in Kihl, 2007 p.5) theory of discourse says
that equal consideration is justified by living under a particular policy in order for successful
democratic governance.
According to Girginov and Parry (2005 p.164) Olympic athletes possess ‘enormous symbolic
power’ and those in position of political power are aware of this. Houlihan (2004, pp.421-
422) contradicts Thibault et al. and Girginov and Parry’s views, arguing that
“athletes are safely quarantined from any significant decision-making opportunities”
(cited in Geeraert et al., 2014, p.20)

14
This is supported by Geeraert et al.’s research stating that only 11% of the sport governing
bodies included in the study granted athletes decision-making power. Thibault et al. (2010,
p.293) supports the inclusion of athletes in the decision making process in international sport
governance but questions the accountability and legitimacy around the appointment of
athletes to the IOC and other international federations in comparison to elected members of
athlete commissions.
Jarvie (2006) believes that shareholder owned/run organisations are arguably far more
accountable than international governing bodies such as the IOC, FIFA and UEFA,
supporting the idea that organisations with athletes involved in important decision making
positions are more transparent and accountable.
Athletes often feel devolved from governing bodies, exemplified by former nine-time
Olympic sprint and long-jump champion Carl Lewis who spoke at a Qatari sports conference,
displaying his disappointment at the World Championships being awarded to London
because of the IAAF’s ‘seedy’ selection process (Telegraph, 2011).
Kihl et al. (2007, p.11) suggests that administrators may often filter through athletes’
suggestions and implement policy without giving a justification for decisions made which can
cause isolation and disconnection from organisations they see themselves as the central
stakeholder.
Habermas’s (1996) solution to this is the deliberative democracy theory employing
communicative power to legitimising policies and decisions made; an example of this is Greg
Rutherford and Darren Campbell’s public criticism of global athletics after the widespread
Russian doping claims, and Robert Harting’s request to be removed from Athlete of the Year
shortlist because of the inclusion of Justin Gatlin, who has received two drugs bans in his
sprinting career (BBC, 2014, Mackay, 2014). Although Habermas (1995) recognises that
there can be obstacles for athletes using their communicative power, such as administrative
power being utilised by those that disagree at the top of sport governance (cited in Kihl et al,
2007 p.15).

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2.5 Athletics governance in the UK
2.5.1 UKA
UKA Athletics is the national governing body for athletics in Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. The governing body’s aim is to inspire the public by winning medals, increase
participation and stage successful athletics events (British Athletics, n.d.).
Grix (2009) tries to convey the clear decline in the sport of athletics in the UK despite being
the most heavily funded of the Olympic programme from UK Sport. Grix (2009) then
theorises the ‘modernisation’ of the governing bodies to accord with International
Organisations adoption of capitalist culture by making UK Athletics a lucrative financial
organisation.
Grix’s article (2009) is particularly critical of the grass-root system for being elitist and less
embracing and explains how the nurturing of solely podium-potential athletes isn’t the
solution, supported strongly with relevant examples from the Osaka 2007 World
Championships; Christine Ohuruogu’s 400 metre gold medal was celebrated by UK Athletics
despite receiving no funding. Clearly the author feels the hierarchical system is not a viable
long-term strategy that will benefit British athletics because of the marginalisation of
coaches, volunteers and athletes that aren’t supported by UK Sport or the national lottery.
An area which the author could have used to support his argument about grass-root athletics
and sustainable sport in the long term is the maintenance of athletics stadia; since the article
was written (2009) the Don Valley stadium in Sheffield has been demolished and there are
proposals to demolish Crystal Palace stadium in London. (Guardian, 2014).

16
2.5.2 British Anti-Doping
The UK’s national Anti-Doping Organisation is UKAD, and abides by the WADC. UKAD is
clearly committed to transparency and good governance through quarterly reports and
appropriate ISO accreditation (UKAD.org, 2015). UKAD has a number of initiatives to
encourage clean sport in Britain; including a portal for reporting doping and athlete
representatives for clean sport through the ‘100% me’ campaign (UKAD.org, 2015).
One noticeable difference between WADA and UKAD is UKAD’s commitment to greater
financial transparency easily accessible published quarterly finances (UKAD, 2015).
On the other hand UKAD were criticised in January 2015 after an investigation by Athletics
Weekly magazine suggesting drug-testing at British road-race events outside of IAAF-label
events is ‘virtually non-existent’, despite 1st place prizes worth up to £25,000 available on
two occasions. Multiple international athletes supporting this claim, including British
distance runners Alyson Dixon and Charlotte Purdue (Athletics Weekly, 2015). Although it is
clear that in the UK doping is comparatively lower to other nations; WADA have suggested
that doping in elite sport could be at around 8%. UKAD’s research into British elite sport
suggests the level of doping in the UK is between 1-2% but acknowledges it is likely to be
higher; at around 4-5% (Batt, 2011, p.264-265).

