About Us: UltraSpectra is a full-service online company dedicated to providing the services of internet marketing and IT solutions to professionals and businesses looking to fully leverage the internet. http://www.ultraspectra.com http://www.ultraspectra.net Join Our Network: facebook.com/ultraspectra twitter.com/ultraspectra youtube.com/user/ultraspecra

1. Arms control and Disarmament

2. Definitional Issues
• What is arms control?
• How is this different from Disarmament?
• Does one lead to another?
• Normative versus practical dimensions.
• What causes arms control?
• Is disarmament feasible?

3. Defining Arms Control
• Any agreement among states to regulate some
aspects of their military capability or potential. The
agreement may apply to the location, amount,
readiness, and types of military forces, weapons and
facilities
• Arms control is an alternative approach to achieving
international security through military strategies or
‘peace through manipulation of force’

4. Definition…
• Participants jointly regulate their abilities to threaten
each other and to drive a bargaining advantage in
their context. So, an arms control agreement allows
states to retain their relative ability to bargain, but at
the same time, reducing the cost of sustaining these
abilities

5. Arms Control Defined
• Jaffrey Larsen: “AC can be defined as any agreement
among states to regulate some aspect of their
military capability or potential. The agreement may
apply to the location, amount, readiness, and types
of military forces, weapons and facilities…all AC
presuppose some form of cooperation or joint
action among the participants regarding their
military programs.”

6. Further Defining Arms Control
• 1961 - Thomas Schelling & Morton Halprin:
“Adjustments in military postures and doctrines that
induce reciprocal adjustments by a potential
opponent can be of mutual benefit if they reduce the
danger of a war that neither side wants, or contains its
violence, or otherwise serve the security of the
nation.

7. Arms Control
In its general conception, arms control is any type of
restraint on the use of arms, any form of military
cooperation between adversaries. Arms control can be
implicit or explicit, formal or informal, and unilateral,
bilateral, or multilateral. It is a process of jointly
managing the weapons-acquisition processes of the
participant states in the hope of reducing the risk of war…
Arms control [refers] to formal agreements imposing
significant restrictions or limitations on the weapons or security
policies of the signatories.
7

8. Disarmament
Disarmament rests on a fundamentally different
philosophical premise than arms control. It envisions the
drastic reduction or elimination of all weapons, looking
toward the eradication of war itself. Disarmament is based
on the notion that if there were no more weapons there
would be no more war. This is a compelling proposition,
with enough truth to give it a very long life in the history
to popular impression, it is not necessarily abut reducing
arms levels.
8

9. Arms control and disarmament
Arms control attempts to stabilize the status quo and
to manage conflict, to force. Although many visceral
opponents would be shocked at the thought, arms
control is fundamentally a conservative enterprise.
Disarmament, by contrast, is a radical one.
Disarmament seeks to overturn the status quo; arms
control works to perpetuate it.
9

10. Major Arms Control Agreement
Agreement Signed by Provision Year
Geneva Protocol 100+ Bans use of chemical weapons 1925
Antarctic Treaty Partial 12 Prohibits all military activity in Antarctic area 1959
Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty 131 Prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere In 1963
outer space, and under water
Outer Space Treaty 127 Prohibits all military activity in outer space, 1967
Including on the moon and other celestial
Bodies
Treaty of Tlatelolco 35 Prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America 1967
Nuclear Nonproliferation 191 Prohibits acquisition of nuclear weapons by Non- 1968
Treaty nuclear nations
Seabed Arms Control 92 Bans placing nuclear weapons in o under the 1971
seabed
Biological Weapons 80+ Ban the possession and use of biological 1972
Convention weapons
10