17
2.6 Chapter Summary
Academic literature on IOC is heavily critical of the organisation’s hierarchical structure and
recurring incidents around transparency and accountability. Reasons for these issues can be
put down to being a self-autonomous sporting institution which inhibits a culture of
corruption that has become a cycle. Without suitable regulation this vicious cycle is likely to
continue and become ‘normalised’, only fundamental change is the reform solution
(O’Higgins, 2006, p.239).
On the other hand, efforts to resolve issues in Athletics governance are becoming more
credible through WADA, the IOC ethics commission and athlete commissions. A recurring
theme among academics is that those in the highest positions of power in sport governance
are responsible for failings in international athletics organisations such as the IAAF and the
IOC (Lenskyj, 2012), but the organisations receive little recognition for progress because of
how the public see corruption and doping incidents in the media.
The introduction of athlete represented committees is a step forward in bridging the gap
between autonomic dictatorships and democratic governance to facilitate decision making in
the best interests of athletics, governed along with internal regulation and self-commitment to
good governance. The degree of decision-making power should be increased to address other
stakeholder interests outside of INGSO’s and their associated corporate sponsors (Thibault et
al, 2010). Although this challenges senior management of INGSO’s and many are not willing
to give up their position of power (O’Higgins, 2006).
It is clear that the amount of literature on the importance of athlete commissions in sports
governance in combatting corruption is minimal which highlights the importance of the work
of Thibault et al (2010), Kihl et al. (2007) and Geeraert et al. (2014).

18
3. METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research processes used to achieve the aims and
objectives of the study – see 1.2 objectives section or project proposal, appendix A. Included
is a brief explanation of the significance of the applied research process model in relation to
this study and how each stage is applied containing the data collection and analysis methods,
the research limitations and ethical issues posed by the research.
3.2 Research Process
The research process best suited to this study is by Saunders Lewis & Thornhill, illustrated in
figure 1 (2003). Other models were considered; Gill and Johnson (2002), Veal & Darcy
(2014) and Jankowicz (2005). Veal’s circular research process model was considered too
broad for the proposed project considering the researcher’s level of experience.
Most research models are multi-process including the following; clarifying the research topic,
reviewing literature, identifying/understanding research philosophy and approach, research
design, data collection, data analysis and writing up/presentation of findings. Saunders et al
(2012) was considered most clear and suitable with a systematic method.

19
Figure 1 – Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2012)

20
3.3 Clarifying the Research Topic
Formulating and clarifying the research topic, critically reviewing the literature and
understanding the study’s philosophy and approach were all performed in the project’s
proposal – see appendix A. The research topic is one that the researcher should be capable of
undertaking and one that excites them (Janowicz, 1995).
3.4 Conducting the Literature Review
Writing a literature review is a description and critical analysis of what other authors have
written (Jankowicz, 2000). The purpose of conducting a critical literature review is to
demonstrate awareness of the subject area and associated applicable theoretical and
conceptual framework for the rest of the study in relation to the study’s research questions
and objectives (Gill & Johnson, 2002).
Carrying out a critical review of literature allows the researcher to refine a focus, setting
conceptual boundaries. Gill and Johnson (2002) suggests identifying a broad area to work on
before focusing down to a manageable topic. For this study the broad area was corruption in
international athletics governing bodies and the focus topic was the importance of athlete
commissions for tackling corruption. By doing this it clarifies the justification for new
research (Gill & Johnson, 2002).
3.5 Research approach
“The researcher’s philosophy determines the way research is conducted.”
(Saunders et al, 2012, p.83).
This study will use the inductive approach theory; this is examining a particular aspect of
social life and derives theories from the data. The inductive approach is considered flexible
and is generally used in the social sciences; by first observing, secondly analysing and thirdly
explaining/theorising. Deductive approach is used primarily in scientific quantitative research
(Gill & Johnson, 2002 p. 40). Johnson (2004: 165, cited in Saunders et al, 2012, p.574)
defines induction as “the intensive examination of a strategically selected number of cases as
to empirically establish the causes of a specific phenomenon”.

21
Interpretivism is more applicable to induction and deduction is more applicable to positivism
(Jankowicz, 1995). Positivism aims to explain the cause and effect of human behaviour and
make conclusions from observation of social phenomena holistically. This does not reflect
individuals’ attitudes and responses which an interpretivist philosophy does (May, 2001,
p.10).
For this study the researcher adopted the interpretive philosophy. Veal states that the
interpretivism attempts to “get inside the mind of the subjects and see the world from their
point of view” (1992, p.31).
This study takes an interpretive phenomenological approach to the primary research to
understand and interpret athletes’ experiences in order to determine the meaning of the
experiences (Tuohy et al, 2013). The generalisations that positivist research makes were not
appropriate for how the data was interpreted. Interpretivism takes an empathetic viewpoint,
delving into the world of the participant in order to interpret their perspective of corruption in
athletics (Saunders et al, 2012, p. 137).
3.6 Data collection
3.6.1 Interviews
Finn et al (2000:75) defines an interview as: “An open, democratic, informal, free-flowing,
two-way process…”
Semi-structured interviews include specific questions but allow further probing for
participants to elaborate and clarify making interviews more flexible and can instigate deeper
into a topic area than structured interviewing. Structured interviews were not chosen for this
study because standardised working may inhibit responses despite increasing comparability
of responses (Finn et al, 2000). Furthermore, structured interviews impede the potential to
record the complexity of respondents’ attitudes (Marvasti, 2004).
Saunders et al (2012) identifies 7 areas requiring competence from the researcher during in-
depth semi-structured interviews:
 Opening the interview
 Using appropriate language
 Questioning
 Listening

22
 Testing and summarising understanding
 Behavioural cues
 Recording data
The interviews will be recorded on an audio-device. Recording the interview allows the
researcher to concentrate on listening to the recipient and follow with appropriate responses,
and then analyse the interview by re-listening. There is the possibility of technical problems
with an audio device but by saving the recording and duplicating it on to the researchers hard-
drive this problem should be avoided (Saunders et al, 2012, p.396).
Focus groups were not chosen for this study because one-to-one interviews allow the
researcher to immerse themselves in the individual athlete’s world and their personal
experiences rather than focus groups which can be influenced by participant’s personalities.
Focus groups are aimed at facilitating discussion rather than the research aim of recording
experiences along with discussion (Then et al, 2014). Focus groups can facilitate more
dominant respondents’ views over others, ultimately influencing the data (Marvasti, 2004).
On the other hand, focus groups can inhibit healthy debate addressing contrasting viewpoints
without needing to come to a consensus (Saunders et al, 2012, p.403).
In-depth interviewing was most applicable to this research because it “encourages mutual
self-disclosure in the context of an emotionally charged atmosphere where the interviewer
and interviewee freely express their views about an issue” (Douglas, 1985, cited in Marvasti,
2004:22). In comparison, in more structured approaches the researchers’ interests are
dominant, impeding respondents from expressing their views on a matter and therefore an in-
depth study. In this particular research into the topic of corruption and bribery, structured
approaches would refocus ‘off-topic remarks’ which could limit the amount of research
conducted because of the amount the participant knows on a topic (Morgan 2002:147, cited
in Marvasti, 2004, p.23).

23
3.7 Qualitative Research
Elias (1986:20) describes the aim of research “the aim is to make known something
previously unknown to human beings. It is to advance human knowledge to make it more
certain or better fitting… the aim is… discovery.” (cited in Veal, 2014, p.38)
Neither a qualitative nor quantitative is best; it is dependent on the initial research question.
(Jankowicz, 1995, p.174). Qualitative research methods are described as soft, flexible,
subjective, political, speculative and grounded (Halfpenny, 1979:799 cited in Silverman,
2001).
Silverman describes how qualitative methods are especially focused on how people observe
and describe their lives (2005:6). Qualitative research allows the researcher to view
observational behaviour whilst quantitative research may conceal social processes.
Qualitative research requires the researcher to adopt a holistic understanding of the topic and
take an empathetic stance in conducting the primary research (Miles & Huberman, 1994:6,
cited in Janowicz, 1994, p.173).
The researcher adopted qualitative research because it interprets social processes as a whole,
whilst quantitative research separates data into different variables (Marvasti, 2004). This
means that the researcher can provide a ‘deeper’ understanding of how athletes have come
into contact with the social phenomena of corruption in sports governance, than what would
have been obtained from purely quantitative data (Silverman, 2005, p.10).
3.7.2 Phenomenology
The purpose of phenomenology is to understand the way individuals perceive the world
around them incorporating their personal experiences (Murray & Holmes, 2014). It is crucial
for the researcher to accept empathy as part of the research without having a bias influence
(Saunders et al, 2012), Singleton et al. (1988:11, cited in Silverman, 2005, p.78) supports this
stance:
“Field research is essentially a matter of immersing oneself in a naturally occurring… set of
events in order to gain firsthand knowledge of the situation.”

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3.7.3 Sampling
The sample for this project is made up of five current or former international athletes that
have competed at either a major IAAF or WMRC major event. The sample size was chosen
to adhere to financial, time-based restraints without compromising the quality of the research,
and was most appropriate for a purposive sample and in-depth semi-structured interviews
(Silverman, 2005).
Sample athletes were contacted by the researcher and asked to take part voluntarily. Studying
a small sample of subjects is suggested when adopting the inductive approach (Saunders et al,
2012, p.119).
This study uses self-selection sampling and purposive sampling. Self-selection sampling was
chosen because of the emotional connection to the study’s objectives for the participants- see
objectives section 1.2 or project proposal – appendix A. Participants accepted to take part,
this would suggest an interest in the research topic if accepting which is one of the
characteristics of successful self-selection sampling (Saunders et al, 2012).
Purposive sampling was used because of international athletics recognition competing at an
IAAF or WMRA recognised event. Some participants may be more interested in the study
topic than others meaning they are better informed. Snowball sampling was not chosen
because of its uncertainty in making initial contact with the international athletics community
(Jankowicz, 2005).
3.7.4 Pilot Interview
The purpose of a pilot study is to resolve any doubts in the proposed questions to be asked in
the interviews by asking the questions intended to ask, in the same environment, using
member of the same sample for the main study (Jankowicz, 2005). The pilot test used one
participant that is a currently competing athlete.
The pilot test revealed that a topic area the researcher expected to come up without
suggestion did not. When asked a general question about corruption in sport, the researcher
expected the participants to raise the Salt Lake City scandal but they didn’t. This led to the
initial question being amended.

25
3.8 Data analysis
Analysis is defined as doing two things; the researcher familiarising themselves with the data
until recognising a pattern/patterns and tabulating the data in a way that the insights
recognised are informative (Jankowicz, 2005, p.190).
The interviews are transcribed after being audio-recorded, then categorised. This allows the
researcher to analyse and explore the data in-depth to;
1. Comprehend and manage them;
2. Integrate related data drawn from different transcripts and notes
3. Identify key themes or patterns from them for further exploration;
4. Develop and/or test theories based on these apparent patterns or relationships;
5. Draw and verify conclusions
(Dey, 1993, Miles & Huberman, 1994, cited in Saunders et al, 2012:479).
This study will use content analysis during the next chapter; specifically open coding which
incorporates the grounded theory previously mentioned in section 3.6 – research approach.
Open coding is the process of separating conceptual units and labelling similar units
(Saunders et al, 2012). This will be performed doing thematic coding (Veal, 2014, p.467). the
key for the thematic coding is located as appendix F.
3.9 Ethics & Access
Research ethics are the steps that must be taken to protect the dignity and safety of the
research participants and researcher, Payne and Payne define ethical practice as:
“…a moral stance that involves conducting research to achieve not just high professional
standards of technical procedure, but also respect and protection for the people actively
consenting to be studied” (2004:66).
Confidentiality and anonymity were specified agreements in the consent form – see Appendix
D for signed consent forms from all participants. Confidentiality and anonymity are
important concepts because revealing the identities of the respondents could result in