11. Agreement Signed by Provision Year
Strategic Arms Limitation 2 Provides for freeze on aggregate number of 1972
Treat (SALT 1) fixed, Land-based ICBMs and SLBMs
ABM Treaty 2 Limits deployment of antiballistic missile systems 1972
Two sites in each country. Reduced to one
site by 1974 agreement
Threshold Test Ban 2 Limits U.S. and USSR underground tests to 150 1974
kt
SALT II 2 Limited the number and types of USSR and 1979
USA. Strategic weapons
South Pacific Nuclear Free- 13 Prohibits the manufacture or acquisition of 1985
Zone nuclear Weapons in the region
Intermediate Range Nuclear 2 Eliminates all U.S. and Soviet missiles with 1987
Forces (INF) ranges Between 500 km and 5500 km
Missile Technology Regime 25 Limits transfer of missiles or missile technology 1987
Conventional Armed Forces 30 Sets limits on NATO and WARSAW Pact tanks, 1990
in Europe Other armored vehicles, artillery, combat,
helicopters And air craft
11

12. Major Arms Control
Agreements
Agreement Signatories Provisions Year
CTBT Over 180 Bans nuclear Tests, 1996
Allows sub-critical
tests

13. Arms control treaties
 Washington Naval Treaty, 1922 (as part of the naval conferences)
 Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological weapons, 1925 and
its two augmentations:
 Biological Weapons Convention, 1972
 Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993
 Outer Space Treaty, 1967
 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968
 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1972

14. Arms control treaties
 Environmental Modification Convention, 1976
 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1987
 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR ), 1987
 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1992
 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I ), 1994
 Wassenaar Arrangement, 1996

15. Arms control treaties
 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 1996
 Open Skies Treaty, 2002
• Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty ( SORT), 2003
• START Three (2010)

16. Arms Control – The Cold War Days
• Theory developed as an adjunct to national security
from 1958 – 62
• Instead of disarmament it emphasized enhancement
of cooperative security arrangements
• Numerous institutional mechanisms
• Problems of trust
• Problems of verification

17. Cold War Days…
• The driver of arms control agreements was
the shared perception regarding the fear of a
nuclear war between the two powers.
• Arms control seen as a prime means of
restraining strategic arms race, especially
restraining the use of certain types of
technologies that exacerbated the threat of
war
• The objective was also to reduce the cost of
war,
• And reduce the damage of a war did occur

18. Arms Control Explained
• According to Thomas Schelling and Morton
Halprin:
“We believe that arms control is a promising, but
still only dimly perceived, enlargement of the
scope of our military strategy. It rests
essentially on the recognition that our military
relations with potential enemies is not one of
pure conflict and opposition, but involves
strong elements of mutual interest in the
avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in
minimizing the costs and risks of the arms
competition, and in curtailing the scope and
violence of war in the event it occurs.”

19. It achieves…
• Reduces possibility of war
• Reduces political and economic costs
• Minimizes the scope and violence of war
• So it primarily depends on cooperation of some level
between adversaries

20. The Purpose of Arms Control
• It is a means to an end which is enhancing
security, especially security against nuclear
weapons
• The three underlying principles of arms
control are:
– It is a means to an end – national security
– States have a common interest in avoiding
nuclear war
– Arms control and military strategy should work
together to promote national security
(deployment of weapons or an adverse tactical
maneuver)

21. Objectives of Arms Control
• Should be in broad harmony with national security
strategy
• Arms control theory was developed during the Cold
War to deal with the questions of:
– What deters?
– How much is enough?
– What if deterrence fails?

22. Methodology
• Institutional mechanisms involving a certain
understanding regarding force buildup, strategic
deployment, etc
• Improve strategic signaling
• Build channels of communication
• Increase exchange of information

23. Institutions
• Alliance or agreements - INCSEA, SALT or Indus Water
Treaty
• Potential tools but remain on the sidelines of
statecraft (Track-II, III…)
• Change preference over outcomes
 Institutions are important because they have the
potential of generating powerful impact on the
policymaking process e.g. Anglo-French Entente 1904
 Institutional mechanisms create enduring patterns of
shared expectation of behavior that gradually receive
some degree of formal assent – INCSEA or Indus
Water Treaty

24. Institutional Mechanisms – Another
View
• Institutions will not have any substantial impact
because, as Charles Glaser Points out:
“Institutions are the product of the same factors – states
interests and the constraints imposed by the system
that influence whether should cooperate”