26
ramifications in the athlete’s careers with sports governing bodies or unwanted media
attention regarding their views (Marvasti, 2004).
The Leeds Beckett University ethics policy was abided by throughout the project – ethical
approvement is located in the appendicies – appendix E. To ensure participants are clear on
the research being conducted an information sheet was provided – see appendix B.
The Leeds Beckett University sports reception was the suggested location to host the
interviews because of convenience with training and the publicity for participant and
researcher safety; although participants were offered any location they felt most comfortable
within reason.
Once recorded the data will be transferred from a recording device and transcribed onto a
password encrypted hard-drive. Only the researcher and research supervisor will have access
to the data recorded.
The participants were accessed through the Leeds Beckett University athletics team and
coaching staff.
3.10 Research Limitations
Purposive sampling restricts the research in that the data collected may not reflect every ‘cell’
and the time-frame for the project is limited to a 6 month period, therefore restricts how much
data can be obtained (Silverman, 2005, p.130).
During the pilot study the researcher used a university athlete that has not competed
internationally due to time-scale and accessibility to international athletes during January,
some of which have altitude training during January and February months. The project would
require a longer time-frame and financial funding for incentive to use international athletes
willing to give a time commitment rather than using university athletes that will not have any
first-hand experience of corruption in international athletics.
3.11 Chapter Summary
This section identifies the structure Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill’s model (2012) gives to
the project. Qualitative methods; specifically semi-structured interviews are the most
appropriate devices in conducting this study into the significance of athlete commissions of

27
tackling corruption in international governing bodies. The data collected will then be
interpreted and analysed using coding.

28
4. DISCUSSION & FINDINGS
This section will discuss the findings from the five semi-structured interviews conducted. An
example of the transcribed interviews is located is located in the appendices – appendix G
and full interview are located in the attached plastic sheet.
4.2 Corruption & International Athletics Governance
When asked specifically about experiences and knowledge of corruption in the form of
bribery and financial payments to officials in athletics governance none of the athletes were
aware of any outside of the IOC or FIFA and presented muted responses requiring the
researcher to make questions less specific to corruption cases (like the Salt Lake City bidding
controversy) which would suggest the amount athletes are aware of corruption in athletics is
dependent on how much media exposure there is.
Another reason for recipients not offering a dynamic insight into the topic area is that they are
being interviewed because of their experience in the international athletic community and
their voluntary participation, not because they are experts in the field of sports corruption
meaning their knowledge in the topic area may be minimal, in general and/or in specific topic
areas. Age of the participants and duration in the international athletics community is a
limitation to the research.
It is clear that where athletes’ performances are not directly influenced by the implications of
corruption (such as bribery of senior officials) they have less first-hand experience or interest
in the topic, unlike an associated issue of corruption, such as doping has on the individual
performance of athletes.
This corresponds with Numerato’s (2009) literature that advocates financial corruption as
having little influence on the sporting result which would provide an explanation for most
interviewee’s responses about corruption lacking in overall knowledge and depth in
comparison to the discussion of doping because they aren’t directly affected. The British
athletes expressed their lack of faith in international governance and don’t see athletes as
having the capacity to influence radical change that they will experience the benefits, yet
those interviewed recognised athletes as valued stakeholders with a position of power within
athletics governance as a unified stakeholder group; without the athletes there would be no

29
event, “they are the one’s competing” as pointed out by participant C when discussing the
hosting of the 2019 World Championships.
The athlete’s disconnection and lack of interest with athletics governing bodies’ procedures
and policy is expressed by pessimistic acceptance that because there has been little change
over a long period of time in personnel and those that have internal political power (such as
organisation committee members) and external political power (such as corporate sponsors).
They see it as unlikely to happen in the near future, especially considering the length of
Lamine Diack’s IAAF presidency and the age of athletes meaning that it is more than likely
that athletes have experienced no substantial change in governance in their competitive
careers prior to implications of the 2002 Salt Lake City bidding fiasco.
Numerato (2009) identified the importance of leadership which coincides with athlete A’s
view that without change in leadership as a result of the formation of athlete commissions
little is being done apart from presenting a positive image for the international sports
organisations.
Similar to Chatzigianni (2006), Mason et al. (2006) MacAloon (2011) and Sugden &
Tomlinson’s (2012) perception that organisational change is only reactive to public and
media scrutiny to preserve the reputation of INGSO’s and the broadcasting and sponsorship
revenue, without addressing the issues the sport faces.
An organisation that is mistrusted and viewed by the public as unaccountable and opaque as a
result of doping scandals will most likely impact on, not only the popularity of the sport in
terms of spectatorship, but the amount of people participating in athletics (Horne & Whannel,
2012). Repercussions of lack of interest in athletics and loss of broadcasting revenue will be
less athletes coming through grass-root clubs and competing at international level.
One athlete mentioned a rumour from when they were competing (prior to their retirement)
linking commercialisation and the doping issues of the late 20th Century, supporting Jarvie
(2006);
“I’ve heard rumours about the 100m final in 1988 when Ben Johnson was caught
very famously, out of that race I heard 7 were all guilty of taking drugs and only Ben
Johnson got caught and the rumour was that he was caught because he was Canadian
and not American and the big sponsors were American so they went for the ‘soft
target’.”

30
If this allegation against the IOC, USOC and USADA were true it would undoubtedly
support Katwala (2000), Jarvie (2012) and Sugden & Tomlinson’s (2012) cynical view of the
IOC as an organisation more focused on the retention of economic revenue and appeasing
commercial partners, such as the TOP programme, over playing a positive role in society and
contributing to fair competition on the highest level since becoming a globalised product
(Owen, 2014).
One participant’s misinterpretation of a question on the commercial nature of organisations
was supportive of Numerato’s (2009) identification of the media as a catalyst for corruptive
activities. The enormity of INGSO’s like the IOC have the capacity to influence how athletics
is televised to portray themselves as moral organisations, dismissing allegations of lack of
transparency and accountability which lead to corruption (O’Higgins, 2006).
The participants understanding of the IAAF, WADA and the IOC is recognised in Lenskyj
and Wagg’s (2012) analysis of leaders in hierarchical organisations as stifling the progression
of fundamental positive change from ‘further down the ladder administrators’. This is
reflected by Numerato (2009) who theorises the social acceptance of systematic corruption in
sport governance that is filtered through all forms of the organisational hierarchy.
This ultimately has repercussions on athletics as a sport. For example, by awarding bidding
committees the rights to host an event because of inappropriate practice and ‘under the table’
financial payments bidding cities are less confident of winning hosting rights legitimately.
This discourages nations/cities to bid for athletics events and encourages nations to take part
in corrupt activities to secure major events like the Olympic Games and IAAF World
Championships. Girginov & Parry (2004) back this up by observing that candidate hosts are
willing to go to extreme lengths to secure the Olympic Games and other mega-events such as
the IAAF World Championships. Having fewer candidate cities/nations bidding for major
athletics events means the choice for the IAAF is limited, making the pressure lower on the
host to deliver a high quality event.
Participant A and E identified the relationship between finance and corruption. Respondent 5
noted capitalist culture as one of the driving factors in corruption which is supported by the
IOC’s introduction of an Olympic channel and its profitability from broadcasting rights.
When asked about the awarding of the 2019 World Championships host city respondent 5
stated “you can see how much money Doha has got, I think they have bought that bid and I

31
don’t think it’s hard to buy.” This supports José Maria Odriozola’s angry response to an
unclear bidding process and Lenskyj & Wagg’s (2012) view that power and money are
influential in bidding for sport mega-events.
Participant E also remarks that financial backing is an influential factor in major international
doping. This is supported by the widespread 2014 Russian doping scandal recognised by
every athlete interviewed as a serious threat to the sport, described by one athlete as “the
doping scandal of the last decade”.
The athletes knew very little about the Salt Lake City bribery allegations but maintained a
united stance in viewing financial transparency as an important element of good sport
governance, recognised by literature conducted after the emergence of the events of the Salt
Lake bidding process; Katwala (2000), Maennig (2005), Hamilton (2010), MacAloon (2011)
and Geeraert (2014).
Most athletes expressed that they were satisfied with the governance of British Athletics and
see it as leading the way in transparency and anti-doping governance; the 100% me
programme was identified by participant D (UKAD.org, 2015). Respondent A described the
relationship with other governing bodies as ‘shooting ourselves in the foot’ by abiding by the
policies and regulations set out by INGSO’s, as other nations don’t.
The data shows confidence in British Athletics holistically and the IAAF in the near future if
Seb Coe is elected as the next president prior to the Beijing World Championships in May
2015 (Telegraph, 2014). Respondent 4 commented on those in power in the future of
athletics:
“I think that it will have a dramatic effect in the short term perhaps people changing position
high in power, if those decisions are made correctly and are successful then the future of
athletics will be better”
Suggested solutions for tackling corruption include developing an independent ethics
commission from the IAAF, IOC and National Governing Bodies which supports Howden’s
view that sport requires a world sports integrity agency (Howden, 2013). This is supported by
Seb Coe’s views to create a truly independent body to regulate the IAAF’s governance of
athletics addressing issues of transparency and doping noted in chapter 2.

32
The only issue presented by the sample around British athletics governance was the
pressuring of athletes to centralise to Southern England to be coached by a GB coach in order
to retain national lottery funding, which the athlete described as “dodgy”. Grix (2009)
recognises the elitism in the British athletics system which leads to marginalisation of certain
athletes and coaches due to their region which doesn’t provide a fair and equal funding
system. An unfair system could lead to decline in high-performance athletes from areas
isolated from GB coaching centres catalysing the elitist “bubble”, as described by participant
E.
4.3. Doping
It is noticeable that the interviewed athletes see a correlation between sports corruption and
doping. One athlete identifies the that systematic doping programs require corrupt officials
from international governing bodies and national federations to ‘get away with’ doping,
giving the example of the Russian Athletics Federation bribing IAAF officials to facilitate the
alleged wide-scale Russian doping program (Independent, 2014). This emphasises the
importance of coordinating between INGSO’s and state government for good governance
(Katwala, 2000).
Although, how much the opinions of British athletes are influenced by the British media
against non-Western states (such as Russia, East Germany and Eastern European Nations,
referred to by one participant), national stigma and competitive patriotism of elite athletes is
open to debate.
Almost every athlete interviewed instigated conversation about performance enhancing drug
doping when asked about corruption in sport and had no reservations in expressing their
disapproval of athletes being caught for doping offences. This gratifies Chatzigianni’s (2006)
view that the role of WADA is merely a smokescreen for wide-spread doping in athletics in
the last decade which simply needed a German journalist to expose what entire organisation
was set out to do; identified by Wendt, and Sugden & Tomlinson (2012) as collaborating with
governments and other INGSO’s in a ‘comprehensive fight’ against doping.
A common theme in the data collection is a call for consistent doping testing for international
athletes across Olympic and World Championship level, particularly when the researcher
mentioned the lack of drug-testing facilities and governance in Kenya. It is clear that it would
not only make athletics a fair playing field but justify and rationalise what British athletes are