25. Issues with Arms Control
• Additional information cannot change the strategic
choices
• There is also the issue of trust
• The concept will not work because relations between
states are driven by their interest in enhancing their
power
• Prisoner’s dilemma

26. Prisoner’s Dilemma
• Choices made by two players between two possible
outcomes
• Hedley Bull’s perspective - players do not act in total
ignorance of each other’s choices and no one can
count on having the last word. Hence, a pessimistic
outcome could be avoided and a condition of
conditional cooperation can be maintained which is
termed as an equilibrium outcome

27. Arms Control in South Asia
• There is a need for institutionalizing arms control
arrangement because:
– Nuclear weapons
– Conventional buildup
– Existing disputes
– Endemic mistrust – a generational change that would
undermine peace
– Countries pursing independent trajectories of socio-
political and military development

28. Present Situation
• Technological expansion
• Asymmetrical balance
• No arms control arrangement
• CBMS only

29. Existing CBMs
Communication Measures
• Hotline between DGMOs since Dec 1971.
• After Brasstacks IV tensions and 1990 US
alarm, DGMO hotline activated weekly.
• Telephone links between sector
commanders on LoC

30. Communication Measures
• Hotlines between PMs:
• Installed in 1989 by Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv
Gandhi.
• In November 1990, re-established by Chandra
Shekhar and Nawaz Sharif to facilitate direct
communication.
• In May 1997, I. K. Gujral and Sharif pledged to
reinstate the hotline.

31. Existing CBMs
Notification Measures
• Agreement on Prior Notification of Military Exercises, 1991:
– 10,000 or more troops.
– No manoeuvres towards IB.
– Exercises at Corps-level minimum 45 km and
Division-level minimum 25 km from IB. No
Division exercise near LoC.
– No military activity within five km of IB.

32. Existing CBMs
Border Security Measures
• Karachi Agreement, 1949: no deployment less than
500 yards from CFL (now LoC). (Observed more in
breach!)
• Indo-Pakistani Agreement on Border Disputes in the
West, 1960.
• Rann of Kutch Tribunal Award after 1965 War. (Left
out Sir Creek dispute.)

33. Existing CBMs
Border Security Measures
• Agreement on Prevention of Violation of Airspace, August 1992:
– Armed fixed-wing aircraft not to fly within 10 nautical miles of IB.
– Armed helicopters not permitted within one NM.
– No aircraft within 1,000 metres.
• Often breached: Atlantique incident; RPVs; helicopters shot down at
Siachen.

34. Existing CBMs
Transparency Measures
• MAs/DAs being invited as
observers for major exercises:
– Zarb-e-Momin in 1989.
– Several Indian exercises.
• DGMO clarifications –
Brasstacks, 1990, Kargil 1999,
ongoing.

35. Existing CBMs
Declarations
• Joint Declaration on Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons.
Track II Measures
• Neemrana initiative.
• Admiral Ramdas’ forum.

36. Breakdown Since 1989 -90

37. Breakdown of CBMs
• Flag meetings on LoC stopped. Fraternisation has
fizzled out.
• Tele links between sector commanders non-existent.
• Deployment on/across LoC, particularly since Kargil
conflict.
• Frequent RPV flights and air space violations.
• Reduced humanitarian cooperation.

38. Breakdown of CBMs
• Flag meetings on LoC stopped. Fraternisation has
fizzled out.
• Tele links between sector commanders non-existent.
• Deployment on/across LoC, particularly since Kargil
conflict.
• Frequent RPV flights and air space violations.
• Reduced humanitarian cooperation.

39. Potential CBMs
• Demilitarisation of Siachen (?):
– Permanent Ceasefire.
– Demarcation of AGPL on ground and map.
– Joint verification agreement.
– Redeployment to mutually agreed positions.
– Agreement to resolve dispute.

40. Potential CBMs
• Verification: Joint
patrolling of LoC to
counter infiltration (?).
• Reduction in Indian
troops deployed in
Kashmir (?)

41. Potential CBMs
• Ferry service between Mumbai
and Karachi
• Security of Oil and Gas pipelines
• Maritime disaster management
• Joint search and rescue at sea
• Protection of fishermen

42. Arms Control in South Asia
• Cycle of conventional and non-conventional
technology proliferation
• Various CBMs that have the potential of
gradually moving towards an arms control
agreement
• Prisoner’s dilemma in the region
• Increasing the cost of the adversary is part of
the calculus
• Varied threat perceptions
• Varied political cultures

43. Potential Arms Control
Measures
• Mutual troop reduction/disarmament (?)
• Notification of mobilisation (?)
• Exchange of data (Detailing existing military holdings, planned
purchases, military personnel and budgets can clarify a state’s current and
projected military capabilities and provide advance notice of destabilising
arms build-up. Data exchanges can take place bilaterally or multilaterally)
• Ground-based electronic sensor systems (Manned or unmanned, these
can verify compliance to agreed restrictions on equipment deployment or
troop movements)
• Incidents at Sea Agreement (first proposed at Lahore, 1999)

44. Some Questions
• Is it possible to build institutional
mechanisms for arms control in the region?
• What will deter either sides from a surprise
attack or destabilizing the military-strategic
balance?
• What will be the institutional guarantees to
ensure that the parties will not shirk from
honoring their commitment?
• What kind of asymmetrical military balance
will ensure deterrence in the region?

45. VERIFICATION MEASURES
• Designed to collect data or provide first hand access in order to confirm
or verify a state's compliance with a particular treaty or agreement.
• Aerial inspections Monitor compliance with force deployment
limitations in restricted zones, confirm data exchanges on the
disposition of military forces, provide early warning of potentially
destabilising activities.
• Ground-based electronic sensor systems (Manned or unmanned) Verify
states' compliance to agreed restrictions on equipment deployment or
troop movements.
• On-site inspections Challenge and routine; help verify that states are
complying with agreements. Inspections may be carried out by third
parties, opposing parties, or jointly.

46. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
at a Glance
May 2003
46

47. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which
entered into force in March 1970, seeks to inhibit the
spread of nuclear weapons. Its 188 states-parties are
classified in two categories: nuclear-weapon states
(NWS)—consisting of the United States, Russia, China,
France, and the United Kingdom—and non-nuclear-
weapon states (NNWS). Under the treaty, the five NWS
commit to pursue general and complete disarmament,
while the NNWS agree to forgo developing or acquiring
nuclear weapons.
47

48. Select Treaty Articles
Under Articles I and II of the treaty, the NWS agree not to help NNWS
develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and the NNWS permanently
forswear the pursuit of such weapons. To verify these commitments
and ensure that nuclear materials are not being diverted for weapons
purposes, Article III tasks the International Atomic Energy Agency with
the inspection of the non-nuclear-weapon states' nuclear facilities. In
addition, Article III establishes safeguards for the transfer of fissionable
materials between NWS and NNWS.
48

49. Article IV acknowledges the "inalienable right" of NNWS to research,
develops, and uses nuclear energy for non-weapons purposes. It also supports
the "fullest possible exchange" of such nuclear-related information and
technology between NWS and NNWS. Article V, now effectively obsolete,
permits NNWS access to NWS research and development on the benefits of
nuclear explosions conducted for peaceful purposes. As the perceived utility
of peaceful nuclear explosions has diminished over time, the relevance of this
clause has lost much of its practical value. It is now moot due to the
restriction on all nuclear explosions mandated by the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty—to which all five NWS are signatories.