33
working towards without the inevitable paranoia that athletes from a nation that has a
reputation for systematic doping are taking performance-enhancing drugs.
2 athletes were asked about Germany’s decision to criminalise the use of performance-
enhancing drugs in competition; one athlete emphasised the importance of incorporating
legality and international sports law to make policies legally binding;
“I’d like to see lawyers involved more and sports law enforced, making things legally
binding. A lot of these governing bodies seem to be a law unto themselves.”
(participant A)
This view supports Howman’s (2013) call for government prosecution, without, it allows
doping sanctions to conform to the IOC’s autonomic governance by ruling as ‘the supreme
governing body of sport’ Wagner (2011).
One athlete stressed their frustration at athletes being caught after competing in their Olympic
final, sighting longer bans as being a solution to the doping culture in athletics. This was a
common theme in the data collected. By giving a harsher punishment it would present a more
substantial deterrent for athletes willing to dope because they would be jeopardising a longer
period of their athletic careers. The sample conclusively sees the ban lengths given out by
CAS and WADA in its current form as not being fit for practice because it allows athletes to
come back stronger which athlete A suggests; “…people are told to go away for 2 years and
have a baby or whatever. Athletes disappear for 2 years and suddenly they come back better
than ever, it leaves a nasty taste…” and another compares a drugs ban to ‘bad injury’;
“It’s quite common in athletics to be out for a year or two with an injury. You look at Justin
Gatlin, he’s not sorry for what he did, he’s had a couple of years out, failed tests twice and
now he’s back making lots of money on the diamond league circuit”.
(Participant E)
All respondents viewed the governance of anti-doping in the UK as successful and leading
the way with the amount of athletes being tested in spite of allegedly having no doping
control systems for IAAF label road races in the UK in January 2015.
Athlete E states that doping has “tainted the sport but I’ve grown up seeing doping as part of
the sport so I accept it’s there”. This view is reflective of an individual that sees it as an

34
embedded component of the sport. Although, this is not reflective of the entire sample; one
athlete summaries how catching those doping is beneficial for the future of the sport;
“At the moment it looks like things are getting worse because there’s so many athletes
are getting caught but actually that means that it’s actually getting better because the
World Anti-Doping Agency are catching more and more people and with the advance
in technology doping system and blood passport they’re actually able to prove that
more athletes are doping, so in time this reduces in the future the more people that
are caught”
(Participant B)
The general consensus is that those interviewed have faith in the sport of athletics to
overcome what is described as a ‘crisis’ for the sport by the current IAAF president Lamine
Diack (Guardian, 2015), despite one respondent commenting that they think doping will
always be a problem because of the ever changing drug masking agents available to athletes.
The researcher commented on the issue of the lack of drug-testing in Kenya and asked for
their opinions on the issue.
4.4 Athlete Representation & Athlete Commissions
When participants were asked about whether they were aware of any athlete commissions in
athletics and any implications of athlete representation, specifically the IOC athletes’
commission, WADA athletes’ commission, IAAF athletes’ commission or BOA athletes’
commission, the responses were extremely limited; some athletes not having heard of them
before.
The one former international athlete acknowledged that there may have been positive change
in athletes benefiting from an increase in prize money for competitions and getting less
popular athletic disciplines (such as the jumps and throws) into grand prix series events, but
nothing that would influence organisations change in sports governance.
Although, generally participants endorsed the concept of giving athlete commissions more
decision-making power being a solution to encompassing athletes as valued stakeholders,
concurring with Kihl et al. (2007) on athletes being essential to having an athlete-centred
sport system to combat corruption through accountable and transparent governance which

35
endorses Jarvie (2006) whom suggests shareholder run organisations facilitate financial
transparency and Habermas’ theory of discourse.
Despite this, participant A questions the current system whereby some members of the IOC
athlete’s commission and IAAF athlete’s commission are not credible themselves;
“A lot of athletes on athlete commissions are famous former athletes that may have
had a shady past themselves, so is that not ‘a poacher becoming a gamekeeper?’”
This supports Thibault et al.’s (2010) cynicism of elected athlete’s motives in international
athlete commissions such as the IOC athletes’ commissions and IAAF athletes’ commission.
The athlete continues, supporting Chatzigianni (2006), Mason et al. (2006) and Sugden &
Tomlinson’s (2012) viewpoint on how sports organisations operate. Athlete A addresses the
issues of INGSO’s reliance on protecting a favourable image to the public by suggesting that
athletes are made out to be given a position in democratic organisations when it is a façade in
keeping with the ethos of their governing bodies;
“…if you don’t actually get to do anything or change the leadership or change how
things are done, it just seems to be ‘lip service’ really.”
All exemplified by the following incidents in athletics governance; Salt Lake City bribery
scandal, allegedly for the London 2017 World Championships by Carl Lewis and Doha’s
questionably being awarded the 2019 World Championships against public opinion. A
solution to the issues of hosting rights is put forward by one of the participants; by letting
athletes decide where the Olympics should be held. Although it is an extreme suggestion,
athletes should be represented in where events are awarded rather than bureaucratic discretion
(Kihl et al., 2007).
(Participant E)
This is an extreme example but offers an insight into the enthusiasm and desire from athletes
to be involved in the decision-making process. It is clear that the views of the athletes
interviewed contradict Girginov and Parry (2005) who identifies Olympic athletes as
possessing ‘enormous symbolic power’.
Athlete D described the exclusionary and elitist nature of the international athletics
community as “the circle” which describes international athletics governing bodies and the