50. Article VI commits the NWS to "pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control." Acknowledging the necessity of intermediate steps in the
process of nuclear disarmament, Article VII allows for the
establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones.
50

51. Article VIII requires a complex and lengthy process to amend
the treaty, effectively blocking any changes absent clear
consensus. Article X establishes the terms by which a state may
withdraw from the treaty, requiring three month's advance
notice should "extraordinary events" jeopardize its supreme
national interests.
The remainder of the treaty deals with its administration,
providing for a review conference every five years and a
decision after 25 years on whether the treaty should be
extended. The 1995 review conference extended the treaty
indefinitely and enhanced the review process by mandating
that the five-year review conferences review past
implementation and address ways to strengthen the treaty.
51

52. With its near-universal membership, the NPT has the widest
adherence of any arms control agreement, with only India, Israel, and
Pakistan remaining outside the treaty. In order to accede to the treaty,
these states must do so as NNWS, since the treaty restricts NWS
status to nations that "manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon
or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.“
For India, Israel, and Pakistan, all known to possess or suspected of
having nuclear weapons, joining the treaty as NNWS would require
that they dismantle their nuclear weapons and place their nuclear
materials under international safeguards. South Africa followed this
path to accession in 1991.
52

53. Thirteen Practical Steps to Implement Article VI
Obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
The following are the thirteen practical steps to implement
Article VI obligations. The program of action was adopted by
the State parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference.
The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for
the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article
VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on
"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament":
53

54. 1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications,
without delay and without conditions and in accordance with
constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other
nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
54

55. 3.The necessity of negotiations in the
Conference on Disarmament on a non-
discriminatory, multilateral and
internationally and effectively verifiable
treaty banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices in accordance with
the statement of the Special Coordinator in
1995 and the mandate contained therein,
taking into consideration both nuclear
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation
objectives. The Conference on Disarmament
is urged to agree on a programme of work
which includes the immediate
commencement of negotiations on such a
treaty with a view to their conclusion within
five years.
55

56. 4.
The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an
appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear
disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a
programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a
body.
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear
and other related arms control and reduction measures.
56

57. 6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish
the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear
disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the
conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and
strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of
strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
57

58. 8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral
Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way
that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of
undiminished security for all:
 Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals
unilaterally;
 Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the
nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant
to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further
progress on nuclear disarmament;
58

59.  The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral
initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament
process;
 Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear
weapons
systems;
 A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that
these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total
elimination;
 The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the
process
leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
59

60. 10.
Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon
as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as
no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or
other relevant international verification and
arrangements for the disposition of such material for
peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains
permanently outside military programmes.
11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of
States in the disarmament process is general and complete
disarmament under effective international control.
60

61. 12.
Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened
review process for the Non- Proliferation Treaty, by all
States parties on the implementation of article VI and
paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament",
and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice of 8 July 1996.
13. The further development of the verification capabilities
that will be required to provide assurance of compliance
with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement
and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
61

62. START I at a Glance
January 2002
START I was signed July 31, 1991, by the United States and the Soviet Union. Five months
later, the Soviet Union dissolved, leaving four independent states in possession of
strategic nuclear weapons: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. On May 23, 1992,
the United States and the four nuclear-capable successor states to the Soviet Union
signed the "Lisbon Protocol," which makes all five nations party to the START I
agreement. START I entered into force December 5, 1994, when the five treaty parties
exchanged instruments of ratification in Budapest. All treaty parties met the agreement's
December 5, 2001 implementation deadline.

63. Basic Terms:
1,600 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers for each side.
6,000 "accountable" warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, of which
no more than 4,900 may be on ICBMs and SLBMs, 1,540 on heavy missiles (the
Soviet SS-18), and 1,100 on mobile ICBMs.
Ballistic missile throw-weight (lifting power) is limited to 3,600 metric tons on
each side.

64. Counting Rules:
Heavy bombers equipped only with bombs or short-range attack missiles (SRAMs)
are counted as carrying one warhead each.
U.S. heavy bombers may carry no more than 20 long-range air-launched cruise
missiles (ALCMs) each. The first 150 of these bombers count as carrying only 10
ALCMs each.
Soviet heavy bombers may carry no more than 16 ALCMs each. The first 180 of these
bombers count as carrying only eight ALCMs each.
No more than 1,250 warheads may be "downloaded" (removed from) and not
counted on existing multiple-warhead ballistic missiles.