36
most successful athlete’s influential in the public eye, not necessarily the highest earners;
such as Robert Harting (BBC, 2014, Mackay, 2014).
“Yes the most successful, not necessarily the highest earners but those that if they’re
not happy the public will know they aren’t happy, but I myself feel like I could talk to
people and say what I would like to see done.”
(Participant D)
This demonstrates how Habermas’ (1996) deliberative democracy theory uses
communicative power and suggests that there is an informal existence of a hierarchy in the
“circle” of the Olympic movement and athletics community meaning the extent of athletes’
communicative power is limited to their success, popularity and athletic discipline (some
athletics disciplines are valued more than others by the public, media and athletes). This
“circle” or “bubble” leaves athletes devolved and isolated from the international athletics
community. Participant E supported this stance;
“For four years I had a card that said I was a part of the IOC passport scheme and you get a
few discounts here and there but you’re not a part of the bigger picture, you’re just a
number.”
(Participant E)
Moreover, participant D believes that they possess the skills to help benefit the sport but
doesn’t feel there is a platform to do that for the average athlete endorsing Kihl’s (2007) work
that suggests administrators filter athlete suggestions and contribution in order for a quick
process of policy implementation which creates this feeling of isolation and exclusion from
decision-making power where the athletes see themselves as a central stakeholder, which also
supports Houlihan (2004) and Geeraert’s research (2014).
The athletes views support Mason (2006) and Jarvie (2006) whom suggest shareholder run
organisations facilitate financial transparency. All athletes interviewed agreed that athlete
commissions would be beneficial but none of the respondents recognised any implemented
policies or change in the athletics circuit since competing internationally. Respondent 5
identified that they were aware of the election process for the BOC athlete commission
through an athlete running for a position but hadnot seen any results.

37
The findings support the work of Houlihan (2004) and Geeraert et al (2014) that athletes are
purposefully isolated from major decision-making which needs to be increased to encapsulate
a fair system of how world athletics in governed. This is confirmed in a statement by the only
athlete not currently competing;
“They have a voice and they can voice their concerns but I haven’t seen any massive changes
in policy or in how things are done as a result of athlete commissions”.
(participant A)
In terms of the IOC athletes’ commission this is unsurprising considering that there are only
12 athletes on the commission when there are 27 international sports federations partially
governed by the IOC, meaning not every sport has a representative.
Although, when one athlete was asked if they felt there is a platform to communicate with
their governing bodies to say what they would like to see changed their response was ‘no’
and that they believe the current system in the UK is fair. It is important to acknowledge
athletes have no responsibility to contest organisational issues of poor governance; their
athletic career is first and foremost the reason why they are in the international athletics
community, not because of experience in administrative and policy making.
Although, respondent 1 and 5 note the importance of major icons in athletics, supporting
Thibault et al. (2010) and Girginov and Parry’s (2005) studies that voice the political power
that athletes possess.
4.5 Additional Study Limitations
Despite the researcher emphasising the value of confidentiality prior to the research
conducted, athletes may have given restrained answers to questions in fear of insulting the
image of their retrospective governing bodies in fear of action being taken which may put
their athletic careers at risk.
The research sample is solely British athletes and does not address the views and experiences
of athletes from alternative nationalities. With the ideal financial backing and time-scale the
study would ideally look at several nationalities to validate the analysis of international
bodies and commissions.

38
The literature evaluated the benefits of athlete commissions does not focus specifically on
their use in Great Britain and only briefly on the sport of athletics and the IAAF.
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter has provided an in-depth discussion of the research findings contextualised by
applying secondary literature used in chapter two. The findings analysed will help formulate
comprehensive conclusions of the research as well as recommendations for industry and
further academic research.

39
5. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMENDATIONS
5.1 Chapter introduction
This study draws the following conclusions and recommendations for industry and academia
from the secondary research literature review and
5.2 Conclusions
Excluding doping activities, corruption is an issue that British athletes at international level
are only narrowly aware of. Their mistrust and feeling of isolation from the exclusionary
“circle” of the international athletics community is an issue that governing bodies have failed
to address. Athletes view themselves as important stakeholders in international athletics
governance and do not see themselves as represented in how the sport is governed by
INGSO’s including WADA, the IOC and the IAAF.
Using the informal public sphere to express the communicative power that athletes possess
could be the inspiration needed for increased transparency and accountability leading to the
exposure of corrupt activities within these organisations.
Where the result is not directly influenced by bad practice in athletics governance, generally
athletes are less knowledgeable and absorbed because they cannot empathise with sports
bureaucrats because they have seen the issues the sport faces as developing athletes and seen
little or no fundamental change in athletics governance, reflected by Lamine Diack’s reign as
IAAF president.
Athlete related decision-making responsibility is heavily weighted to sports bureaucrats and
requires organisational reformation of international athlete commissions to encompass
athletes as valued stakeholders.
Doping is viewed as a serious threat to the sport but the recent exposure of systematic doping
in Russia is demoralising and frustrates clean British athletes, but is seen as progression in the
‘fight against doping’ that WADA is supposedly working towards. Since the establishment of
WADA it is undeniable that anti-doping measures and anti-doping governance have
improved substantially but have a long way to go to tackle an issue so entangled in the sport.
The possibility of Sebastian Coe being IAAF president has given athletes confidence in how
the sport will be governed in the future.

40
Athlete commissions were established to break-down bureaucratic barriers restricting and
isolating central stakeholders of international athletics like athletes but it is clear that these
characteristics haven’t been eliminated, but reinforced through lack of influential decision-
making power and elitist ‘cherry picking’ of athletes that support the ethos of the organisation
and discarding critics by using the administrative power international sports governing bodies
such as the IOC and IAAF possess.
Athletes democratically elected to represent athlete’s interests and work towards the best
interests of the sport through athlete commissions are a route to developing transparent and
accountable international athletics governing bodies. These bodies would argue the success of
athlete commissions because of their desire to maintain a romantic idealist image of the
organisation despite autonomic governing.
5.3 Recommendations
5.3.1 Industry
The legitimacy of appointing members that are athlete’s to the IOC and IAAF alongside
elected members of athlete commissions needs to be clarified and illuminated to the public
and the athletics community.
Organisations must empower athletes as a valued stakeholder group through transparent
practices and developing the degree of decision making power in athlete commissions. This
will lead to personnel changes at the highest level of power in the hierarchical and corporate
INGSO’s.
The establishment of an independent ethics commission and independent doping body would
justify decision-making and policy implementation eradicating cynicism of corruption and
bribery being influential on decisions made by administrators and increasing athlete’s faith in
fair competition and reflecting positive social values.
Creating an athlete centred international sport system in the IOC, ‘the supreme sport’s
governing body’, to devolve to individual international sport federations like the IAAF
integrating executive committee members and athlete representatives. This can be
implemented by increasing the number of athletes in the IOC athletes’ commission and IAAF
athletes’ commission. IOC sessions should be conjoined with the IOC athletes’ commission
and the IAAF congresses conjoined with the IAAF athletes’ commission.

41
5.3.2 Academia
Research into corruption as a theological and philosophical practice in the Olympic
movement and guidance for good governance in INGSO’s is saturated; therefore research
into the implications of corruption in athletics would be appropriate. Future academic
research should investigate the power relations of stakeholder groups and how they can be
changed to achieve good governance in international athletics governing bodies. In particular
the extent of communicative power in context to the globalisation of athletics and
advancements in technology, like using twitter as a source of communication between
athletes and fans.
The area most identifiable of lacking in substantial academic research is how successful
athlete commissions are in the progression of international sport, particularly athletics.
The validity of the project could be strengthened by repeating the study but having
participants with specific criterion, such as athletes that have competed at IAAF and IOC
events for 4 years or more that still compete internationally and comparing the results with
former athletes that competed for 4 years or more at Olympic and World Championship
level. This would allow athletes that have had more experience of being a part of the elite
international athletics community and have a comprehensive understanding of how the IAAF,
IOC, BOC and British Athletics are governed. Their understanding of issues presented by
athletics governance would help give an insight of how athletes’ attitudes have changed as
the sport has developed since reformation of the IOC, the development of international
doping and societal changes.

42
6. APPENDICES
Appendix A: Project Proposal
Aim:
To critically analyse the extent of athletes influence on governance of international athletics
governing bodies and their knowledge around the topic of corruption exploring whether
international athletes are aware of their position of power in these organisations and the
implications of corruption on elite athletes.
Objectives:
Objectives of the study:
1. Investigate athlete’s views of corruption in international athletics governing bodies.
2. Investigate the implications of corruption on the sport of athletics, the athletes and sport
governance.
3. To explore allegations of corruption against international governing bodies using external
publications and contemporary academic literature to theorise and contextualise my research.
4. Explore British athletes’ experiences of corruption & associated issues since competing
internationally and the implications they have had in a wider context.
5. Analyse the importance of athlete commissions to good governance in international
athletics governing bodies.
Context
Corruption of the bidding process in the IOC has been an open secret for a long time
(Lenskyj, 2000). Since commercialisation and unlocking of economic potential of the
Olympics at the Los Angeles 1984 Games, television rights, sponsorship programmes, and
the attraction of hosting an event claimed to deliver the world’s largest-ever television
audience have sustained the IOC though corruption, the performance-enhancing drugs saga
and economic volatility (Tomlinson, 2012).
The emergence of corruption and bribery in the public eye came in the early 1990’s following
the 2002 Salt Lake City bid which began to ‘damage the reputation’ of the organisation. The
IOC have subsequently engaged in public relations companies such as hill and Kowlton who
were known for their influence on the US public about opinions on the Gulf War (Roche,
1999 & Starkman, 1999, cited in Lenskyj, 2000 p. 23) and ‘spin doctors’ to manage the
Olympic image and the media, Horne & Whannel (2012) compares political parties to
international sports organisations and international federations. The research is to find out
whether athletes have succumbed to the ‘Olympic family’ image, relinquishing personal
queries into the validity and credibility of the IOC.
Payne (2005, cited in Horne & Whannel, 2012 p.44) describes the introduction of self-
regulation in the IOC as the ‘Olympic Turnaround’, in which they changed the rules (also

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