65. Other Provisions:
START I runs for 15 years with an option to extend for successive five-year periods.
Based on commitments made at the March 1997 Helsinki Summit, the sides agreed in
principle to negotiate an agreement making the START treaties unlimited in duration.
Separate "politically binding" agreements limit sea-launched cruise missiles with
ranges above 600 kilometers to 880 for each side and the Soviet Backfire bomber to
500.

66. START II and Its Extension Protocol at a Glance
January 2003
Russia announced on June 14, 2002, that it would no longer be bound by its START II
commitments, ending almost a decade of U.S.-Russian efforts to bring the 1993 treaty
into force. Moscow's statement came a day after the United States withdrew from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and a few weeks after the two countries concluded a
new nuclear arms accord on May 24. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT),
which requires the United States and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to
1,700-2,200 warheads apiece by December 31, 2012, effectively superseded START II's
requirement for each country to deploy no more than 3,000-3,500 warheads by
December 2007. Yet other key START II provisions, such as the prohibition against
deploying multiple independently target able reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), were not addressed in the SORT agreement.

67. START II's ratification process began after U.S. President George H. W. Bush and
Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the agreement on January 3, 1993. The
United States ratified the original START II agreement in January 1996, but never
ratified a 1997 protocol extending the treaty's implementation deadline or the
concurrently negotiated ABM Treaty succession, demarcation, and confidence-
building agreements. On May 4, 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the
resolution of ratification for START II, its extension protocol, and the 1997 ABM-
related agreements. Russia's ratification legislation made exchange of START II's
instruments of ratification (required to bring it into force) contingent on U.S.
approval of the extension protocol and the ABM agreements; Congress never voted
to ratify the entire package.

68. Basic Terms:
 Deployment of no more than 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads on
ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers
by December 31, 2007.
 "Deactivation" of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles slated for
elimination under the treaty by removing their nuclear reentry vehicles
(warheads), or taking other jointly-agreed steps, by December 31, 2003.

69. Additional Limits:
 No multiple warheads (MIRVs) on ICBMs.
 All SS-18 "heavy" Russian ICBMs must be destroyed.
 No more than 1,700 to 1,750 warheads may be deployed on SLBMs.
 Reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, as well as de-MIRVing ICBMs,
may be achieved by "downloading" (removing) warheads from missiles.
Once removed, warheads may not be restored to downloaded missiles.

70. The START III Framework at a Glance
January 2003

71. With the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), it appears
unlikely that a START III agreement will be negotiated. President George W. Bush
and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed SORT on May 24, 2002. The treaty
calls for each country to deploy no more than 1,700-2,200 strategic warheads,
effectively matching the limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads proposed for START III.
SORT does not, however, address strategic nuclear warhead destruction or
tactical nuclear weapons limits, both ground-breaking arms control measures
that were suggested for inclusion in START III.

72. START III's Origins:
 During their March 1997 summit meeting in Helsinki, U.S. President Bill Clinton
and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed on a framework for START III
negotiations. At the Moscow Summit in September 1998, Clinton and Yeltsin
reiterated their commitment to begin formal negotiations on START III as soon as
Russia ratified START II.

73. Basic Elements:
 By December 31, 2007, coterminous with START II, the United States and Russia would
each deploy no more than 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads on
intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy
bombers. Russian officials stated that they were willing to consider negotiated levels as
low as 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads within the context of a START III agreement.
 The United States and Russia would negotiate measures relating to the transparency of
strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear
warheads, as well as other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures to
promote the irreversibility of deep reductions.
 The United States and Russia would resolve issues related to the goal of making the
current START treaties unlimited in duration.2

74. Resolution 1540

75. • Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
• 1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form
of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop,
acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery;

76. • Decides also that all States, in accordance with their
national procedures, shall adopt and enforce
appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-
State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess,
develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical
or biological weapons and their means of delivery,
in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as
attempts to engage in any of the foregoing
activities, participate in them as an accomplice,
assist or finance them;

77. • . Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective
measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and
their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate
controls over related materials and to this end shall:

78. • Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in
accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation
and consistent with international law, to take cooperative
action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related
materials;

79. • Every day, millions of men, women and children are living in
fear of armed violence. Every minute, one of them is killed.
There are 640 million weapons in circulation globally and 8
million more are produced every year along with 16 billion
bullets. Small arms are produced by 1,249 companies in

80. Ban Ki- Moon’s five point
proposal
• All states to negotiate an international nuclear weapons
convention, backed by a strong system of verification;
• The U.N. Security Council to discuss security assurances
with non-nuclear states;
• The international community to pursue institutionalization
of nuclear treaties, including the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty;
• Nuclear states to be more transparent about the sizes of
their arsenals, stocks of fissile material and specific
disarmament achievements;
• All states to pursue complementary materials, including the
elimination of other types of WMD.

81. What did he say…
• "The United States will take concrete steps toward a world
without nuclear weapons,"
• Committed himself to reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
• Bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force.
• And seeking tough penalties for countries that broke the rules
on non-proliferation.

82. What did he say….
• If the nuclear threat from Iran were eliminated,
this would remove the driving force for building
anti-missile defenses.
• As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will
go forward with the missile system," Obama
said.
• "If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have
a stronger basis for security, and the driving
force for missile construction in Europe will be
removed."

83. What is behind the Obama
doctrine
• More is worse not better: "Even with the Cold War now over,
the spread of nuclear weapons or the theft of nuclear material
could lead to the extermination of any city on the planet,“

84. Basic assumptions
• Nuclear weapons have become more trouble than
they are worth, an expensive luxury for superpowers
and a threat for the rest of the world.
• The size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals inspires
nuclear starter-states such as China to add to their
stockpiles and give non-nuclear states a reason to join
the club.
• Getting serious about eliminating nuclear weapons
makes the United States more credible when it argues
that states such as Iran should not be able to build
their own arsenals.

85. Why the initiative
• Responding to call for a nuclear free world made by Former
secretaries of state Kissinger and Schultz and two others, former
Defense Secretary William Perry and former Sen. Sam Nunn in a
joint newspaper article.
• Ashton B Carter, Obama’s nominee as the Pentagon's chief
weapons acquisition official, has warned of dangers of
“catastrophic terrorism” facing the United States.
• Obama has hired a coterie of advisers and aides with extensive
arms control and nonproliferation pedigrees.

86. Feasibility of the proposal
• We have been there before – 1986 Reagan proposal for
ground zero – for example.
• Is the US willing to lead by example?
• Can he get other’s – the remaining 4 P’s, India, Israel and
Pakistan on board.
• Will US be the last to eradicate nukes?
• What will happen to the nuclear labs and the
infrastructure?
• What will happen to nuclear knowledge?
• What about security guarantees?

87. Feasibility of the proposal
• Is the world ready for a nuclear weapon free world?
• How do we address the security concerns of weak states?
• How do we reverse the proliferation dynamic?
• Who will punish the violator of the global norm against having
nuclear weapons?

88. WMD and Prospects for AC in
Globalized World
Nuclear Chemical Biological Cyberspace
Number of P5 plus 3--- 100s 100s 10,000 plus
participants
R and D Limits ABM Treaty, CTBT No testing Testing limits None
Production/storage Declarations, Limits Ban Ban None
Deployment Launcher Limits None None None
Testing Warhead Limits Ban Ban None
Use Legal 1993 ban 1972 ban Criminal law
Barriers to entry High Moderate Low Very low
Offense Dominant Limited Dominant Dynamic
Defense Very Difficult Dominant Difficult Dynamic
Verification Relatively easy Difficult More Difficult Very difficult
Dual Purpose Low High High Very low
Role of NSA Low Moderate High Very high

89. Connect With Us
ULTRASPECTRA OPEN Academy
Facebook.com/Ultraspectra Facebook.com/openacademy.isb
Twitter.com/Ultraspectra Twitter.com/openacademyisb
YouTube.com/user/ultraspectra YouTube.com/user/openacademy
LinkedIn.com/in/Ultraspectra LinkedIn.com/in/openacademy
Forum.ultraspectra.com